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LORD JOHN RUSSELL

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

E. Russell

THE LIFE

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

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BY

SPENCER WALPOLE

AUTHOR OF 'A HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM 1815'

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With Two Portraits

IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. II.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
XVIII.	PANIC AND PARSIMONY	1
XIX.	FOREIGN POLICY	31
XX.	THE CONSEQUENCES OF 1848	64
XXI.	IN PARLIAMENT AND AT HOME	90
XXII.	THE FALL OF THE WHIGS	116
XXIII.	DISRUPTION AND COALITION	143
XXIV.	THE CAUSES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR	176
XXV.	THE FALL OF LORD ABERDEEN	211
XXVI.	THE VIENNA CONFERENCE	241
XXVII.	OUT OF OFFICE	270
XXVIII.	ITALY FOR THE ITALIANS	310
XXIX.	THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR	338
XXX.	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	368
XXXI.	PRIME MINISTER AGAIN	399
XXXII.	CLOSING YEARS	418
	EPILOGUE	455
	INDEX	473

LIFE

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

CHAPTER XVIII.

PANIC AND PARSIMONY.

In forming an Administration in the summer of 1846, Lord John did not encounter the difficulty, which frustrated his efforts in the previous December, arising from the hostility to Lord Palmerston both at home and abroad. Lord Palmerston, however, had hardly resumed his seat in his old office when the storm was renewed in its former fury. A long negotiation had taken place during the preceding years between the Courts and Governments of France and England in reference to the marriage of the young Queen of Spain and her sister the Infanta. It was virtually arranged that a husband for the Queen should be selected from among the descendants of Philip V., and that, when the Queen was married and had issue, her sister's hand should be given to a younger son of Louis Philippe, the Duc de Montpensier. This arrangement did not satisfy the ambition of the Queen's mother; she was on bad terms with the sons of Don Francis, the only available descendants of Philip V., and she decided on boldly offering her daughter's hand to Leopold of Saxe Coburg, who, as brother of the King of Portugal, nephew to the King of Belgium, and cousin to Prince Albert, was allied with reigning families of influence. Mr. Bulwer, the British Minister at the Court of Madrid, incurred Lord Aberdeen's censure by conniving at and approving this offer. Disavowed by England and opposed by France, the proposal came to nothing;

and, when the change of Government took place in England in June 1846, the negotiation for the disposal of the hand of the Queen of Spain was not concluded.

On July 19, a few days after his return to the Foreign Office, Lord Palmerston wrote a despatch to Mr. Bulwer enumerating the available candidates for the Queen of Spain's hand—among whom he included Prince Leopold—and adding that her Majesty's Government only wished the choice to fall on the one most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen and the welfare of the Spanish people. He went on to denounce arbitrary government in Spain, and to intimate a hope that no time would be lost in returning to the ways of the constitution and to obedience to the law. It has perhaps never been noticed that this famous despatch was dated on a Sunday. Lord John received it just as he was going to church.

I read it over in a hurry ; it did not strike me at the moment that there was anything objectionable in it, and I sent it back. If I had not gone to church, and paid more attention to it, it would not have gone.[1]

On the following morning Lord Palmerston handed a copy of the despatch to M. Jarnac, the French chargé d'affaires in London, who at once transmitted it to Paris. Louis Philippe, angry beyond control at finding the Prince of Coburg's name among the recognised candidates for the Queen's hand, considered, with some reason, that the English were departing from their engagement, and that he was consequently liberated from his own. Instead, therefore, of postponing the Montpensier marriage till the Queen of Spain had children, he decided to press forward the marriages of Queen and Infanta simultaneously. And it so happened that Lord Palmerston's despatch, while rousing his anger, furnished him with the means of procuring his revenge. For, while the first part of it was unpalatable to France, the second part was likely to be equally intolerable to Spain. Knowing this, Louis Philippe forwarded a copy of the document to the Queen-mother, and urged her to save herself from British interference by leaning on

[1] This is said by Mr. Greville on Lord John's own authority (*Memoirs*, 2nd series, iii. 298).

France. The event showed that he rightly understood Queen Christina's character. A return to the ways of the constitution seemed to her to indicate the threat of a new revolution. She at once decided to withdraw her objection to her elder daughter's marriage with the Duke of Cadiz, and to celebrate the two marriages together and as soon as possible.

The usual excuse urged in Lord Palmerston's behalf is that, in naming Prince Leopold as one of the candidates for the Queen's hand, he stated a fact without enunciating a policy. The excuse is impossible to any one who has compared Lord Palmerston's private correspondence with his public despatches; because, while publicly he was only mentioning the Prince as a possible candidate, in private he was expressing his preference for him, and a desire to stop the Montpensier marriage altogether. And Lord John's private papers confirm this view. For on the 11th of August, before the effects of the despatch of the 19th of July were known, Lord Palmerston forwarded to Lord John a public despatch and a private letter from Mr. Bulwer, and added—

> The whole of the despatch, with the exception of one single passage, goes strongly to show that Prince Leopold ought to accept the Queen's hand, upon the condition that the Infanta shall not marry afterwards a French Prince; and it would seem from Bulwer's despatch that such a condition would be agreed to by Christina, Rianzares, and Isturitz, who at present have the whole of such questions under their control.

Thus Mr. Bulwer and Lord Palmerston were playing for the marriage which Louis Philippe disliked, and plotting against the marriage which Louis Philippe desired. Thus, too, Lord John's presence at church on the 19th of July enabled Lord Palmerston to play a trump card, which influenced the whole game.

At the beginning of September the Cabinet learned the full consequences of this fatal policy; and, on the 14th of that month, it authorised Lord Palmerston to express its deep regret and extreme surprise at the alleged decision of the Spanish Government to celebrate simultaneously the two marriages. The Cabinet at which this note was agreed upon

was held at The Grove (Lord Clarendon's), and there was some difference of opinion whether any remonstrance should be drawn up or not. One member who was present understood that it was ultimately

decided to say no more, and to leave the Spaniards to marry as they pleased, taking credit to ourselves for non-interference. Instead of this a strong remonstrance is presented at Madrid. Now, don't suppose that I object to the remonstrance: I do not think that I should have done it myself, but I am not prepared to say that it is wrong. But the course adopted by the Foreign Office is more hostile than that which you concurred in at The Grove . . . There is the more or less hostile course: the less is one five of us preferred, the more comes from P[almerston].[1]

Under these circumstances, four days after the date of this remonstrance, Mr. Wood wrote a long letter to Lord John—

to impress upon you the necessity of taking more into your own hands the direction of the *detailed steps* of foreign matters with France. I am afraid, not only from what you said to me yourself, but from what I have heard from others, that, in our two months of office, a state of hostile feeling between the Ministers of the two countries has been created. They certainly have behaved very ill. But I confess that I have a misgiving that we are not free from blame; and this not so much in overt acts done by us as a Government, as by the mode and manner of what has been done and not done. . . . Therefore and for these reasons I press upon you to look to these things yourself. I see no other remedy. The Cabinet cannot interfere, for the mischief is done before we hear of anything; and a Cabinet is too cumbersome a machine for such work. Nobody can do it but yourself: and it is no easy matter, I am well aware, for you. . . . In our conversation on foreign matters I mentioned to you how much Lord Grey directed the course of the Foreign Office, and even then he had no little trouble in appeasing the irritation in the minds of the Foreign Ministers which Palmerston somehow or another had caused. I quite admit the truth of your observation that it is much more difficult for you than for him to do [so]. Nevertheless, nobody but you can do anything, and it seems to me to be essential to the Government that it should be done.

[1] Mr. Wood to Lord John Russell, September 18, 1846.

Lord John hardly needed this advice. From the first formation of his Government he exerted his direct control in every department ;[1] and this control was so effectual that Lord Clarendon believed and declared that Lord 'Palmerston's independent action in the Foreign Office has received a complete and final check.'[2] But, while he endeavoured to maintain a sufficient control, and while he certainly disapproved some of his colleague's actions and regretted some of his phrases, he gave him the loyal support which all great men accord to those from whom they expect loyal service. With some indiscretion, the French Government carried to the Prime Minister their complaints against the Foreign Secretary. Here is Lord John's reply :—

Wimbledon : October 26, 1846.

My dear Count Jarnac,—I received when I was at Hatfield the letters you were so good as to write to me, enclosing one from M. Guizot to yourself. I thought it right, especially as you had offered to send it through Lord Palmerston, to give him an opportunity of reading a letter in which he was mentioned in terms so unreserved.

To commence, however, with the general discussion into which M. Guizot enters, I must, in the first place, declare that I can by no means agree to the statement that the French Government have done nothing but what they had announced beforehand.

Those, who were conversant with the state of the negotiations before the present Ministers came into office, received the announcement of the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier with the heiress of the crown of Spain with surprise and indignation ; so little were they prepared for that event by the declaration of February.[3] The public of Europe will, as I believe, participate in those feelings, which are common to all English statesmen acquainted with those transactions.

With respect to myself, allow me to say that I came into office convinced that a cordial understanding with France was beneficial to

[1] X. said, 'Lord John was well disposed to interfere in foreign affairs, and indeed as a Prime Minister ought in every department' (Greville, 2nd series, ii. 410). Lord John's correspondence with his colleagues shows very clearly how close a supervision he exercised over all the offices.

[2] Greville, 2nd series, ii. 423.

[3] In February 1846 M. Guizot had directed the French Minister in London to read a memorandum to Lord Aberdeen, in which he had declared that, in the event of a Bourbon marriage being impracticable, France would consider herself free from her engagements and would demand the hand either of the Queen or of her sister for the Duc de Montpensier.

both nations, and conducive to the peace of the world. I was convinced that M. Guizot shared that sentiment; but, while I am still convinced of the benefits to be derived from an intimate friendship between England and France, I can no longer believe that M. Guizot attaches any value to that friendship.

I cannot believe it because, M. Guizot having received from you a confidential communication of a despatch to Mr. Bulwer—not intended for the perusal of the Spanish Ministers—that despatch was transmitted to Madrid, and employed, no doubt by M. Guizot's directions, to exasperate the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain against the English Government.

How is it possible to act with frankness and confidence towards persons who thus take advantage of frankness, and misuse the confidence reposed in them?

I cannot believe it because the resolution of the Queen's Government in London not to adopt or promote the marriage of Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg with the Queen of Spain—a resolution taken in deference to the declared policy of the King of the French—was used at Madrid for the purpose of hastening the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier with the presumptive heiress of the Spanish crown. How is it possible to act in friendly conformity to the views of France, at the risk of alienating other Governments, if such acts are to be the very weapons employed to do that which is most injurious to British interests, and most offensive to British feelings?

So much as to the past. But M. Guizot seems to apprehend a revengeful conduct on the part of England for the future. Let him be reassured. Nothing that has occurred will induce us to forget what is due to the interests of Spain, to the just claims of France, to the peace of the world. I should be very sorry to see a civil war recommence in Spain, and I have already signified to those whose ardour might induce them to favour outbreaks, that England neither wished for, nor will encourage, insurrections.

The Government of France has, however, likewise a duty to perform. When M. Guizot announced the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier, he told Lord Normanby that the Infanta would become a French princess, and that the Duke of Montpensier would not become a Spanish prince. In a memorandum, which you yourself showed me, it was stated that France would not interfere in the internal affairs of Spain. M. Guizot, in his despatch in answer to Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Normanby, states that France will respect the internal affairs of Spain.

If these declarations are adhered to with good faith, and in the

face of temporary difficulties, Spain may be free, prosperous, and independent.

But, if the ordinances of Charles X. are taken as the model for Spanish administration, and if obedience is to be enforced by the threat that what France had done by the pen she will maintain by the sword, the people of Madrid may resist, as the people of Paris resisted, with less provocation, in the month of July 1830, the suppression of the constitution and the violation of the freedom of the press. In such a case it will not be possible for M. Guizot to throw upon others the responsibility of fearful consequences. Lord Palmerston was disposed (as well as his colleagues) to act in concert with France, and by our joint advice to help in restoring the broken liberties, and establishing the permanent tranquillity of Spain.

M. Guizot has chosen to break the links of good faith and friendly correspondence by which these great objects might have been effected. He may endeavour to attain the same objects on his side; Lord Palmerston and I may attempt to promote them on ours. Cordial co-operation in Spain is no longer possible.

I cannot but notice, though I will do so very shortly, M. Guizot's accusation against Lord Palmerston. In my opinion he has conducted himself with the greatest moderation and calm reflection throughout this painful transaction. I have the greatest reliance on his sagacious perception of the true interests of his country, and I have the truest satisfaction in constant co-operation with him upon all our foreign relations.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord John's vigorous language was the more generous, because Lord Palmerston had lately forwarded to Mr. Bulwer a protest, which he had directed him to present to the Spanish Government, containing a passage which Lord John had not merely not approved, but to which he had distinctly objected.[1] In the following February Lord Palmerston took a still more unjustifiable step. He informed the French Ambassador in

[1] The passage in question is, 'The undersigned is now instructed to declare, on behalf of the British Government, that the issue of such [the Montpensier] marriage would be held by Great Britain to be disabled by the stipulations of treaties and by the public law of Europe from succeeding in any case to the Spanish throne' (*Correspondence relating to the Marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain*, p. 29). For Lord John's objections, see Greville, pt. ii. vol. iii. p. 121. But Lord John himself said (writing to Lord Lansdowne, *vide infra*, p. 45), 'The despatch to Bulwer concerning the Montpensier marriage was sent to Madrid two days before I saw it, and against the opinion I had expressed to Palmerston.'

London, that unless Lord Normanby, who had an unfortunate quarrel with M. Guizot, received an immediate and satisfactory reparation, the intercourse between the two countries would cease. Lord John only accidentally heard of this communication. He was fortunately in time to stop its transmission to Paris, and to insist on Lord Normanby being told to pursue a more moderate course in future.[1]

In the meanwhile two other matters were occupying the attention of the Foreign Office. Encouraged by the difference between France and England, the three Northern powers ventured on an act of autocracy and suppressed the little republic of Cracow, whose existence was guaranteed by the Treaties of Vienna. The suppression, which elicited a warm but ineffectual protest from this country, illustrated the growing difficulties which Lord John had to encounter from the presence of Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office. Prince Albert took a natural interest in the question, and invited an eminent literary man who is still alive to write a pamphlet upon it. This gentleman, before complying with his request, asked permission to consult Lord Palmerston, and the Prince replied that he did not see any necessity for his consulting the Foreign Secretary, though he had no objection to his consulting the Prime Minister.[2] This little incident shows the distrust of Lord Palmerston which the Court had already contracted. In the winter of 1846–7 a new difficulty arose in Southern Europe, on which the Queen and Prince both felt strongly. The young Queen of Portugal had passed much of her childhood with the Queen of England; she was by marriage nearly connected with Prince Albert; her husband was unfortunately unpopular; and, at the end of 1846, Oporto, the second city in the kingdom, and the adjacent provinces, rebelled against her authority. The revolt created great alarm in Lisbon; and the Duc de Saldanha, the only capable military man in Portugal, by a forcible *coup d'état*, dismissed the Ministry and placed himself at the head of the Government. However much this arbitrary proceed-

[1] Greville, pt. ii. vol. iii. p. 62.

[2] The story is partly told by Mr. Greville in *Memoirs*, iii. 14. I have Mr. Reeve's authority for the version in the text.

ing may have tended to preserve order at Lisbon, it furnished the insurgents at Oporto with a new excuse for revolt. The insurrection spread; the partisans of Dom Miguel joined the insurgents, and a war of parties became a war of dynasties.[1] Powerless to suppress the revolt, the Queen of Portugal appealed to the nations which had signed the treaty of 1834 to intervene in her favour, and the English Court desired to give her material assistance. Lord John took the matter into his own hands, and drew up a memorandum, which he enclosed in the following note to Lord Palmerston:—

March 29, 1847.

My dear Palmerston,—The Queen is very anxious for our intervention. I have drawn up the enclosed sketch of what we might do. At all events, Moncorvo, Isturitz, and Ste. Aulaire[2] are entitled to an answer. We may mention the subject to-day, and bring it regularly before the Cabinet to-morrow. One of the main difficulties is that we cannot trust Saldanha, and the Queen has no other general. Yours,

J. R.

The memorandum was as follows:—

The French Government have received, as well as ourselves, a representation from the Minister of Portugal, urging the fulfilment of the Quadruple Treaty by forcible interference on the part of England, France, and Spain, against the Junta of Oporto.

The French Government admit the justice of this representation, and ask us to communicate our opinion to them.

The Quadruple Treaty in its terms and purport, as the preamble shows, was a temporary treaty, applied first for the purpose of driving Don Carlos and Dom Miguel from Portugal, and afterwards, by a subsequent convention, for the purpose of subduing the Carlist insurrection in Spain. These objects having been accomplished, the Quadruple Treaty has received its literal fulfilment.

But it may be said that the spirit of the treaty may be invoked for the purpose of quelling Miguelite insurrection in Portugal and Carlist insurrection in Spain.

The Queen's Government have shown themselves ready to adopt this view of the case, and instructions in conformity with it were given to Mr. Bulwer very lately. But, in order to apply the spirit

[1] I am repeating language which I have used before (*History of England*, iv. 531).

[2] The Portuguese, Spanish, and French Ministers in London.

of a treaty which has expired, the circumstances must be similar, and the object to be attained the same with that of the fulfilled treaty.

The circumstances of Portugal do not resemble with any exactness those which gave rise to the Quadruple Treaty. Dom Miguel has no authority in Portugal, and there is no considerable body of men in arms to support his pretensions to the throne. There is, however, a lamentable civil war, and a serious danger.

The insurrection in Portugal may be said to have a double aspect. Under one aspect the Portuguese in arms against the Queen's authority may be said to have risen against a Court revolution ; to be acting in defence of the constitution of the country ; and to be driven to resistance by the arbitrary measures of the advisers of the Queen of Portugal. Under the second aspect they may be viewed as insulting and defying the Queen ; placing the Miguelite General at the head of their forces ; restoring all Miguelite officers to the rank of which they were deprived by the Convention of Evora ; and studiously refraining from any pledge by which Dom Miguel might be excluded if they should prove victorious. Sir Hamilton Seymour has dwelt on these circumstances in his despatch.

Under the first of these aspects the Junta of Oporto would not fall under the conditions of the Quadruple Treaty, nor be liable to British hostility according to the established policy of this country as laid down by Lord Castlereagh and succeeding Ministers to the present time. Under the second aspect, if it could be separated from the first, the Junta of Oporto may be the object of displeasure, and even of coercion by England and Spain.

But, in order to effect a separation of those who wish to defend the liberties of their country (as they view them) from those who wish to depose the Queen, it must be made clear that the Queen of Portugal has adopted every means to assure her subjects in arms against her that their fears are groundless. The offer of a complete amnesty ; a promise to abide by the constitution, and to convoke the Cortes within (six) months, together with the nomination of moderate men as Ministers, might effect this object. And, if all fair offers were obstinately refused, a case might be made out for introducing Spanish troops in the North of Portugal, and defending Lisbon by British marines.

But at present the course taken is the reverse of that which is here indicated. No terms with rebels ; no Cortes to be assembled ; violent partisans to be placed in the Ministry ;—such it is understood are the conditions imposed on the Queen in the most imperious language by the Marshal Saldanha.

But the despotism of Marshal Saldanha is not an object so dear to Great Britain that the English navy should be employed to support it.

Whatever may be hereafter the case, therefore, and however much her Majesty's Ministers may lament the disorder and impending ruin of Portugal, there is at present no case for interference either by the letter or the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty.[1]

The Cabinet met at the end of March and considered this excellent memorandum. Guided by the advice which it contained, they decided on advising the Queen of Portugal to grant a full and general amnesty, to revoke all the decrees issued since the *coup d'état*, to convene the Cortes at the earliest possible opportunity, and to compose a Ministry of moderate men; and, thus creating the conditions which Lord John had enumerated as essential, call out the northern rebels to return to their allegiance. If the Junta should yield on these conditions, the Cabinet declared that Great Britain would see that they were fulfilled with good faith. If, on the contrary, they were refused by the Junta, 'the British Government would concert with the Governments of France and of Spain the best means of affording effectual assistance to the Queen of Portugal.'[2]

The advisers of Donna Maria with some reluctance and after some hesitation assented to these terms. The insurgents at Oporto refused to comply with them; and the

[1] During the discussion on the affairs of Portugal an incident occurred which ought perhaps to be mentioned. Lord Palmerston, upon the advice of the Queen's Advocate, directed Sir H. Seymour to claim an indemnity of 100*l.* from the Portuguese Government for a Mr. Croft illegally imprisoned at Lisbon. Sir H. Seymour, in a despatch of April 3, 1847, demurred to this policy, stating his reasons against it, and these reasons Lord Palmerston thought bad and insufficient. He accordingly drafted a despatch directing Sir H. Seymour to carry out his orders. This despatch was sent to the Queen, who in the meanwhile had read Sir H. Seymour's letter, and had stated, in a pencil memorandum, that his conduct should be approved. Lord Palmerston, writing to Lord John on April 19, 1847, asked him to ascertain whether the Queen had read his draft despatch before she had written her memorandum, as in that case, since he could not take upon himself the responsibility of approving Sir H. Seymour's conduct, there was nothing left for him but humbly to request her Majesty to accept his resignation.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers relating to Portugal*, p. 239. The student would do well to compare the despatch and Lord John's Memorandum with Lord Palmerston's Memorandum in his Life by Mr. Ashley, ii. 20.

Government accordingly proceeded, in concert with France and Spain, to draw up an agreement [1] for forcibly terminating the insurrection. This decision very nearly brought Lord John's Government to an abrupt conclusion. Conservatives and Radicals, opposed to one another on most matters, were agreed in condemning the Portuguese policy of the Administration. Lord Stanley in one House, Mr. Hume in the other, proposed motions censuring its conduct; and Lord John made up his mind, if he were defeated, to retire from office.

But the debates were destined to have a very different result. Mr. Hume overstated his case by declaring that the Whig Government of Lord Grey had been formed on the principle of non-intervention. Whatever merit or demerit may attach to Whig foreign policy, there can be no doubt that no Foreign Minister has ever displayed more desire to interfere than the Whig Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston; and Lord John, who spoke early in the debate, had no difficulty in showing that intervention in the affairs of other countries had been practised not only by Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, but by Mr. Canning and Lord Grey. As the debate proceeded, the critics of the Government on both sides of the House saw to their dismay that their chances of victory were decreasing; and on the third night, when most of the Ministers had temporarily repaired to the House of Lords to listen to Lord Stanley, Lord George Bentinck managed to get the House of Commons counted out. This ridiculous termination of the onslaught in one House led indirectly to its abrupt ending in the other. Lord John let it be understood that, though he would have submitted to defeat in the Lords if he had been backed by a majority in the Commons, he could not tolerate a reverse in one House untempered by the approval of the other. This hint settled the question. The Peers, willing enough to give Lord Stanley a triumph, were not willing to provoke a Ministerial crisis. Lord Stanley's motion was brought to a sudden conclusion, and the Government found itself in a majority of nineteen.

One good result indirectly ensued from the controversy respecting Portugal. France and England, bitterly estranged

[1] *Parliamentary Papers relating to Portugal*, p. 362.

in 1846 on the subject of the Spanish marriages, were again drawn together, or at any rate found it possible to act with one another for a common object. But this concurrence of opinion did not at once terminate their mutual jealousy. Many people in France thought that England could not be trusted to pursue an honourable course on any subject which affected French interests; many sober-minded English citizens believed that the French were meditating the invasion and conquest of England.

The acrimonious feelings which unfortunately thus prevailed had been originally fanned into heat by Lord Palmerston's policy in 1840; and, though Lord Aberdeen's career at the Foreign Office from 1841 to 1846 had done much to cool the flame, on at least two occasions during this period questions had been raised which under other guidance might have led to war. The first of these was on the affair of Tahiti; the second grew out of the appointment of the Prince de Joinville, one of Louis Philippe's sons, and the author of a very warlike pamphlet, to the command of a French fleet on the coast of Morocco. It is not generally known, but there is the highest authority for saying, that there was a difference of opinion in Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet on our relations with France in the autumn of 1845: that Lord Aberdeen, perceiving that the Prime Minister's opinion of France had undergone an entire change, proposed that he should retire; and that, though Sir Robert Peel refused his proffered resignation, he declared that the French King and the French Ministers were so beset by the clamour of the French press that he could place no confidence in the ability of either of them to act on their own pacific and friendly inclinations.

It would have been hardly possible for a Prime Minister who expressed such an opinion to have avoided considering what means were available for the defence of England in the case of war. During the first four years of Sir R. Peel's Government, the Duke of Wellington had constantly drawn attention to the necessity for fresh defences; but Sir Robert, engrossed in questions of commercial policy, had paid little or no attention to the Duke's wishes. On September 10, 1845, the Duke reverted to the matter in a more formidable memorandum.

Prefacing his argument by a reference to the critical condition of our relations with the United States—and by avowing his belief that a difference with France would bring the States, and a difference with the States, France, into the field against us—he carefully enumerated the various places on the south coast of England on which an enemy might land, and suggested the arrangements which should be made to make such landing difficult. Sir Robert Peel was at last alarmed by the Duke's opinions, and contemplated introducing some measures of defence; and so earnest was he in the opinion, that on his resignation in 1845 he undertook to support Lord John not merely on any measure of Free Trade, but also on any measure which might be adopted for the defence of the country.

On resuming office at the close of 1845, Sir Robert Peel did not find it possible to carry out the policy which he had offered Lord John Russell to support. Parliament, occupied with protracted debates on corn and coercion, had no leisure for considering questions of defence, and during the session of 1846 nothing was heard of the probabilities of invasion. At the close of the session the Duke of Wellington went over the whole southern coast of England, personally examining its capabilities both for invasion and defence; and, annotating his memorandum of 1845 with the results of his inspection, he forwarded a copy of it, thus enlarged, to Lord John Russell. On August 12 he supplemented the memorandum with another, in which he urged, in addition to other precautions, the formation of a militia force.

It is a remarkable circumstance, which Mr. Greville has mentioned,[1] that the Duke of Wellington was on much better terms with Lord John than with Sir Robert Peel. Lord John wrote to the Duke constantly; he consulted him on various subjects; and he perhaps never lost the impression which he had contracted when he had ridden as a mere boy with the Duke, in the hour of his trial, along the lines of Torres Vedras, or dined with him as a young man, in the hour of his triumph, on the slopes of La Rune. He was therefore almost instinctively disposed to attend to the Duke's

[1] Part ii. vol. ii. p. 433.

recommendations. And another of his colleagues was prepared to go even further. In opposition Lord Palmerston had blamed Sir Robert Peel for neglecting the defences, and had used the epigrammatic phrase that steamers had bridged the Channel. In office he could not help perceiving that his own despatches had embittered the relations between France and England, and had added to the reasons for defensive measures. On November 6, 1846, he wrote a letter to Lord John on the subject of the Duke's memorandum. Defences both by sea and land were, he argued, excellent things in their way. But behind the fleet, the first line of defence, and the land batteries, the second line which the Duke proposed to erect, it was necessary to have an increased force, and Lord Palmerston strongly urged the formation of a militia of 100,000 men.

Encouraged by the reception which had been accorded to him by the Prime Minister and by the known views of the Foreign Secretary, the Duke on February 8, 1847, drew up a fresh memorandum, which contains ample evidence of the alarm which he felt. In this memorandum he assumed that, if war with France broke out, an attack on the shores of England would be immediately attempted, and that if the British fleet were defeated, a battle would have to be fought on the soil of England for 'the possession, sovereignty, and independence of the British Empire.' But we had only 50,000 soldiers in the British Islands, and there were not 5,000 who could be employed 'on any service whatever without leaving standing at their posts without relief all men now on duty, whether in guard of the Queen's person or her palaces, of naval arsenals and stores, of the Bank, of the Tower, or elsewhere.' Men, therefore, from the Duke's standpoint, were urgently necessary; and the Duke recommended that the militia, which he computed at 150,000 men, should be 'raised, organised, trained, and disciplined;' and that 20,000 men should be added to the recruiting companies and depôts of the regular regiments of the army serving abroad. In addition to this substantial increase to our military force, the Duke thought it essential that works of fortification should be erected to secure existing harbours and roadsteads, and that fortified harbours of refuge

should be constructed at Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Dover, and Newhaven or Seaford.

This formidable memorandum was circulated among the members of the Cabinet, together with a printed minute, and the heads of a draft Bill, prepared by Sir Robert Peel's Administration, for reviving the militia. The Cabinet, however, thought that when the session had already begun it was hopeless to find time to consider the many matters with which the memorandum dealt; and that the state of the finances, burdened with the heavy cost of the Irish famine, and the proximity of a general election, made it inadvisable to deal with the subject immediately. Lord Palmerston, indeed, made a vigorous protest against delay; but men like Lord Grey and even Lord Auckland agreed with Sir Charles Wood and Sir George Grey in declaring that postponement was inevitable. Nothing accordingly was done during the remainder of the Parliament. But after the dissolution Lord John took the matter into his own hands and drew up the following memorandum for circulation in the Cabinet:—

September 21, 1847.

I propose in this memorandum to treat only of a militia force for the United Kingdom.

The object to be attained is to have a sufficient number of men enrolled and organised, who might be available for the defence of the country on the first breaking out of war. The reasons urged by the Duke of Wellington against a force of disbanded soldiers appear to me to be very formidable.

What I should propose, therefore, in the view of raising a considerable force without too great a strain on the finances of the country, is as follows:—

1. That the Local Militia Acts, passed at the end of the last war, should be taken as the model for the proposed enactments. Officers of the army, not belonging to the counties, to be admissible to any rank under that of lieutenant-colonel.

2. That the men should be raised in the counties by beat of drum; and, if the numbers should be deficient, the poor law unions should furnish the remainder in proportion to their population.

3. That the present militia staff should be used for the purpose of recruiting for the local militia.

4. That the number of men to be raised for Great Britain should

be 72,000. The expense of keeping that number out for training and exercise for two months in each year would be one-sixth of keeping the whole number embodied [i.e. for a whole year], or 12,000 at 40*l.* a man=480,000*l.*

5. That in Ireland, where a similar force would not acquire steadiness with so short a training, four regiments should be raised, to be called respectively, the Leinster, Ulster, Munster, and Connaught Militia.

6. That each of these regiments should consist of 1,250 men—in all 5,000 men; that they should not be obliged to leave the United Kingdom, but be disposable in any portion or station of Great Britain.

7. The cost of this force, at the same rate of 40*l.* a man, would be 200,000*l.*

8. The whole annual cost of the proposed force would thus be 480,000*l.*+200,000*l.*=680,000*l.* The produce of one penny in the pound income tax is about 700,000*l.* in Great Britain. The cost of clothing and arms at the commencement is to be added, but it may safely be affirmed that, at the yearly charge of one penny in the pound additional income tax, the country would have the benefit of an increase of 72,000 organised, and 5,000 drilled troops to the force at present available to repel invasion.[1]

During the next few months a good deal of correspondence took place on the plans which were thus formulated; and the modest scheme of defence which Lord John had sketched in September showed a constant tendency to grow. Before the end of the year the Cabinet had two other plans before it. (1) Lord Palmerston desired to reorganise the regular militia, enrolled either by voluntary enlistment, or if necessary by ballot, consisting of 140,000 men, and liable to serve in any part of the United Kingdom. (2) Mr. Fox Maule, the Secretary at War, believing, with Lord John, that it would be, under any circumstances, a hardship to take balloted men from their homes and business, and that the hardship would be increased if the ballot took place in time of peace and the men were embodied on the outbreak of war, desired to postpone the organisation of a regular militia till the outbreak or approach of war made it indis-

[1] Sir C. Wood wrote in reference to this memorandum: 'Dear Lord John,—There is no gainsaying this, but it is hard upon us to have to make up for the deficiencies of our predecessors.—Yours, C. W.'

pensable; and in the meanwhile to rely on a local militia, liable except in case of invasion to serve only in their own counties; and to encourage the formation of a volunteer force.

Lord Palmerston's objections to Mr. Fox Maule's scheme were stated and re-stated by him in long letters to Lord John in December 1847 and January 1848. These elaborate letters are far too long to quote in this biography. But, apart from the evidence which they afford that Lord Palmerston shared the alarms of the Duke of Wellington, they have an interest of their own; for they anticipate the objections which Lord Palmerston urged in 1852 to Lord John's Militia Bill, and which led to the final defeat of Lord John's Administration.

In the meanwhile the discussion, which had been chiefly confined to the Cabinet and to its advisers, had extended to the general public. A letter of the Duke of Wellington's, written in confidence to Sir John Burgoyne early in 1847, was suffered through Sir John's indiscretion to appear a twelvemonth afterwards in the columns of a newspaper; and the public was alarmed to find that, in the opinion of the first soldier alive, the whole south coast of England—with hardly an exception—was open to invasion, and that the country had no means of opposing a hostile force. The effect which this letter produced on the public mind must be evident to any one who has read one of the most famous of Mr. Cobden's pamphlets, 'The Three Panics.' The pain which its publication gave to its author will be seen from the following note:—

Strathfieldsaye: January 7, 1848.

My dear Lord,—I assure you that no person saw with more pain than myself the publication in the newspapers of a confidential letter from myself to the Chief Engineer. I heard in the Athenæum that this letter had been shown about, and had been commented upon; and after inquiry I found that it was true, and I saw a copy of it! But I never could discover in what manner it had got out. But I understand that Sir J. Burgoyne entrusted my letter to his daughters, who communicated to their friends not only in Sussex but in Ireland! I have been in communication upon this subject with the Master General of the Ordnance ever since the formation of your Lordship's Government. I communicated to him all that had passed between

me and the former Master General, the whole of which had been seen by Sir Robert Peel.

Nothing can be more legitimate than a confidential letter from the Commander in Chief to the Chief Engineer. He had been in constant confidential communication with Lord Anglesey and me, and I could not think it possible that a word that I should write would ever be read by the public.

My opinion has invariably been that the effectual and indeed only safe mode of bringing the important subject of that letter to the cognisance of the public was by the Government itself, and I cannot state how much I feel that this letter should have been published, which certainly treats of the whole subject, past, present, and future. —Believe me, ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

I will attend your Lordship in London whenever you will send for me.

Forced on by the prevalent excitement, and unable to reconcile the contrary views of his colleagues, Lord John drew up the following memorandum, which was printed and circulated confidentially to the Cabinet on January 10:—

Confidential]

NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The question of national defence is now likely to obtain that public attention which two years ago it seemed so little likely to command. At the same time, the Government must be careful not to exaggerate the danger, any more than to overrate the security, of our position.

France is the country nearest to us as a neighbour, most formidable as a rival, and with whom we have at once the most frequent opportunities of friendly concert and the greatest probability of irreconcilable quarrel. The danger of war, it must be observed, will be greatly increased if the two countries are in an unequal state of preparation. For, if both are unprepared, both will take some time to prepare before hostilities are begun; if both are prepared, both will be unwilling to rush into war at the hazard of severe and instant retaliation, or at least of successful repulse. But, if one is prepared and the other is not, from the moment when war becomes probable the State which is prepared becomes eager to take advantage of its superiority, before the balance of forces can be restored by measures of recruiting and equipment.

In August 1840 and in August 1844 we were in considerable danger of sudden hostilities without much previous time for

preparation. Thus it is clear that hostilities may break out suddenly, not by our own choice, and only to be averted by dishonourable or painful sacrifices of national character or interests.

It can hardly be doubted that the French have for a long time made preparations for a naval war; that such preparations can be directed against no other power than England; and that the preparations of England have been, as is usual in such cases, slackened by the security which the great victories of the end of the last war have inspired.

There are three modes by which the French may injure and assail England on the breaking out of a war:—

1. By sending steamers to alarm our coasts and interrupt our trade, as proposed by the Prince de Joinville.

2. By landing a force to bombard and destroy our naval and military arsenals.

3. By invading England with an army of 30,000 or 40,000 men, and marching at once to London.

The first mode, though of importance, need not here be discussed. It will be sufficient that measures of detailed precaution should be taken against such a danger.

The second and third modes may be discussed together, as they depend on the means which the French have of crossing the Channel.

Let it be admitted that the French have twenty steamers capable of carrying 1,500 men each. In order to land 30,000 men in England, these steamers must first be collected in one or two ports. Such a measure would in itself be a menace, and it would be justifiable and right, as a precaution in self-defence, to assemble steamers and sailing men-of-war on our side, and send them to watch the port where the French were collecting theirs. The first step, therefore, is to have a sufficient naval force at home to be able to collect such a squadron of vigilance.

It may be said that the French troops might come over in separate detachments of two or three steamers from different ports; but such a measure would require a combination so difficult as to make it almost impracticable; and, if it failed, would hazard the loss of all the ships and troops employed.

Even the passage of twenty steamers together, when collected, would require arrangement and precision. All must conform to the speed of the slowest steamer, otherwise the squadron would be separated. But such speed, being inferior to that of our fast steamers, would give time for notice and orders to assemble and keep our force together at a given point.

There are many points to consider on this subject, which I pass over here, but which deserve the serious consideration of the Admiralty. It is obvious that our steamers could blockade or watch a port with a strong wind blowing in shore, but our sailing-vessels would be driven away. Could the steamers oppose the egress of the French force alone?

If such force comprised line-of-battle ships and frigates, must not the blockading or watching steamers retire? Would not their retreat leave the passage open to the enemy?

The next point, therefore, is to have a sufficient force to defend our own shores. Such force must consist of—

1. Ships.
2. Fortifications.
3. Troops.

1. We must have the means of collecting a strong squadron of line-of-battle ships and steamers in the Downs, or at Spithead, Torbay, or Plymouth. Such a squadron, upon hearing of the departure of an enemy from an opposite port, would at once be in readiness to direct itself to the point menaced. Say the enemy landed near Brighton, the fleet would soon be there—would fight, sink, and destroy any vessels left on the coast, and would be ready to intercept any fresh supplies.

2. Next. The invading force might attack Portsmouth by land. We must have Portsmouth fortified by land as well as by sea, so as to make it capable of standing a regular siege. Measures for the defence of our dockyards have been for some time in preparation. The late Government ordered block-ships to be got ready, to furnish batteries of defence against an attack by sea. The present have organised dockyard battalions, and further measures are in contemplation, of which Lord Auckland has the direction.

3. I come to the most vulnerable part of our present position.

Let us suppose the French had overcome all difficulties, and had landed 30,000 men, with artillery and cavalry, on our shores.

We must oppose them with an army in the field.

We have 55,000 men of regular troops in the British Islands, 13,000 pensioners, and 14,000 yeomanry.

Of these, the first only are available for all services. Not less than 10,000 must be sent on the breaking out of war to reinforce our garrisons abroad, to be followed by 10,000 more in the next year; 25,000 would be required by different garrisons; leaving only 20,000 for the defence of England and Ireland.

It is manifest that, unless we can supply our garrisons by some other means, and add largely to our force in the field, we have no adequate force to oppose to an invading army.

It is proposed to do this by a militia force. Two plans have been framed for this purpose :—

1. The first is to raise 100,000 men by way of ballot in Great Britain, to serve for seven years, to be embodied on the breaking out of a war.

2. The second is to postpone the raising of a regular militia till the breaking out of war, and to raise only a local militia, to serve in their own counties, and not to leave them except on an imminent risk of invasion.

The first is the plan of the late Government. It is open to the serious objection that it subjects 100,000 or 130,000 men to the chance that they may be for five or six years taken away from their homes and occupations—their industry lost, their position gone, and their prospects of settling in life abandoned for a long period.

Such a chance would make the militia service unpopular in the extreme. It would likewise entail a very heavy charge for the wives and families of militia men on the breaking out of war.

The second plan has the fatal defect, that of not providing a drilled body of men at the breaking out of war. The militia would be levied in a hurry, amid the confusion of recruiting for the regular army ; the local militia would not be available till the enemy were in Sussex or Hampshire.

I should propose to combine the two plans, and to obviate, in degree at least, the disadvantages of each. My plan is—

1. That a number of men amounting to 150,000 in Great Britain, and 50,000 for Ireland, should be raised for the service of the militia.

2. That one-fifth of this force should be balloted for, and raised every year.

3. That the men so raised should be bound to serve for five years.

4. That all men between eighteen and twenty-five should be liable to ballot for the militia.

5. That for the first three years of service they should be liable to be called out for 28, 28, and 21 days respectively ; and for the last two years for 14 days each year in time of peace.

6. That for the first three years they should be liable to serve as embodied militia for two years of war. That during the last two years they should be bound to leave their counties only on the imminent danger of invasion.

7. That the mode of raising the force should be settled by regulations prepared by the Secretary at War, and be embodied in a Bill to be laid before Parliament.

There would thus be—

In the first year, 40,000 men exercised and trained for twenty-eight days, and liable to serve in garrisons, and for the defence of the country, for two years of war.

In the second, 80,000 ditto.

In the third, 120,000 ditto; but the first 40,000 would have twenty-one days' drill only.

In the fourth, there would be 120,000 so serving, and 40,000 local militia.

In the fifth, 120,000 as before, and 80,000 local militia; and so on in all subsequent years.

A man balloted at 18 would be free at 23, unless it were thought proper to retain him for one year of war, if the five years had not expired before the breaking out of war.

A man balloted at 25 would be free at 30.

If no war occurred, these men would not have to leave their homes. If war occurred, they would have to leave them for two years before 30 years of age. At the breaking out of war, when the system was complete, 120,000 men would be liable to serve in the embodied militia. Two years would give time to raise the regular force, and each year 40,000 balloted men would be added to the militia. It might then be provided that the men thereafter raised for the militia should serve for five years in the embodied, and five other years in the local militia.

The number of adult males in the United Kingdom may be taken at 7,000,000. The number between 18 and 25 may be estimated at [blank in original].

Thus the means of defence at the disposal of the Government, in case of a sudden war, would be—

1. A good naval force, consisting partly of steamers, ready to watch or blockade a foreign port.
2. Dockyard battalions and a coast militia.
3. An army of 55,000 to 60,000 men of regular troops.
4. Pensioners to the amount of 15,000 men.
5. A militia in 1848 of 40,000 men, and in 1851 of 120,000 men.
6. A local militia in 1851 and subsequent years.

January 10, 1848.

Lord Palmerston at once wrote—

I have read with great pleasure your very clear and able paper, which I herewith return to you.

But he went on to argue that as it would take five years before the whole force was enrolled, and six or seven years before it was adequately trained, the constitution of an effective defence would be postponed to 'an awfully distant period.'

If you took your number in three years, and by thirds, instead of by fifths, perhaps your measure might be sufficient.

Thus, while the Cabinet was agreed that steps were urgently necessary to place the country in an efficient state of defence, its members had arrived at no exact conclusion on the measures to be adopted for this purpose. It was ultimately decided to strengthen all the regular services, increasing the army, navy, and ordnance estimates by 358,000*l.* for that purpose, and to take an additional vote of 150,000*l.* for 'laying the foundation of a militia force.' These figures would have been serious enough if they had stood alone. Unfortunately, the commercial crisis of the previous year had made its mark on the revenue, while the condition of Ireland and the exigencies of a war at the Cape were simultaneously throwing heavy charges on the Government. The Cabinet concluded that the revenue on which it could safely rely would be exceeded by the estimated expenditure by more than 3,000,000*l.* To cover this great deficiency, it proposed not merely to continue the income tax, which naturally expired in 1848, but to raise the rate of the tax from sevenpence to twelvepence in the pound.

So grave a decision had rarely been formed by any Government in time of peace. The Cabinet rightly concluded that the grounds of it must be authoritatively explained by the Prime Minister himself; and accordingly on the 18th of February Lord John rose to bring forward the Budget of the year. Lord John, who had been suffering for some weeks from influenza, was so unwell when Parliament met that he was hardly fit to attend the House. His illness probably accounted for the circumstance that his speech on this occasion was one of the least successful speeches he ever made. But, even if he had spoken with his customary force, he would probably have found it impossible to have carried the scheme

which he had brought forward. For, while it was based on the panic which prevailed, it incidentally administered the best specific to fear. The chances of invasion seemed preferable to the certain addition of fivepence to the income tax. Three days afterwards the Government, alarmed at the aspect of the House, referred the estimates to secret and select committees; while, on the last day of the month, the Chancellor of the Exchequer offered to abandon the additional income tax if the duty were continued for another year at its ordinary rate.

Never perhaps before had a single fortnight effected so radical an alteration in the financial policy of a Ministry. But then it must also be remembered that never before had a single fortnight produced a more radical alteration in the political situation. When Lord John brought forward his Budget, on the 18th of February, the throne of Louis Philippe seemed secure: when Sir Charles Wood abandoned the income tax on the 28th of February, Louis Philippe and his family had fled from Paris, and were seeking—no one knew how—to escape from France. The great steam fleet, which was to serve his purpose as an invader, could not afford him one little vessel in his flight; and the monarch was about to seek refuge in a country whose liberties the alarmists had thought he was about to destroy. Verily, if an additional fivepence in the pound had overcome panic, the fall of the Man of July had deprived the alarmists of excuse.

The convulsion which upset the throne of Louis Philippe was felt in every corner of Europe. The Emperor of Austria was forced to abdicate; Lombardy was temporarily lost to the Austrian Empire; the throne of Prussia was shaken by the Revolution; and even the Pope was forced to quit Rome; while Chartists in England, and Repealers in Ireland grasped at the opportunity which was suddenly presented to them. Thus internal, and not external, dangers became the theme for discussion; and, instead of organising a militia to meet the French, the Government was soon enrolling special constables to meet the Chartists.

Yet the Ministry was undoubtedly weakened by the failure which it had experienced. Lord John's evident

inability to shake off his long and depressing influenza confirmed the doubts, which sedate bystanders were forming, of the permanence of the Government; and the determination of Ministers to make no further concessions increased these feelings. Writing on the last Sunday in February, Lord Lansdowne said—

> I assume that you will in no case, as things now stand, consent to any reduction of estimates, but will instantly resign if any such should be carried.

And, on the following Friday, Lord John successfully resisted a proposal of Mr. Horsman to exempt professional and precarious incomes from the full weight of the tax. The victory was achieved by a large majority; but it was ominous that Lord John was chiefly supported by Protectionists and Peelites, and opposed by many of his own supporters.

Though Lord John could not derive unmixed comfort from a victory obtained under such circumstances, the conclusion of the debate gave him some relief, as it enabled him to go down to St. Leonards, and to give himself fourteen days of such rest as a Prime Minister can obtain in a so-called holiday. Mr. Fergusson, who was attending Lady John, allowed her to go too, on the single condition that she should travel by road; and, on the Saturday, she and her son met Lord John and his eldest daughter, who went down together by railway. Unfortunately the Sunday was wet; and Lord John, instead of obtaining air and exercise, had to remain indoors all day, and listen to M. Lamartine's 'History of the Girondists' and Archdeacon Hare's sermon on 'The Mission of the Comforter,' which Lady John read to him.[1]

A wet Sunday was succeeded, however, by a fine Monday, and Lord John visibly profited by the quiet and the sea air. On Thursday he was so much better that his wife

[1] Lord and Lady John had usually a book on hand which they read together. For instance, in the recess of 1847 they read Sir J. Mackintosh's *History of the Revolution*, Prescott's *Conquest of Peru*, *The Life of Lord Erskine*, and some of the writings of an old friend, Dugald Stewart, and of a new friend, Professor Hinds, whom Lord John was already thinking of for the bishopric to which he soon afterwards promoted him.

wrote that he was 'going on delightfully.' On the Friday he ventured to return to London to take part in a possible division on a motion of Mr. Hume's on the income tax. But the debate was adjourned till the following Monday, and Lord John again rejoined his wife and children at St. Leonards. On the Monday he returned for one more night to London, to speak and vote on Mr. Hume's motion, and gave proof to his friends of his improving health by making one of the best speeches he ever delivered.

Much of this speech was essentially one for debate, and possesses only a temporary interest. It was an amusing and effective description of the motley minority which he assumed would follow Mr. Hume into the lobby. But part of the speech touched a much higher chord.

I hope we are about to see the nations of Europe . . . bind themselves in more friendly terms with one another. Still . . . no man can venture to say what the time may bring forth; and for one, I will not consent to disarm England . . . in the present state of Europe . . . It is but the part of wise and prudent men, while everything is uncertain, not to affect security; and, while there is darkness around, not to pretend that we are walking in broad daylight. For these reasons, I can neither agree to the proposition of the noble Lord opposite [Lord G. Bentinck], and consent to take the income tax for one year in order to resort to a permanent tax upon corn and raw cotton; nor agree to the proposition of the hon. member for Montrose [Mr. Hume], and consent to take the income tax for one year in order to prepare the way for a great reduction in the present amount of our naval and military force . . . If it be the choice of England to descend lower in the scale of nations . . . then it is for this country to say so . . . Only let me not be the instrument to carry into effect that which I should think the degradation of the country, the fall of her pride, and the loss of her glory.

In his published diary Mr. Greville said of this speech—

Lord John Russell had a great success the other night, and his speech got many votes. It was one of the best he ever made, and in all respects judicious and becoming his position.

In a private note to the Duke of Bedford he said—

Last night was a great night for John and the Government. He spoke remarkably well, and he gave the concern an immense lift.

He seems to have done it in his best style, and to have carried the House with him—exhibiting vigour both physical and political. The division was capital. I really think he has raised the Government stock prodigiously ; and, if they are now dexterous and tolerably lucky, and John's health does not give way, they will do.

Thus, once more, Lord John had risen to the occasion, and retrieved by a considerable effort the fortunes of his Administration. During the next few months, the fall of thrones and the crash of armies on the Continent diverted attention from the causes which had produced panic in January. The select committees appointed in February denounced expenditure ; the House of Commons loudly called for economy ; and the Administration, which had begun the year by proposing increased armaments, at the end of the session found it necessary to retrace its steps. The expenditure on the navy and ordnance was reduced, and the reorganisation of the militia was abandoned. But neither public nor Parliament was satisfied with this reduction ; and at the end of August, Lord John found it necessary to write to Lord Auckland—

August 26, 1848.

My dear Auckland,—Now that Parliament is nearly ended, I wish to impress seriously on you the disposition of the House of Commons in respect to the estimates. I think it absolutely necessary to propose a reduction of three at least, and probably five, thousand men in the number of seamen and marines for next year.

The first step to be taken, however, is to reduce the number of men within the vote for the present year.

This I trust you are doing as fast as circumstances will permit.

The next thing is to consider in what way the prospective reductions can be effected with the least injury to the efficacy of the service.

The committee say that, when an increase is required on a particular station from temporary necessity, the increase is made permanent without necessity.

A fleet in the Mediterranean is useful, almost essential, to guard Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar ; protect our interests in Italy, Turkey, and Greece ; and save us from the new colony of Algiers.

But a fleet or squadron of large ships in the Channel is only useful occasionally.

There are two sources, i.e. foreign stations—such as the Pacific and

New Zealand—and the home squadron, from which reductions can be made.

There are several others with which you are acquainted from your knowledge of the department.

We must not diminish, however, our force on the coast of Africa without the most mature consideration.

The result is that you must take Dundas and Berkeley, and Milne and Ward, into council; and consider how you are to reduce the actual force. Whether seamen or marines are reduced, is to me a matter of indifference.

If I were to say what my judgment would incline to, it would go to the laying-up of the St. Vincent, and two other large ships in he winter, keeping a good frigate and one smaller ship at Lisbon.

If affairs on the Continent change their complexion, why *alors comme alors*, but at present there is no ground for alarm in the Channel.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

On the 7th of December Lord John wrote to the Duke of Wellington—

Private] Chesham Place: December 7, 1848.

My dear Lord,—The Cabinet, upon examining the state of the revenue and expenditure, and the present prospects of the revenue for the coming year, have come to the conclusion that it will be necessary to make a considerable reduction of the army. The precise amount is not determined, and I should not wish to arrive at any positive decision till we know a little more of the intentions of France after the Presidential Election. But I wish to prepare your Grace for a decision which the state of our finances will probably render absolutely necessary.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

The Duke did not agree to this proposal, and Lord John wrote again :—

Private] Woburn Abbey: December 16, 1848.

My dear Lord,—I fully appreciate all the reasons for keeping up our military force, stated in your Grace's letter of the 8th.

But there are political considerations which appear to me to be of the utmost weight in the present state of our finances, and of Europe.

The estimated revenue for 1849–50 will not allow of the expenditure of 1848–9, without leaving a considerable deficit.

Such a financial situation ought not to continue.

But the imposition of a new tax, or an increase of the present taxes, would raise an opposition from all parties.

In the present state of the public mind, tranquil amid great storms, it is desirable not to give, without necessity, a topic for agitation, and a ground for discontent with our form of government or the state of the representation.

There are always agitations, but they are not to be feared unless there is matter which is *agitable*.

A gradual and prudent course of retrenchment will satisfy the public mind, and enable us to preserve our present safe and enviable position.

I state these considerations privately to your Grace, both because they cannot be stated in an official letter of the Secretary of State, and because your Grace's masterly comprehension of the interests of the State will enable you to combine the views of an experienced statesman with those which more properly belong to the Commander-in-Chief.

In order to make the reliefs less burdensome, Lord Grey is contemplating every possible reduction in our colonial garrisons.

On this subject, however, I will not farther enter, as it would lead me far.

I will only say, therefore, that the system which will enable us to make the greatest and most speedy effort on the breaking out of war, without trenching too deeply on our finances in peace, appears to me the best.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

So ended the first of what Mr. Cobden used to call the 'three panics.' The pendulum of public opinion had violently vibrated from panic to parsimony, and the dread of additional taxation had quenched the desire for increased armaments. The army and navy estimates were rapidly reduced; till, when a new panic occurred in 1852, they stood at the lowest point which they had reached since the fall of the Whigs in 1841.

CHAPTER XIX.

FOREIGN POLICY.

THE consequences of the fall of Louis Philippe on the policy of the British Ministry were not at first visible. An element of uncertainty affected the situation. No one knew what a Revolutionary Government in France might desire, or be forced, to do. But Lord John, on the 28th of February, paved the way for a good understanding, by declaring that—

> We have no intention whatever to interfere with the form of government which the French nation may choose to adopt, or in any way to meddle with the internal affairs of that country.

And M. de Lamartine, who became for a few months the guiding spirit of the French Councils, soon showed that he had a greater desire to maintain the English alliance than to disturb the settlement of 1815. M. de Lamartine, indeed, immediately after assuming the reins of government, issued a circular to the representatives of France at foreign Courts, some phrases in which were calculated to excite alarm. But the language embodied in this formal document was intended for the people rather than for statesmen ; and, as the following singular correspondence will show, M. de Lamartine simultaneously took unusual steps to let his true views be known in England :—

London: March 3, 1848.

My dear Lord,—Mr. Wellesley . . . arrived from Paris yesterday, and read to me last night a *note verbale* of a communication made to him for me by M. de Lamartine, which he wrote down in M. de Lamartine's presence, and read to him.

I likewise enclose the answer which I propose to write to M. de Lamartine.

The desire is expressed in the note that I should lay it before her Majesty's servants.

My duty to the Queen, as her loyal subject, would make it impossible for me to receive such a communication, and to omit to lay the same before her Majesty's servants.

But I have thought it desirable to avoid to inform M. de Lamartine that I had done so, or should do so, as the omission enables her Majesty's servants to notice this communication or not as they may find most convenient, which I think desirable, as it contains a paragraph which might be considered hostile towards the Courts in the North of Europe with which this country is bound by treaties of alliance, officially communicated to the Government of France at the time they were concluded, the existence of which engagements must be known.

It appears to me that it might be very inconvenient at the present moment either to notice or to avoid the paragraph above referred to.

Since writing the above I have received from Mr. Wellesley a note, dated this day, containing a further explanation of circumstances which appeared in 'La Presse' on Tuesday, Feb. 29.

I beg your Lordship to let me know whether you think there is any objection to my sending to M. de Lamartine the answer of which the copy is enclosed.—Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

The Lord John Russell.

The memorandum of Mr. Wellesley was as follows:—

Les républiques ont besoin d'ordre à l'intérieur, ont besoin surtout qu'il y ait chez chaque citoyen le sentiment du respect de l'ordre, du désir de le maintenir. C'est à établir l'ordre sur des bases larges et solides, reposant sur la confiance de tous, et sur l'opinion publique, que s'attache aujourd'hui M. de Lamartine.

Il ne doute pas que ses efforts ne soient couronnés de succès. Il desire, que les autres, avant de le juger, de juger la république telle qu'il veut la faire; telle qu'il la fera; en attendant, il demande trois mois pour mériter l'approbation des gens sages, des hommes de bien; il espère qu'il ne lui faudra que six semaines. Il croit que le Duc de Wellington, dont il désire avoir l'assentiment, attendra pour se prononcer définitivement, ou ne se prononcera qu'au fur et à mesure.

Mais il doit ici prémunir le Duc de Wellington qu'il recherche, non pas à cause de sa haute position, mais à cause de la grande influence, toute de paix, qu'il exerce depuis longtemps en Angleterre —il doit le prémunir contre les accidents d'une lutte déjà engagée entre le Gouvernement Provisoire et le parti extrême—il doit le pré-

munir contre les criailleries des journaux et leurs articles intempestifs, et pour l'assurer de son sens d'action à lui, Monsieur de Lamartine.

Monsieur de Lamartine fait dire au Duc que si le Gouvernement Provisoire représente la majorité de la nation, elle en représente la majorité disposée à rechercher et à resserrer l'alliance anglaise.

Monsieur de Lamartine considère la constitution de l'Angleterre comme le 'ne plus ultra' des républiques libérales, ayant un magistrat souverain héréditaire pour chef. Le Gouvernement Provisoire veut amener la France au même état de libéralisme. Pour le faire, il a fallu avoir recours au peuple et aux masses ; ils demanderont sans doute des concessions en échange. Le Gouvernement Provisoire compte faire des concessions ; mais dans ses concessions il n'entend aucunement sacrifier l'alliance anglaise. Il veut défendre les peuples libres contre les aggressions des Cours du Nord, et il espère trouver un appui en Angleterre. Il fera une déclaration énergique aux nations de l'Europe, mais le Duc de Wellington en comprendra le vrai sens.

La République ne peut pas paraître craindre quand elle ne craint pas et que les masses sont toutes prêtes à la guerre : il y a surabondance de population.

Prenez note de mes explications, m'a dit M. de Lamartine ; faites en part au Duc de Wellington. Assurez le du respect, de la haute opinion que j'ai pour son assentiment à notre République—qu'il fasse part de ce que je vous ai dit au Cabinet anglais. Si le Duc nous est favorable, je connais assez en Angleterre le poids de son opinion pour désirer qu'elle soit dans l'intérêt de deux nations bien grandes, bien fortes.

Si le Duc vous y autorise, vous me ferez part de ce qu'il vous aura dit pour moi, et je lui écrirai.[1]

The second enclosure was as follows :—

My Lord Duke,—I trust your Grace will excuse my recalling to your attention a point which is not in my notes, and which, on reflection, has appeared to me most important as specifically illustrating the purport of a principal part of M. de Lamartine's conversation.

He said to me, 'Il y a d'ailleurs aujourd'hui [29 Feb.] dans "La Presse" un de ces articles que nous déplorons. . . . Vous voyez

[1] At the end of the memorandum the Duke added in pencil : 'Note—parts of the original very illegible.' Those who are acquainted with the Duke's handwriting in his later years will appreciate the difficulty of accurately transcribing the illegible copy of an illegible original.

combien il est difficile de conserver l'unité des détails de notre pouvoir où nous admettons le journalisme, et du principe de l'alliance anglaise partout, toujours, que notre amour de la Patrie et notre admiration pour vos grandes institutions libérales nous fait adopter, nous fera poursuivre.'

As I left Paris immediately, I had not time to read myself the article Monsieur de Lamartine alludes to, and with which your Grace is of course acquainted.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. WELLESLEY.

The Duke's proposed reply was as follows :—

Le Maréchal Duc de Wellington présente ses hommages à Monsieur de Lamartine. Il a reçu des mains de M. Wellesley le rapport par écrit de la communication verbale dont l'a honoré Monsieur de Lamartine.

Le Duc le remercie de la justice qu'il lui rend en le croyant intéressé au bonheur de la France, et à la consolidation des institutions pour la régie des affaires de son Gouvernement, et de la confiance avec laquelle il a communiqué avec le Duc.

Le Duc désire sincèrement que la France puisse être heureuse. Elle n'a rien à craindre, ni à désirer [que] la durée de la paix générale, dont dans ses proportions elle a joui des bienfaits comme les autres nations du monde.

Lord John replied—

Chesham Place: March 4, 1848.

My dear Lord,—I am going to-day to St. Leonards for my health, and have only a few minutes to acknowledge your Grace's letter of yesterday.

It appears to me that nothing can be more judicious than your Grace's reply to M. Lamartine, and I can see no objection to it being sent.

There is, as your Grace observes, a very suspicious phrase about the Northern powers, and I shall immediately transmit the correspondence to Lord Palmerston for his consideration.

In the meantime it would be very useful if your Grace would see Count Dietrichstein, who seems greatly alarmed and very unjustly suspicious of the intentions of the British Government.

We desire only the continuance of the general peace and of the present territorial arrangements.—Yours,

J. RUSSELL.

Four days later the Duke wrote again :—

London: March 8, 1848.

My dear Lord,—I informed you that I had sent to Paris by the hand of Mr. Wellesley my letter addressed to M. de Lamartine. I enclose Mr. Wellesley's report of his delivery of my answer. It is best to postpone to decide whether I consent to the publication of my letter till I shall receive his answer in writing, and I will of course do nothing without submitting to your Lordship my notions.

I have considered it my duty to keep secret M. de Lamartine's communication to me, and mine to him.

Nobody knows of it excepting your Lordship and those of your colleagues to whom you may have communicated these documents.

I have done so not only for the reason stated to your Lordship in my letter of the 3rd inst., but because I did not think it fair or quite safe possibly for Monsieur de Lamartine to make public the whole of his communication to me, particularly that part of it in relation to monarchy.

I confess that I should not like to see my letter published without some notice at least of the purport of the communication to which it is an answer.

I don't think the public would be satisfied with such a communication.

However, I will decide upon nothing till I shall hear further from M. de Lamartine, and shall have your Lordship's concurrence in the course which I shall propose.

I hope that you receive benefit from your residence at St. Leonards.—I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

The Lord John Russell.

The enclosure was as follows:—

Paris, 9 Rue du Helder: Monday, March 7, 1848.

My Lord Duke,—According to your directions I left London on Saturday evening. I reached Paris on Sunday. I called immediately upon M. de Lamartine, who received me at five, after post hour. I delivered your Grace's letter.

M. de Lamartine expressed great satisfaction at the nature of your Grace's communication. His Excellency manifested a strong desire to obtain your Grace's leave to acquaint the public with the feelings he told me your Grace had expressed. He added that such was the respect entertained in France for your Grace's opinion, so strong was the belief of the honest and enlightened part of the French community at large that your Grace's feeling was, and ever had been, the

expression of that of the true majority of the aristocracy and people of England, that the public would receive your letter as a guarantee for peace and future security.

M. de Lamartine desired me to call upon him on Wednesday evening to receive his answer to your Grace's letter. I shall, of course, immediately take it over.—I have, &c.,

J. WELLESLEY.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington.

London: March 11, 1848.

My dear Lord,—Mr. Wellesley returned from Paris last night, and brought me a letter from M. de Lamartine, of which I enclose a copy.

He certainly places me in an anomalous position, and he has greatly aggravated the difficulties thereof by the course which he and the Provisional Government have taken, and by the publication of his intentions to the diplomatic representatives of France at the different Courts of Europe!

The Provisional Government, endowed with the powers of peace and war, exercises the same to the full extent without hesitation. To insist that the Government *de facto*, and eventually the Republic to be appointed, shall succeed to all the rights and privileges of the King of the French, under the provisions of the several treaties of peace and alliance and the various diplomatic acts, is one thing, and may be and is reasonable, provided the French Government undertakes to perform its part of the several engagements.

But not only is the intention avowed of proposing alterations in the treaties of peace by which all the powers of Europe are bound, but of making such alterations as may give to France a right to interfere in the internal government of other States and their dependencies. Such an arrangement would lead to little less than perpetual war.

If such pretension had been admitted into the treaties of 1814–15 we should have had King Louis Philippe interfering in the insurrection in Canada in 1837, and in Ireland in 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843!

Then I am called upon to promote an alliance between her Majesty and the French Republic.

I don't know that I can have any influence upon such a question. But if I had, neither I, nor, as I believe, any Englishman could desire to see her Majesty allied with the French Republic in interference in the interior government of other countries.

I think it best to give no answer to M. de Lamartine. Nor shall I, unless your Lordship should think it useful that I should.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

The Lord John Russell.

The following was the enclosure :—

Monsieur Lamartine présente ses respectueux sentimens à S. E. le Duc de Wellington et lui accuse réception du billet qu'il a bien voulu lui adresser par Monsieur Wellesley.

Il prie S. E. le Duc de Wellington d'être bien convaincu que les intentions pacifiques exprimées par M. Wellesley ne sont pas seulement celles de Monsieur Lamartine et du Gouvernement Provisoire, mais celles de la nation entière, et que si la Grande-Bretagne comprend aujourd'hui comme la France que les destinées du monde sont dans l'union des deux nations, rien ne pourra plus s'opposer à ce que la Grande Alliance de 1789 entre les têtes supérieures des deux pays ne devienne aussi vraie qu'elle sera durable.

Monsieur Lamartine fait les vœux les plus ardents pour que sa Grace le Duc de Wellington appuie de sa haute influence une idée si heureuse pour le genre humain, et pour que le Héros de la guerre en Angleterre devienne pour les deux pays le lien de la paix.

LAMARTINE.

Lord John replied—

St. Leonards : March 12, 1848.

My dear Lord,—M. Lamartine puts us all in a difficult position. In conversation with Lord Normanby he entirely assents to the maxim of the law of nations that no changes in the internal form of a government can change the obligations contracted towards foreign powers, and he disclaims all intention of interfering in the internal concerns of other States.

At the same time his circular lays down the freedom from the treaties of 1815, which M. Lamartine declares is too popular in France to be resisted, and some strange phrases about 'Providence sounding the hour of independence' give scope for interference at any moment when the Government or the National Assembly may declare that hour to have sounded.

I see no course open to us but to take M. Lamartine's professions in the most pacific sense without relying too much on his power of making good his meaning. On the other hand, the destruction of the free State of Cracow last year gave M. Guizot ground for saying that, as other powers had violated the Treaty of Vienna, France was only bound so long as she chose to be so. I think your Grace need not write again to M. Lamartine, but it may be as well that your Grace should send him a civil message that you had received his letter, which did not require any answer on your part.—I have, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

This curious overture of M. Lamartine must have convinced Lord John that, whatever consequences were likely to ensue from the Revolution of February, danger to England could not be included in the number. France, however, was only one of the countries which felt the full force of the revolutionary movement. On the 13th of March, less than a fortnight after the flight of Louis Philippe, the fate which had fallen on the youngest throne in Europe overtook its oldest dynasty. The people in Vienna rose; defeated the troops; forced M. Metternich, who had grown old in the service of the Empire, to fly; and obliged the Emperor to promise constitutional institutions. In the next ten days the people of Milan, after a terrific combat in the streets, compelled Marshal Radetzky and the Austrian garrison to evacuate the city. Almost on the same day Signor Manin seized the arsenal at Venice, drove out the Austrians, and proclaimed a Provisional Government.

The cause of Italian freedom, which had been apparently secured by these successes, had been very dear to Lord John from the days in which, little more than a boy, he had first visited the peninsula; and during the preceding months had been closely occupying his attention.

In July 1846, when Lord John was resuming office, the death of Gregory XVI. led to the election of Cardinal Ferretti, a prelate of liberal opinions, to the pontifical chair. The friends of progress both in Italy and elsewhere were elated at the evident desire of the new Pope to promote liberal measures. For some months it seemed possible that Italy might realise the dream of moderate reformers, and that autocracy might everywhere be replaced by self-government. From the first, however, the cause of constitutional reform was beset by two dangers. On the one hand, the party of Young Italy, with M. Mazzini at its head, desired to go much further than moderate reformers were willing to travel. On the other hand, the Old Catholic party, which had the direct support of Austria, persisted in declaring that there was no halting-place between moderate and extreme measures. The new Pope hesitated in painful uncertainty between the advice which he received on the one hand from M. Rossi,

who represented M. Guizot and progress at Rome, and from M. Metternich and the Sanfedisti, as the Old Catholic party was called, on the other.

While the Pope was thus hesitating between progress and reaction, Lord John, with the consent of his colleagues, prevailed over the reluctance of the Court,[1] and decided on sending a special mission to Italy. He entrusted the task to Lord Minto, who had special qualifications for the office. In the first place Lord Minto's son-in-law was Minister at the Court of Piedmont; in the next place, as a member of the Cabinet, and as the member who in his department had nothing to do, he was both available for the mission and peculiarly qualified to speak the mind of his colleagues; while, in the third place, though blood is not usually a recommendation for office, it was certain that the Prime Minister's father-in-law would speak with an authority which no other man of equal ability could command.

During the autumn of 1847 Lord Minto's presence was everywhere regarded as an encouragement to reform. Late in the year, however, more energetic movements disconcerted the efforts of the moderate reformers. Riots in Milan, in Venice, and in Central Italy justified, or seemed to justify, the acts of repression and interference to which Austria resorted. In January 1848 a rising in Sicily forced the King to concede what was known as the Constitution of 1812. In the same month the Piedmontese demanded and obtained representative institutions. The news of the revolution in February fell, therefore, like a spark on a magazine ready to explode. Milan and Venice, it has already been stated, drove out their Austrian garrisons; Piedmont formally marched to the help of the Milanese. All Italy clamoured to be led against Austria; and the Austrians actually appealed to Great Britain to mediate in the crisis.

The British Court watched these events with dislike. Prince Albert, six years afterwards, told Count Vitzthum that the King of Piedmont had fallen like a robber on Lombardy in 1848.[2] The Prime Minister, on the con-

[1] *Life of Prince Consort*, i. 428, *seq.* The Queen thought the mission 'a very grave question.'

[2] *Memoirs of Count Vitzthum*, i. 109.

trary, regarded the crisis with very different feelings. He shall, however, explain his own views in his own language :—

Memorandum] May 1, 1848.

The great highways of Europe having been broken up by late events, it is necessary to consider the present state of affairs both *de jure et de facto.*

M. Lamartine has declared the treaties of 1815 at an end, only reserving a respect for the rights of possession enjoyed by sovereigns of States.

As a consequence of the internal changes in France this new position is indefensible under the recognised principles of the law of nations.

But it is not so as a ground for changes made or contemplated since this view of M. Lamartine was first declared.

In 1813, Holland, Belgium, Milan, Tuscany, Rome belonged to France by treaties as sacred as that of 1815. Germany was subject to her.

Events changed this state of things.

Austria, Holland, and other powers acquired by force and established by treaty new rights.

In 1830 Holland lost by insurrection her dominion over Belgium. A new treaty recognised a new power.

In 1848 Austria has lost Milan, and is obliged to recognise new rights in Hungary and Bohemia.

Germany has broken loose from the powers which governed her, and is seeking a reconstruction in some more liberal form.

It is impossible not to admit that these facts form as good a ground for new transactions as the events of 1813–15 did for the Treaties of Vienna.

Nor are these changes less to be justified in reason. Napoleon used his power to oppress independent nations. Austria, Russia, and Prussia used the force given them by the indignation of the people of Germany, Spain, and Italy to establish large armies, and by large armies despotic and degrading forms of government.

Prussia broke loose from this system in 1847. Italy followed, and Austria itself has now had its revolution.

It is impossible to deny that France has as good a right to assist the movement of 1848 as Prussia and Austria had to assist the movement of 1813.

Nor does she want a precedent.

In 1831–32 the naval forces of England and the troops of France

combined to make the King of Holland forego the rights he had acquired by the treaty of 1815.

Thus the right of France to interfere when nations have driven out their Governments by their own means being such as it is not easy to dispute, it becomes us to consider what is to be our part in the new forms of European policy.

It is obvious that it is not becoming or expedient for us to proclaim the invalidity of the treaties of 1815. On the contrary we ought rather to promote in the interest of peace and order the maintenance of the territorial arrangements then made.

But neither ought we to go on clinging to a wreck if a safe spar is within our reach.

Austria can hardly restore her sway in Italy. If she gains a victory, France will aid the Lombards, and with the assistance of all Italy overpower her. If she attempts a protracted war, the state of her finances, and the discontent of Hungary and Bohemia, will soon distract her councils and paralyse her efforts.

It is advisable, therefore, that we should use our efforts in communication, though not in direct concert, with France, to produce a frank abandonment of Lombardy and Venice on the part of Austria.

France will probably require compensation either on the side of Savoy, or, if Charles Albert is not made King of Lombardy, by means of influence on the Lombard Republic.

The Lombards on their side desire no influence, French or German, in their affairs, and it is obviously our interest to favour their feelings of independence. If, however, the war goes on, the influence and the arms of France are sure to be seen on the other side of the Alps.

Our endeavour, therefore, should be to settle the matter quickly —and to settle it by negotiation.

If by transferring to Austria the protectorate of the Ionian Islands we could give her security on the side of Trieste and increased power on the Adriatic, we ought willingly to do so. The Ionian Islands are only of use to us as a means of keeping Russia and France out of a strong position. They are neither colony nor independent; neither free nor subject; a source of perpetual irritation, expense, and annoyance.

In Germany the Schleswig Holstein question threatens much disturbance. But the heir through the female line having offered to resign his pretensions, there is a favourable opening for negotiation.

The condition of the Peninsula is, as usual, discouraging. In

Portugal we may, indeed, from old habits and an inveterate tendency to alliance, maintain some shadow of influence, and in time of danger we shall always be appealed to.

In Spain the case is different. Narvaez seems to be the only able Spanish statesman, and he cannot bear liberty. But it was for the sake of liberty in the Peninsula that we joined in the Quadruple Treaty of 1834.

As matters stand at present I think Mr. Bulwer should be directed—

1. To consider the Montpensier question as suspended, and not to interfere at all in it, unless he receives positive directions to that effect.

2. Not to give any opinion whatever on the internal affairs of Spain.

But for his own guidance he should be informed that we cannot be expected to support the Queen's title to the throne if that throne is endangered by the acts of her own Ministers acting in her name. Otherwise we should be doing that which, in the case of some Indian princes, has been so justly censured, viz., supporting kingly oppression against popular resistance by means of British forces.

Without going further into the state of Europe, I would make one general observation.

It is our interest to use our influence as speedily and as generally as possible to settle the pending questions, and to fix the boundaries of States. Otherwise, if war once becomes general, it will spread over Germany, reach Belgium, and finally sweep England into its vortex. Should our efforts for peace succeed, Europe may begin a new career with more or less of hope and of concord; should they fail, we must keep our sword in the scabbard as long as we can, but we cannot hope to be neutral in a great European war. England cannot be indifferent to the supremacy of France over Germany and Italy or to the advance of Russian armies to Constantinople: still less to the incorporation of Belgium with a new French Empire.[1]

This remarkable memorandum practically recommended three things: (1) abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of Spain; (2) concert with France in mediating between Austria and Piedmont; (3) negotiation on the Schleswig-

[1] This is apparently the memorandum to which Baron Stockmar refers in his *Memoirs*, ii. 370. But the Baron's account of it is very inaccurate.

Holstein succession. It was probably inspired by a desire not merely to instruct the Cabinet, but to control the Foreign Minister. For the events of 1848 were both increasing the labours of the Foreign Office and encouraging Lord Palmerston to take of his own volition steps on which he ought to have obtained the approval of the Cabinet and the technical sanction of the Queen. He had received a proposal from the Russian Minister for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question,[1] which, to the grave annoyance of the Queen, he had not thought it requisite to communicate either to the Court or to his colleagues, and, without the knowledge either of Queen or colleagues, he had addressed a despatch to Sir H. Bulwer, recommending that the basis of the Spanish Government should be enlarged.

When Lord John became acquainted with Lord Palmerston's action he addressed the note to Lord Lansdowne which has been already quoted, begging him to see Lord Palmerston, and adding—

> It is difficult to go on in this way, but I must beg you to interfere before I say all I think.

Urged on by this letter, and stimulated by an attack in the Lords on Lord Palmerston's policy, Lord Lansdowne did interfere ; and it was definitively arranged that in future all the Foreign Secretary's despatches should be submitted to the Prime Minister.[2] But, so far as Spain was concerned, the mischief was already done. The Spanish Government returned Mr. Bulwer the offensive despatch which he communicated to it from Lord Palmerston ; and, on Mr. Bulwer's receiving two further despatches approving his conduct, and commenting severely on the Spanish Ministry, sent him his passports and desired him to leave the country. The news of this unusual and awkward event reached England on the 24th of May. It excited natural consternation both at the Court and in the Cabinet. On the following Sunday (the 28th) the Queen sent for Lord John to pour out to him her complaints and her anxiety. While the Queen was thus occupying the

[1] For this matter see Greville, *Memoirs*, pt. ii., iii. 178.
[2] Greville, *Memoirs*, iii. 174.

Sunday, one of his colleagues, Lord Grey, was writing him a long and earnest remonstrance on Lord Palmerston's conduct :—

Belgrave Square : May 28, 1848.

My dear Lord John,— . . . It is clear that motions of direct censure upon the Government will be made in both Houses of Parliament. This censure will be directed, not against Sir H. Bulwer, but against the Administration ; and, from all I can hear, the result of the division will be very doubtful in both Houses. But, whatever may be the vote which either may come to, the debate will certainly be most damaging. We shall be blamed not merely for the recent correspondence, but for the general system of intermeddling of which that correspondence is only the climax. The last insult of the Spanish Government will probably be admitted to be indefensible, but we shall be told it is the natural result of our own previous misconduct, and that our past errors render it impossible for us to resent this insult, as for the honour of the country we ought, by insisting on Bulwer's being again received as our Minister by the Spanish Government.

Being convinced that an attack of this kind will immediately be made upon the Government, and that in the House of Lords it will be very powerfully supported, I think it only right that I should lose no time in warning you that it will be out of my power to take any part in repelling it ; and further that, if I am taxed with disapproving of what has been done, I shall be compelled by silence at least to admit it.

If the line of policy which has been adopted had been approved by the Cabinet, it would, of course, have been the duty of every member of the Cabinet, including those who might have differed from the majority but had acquiesced in their decision, to have now supported what has been done. But when the fact is that the subject never was brought before the Cabinet, when I and most of the members of it first saw the objectionable despatches in the newspapers, and when it is notorious that, if the question had been submitted to us, we should most of us (I believe including yourself) have entirely disapproved of the adoption of such a tone towards an independent Government, the case is entirely altered, and I can recognise no obligation to support a policy which none of our opponents can condemn more than I do. . . .—Yours very truly,

GREY.

The Lord John Russell.

While Sir Charles Wood wrote more concisely :—

D[owning] S[treet]: May 28, 1848.

Dear Lord John,—I hope that you *have* seen the letter to Isturitz, and that it is a proper one; and that you have made it certain that you *are* to see all other *future* letters before they are sent.—Yours ever, C. W.

So far as this particular question was concerned, Lord John had his own way in future. The Cabinet rejected the warlike counsels which Mr. Bulwer advocated and the prompt and decisive measures which Lord Palmerston himself suggested. And, after an interval of some months, harmony was restored between the Courts of Madrid and London; while Mr. Bulwer was sent to Washington, where his peculiar habits of interference were expected to produce less mischief. But, if the storm which had agitated the air of Madrid blew over, before another month elapsed one of Lord Palmerston's characteristic despatches to Portugal excited the anxiety of his sovereign and of the Prime Minister: and Lord John had to pass his last Sunday afternoon in June in allaying the Queen's apprehensions instead of spending it in the quiet repose of Pembroke Lodge.

The affairs of Spain and Portugal were only of secondary importance in 1848. The attention of Court and Cabinet was mainly concentrated on Italy; and, in the memorandum which has just been quoted, Lord John had recommended that England should use her influence to induce Austria to abandon Lombardy and Venice. It seemed not impossible at the end of May to secure this result. Austria had sent Baron Hummelauer on a special mission to London to endeavour to arrange some reasonable compromise; and the Piedmontese had won victories, which for the moment seemed likely to be decisive, at Goito and Peschiera. Unfortunately the events of the succeeding month proved less favourable to the Italians. A new revolution breaking out at Naples restored the authority of the King, who forthwith withdrew the Neapolitan contingent from the Italian army in Northern Italy, and took steps to reduce Sicily to subjection. Shortly afterwards, Marshal Radetzky, moving from the position to which he had retreated, defeated the Piedmontese army at Novara, and recovered Milan. The Italians, in their

difficulty, appealed to France, where a new revolution had placed supreme power in the hands of General Cavaignac. Revolutions in Paris and Naples, and strategy on the Lombard plains, had altered the whole conditions of the problem.

These events brought new difficulties to the distracted Prime Minister. The Queen and Prince watched the success of Marshal Radetzky with more complacence than Lord John and Lord Palmerston; and, though her Majesty shared the anxiety of her advisers to terminate bloodshed, she desired to pay a due regard to what she considered the just claims of Austria. She noticed with some apprehension that Lord Palmerston was again in close communication with France, and that he was animated by the desire, in concert with the French, to do as much as possible for Italy. General Cavaignac had just sent M. de Beaumont to represent France in London; and M. de Beaumont rapidly succeeded in establishing the most amicable relations with the Foreign Minister. Lord Palmerston considered that the best results ensued from the understanding between M. de Beaumont and himself. The Queen, on the contrary, thought her Minister was committing her by his language to steps which she did not approve. She remonstrated; and Lord Palmerston had to yield.

But the Queen's remonstrance again drew Lord John's attention to the difficulties which were inseparable from Lord Palmerston's presence at the Foreign Office. As Lady John wrote in her private diary, on August 13—

> John's difficulties about Lord Palmerston increase, because the Queen's disapprobation of everything Lord Palmerston does increases.

Lord Palmerston on his part easily forgot the complaints of the Queen and the Prime Minister. Writing on the 25th of September, he referred to them as ancient history, and added that his own action had been beneficial. Lord John replied—

Oban: October 1, 1848.

My dear Palmerston,—I wrote to you yesterday upon the immediate point of the nomination of a Minister to represent this country in the conferences about Italy. There is, however, a sentence in your letter which I must notice, without at all intending to revive any controversy about your language to Beaumont, which I shall be glad

to think had the good effect you mention. You say, 'Unfortunately the Queen gives ear too readily to persons who are hostile to her Government, and who wish to poison her mind with distrust of her Ministers, and in this way she is constantly suffering under groundless uneasiness.' That the Queen is constantly suffering under uneasiness is too true, but I own I cannot say it is always groundless. It is surely right that a person speaking in the name of her Majesty's Government should in important affairs submit his despatches to the Queen and obtain the opinion of her Prime Minister before he commits the Queen and her Government. This necessary preliminary you too often forget; and the Queen naturally, as I think, dreads that upon some occasion you may give her name to sanction proceedings which she may afterwards be compelled to disavow. I confess I feel some of the same uneasiness; but as I agree with you very constantly in opinion, my only wish is that in future you will save the Queen anxiety, and me some trouble, by giving your reasons before, and not after, an important despatch is sent. The Queen's absence and mine, the constant flow of French, Danes, Germans, &c., pressing for an immediate answer, may have made this difficult for the last month; but the Queen is now, I trust, at Windsor, and I shall be at Minto in the course of this week.—I remain, yours very sincerely,

J. RUSSELL.

When Lord John reached Minto, a few days afterwards, a new difficulty had arisen. The Queen desired that this country should be represented at the Conference, which it was proposed to hold on Italian affairs, by an Envoy in whom she had confidence. She objected to Lord Normanby, whom Lord Palmerston desired to send, because she thought that he shared the Italian sympathies of the Foreign Minister. Lord Palmerston, on the 6th of October, referred the matter to Lord John, who, apparently for the Queen's information, drew up the following memorandum on the policy which he thought this country ought to pursue.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS. October 18, 1848.

In order to form a fair judgment of the present state of foreign affairs it is necessary to look back.

Forty years ago Spain gave the signal of resistance to the system which Napoleon had successfully enforced on Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The terrible power which he possessed did not frighten the people of Spain. They did not calculate; they fought, fell, and rose

to fight again. In a few years the sovereigns of Europe, recovering from their panic, and paid by England, joined in the resistance. But, in order to do so with success, the King of Prussia promised a constitution; England called upon Lombardy and Sicily in the name of liberty, and the people of Europe were promised, if they would resist Napoleon, freedom as well as independence. The sovereigns of Europe triumphed, and their earliest attention was given to the punishment of those who had aided them, and to the repression of all attempts to obtain freedom similar to that of England. Arguelles in Spain was sent to a dungeon; Pellico and others in Lombardy and Piedmont were seized and imprisoned. In 1830, upon the French Revolution, one of the forced arrangements of 1815 broke to pieces. Belgium revolted; the Prince of Orange marched with a well-appointed army to put down the rebellion. France under Louis Philippe sent an army to support the insurgents; and England joined with France to deprive the King of Holland of the territory secured to him by treaty. The result has been most satisfactory. The people of Belgium have been governed with wisdom, with fairness, with due regard to their national character, and they now reward such treatment by devoted loyalty to their King and firm attachment to their constitution.

In Russia and Austria the event has been different. Where the press has been most enslaved, where representative institutions have been most carefully excluded, there we now see authority most helpless, anarchy most prevalent, and mob excesses most cruel. The part of England in these circumstances was pointed out by experience. Had she joined with Russia in declaring that no changes should take place in the territorial arrangements of 1815, she would have provoked a war like that of 1793, without the alliances she was then able to form. Her obvious policy then was to dissuade from all violent invasions of territory, and to hold out prospects of conciliatory arrangements to the powers brought into conflict by the great *débâcle* of February 1848. This course she has pursued. She did not, as advised by some, interfere to prevent the Prussian invasion of Schleswig, but she advised an armistice and terms of agreement to Denmark and to Germany. In the same manner she dissuaded Charles Albert from invading Lombardy, and France from sending an army to his assistance. By these means she has hitherto staved off, though not prevented, an European war. In order finally to secure peace, she must show fairness to all parties. Lombardy must have a civil Government virtually if not nominally independent of Vienna; Sicily must have a Legislature and Administration virtually independent of Naples.

Thus in our foreign policy as in our domestic we must be at once conservative and reforming—preserving that we may reform, and reforming that we may preserve.

Fortunately, the beginning of winter and the disposition of General Cavaignac afford scope for such a policy. Unfortunately the disposition of the Cabinets of Austria and Naples seems hostile to any compromise.

If they continue so we may expect perhaps a short reaction, but in the end a strong reinforcement to the republican party in Germany and in Italy. In that case we can only stand aside and guard ourselves.

J. R.

The anxiety of the Court was not entirely allayed by a knowledge of the Prime Minister's opinions: and almost immediately afterwards her Majesty invited Lord John to Windsor, and during a visit—which was protracted over three days—discussed with him the state of affairs abroad, and her reasons for disapproving the course which Lord Palmerston was pursuing. And certainly the events which were rapidly succeeding one another on the Continent justified and excused the Queen's anxiety. In Prussia, Berlin was on the eve of a revolution. In Austria, Vienna was being bombarded by Jellachich's battalions; the Emperor of Austria was a fugitive; and Kossuth was winning victory after victory in the cause of Hungarian independence. But even in the hour of defeat Austria was steadily declining to enter into conference on the affairs of Italy except on her own terms. In October, indeed, while Lord John was at Windsor, hopes were entertained that the difficulties which she was raising would be surmounted. As November ebbed away, this prospect disappeared.

Osborne:[1] December 2, 1848.

My dear Palmerston,—. . . We have now exhausted argument to induce Austria to give up Lombardy. Your despatches on this subject cannot be surpassed, and can only be repeated. F. Schwarzenberg is less liberal than Wessenberg, and, having less intelligence, is less likely to be persuaded. It is obvious Austria will never consent to any place of conference out of her dominions; that France will not consent to any place within them; that Sardinia will not consent to any basis of negotiation other than that

[1] Lord and Lady John were the Queen's guests in the Isle of Wight.

first proposed: that Austria will never agree to that basis. It results from this account that the conference is impossible or will be nugatory.

Territorial questions put aside, might we not urge on the King of Sardinia that it behoves him to make the best terms he can for peace, order, and liberty in Italy? All would be lost by a war; but by agreeing to a peace—on the declaration of Austria that she will instantly give free institutions to Lombardy—England, France, Austria, and Sardinia may all use their influence to preserve constitutional government in Italy, to put down anarchy, and maintain tranquillity: whereas, if there is to be war between young Italy and Austria, whatever Austria may lose will probably go, not to strengthen Sardinia, but to promote republican views and shake every throne in Italy.—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.[1]

In the meanwhile, events in Southern Italy were leading to a fresh crisis and fresh embarrassment.

Opinion in the Cabinet had from the first been divided on the policy to be pursued towards Naples and Sicily. Lord Minto, on the one hand, had a strong desire to defend the Sicilians against the attack of their sovereign, and, in fact, told Lord John in August that he could not remain in the Cabinet if we did not interfere. The Grey party, on the contrary, disliked the notion of any British intervention. A compromise was adopted in November, and a well-intentioned though useless attempt was made to mediate between the two parties. On its failure war was resumed, and an agent of the Provisional Government of Sicily came to England for the purpose of procuring arms for the insurgents. The contractor to whom the agent applied said that he had recently supplied arms to the Ordnance Office, and had none others ready;

[1] Writing nearly four years afterwards to Lord Aberdeen, on July 2, 1852, Lord John said: 'After he [Charles Albert] had made his first attempt, we, in conjunction with France, proposed to mediate. What we intended to propose was that Charles Albert should withdraw his claims to Northern Italy (Lombardy and Venice), and that Austria should withdraw her claims to indemnity for the past war. This was settled between Palmerston and me, and would have been laid before the Queen in a formal shape. But both parties were anxious for another struggle. Charles Albert broke the truce, and was beat at Novara. We then interfered by advice. I advised the Piedmontese Envoy to offer sixty or seventy millions of francs, instead of thirty which he proposed; and Thiers at Paris told Mr. Hubner that, if moderate terms were not made at Vienna, France would go to war. Thus the peace was made.'

but that, if the Ordnance Office would permit these arms to be transferred to the insurgents, he would undertake to replace them in due course with others. The Ordnance Office referred the application to Lord Palmerston, who, without consulting his colleagues, at once gave the requisite permission. This curious proceeding was communicated by the contractor to the editor of the 'Times,' who made it the ground of a severe attack on the Administration; and Lord John's attention was thus drawn to the 'provoking business.'

Downing Street: January 20, 1849.

My dear Palmerston,—I have been revolving in my mind what course it may be best to take with regard to the guns delivered out of the Queen's stores, with a view to enable the contractor to furnish the materials of war required by the Sicilians.

I think, considering that our position was and is one of neutrality . . . . we ought as a strong power to do voluntarily that which we should enforce upon a weaker State; we are bound to express to the Neapolitan Government our regret as to what has occurred, and to assure them that we shall be careful in future that no act of the Government shall favour one of the contending parties more than the other.

I would like to know your view of this course, and at all events I propose to bring it before the Cabinet on Tuesday. As I fear you are not well enough to go out, we can, if you like it, have the Cabinet at your house.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

It is due to Lord Palmerston to insert his answer:—

C. G.: January 22, 1849.

My dear John Russell,—These are the papers on which in September last I stated to the Ordnance that there would be no objection to their letting the contractor have back the iron guns that he wanted for the Sicilians. Perhaps it would have been better if I had said no instead of yes; but there is a wide difference between what was then done and supplying the Sicilians with our own stores at our own expense.

. . . . . .

With regard to the course to be pursued about the matter of the iron guns, I am not aware that the Neapolitan Government has ever made any complaint on the subject; and it seems to me that it would be odd for us to be making at the end of January an apology

to the King of Naples for a thing that happened last September and of which he has never complained, and which moreover was not nearly so unfriendly an act as the encouraging the Sicilians to choose another king ; the saluting of their independent flag ; and the forcible stopping of the military operations in Sicily. If we are to begin to confess our sins to the King of Naples we ought at least to make a clean breast of it. He would no doubt be as much delighted as surprised at our penitence, but I am afraid it would not tend to bring to a speedy and satisfactory issue the negotiations now carrying on at Naples.

I should be against making any communication on this matter to the Neapolitan Government ; and in answer to questions in Parliament I should say that one step in a long course of proceedings cannot be fairly judged of unconnected with the whole, and that we will lay all the papers before Parliament the moment we can do so without prejudice to the negotiations now going on, and which by my brother's despatches seem to be brought within a range of difference which might easily admit of reconcilement.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Lord John of course communicated the whole circumstances to the Queen, suggesting the possibility of removing Lord Palmerston to Ireland. He probably imagined that Lord Palmerston would refuse to sign the apology to Naples, and that his continuance at the Foreign Office would be thus impracticable. But, when the Cabinet met on the following morning, Lord Palmerston gave way, and consented to sign a public despatch to his brother, Mr. Temple, saying that 'the authority [to supply the arms] was given inadvertently' and that 'her Majesty's Government regret what occurred.'

With Lord Palmerston's submission the crisis ended, and the project of removing him to Dublin was abandoned. But the solution of the difficulty was not accepted by all parties. Lady John wrote on her husband's return from Windsor—

24 [*January*].—Queen disappointed with the result of the Cabinet. Discontented letter from Lord Grey to John.

Both the Queen and Lord Grey probably concluded that the same difficulty, which had so constantly occurred, was certain to recur, and if such were their anticipations they were not unfounded. During the next few weeks the Pied-

montese unwisely renewed the death struggle with Austria; and the Queen was alarmed at observing that Lord Palmerston was laying upon Austria the responsibility which she thought ought to have been thrown on Piedmont. Shortly afterwards the French, in consequence of Austrian success, formally occupied Roman territory; and the Queen had perhaps a not ungrounded apprehension that her Foreign Minister was anxious to interfere in the internal affairs of Rome; while throughout the summer Lord Palmerston was constantly addressing sharp and bitter reproaches to Austria; and the tension between Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Vienna, and the Foreign Secretary became so sharp that it is difficult to understand how the two men managed to maintain their relative positions.[1]

Throughout 1849, therefore, the tension which had already been felt at the Foreign Office was not lessened; and in the summer of that year the Queen found it necessary to draw attention to the constitutional rule that the control of foreign policy rests with the Prime Minister, and to direct that all despatches submitted for her approval should pass through the hands of Lord John Russell.[2] It is almost inconceivable how a man of Lord Palmerston's temperament submitted to this rule. As he himself said, writing to Lord John on June 18, 'This will reduce my flint-gun to a match-lock.' But at the same time he added, 'If you and the Queen wish it I can alter the present arrangements and order all drafts to go first to you, and then to the Queen after you have returned them.'

There is no doubt, therefore, that Lord Palmerston assented to the rule which the Queen laid down, and waived the right, which he undoubtedly possessed as Secretary of

[1] The correspondence on this subject was sealed up by Lord John with his own seal, and was apparently unopened until it was opened by me. Lord Ponsonby went so far as to tell Lord John that 'he had received from Palmerston letters which are not to be submitted to by any man.' Lord John told Lord Ponsonby, 'I do not by any means identify myself with these [Lord Palmerston's] letters. But they were private letters, written in haste, written on the impulse given by reports unfriendly to you, and excited partly by the very Austrian view you have taken of the politics of Europe. I come to the conclusion that your sentiments have been very natural in your position; but, being of the character of flint, they have struck fire on the steel to which they were opposed,' &c., &c.

[2] *Life of Prince Consort*, ii. 302.

State, of taking the Queen's pleasure directly on the affairs of his own department;[1] and there is no reason for supposing that, for the next four months at any rate, he did not loyally adhere to the arrangement which had thus been forced on him.

But the recess had hardly commenced when a fresh crisis occurred. The Hungarian rebellion was suppressed by the joint arms of Russia and Austria. Some of the Hungarian leaders fled to Turkey, and the two Emperors applied to the Porte for the extradition of the fugitives. Lord Palmerston drafted a despatch in which Sir Stratford Canning, the Minister at the Porte, was directed to urge the Sultan 'not to give these people up, and if their surrender were insisted on to say that the refusal was in consequence of our remonstrance.' Prince Albert stated to Lord Grey, who was in attendance at Balmoral, his strong objections to this language. Lord Grey supported them in a letter to Lord John: and the despatch was ultimately modified, the Porte being simply advised to resist the demand. The Porte's compliance with this advice led to an ultimatum on the part of Russia; and Lord Palmerston at once wrote—

Brocket: September 28, 1849.

My dear John Russell,— . . . It seems to me that, unless we mean to abandon all idea of maintaining Turkey, and are prepared to let her fall at once into the grasp of Russia, we ought to invite France to join with us in supporting the Sultan in the honourable decision which he has taken; and I can have no doubt that if England and France take a firm attitude in this matter Austria and Russia will acquiesce and abstain from any violence, and in that case a great step will have been taken towards placing Turkey in that position of political independence which it is so much the interest of Western Europe, and especially of England, that she should occupy. If France enters into our views, the course which I should recommend would be that

[1] It will be new to most persons, but there is high authority for saying that, during the course of Sir R. Peel's Administration, the Queen, in a most courteous letter, expressed to Lord Aberdeen her wish that the rule that all drafts not mere matters of course should be sent to her before the despatches had left the office, should be observed; and that Lord Aberdeen undertook that this should be done in all cases in which the exigencies of the situation did not require another course. It was one of the misfortunes of Lord Palmerston's tenure of the Foreign Office, that his conduct impelled, or perhaps forced, the sovereign to make the same demand without conceding the same reservation.

strong representations should be made by the two Governments, at Petersburg and at Vienna, with a view to urge upon the consideration of Russia and Austria the injustice of endeavouring to force the Sultan to comply with a demand which as an independent sovereign he has a perfect right to decline to accede to ; and to guard against accidents and to give weight to our representations I would propose that the English and French squadrons in the Mediterranean should be ordered up to the Dardanelles with instructions to go up to Constantinople if they should be invited so to do by the Sultan—either to assist in defending Constantinople from actual or threatened attack, or for the purpose of giving him that moral support which their presence in the Bosphorus would afford.

It might also be expedient that our admirals should offer to rid the Turkish Government of the cause of dispute, by bringing away the Hungarian and Polish refugees.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

The Cabinet adopted the first part of this advice. They decided on supporting the Porte, though they declined to allow the fleet to enter the Dardanelles.

Downing Street : October 2, 1849.

My dear Lord Minto,— . . . The Cabinet were unanimous in their opinion that the Porte must be supported ; that remonstrances should go to Vienna and Petersburg ; and that Parker should be desired to approach the Dardanelles to help the Sultan in case of need.

This is right, and the determination would have done your heart good.

I fear the business with the Czar will be stormy.—Yours affectionately,

J. RUSSELL.

The policy of the Cabinet was successful. Russia and Austria withdrew a demand which they found was not merely resisted at Constantinople, but withstood by Western Europe ; and the Ministers had the satisfaction of knowing that they had maintained the independence of an ally, and defeated an unjustifiable demand made by two strong powers on a weak nation.

In this country most persons approved what the Ministers had thus done. Even those who in secret sympathised with the autocratic powers of Eastern Europe were disposed to

think with Lord Clarendon that it was more dignified to be 'squaring at Russia, than sticking pins into Naples;' and Lord Palmerston gained more in public estimation from this single action than from his whole previous policy. Unfortunately the presence of the fleet in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles suggested to him a much more questionable proceeding. Some British subjects, among whom were Mr. Finlay, who is famous from his history, and Don Pacifico, who is famous from his claims, had long complained that they had been unable to obtain redress from the Greek Government. Lord Palmerston thought that Sir W. Parker might be instructed on his return from the Dardanelles to call with the squadron at Athens and demand reparation. 'If the Greek Government does not strike'—so he expressed himself in a private letter to Mr. Wyse, the British Minister at Athens—'Parker must do so.' The claim at the outset attracted very little attention either in the Cabinet or among the public, though Lord John apparently doubted the expediency of strong measures.

Woburn Abbey: January 12, 1850.

My dear Palmerston,—I send you back this correspondence, as I think the complaint is hardly worth the interposition of the British Lion.

Baring somewhat remonstrates against the constant employment of our ships to support our diplomatic agents, and I was lately told by one of these last that he wished his interference was only ordered on large occasions and not on every case of a debt of 20*l*.

I think that this is a case in point.—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston, however, clung to a policy to which, in fact, he had already committed himself in private to Mr. Wyse; and when Lord John compelled him to alter his public despatch he protested against the alteration in the following note:—

C[arlton] G[ardens]: January 26, 1850.

My dear John Russell,—I have altered the draft to which your note relates, to meet your objection.

But upon the general principle in question, I would beg to ask—First, what is to be done in cases in which all diplomatic persuasion has been exhausted in vain to obtain from one of these small States

just redress for a wrong done to a British subject: are we to sit down contented and tell the complainant that he must bear the injury as well as he can?

Secondly, I would ask, if that is to be our course, what is the purpose for which in time of peace we keep ships of war in foreign stations, and why we should not agree to Cobden's motions for reducing a useless force, and thus save an unnecessary expense.

If these cases have multiplied during the last two or three years beyond all former example, it is in consequence of the prevalence of the notion that British subjects may be wronged with impunity, and that the British Government will not stir hand or foot to help them. It is not so with French or North American citizens, and no State ventures to ill-use a Russian.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

In the meanwhile Sir W. Parker, acting on Lord Palmerston's private instructions, had commenced to strike, and had already seized various vessels, the property not only of the Greek Government but of Greek citizens. When the news of these reprisals reached London they excited considerable consternation. The Russian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to remonstrate; the French Minister tendered the good offices of France; and the Cabinet, for the first time fully aware of the policy to which Lord Palmerston had committed it, readily grasped, though against Lord Palmerston's opinion, at the offer of French mediation. The Cabinet intended that Mr. Wyse should be instructed to lend every assistance to Baron Gros, the French mediator. But Lord Palmerston, in his despatch, carefully told Mr. Wyse to take no part in the negotiation unless expressly invited to do so, and then only if it should appear expedient. The Cabinet intended that Mr. Wyse should have some discretion in compromising the claim of Don Pacifico. No power of compromising it was inserted in Lord Palmerston's despatch. The Queen was the first to observe what Lord Palmerston had done, or rather had omitted to do.

February 18, 1850.

My dear Palmerston,—The Queen asked me yesterday about the despatch to Wyse, and said she had not seen it again. I told her what had happened, and she expressed great displeasure that the despatch had been sent off without inserting the discretionary power

to Wyse and Parker which I had recommended. You saw that the Cabinet all approved of such discretion being left to our Minister and Admiral. Here, then, is a despatch gone on an important subject which is not in conformity with the Queen's opinion, or mine, or that of the Cabinet. This is a serious deviation from the usual and right course on such subjects. It can only be, in part, repaired, by your preparing a draft immediately to go by the earliest opportunity.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

It is due to Lord Palmerston to add his answer:—

C. G.: February 18, 1850.

My dear John Russell,—I have received your letter of to-day, and I send you a memorandum which I received from the Queen yesterday, in which she says that you had told her that I had sent off, *unaltered*, the despatch of which, on Friday, she sent me the draft, accompanied by a memorandum from you suggesting two alterations, in which she said that she herself also concurred. I have sent the Queen the draft itself with the alteration which I did make in it, and I also sent her your note stating that such alteration was 'very good,' and I leave it to you to explain to the Queen how you can reconcile with the facts of the case your assertion to her that I had sent off that draft *unaltered*.

The second point to which your Memorandum related was a discretionary power to Wyse as to entertaining any proposition that might be made to him. That point was discussed in the Cabinet on Saturday. The only claim to which that question could possibly apply is that of Pacifico; and, in deference to the opinion of the Cabinet, I sent off a despatch to Wyse by the overland Mediterranean mail of Saturday, giving him a discretionary authority to entertain any reasonable proposition as to the detailed amount of Pacifico's claim.

The despatch of Friday was sent off by the messenger, whom it was very important not to delay longer than that day.

I should have sent you the draft of Saturday before I sent it off; but, when I went back to my room from the Cabinet, I found Drouyn de Lhuys waiting to see me, and he kept me so long that I had barely time to write my despatch and have it copied out for signature before the moment when the messenger who was to take it had to start by the railway train to Dover.

I was not made aware on Friday that there would be an opportunity of writing to Greece on the next day, or the Friday's despatch might have been kept for Saturday.

I think, however, that you will see, from what I have stated, that you have, according to a colloquial phrase, 'picked me up before I was down.'—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

The excuse which Lord Palmerston thus made was, however plausible, unsound. Lord John had not complained that the despatch had been sent unaltered, but that it had been sent without the addition which he had required, and which the Cabinet had approved. And the fact that Lord Palmerston himself found it necessary to make the addition on the Saturday proves that Lord John was right in saying that the despatch of Friday should not have left England without this addition to it.[1] Hardly a month, moreover, elapsed before a similar difficulty arose. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister at London, finding that the negotiations at Athens made no progress, suggested to Lord Palmerston that the matter should be arranged between them. Lord Palmerston closed with the offer, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys and he agreed on a basis of compromise. Instructions were at once sent by France to Baron Gros at Athens to announce the conclusion of the arrangement. Lord Palmerston neglected to make a similar notification to Mr. Wyse, and it was not until the omission was noticed that he was compelled to send a special courier *viâ* Trieste with the necessary instructions. The courier arrived too late; Mr. Wyse, before he came, had ordered the renewal of reprisals, and the Greeks had at last yielded. The French Government, deeply mortified at the whole proceeding, at once recalled M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Lord John, of course, at once announced the fact to the Queen, and received the following answer, which has already been published by Sir T. Martin:—

Buckingham Palace: May 15, 1850.

My dear Lord John,—Both the Queen and myself are exceedingly sorry at the news your letter conveyed to us. We are not surprised, however, that Lord Palmerston's mode of doing business should not be borne by a susceptible French Government with the same good humour and forbearance as by his colleagues. The Queen hopes to be well enough to see you on Sunday at one o'clock.—Ever yours truly,

ALBERT.

[1] For these despatches see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1850, pp. 91, 93.

But this was not all. Though the Cabinet met on the 16th to consider M. Drouyn de Lhuys's recall, Lord Palmerston, speaking in the House of Commons in the evening, said that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had gone to Paris 'in order personally to be the medium of communication between the two Governments as to these matters.' He persuaded Lord Lansdowne to make a similar statement in the Lords. And the next day, when the truth was known, he absented himself from the House, and left Lord John in the humiliating position of having to explain away, as best he could, his colleague's language.

Lord John felt bitterly the whole of this transaction. He did not, indeed, agree with the view which was taken of the affair at Court. The Queen thought Lord Palmerston wrong both in matter and manner; Lord John, on the contrary, thought him right in the matter of the dispute and wrong only in the manner of enforcing it. But he could not refrain from the conclusion that, after what had occurred, and was constantly occurring, Lord Palmerston could not with any propriety be left at the Foreign Office: and he told both Lord Lansdowne and the Queen that he had determined on a change at the end of the session. He communicated his decision to Lord Palmerston in the following letter :—

Private] Pembroke Lodge: May 22, 1850.

My dear Palmerston,—I saw the Queen on Monday, by her desire, and it is right I should inform you of the course which I stated to her I should pursue, and which she has been pleased to sanction. I first stated that all your colleagues were prepared to assume the responsibility of your conduct on the Greek question, and that if any change took place on that question it must be a change of the entire Ministry. The Queen deprecated the resignation of the Ministry, and desired me not to propose it. I then said that there were some questions pending in Parliament which might make that resignation necessary. I would not, however, anticipate votes, of which the importance must be weighed at the time. But, supposing the Ministry to arrive at the end of the session, it was my duty to tell her Majesty that I thought the interests of the country required that a change should take place in the Foreign Department; that, without imputing blame to you, I thought it must be confessed that, looking at the position of England, her readiness to acknowledge all

forms of government, despotic and democratic, and her wish to respect the rights of all foreign nations, she was encountered by more hostile feelings in her course than was natural or necessary; that I thought, if you were to take some other department, we might continue the same line of foreign policy without *giving* the same offence; that I should object to any change which implied that we preferred the intimate alliance of Austria and Russia to those we had hitherto maintained; that, with respect to the particular arrangement to be made, I could not make any definitive proposal at the present time. The Queen assented entirely to all that I had stated, but declared her opinion that the change to be proposed should not take place later than the end of the present session. I will only add that I consulted Lord Lansdowne before and since my audience with the Queen. He has made a suggestion as to the proposed arrangements, which I shall be glad to communicate to you, as well as various details on this matter, when we have an opportunity of talking it over together.—I remain, yours very faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

It was Lord John's intention, when he wrote this letter, to take the post of difficulty himself, and to assume personally the management of the Foreign Office. But, as he could hardly hope that his health would be equal to the multifarious duties of that department, the lead of the House of Commons, and the general supervision of the Administration, he intended simultaneously to accept a peerage. So matters stood on the 22nd of May. But in the next few days the conduct of the Conservative party completely altered the situation. Lord Stanley gave notice of a motion, which he ultimately proposed on June 17, in which he asked the Lords to declare their regret that 'various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other powers.' A Minister, who thought—as Lord John thought—that Lord Palmerston had been right in matter, and wrong only in manner, could not avoid directing his colleagues to meet this motion with a direct negative. But a Ministry which resisted Lord Stanley was forced from the very nature of the case into fresh alliance with Lord Palmerston. The result of the debate, moreover, made this plain; for Lord Stanley's motion was

carried by a considerable majority, and Ministers had only to consider whether they should retire from office or ask the House of Commons to support them against the Lords. They chose—and few constitutional authorities will doubt that they rightly chose—the latter alternative; and Mr. Roebuck was selected to bring forward a motion in the Commons, formally approving the policy which Lord Palmerston had adopted. The debate which took place on this motion was one of the most memorable which ever occurred in the House of Commons. It was the last in which Sir Robert Peel was ever destined to take part; it was signalled on the second night by the remarkable speech in which Lord Palmerston himself, from the dusk of one day to the dawn of another, vindicated his policy. It was closed on the fourth night on behalf of the Government by Lord John, who of course suppressed the annoyance which he had so frequently felt at Lord Palmerston's conduct, and confined himself to a generous defence of his colleague as a Minister of England. It was followed by a triumphant division, and it left Lord Palmerston the most popular man in the country. History had, in fact, repeated itself. And, just as the struggle which had taken place in the Melbourne Cabinet in 1840 had resulted in a victory for Lord Palmerston, so the circumstances which had apparently prepared his fall in 1850 had made his position more secure than ever.

During the many disputes for which the previous years had been remarkable, and which have been partly related in this chapter, Lord John had undoubtedly filled a middle position between the Court and the Foreign Office. He had almost uniformly agreed with the principles on which his colleague had acted, and he had almost as uniformly regretted and reproved the manner in which Lord Palmerston had conducted his policy. During 1846, 1847, 1848, and 1849, the Queen had addressed her remonstrances to Lord John. It has been recently shown that at the commencement of 1850 she adopted another course, and carried her complaints to the Irish Viceroy. It is perhaps unnecessary, in this memoir, to inquire too closely into the reasons which induced the Queen to take this unusual course; it is sufficient to acknowledge

that throughout the whole of his Administration she gave to Lord John the support which a Minister has a right to expect from his sovereign; and, even in those cases in which she dissented from his opinions, accepted his recommendations.

While, however, the discussion on the Greek claims was being carried on, and the Queen was complaining of Lord Palmerston's neglect to bring his despatches into conformity with her wishes and the directions of the Cabinet, she drew up the memorandum on the relations between a Foreign Minister and his sovereign, which has been published under her own authority. The memorandum, prepared in March, was, however, not issued till the middle of August, and Lord Palmerston in acknowledging it declared that he would 'not fail to attend to the directions which it contains.'

With the issue of this memorandum the curtain fell on the first act in this strange drama. In words Lord Palmerston had fully submitted; and for a few weeks the Court was pleased to observe that he was

> exceedingly attentive and active, writing and explaining to the Queen all that is going on.

But in practice the victory was with Lord Palmerston. The attack upon his policy had not merely failed: it had covered him with fresh popularity. Four years of office had deprived him of the confidence of the Crown; but he had gained, in exchange for it, the confidence of the people.

CHAPTER XX.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF 1848.

THE extraordinary events which agitated continental Europe in the early months of 1848 naturally made a strong impression on the people of this kingdom. In Great Britain, where the commercial crisis of the previous autumn had thrown multitudes out of employment, the people were easily persuaded that their social advancement could readily be secured by political changes. In Ireland, the calm which had been temporarily established by Lord Clarendon's administration was ruffled by the fall of Louis Philippe. The discontented resumed their agitation ; their leaders sent a deputation to M. Lamartine to beg for the sympathy and aid of France ; their organs used language inciting to violence ; Lord Clarendon declared that civil war was imminent ; and Lord John, moved by these circumstances, on March 30 drew up the following memorandum :—

STATE OF IRELAND. March 30, 1848.

The increasing danger of an outbreak in Ireland, and the prospect of the misery it would occasion, make it necessary for the Government to give their urgent attention to such measures as may be best calculated for such a crisis.

Lord Clarendon points out the humanity and the economy of immediate steps, but it may be doubted whether those he suggests are sufficient to meet the evil.

I will not point out here the quick spread of disaffection, the equal danger of trials for high treason and of leaving at large the instigators to rebellion, the misery prevailing in the country, the heavy rates now levied, the position of the Roman Catholic clergy, the successful risings of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Milan, and Sicily. It is sufficient to glance at these things.

But to the course to be adopted. We might suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, and call out yeomanry or volunteers from the North.

But this would be to rely entirely on the Protestants, and would probably unite the whole Roman Catholic population against us.

We might proceed in our present course, only adding measures of conciliation to our present prosecutions.

But it seems to me that this course would give an open road to the conspirators, and allow them to mature their plans.

I should therefore propose—

1. That a Bill be brought in to control ejectments, on the principle I have already stated to the Cabinet.

2. That the repayments made to the Government upon the loans of the two last years be laid out in further loans, as already agreed upon between Sir Charles Wood and the Irish members.

3. That a million in Exchequer Bills be advanced to the Exchequer Bill Loan Commissioners for the purpose of making useful works in Ireland, especially works of drainage.

4. That the Habeas Corpus Act be suspended for one year.

5. That a sum of 400,000*l.* a year be levied by a land-tax in Ireland, and paid over to the Roman Catholic members of the Bequests Commission, to be laid out by them, either in the purchase of glebe houses and glebe lands, or in the payment of the parish priests of Ireland.

I have made these propositions large and decided, as I do not believe that less will suffice for a disease so deep-seated and so threatening.

I say nothing of the Landlord and Tenant Bill. It may go to a select committee, but I cannot expect any real good from it.

J. RUSSELL.

Thus, in March 1848, Lord John was again reverting to the policy which he had desired in the previous autumn; and proposing to couple a large measure of precaution with still larger measures of conciliation and reform. But he soon found that difficulties, which were almost insurmountable, interfered with this policy. The Cabinet—or at any rate the four members of it, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Grey, and Sir C. Wood, whose opinions are preserved—agreed that his minor recommendations were desirable if they were practicable. But they leaned to the opinion that any interference with the right of ejectment would require to be very carefully guarded; and that any proposal for the endowment of Roman Catholicism should only be made after previous concert with the head of the Roman Catholic

Church. Remedial legislation, on large and broad foundations, was for the moment impossible. Protective legislation was almost equally difficult. Lord Clarendon, writing on the 1st of April, told Lord John that, if Parliament would at once assent to the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, he thought the time was ripe for this measure; but he waived his demand for it because in the opinion of the Cabinet the Bill could not be carried without long and protracted debates.

Thus the condition of Ireland naturally excited grave anxiety; and on the 3rd of April, Lord Jocelyn, who was acting with the knowledge both of Lord Clarendon and of Lord John, drew public attention to it. He said—

I believe there is not a single man in this House who has not seen with indignation and disgust the language of certain mischievous and traitorous men; avowedly with the object of overturning the institutions of the country—avowedly with the object of levying war upon her Majesty's Crown, by exciting to overt acts of rebellion her Majesty's subjects in that country. I believe it is with similar feelings that the public of this loyal country have seen that men have been found in Ireland so void of their own and of all national honour as to be at this moment seeking in a foreign country for foreign arms to carry out their traitorous purposes. . . . I would ask the noble Lord whether he thinks that there is sufficient power still vested in the Government to crush in its birth this rebellious spirit; or whether he does not think that the time has come . . . when it is the duty of Parliament to give the Executive Minister in Ireland power to enable him to meet with vigour and effect whatever the emergency may require.

Lord John replied—

It is quite true that language of the nature described has been used in Ireland—language exciting to rebellion against the Crown . . . with a view to establish Ireland as a separate nation independent of the Crown of these realms . . . That language has been followed by the manufacture of pikes, by the formation of rifle clubs, and various other preparations, which are openly avowed by the press of that country with a view of creating a civil war in Ireland. . . . It is, however, a most difficult and most delicate matter for the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to consider what steps he should take. . . . I hope I need not assure the House that, whilst the Lord Lieutenant is anxious to put down disaffection and rebellion, it is his earnest wish

to listen to complaints, and to apply, so far as is in his power, a remedy or an alleviation to any distresses or evils that exist. . . . But the noble Lord may rest assured that it is the full determination of her Majesty's Government, having the utmost confidence in Lord Clarendon, and in his administration of public affairs, to do all that is in their power to support the law in Ireland, and maintain the peace of that country; and, furthermore, that we shall not shrink, should it prove necessary so to do, from asking this House for the grant of any further powers that may be requisite.

This reply gave great satisfaction to Lord Clarendon, who at once thanked Lord John for his 'stout declaration.' It gave less satisfaction to Conservative politicians, who then, as ever, thought that the true remedy for Irish discontent was English coercion. But, as a matter of fact, the Cabinet was already deliberating on the powers which the disturbed condition of Ireland made necessary; and four days afterwards Sir George Grey introduced a measure, which is known in history as the Crown and Government Security Bill, by which the provisions of an Act of 1796, introduced by Mr. Pitt, and of an Act of 1817, carried by Lord Castlereagh, were extended to Ireland. By the advice of Lord Campbell, offences against these Acts were declared to be not treason but felony, punishable with transportation; but

A new provision of unprecedented severity was imported into the law, and any person who, by open and advised speaking, compassed the intimidation either of the Crown or of Parliament, was made guilty of felony.[1]

To the first portion of this Bill no one raised any objection. It applied to Ireland a law which was already in force in England; and it mitigated the savage punishment awarded to high treason. To the second part of it grave objections were at once made. It was resented as an interference with the liberty of speech, and Lord John was constrained to promise that its duration should be limited. With this concession the Bill became law. But before it actually passed, at the end of April, the tension in Ireland had become less severe. The Irish, in fact, were discouraged by the rebuff which their

[1] I am here, as elsewhere, reproducing language I have previously used—*History of England*, iv. 331.

leaders received in France, and by the failure of the Chartists in England. In the former country M. Lamartine told an Irish deputation that it was not meet for France to intervene in the affairs of a country with which she wished to remain at peace. In the latter the energetic measures of the Government prevented the monster procession which had been intended to carry a petition from Kennington to Westminster.

Lord John in the first instance had thought that the Chartists might have been permitted to cross Westminster Bridge; and, after delivering their petition at the doors of Parliament, have been turned off by the police to Charing Cross and the Strand.[1] But reflection and consultation showed the dangers of this course; and a Cabinet was hastily summoned, which the Duke of Wellington was invited to attend, at which it was determined to prevent the procession from crossing the bridge. After the Cabinet, the Duke saw Colonel Rowan, one of the Commissioners of Police, and wrote to Lord John—

London: April 6, 1848.

My dear Lord,—Since I came to the Horse Guards I have seen Col. Rowan, and we can be prepared to support him in stopping the procession into the town at whatever point may be most convenient to the police and the Government.

My own opinion is that it is desirable that the procession should be forced to detach its deputation with its petition at as great a distance as possible from this centre of the communications of Government with the troops and with Parliament, and of the members of both Houses of Parliament.

It will be creditable to Government that these communications should not be liable to interruption.

It appears to me that the place at which the procession shall be stopped is entirely at the option of Government.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON

So wrote the first soldier of his generation, with a confidence in his own resources which his successors have not always displayed. On the same evening the Home Secretary stated publicly in Parliament that the Government had directed a Proclamation to be issued warning all loyal and

[1] *Recollections and Suggestions*, 252.

peaceable persons to abstain from taking part in the procession. This firm attitude on the part of the Government, and the conduct of the upper and middle classes, who came forward in their tens of thousands and enrolled themselves as special constables, convinced the Chartists that discretion was the better part of valour. Sir G. Grey wrote on the evening of the proposed demonstration—

H. O. : April 9, 1848.

My dear Lord John,—Since C. Wood wrote to you, I have had a visit from a Mr. Gurney, who tells me he had been this evening with Mr. Ernest Jones, and that the Chartist leaders were much subdued and frightened. Mr. Gurney said he urged on Jones to issue a notice to-morrow abandoning the procession ; but that Jones thought this impossible, saying the leaders would gladly do so, but that the people could not be controlled. He went on, however, to say that, if the meeting was allowed to take place, and some sort of demonstration to be made, on the condition that the procession should not come near the House of Commons, he thought the people would be satisfied, and that the affair might pass off quietly. I told him I had given my final orders to the police, that the leaders must be aware of the determination of the Government ; that they would know to-morrow morning what orders the police had, and must act accordingly. But putting this information with yours from Mr. H.,[1] I think the course which we have decided to take is right and will lead to a quiet termination of this business.—Yours truly,

G. G.

Sir George Grey's anticipations were fulfilled. To quote Lady John's diary :—

God be praised, all has ended quietly. . . . John and I went between nine and ten to Downing Street. I divided the day between his room and Lady M. Wood's, where was also Lord Grey. One cheering report after another prevented us from having a moment of alarm after one o'clock—the hour at which the procession was to have left Kennington Common, instead of which the people quietly dispersed. . . .

11th.—Walk with John. Visits and congratulations without end.

The Duke of Bedford wrote—

I wish you joy most heartily on the events of yesterday, which cannot fail to produce the best effects everywhere, and show the

[1] I cannot decipher this gentleman's name, and I have merely inserted the first letter of it.

country and the world that we do not mean to be scattered and trodden down like other Governments, and that there is resolution and power here to assert the supremacy of law and order. I hear but one opinion as to the conduct of the Government among rational men of all parties.—Yours affectionately,

B.

Four days later, when all England was rejoicing at the victory of order, Lord John had his own reasons for thankfulness, for on that day his wife presented him with his second son.

Wi' the violet and gowan he breathed his first breath,
They smile, and grim winter disarmed we see :
To our country, still echoing danger and death,
Like a cherub of peace came my bonny Wee-wee.[1]

The birth of this boy did much to complete the cure which had commenced with the fortnight's change at St. Leonards. As Lady John wrote on the 16th of May—

This child has done much already to restore his health and strength. Summer weather and the success of all his political measures for the last anxious months have also done much, although he still has some cough.

The suppression of the Chartist procession on the 10th of April had, indeed, improved the political outlook both in England and in Ireland. Lord Clarendon[2] wrote with increasing confidence, and the rapid passage of the Crown and Government Security Bill armed him with fresh machinery for checking disaffection. Young Ireland in the early days of the Repeal movement had followed the stirring counsels of the 'Nation' newspaper. But a party had now arisen in

[1] The child's pet-name.

[2] Writing on March 30, before the suppression of the Chartists, Lord Clarendon said : 'No Tipperary landlord ever received more threatening notices than I do, or more warnings as to when and how I am to be assassinated. I can't say these disturb me at all ; but, as Dublin is full of the greatest ruffians on earth, I am obliged to observe a certain amount of precaution, and I only go out in the carriage for a short walk in the park, which makes me nearly a state prisoner. Redington is ill and absent ; so is the Chancellor, though he can come to town occasionally when he is sent for. I have little or no assistance from anybody, and the life I lead is hardly endurable.' Lord John did not always agree with Lord Clarendon's proposals for energetic coercion, but he recognised his great qualities, and gave him a loyal support in his difficult position.

favour of stronger action than that which was advocated by the 'Nation.' The prophet of this party was Mr. Mitchel; its organ the 'United Irishman.'

The deliberate policy of the 'United Irishman' was to force the hand first of the Government and then of the Irish people. Mitchel had made up his mind so to rouse the passions of the people as to compel the Government to take steps for the suppression of rebellion by the arrest of some of the leaders. Mitchel calculated upon the populace rising to defend or rescue their heroes—and then the game would be afoot; Ireland would be entered in rebellion; and the rest would be for fate to decide. . . . He kept on urging the people to prepare for warlike effort, and every week's 'United Irishman' contained long descriptions of how to make pikes and how to use them; how to cast bullets, how to make streets as dangerous for the hoofs of cavalry horses as Bruce made the field of Bannockburn. Some of the recipes, if we may call them so, were of a peculiarly ferocious kind. The use of vitriol was recommended among other destructive agencies. . . . In the mean time the Government had to do something. The Lord Lieutenant could not go on for ever allowing a newspaper to scream out appeals to rebellion, and to publish every week minute descriptions of the easiest and quickest way of killing English soldiers.[1]

Lord Clarendon accordingly decided to proceed against Mr. Mitchel under the new Act which enabled him to suppress a newspaper and to punish its editor. The trial was watched with great anxiety by the friends both of order and of disorder. The former thought it necessary to take the steps usual in Ireland, but repugnant to Englishmen, for securing a fair jury. The latter placarded the walls of Dublin with a notice that the curse of God, and the fate of perjurers and assassins would fall on the jurors who convicted John Mitchel.[2] The verdict was unexpectedly satisfactory to the Viceroy. The jury convicted the prisoner. He was sentenced to fourteen years' transportation,

hurried under an escort of cavalry through the streets of Dublin, put on board a ship of war, and in a few hours was on his way to Bermuda.

[1] I have purposely, in the whole of this description, and in the subsequent extracts, used the words of an Irish writer—MacCarthy's *History of Our Own Times*, ch. xviii.

[2] One of these placards is among Lord John's papers.

The result ought perhaps to have shown Lord Clarendon that the danger was not so great as he had apprehended. But it must in fairness be recollected that it is one thing to judge after the event, and another to be wise at the time. The symptoms at the moment seemed very threatening. The 'United Irishman' was succeeded by the 'Irish Felon;' the language of the 'Nation' became more violent; and Lord Clarendon thought it necessary to arrest the editors of both of these papers, as well as the three editors of the 'Tribune.' Mr. Smith O'Brien, Mr. Meagher, and other leaders of the Young Ireland party thereupon left Dublin and withdrew into the country.

They held a series of gatherings, which might be described as meetings of agitators or marshallings of rebels, according as one was pleased to interpret their purpose.

Lord Clarendon, in his confidential letters, talked continually of the 'insurrection' and of 'the rebel army;' and on the 20th of July the news was so grave that Lord John postponed his son's christening, which had been fixed for that day, and went up to London. On the following day the Cabinet decided on suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, and on Saturday the 22nd Lord John rose at a special morning sitting of the House of Commons to introduce a measure for the purpose. So little had he anticipated the necessity for doing so that he had asked a party of friends to dine with him at Pembroke Lodge; and when he left home he charged his wife to do the honours of his dinner table, to which he thought he had no chance of returning. But at eight o'clock he was back at Richmond radiant with the news that the Bill had passed through all its stages. One of the guests at his dinner-table, however, has told the story:—

The House of Commons was wonderful on the 22nd. Nobody had the least idea of it, not the Cabinet. It was an inspiration of John Russell's: he began by making an excellent speech, an hour and a half. When they divided he made a speech in the lobby, begged the people not to go away, and said he meant to propose to go on with the Bill. To his own amazement, as much as anybody's, he found no opposition, and carried the Bill through at the sitting. . . .

It was a great event, for which neither the Lord Lieutenant nor anybody in Ireland will have been the least prepared.

Mr. Greville did not, in this passage, exaggerate the importance of Lord John's success. Just as the 'United Irishman' had tried to force the hands of the Government, so Lord John had forced the hands of Mr. Smith O'Brien and his associates. Within a week after the passage of the measure, Mr. Smith O'Brien made his abortive attack on the police at Ballingarry which led to his arrest.

Yet for a few days after the passage of the Bill the anxiety of those in authority continued to be great. The christening of Lord John's child, postponed in consequence of the bad news, was fixed for July 27, and Lord Melgund (the present Lord Minto) and Sir George Grey were asked to be the boy's sponsors. To Lord and Lady John's consternation, Lady Grey arrived at Richmond without her husband, with the news that all the South of Ireland had risen, and that the troops had refused to act against the insurgents. Agitated by intelligence which corresponded only too correctly with Lord Clarendon's anticipations, Lord John, instead of returning to Pembroke Lodge with his guests to cut the christening cake and drink the baby's health, drove straight to London. Stopping at Apsley House on his way to Downing Street, he had the satisfaction to find that the Duke of Wellington refused to believe that portion of the news which related to the misconduct of the troops. From Apsley House he proceeded to the Cabinet. One of his colleagues, Lord Campbell, said—

> John Russell tried to look firm, but was evidently much appalled; and we were all in deep dismay. The Duke of Wellington was sent for, and orders were issued for pouring in reinforcements of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and ships of war from all quarters.

But, before the evening closed, the Ministry learned that no general rising of the Irish had occurred, and that the news, which had been telegraphed from Liverpool, was totally destitute of foundation.

At the close of this anxious session Lord John set out on a journey of unusual importance. Just ten years had passed

since he had paid his last flying visit to Ireland. He had gone there almost at the close of Lord Normanby's viceroyalty, when an Irish administration, conducted on Irish ideas, had spread comparative contentment and peace throughout Ireland. He determined to return in 1848 to see with his own eyes the condition of the country. He carried with him his wife and his eldest son and daughter. They left Euston on a bright summer's morning at nine o'clock. The railway company, even in those days, provided a separate compartment for the Prime Minister and his family. And Lord and Lady John found almost as much as the children to occupy and interest their minds. For the journey from Crewe was new to them all. Mr. Stephenson's tubular bridge across the Conway, the prototype of the still greater bridge over the Menai Straits, had just been completed. The party walked through it; and, while Lord John inspected it, Lady John had time to admire the magnificent ruins of the neighbouring castle. That night the party slept at Bangor; on the following day the weather was again propitious, and they crossed the straits, the workmen on the tubular bridge cheering heartily all the time; proceeded in a special train to Holyhead, where they found the 'Banshee,' the fastest steamer afloat, ready to take them to Kingstown. The party landed amidst an immense crowd, through which they were escorted by the police; and Lady John felt some natural apprehensions for her husband's safety. But the crowd was rather curious than ill-natured, and the Russells arrived safely at the viceregal lodge. The visit incidentally gave Lord John the means of going to a place which had lately acquired a personal interest to him. Lord Ludlow, dying without issue, had left his property at Ardsalla in Meath to the Duke of Bedford; and, in January 1847, the Duke had intimated to Lord John his intention of settling it on him and his son.[1] It was natural, therefore, that Lord John should desire, during his stay in Ireland, to visit a pro-

[1] In making this communication, the Duke referred to the uncertainty of human life, and said, 'I have had two merciful escapes from assassination, while you have had one during the past year.' Lady Russell is unable to recollect the incident to which the Duke referred. But it is probably that to which Mr. Greville alludes in *Memoirs*, part ii., iii. 65.

perty in which he had so direct an interest. He found a good Elizabethan house in a pretty country on the banks of the Boyne; and, though in driving from Dublin he saw many wretched cabins and much careless farming, the people seemed on the whole more prosperous than he had expected to find them.

Thus in almost every respect the short fortnight's visit to Ireland was productive both of advantage and pleasure. One disagreeable incident, however, was connected with it. Mr. Smith O'Brien, who was awaiting his trial, persuaded his counsel to serve a subpœna on Lord John to give evidence upon it. When Lord John, therefore, turned his back on Ireland on September 9, he had the disagreeable prospect of returning in a fortnight's time to be questioned and cross-questioned by Irish counsel on matters on which he could really throw no light. The sea, which was propitious on his arrival, favoured his departure, and he and his family arrived safely at Greenock. There they rested a couple of days, leaving on the 13th amidst much cheering for Perth, and proceeding on the 16th to Taymouth, where Lord John left his wife and children, and joined the Queen at Balmoral. He returned to Taymouth on September 21; and, reaching Glasgow on the 26th, he had the satisfaction of receiving a message from Lord Clarendon that his presence at Mr. Smith O'Brien's trial would not be required. This welcome news enabled him to alter his plans; and, embarking at Greenock on the 'Banshee,' which had been sent to carry him to Ireland, he steamed up Loch Fyne to Inverary. More than forty years had passed since in his boyish journal he had pronounced the castle the most beautiful place he had ever seen. He returned to it now as Prime Minister; and his wife, unconsciously imitating his forgotten language, described it in her diary as 'this most glorious place.' After a short stay at Inverary the party travelled to Oban and Callander, through the Trossachs to Edinburgh and Minto, whence in the middle of October they returned to Richmond.

During this tour the state of things which he had witnessed in Ireland, and his conversations with Lord Clarendon, had largely occupied Lord John's thoughts. For the fourth

year in succession the potato was failing; famine was again imminent; and, though the population of Ireland was decreasing at the rate of 250,000 persons a year, it was no longer possible to doubt that the people were too numerous for the soil. Lord Clarendon consequently favoured, and Lord John was inclined to adopt, a large and well-considered scheme of emigration. This measure alone, however, was not likely to bring peace to Ireland. The Roman Catholic clergy, dependent for their livelihood on the contributions of their congregations, were necessarily sharing the distress of their flocks; and Lord John thought the moment opportune for reverting to the scheme—which he had favoured for ten years—of making some provision out of the resources of the State for the priests of the Church of Rome. He felt, however, that, while such a proposition was certain to excite the rancour of extreme Protestants, it would be useless if it were not accepted as a boon by the Roman Catholics; and, at Lord Clarendon's suggestion, he opened his mind to Mr. Redington, who, as Under Secretary to the Irish Government, as a large Irish landlord, and as a Roman Catholic, was specially qualified to advise him.

Premising that the proposal should not be made without the concurrence of the Pope, and unless there was a fair chance of its being carried—premising also that the provision, which should be sufficient and complete, should be raised by a tax on Ireland—Lord John proposed to set aside a sum of 500,000*l.* a year, for the endowment of the clergy, the provision of glebes, and the repair of chapels, to be raised by a land-tax of 1*s.* 6*d.* in the pound, and by a house-tax on houses of 10*l.* value and upwards. As this taxation would produce more than the requisite half-million, Lord John proposed to devote any surplus to emigration, and to the relief of those unions which could not bear the pressure of the poor rate. In a very long letter, of the 7th of September, Mr. Redington, while fully acknowledging the liberality and wisdom of Lord John's intentions, pointed out that the Presbyterians of Ulster—the most loyal province of Ireland—would certainly resist a proposal for taxing them for the support of the Roman Catholic religion. He suggested, therefore,

that the cost should be thrown on the Consolidated Fund; and, in order to recoup the necessary outlay, that the Irish Church should be 'revised;' that the whole of its revenues should be paid into the Exchequer; that full compensation should be made for all existing interests; and that the cost of a moderate and reduced establishment should also be paid by the State.

This correspondence showed plainly the extreme difficulty of doing anything. Mr. Redington, representing the opinions of the Irish, was practically declaring that the partial disendowment of the Irish Church must accompany and provide for the endowment of the Roman Catholic faith. Lord John, on the contrary, acquainted with feeling in England, with the opinion of many of his own colleagues, and recollecting the history of the Appropriation Clause, was painfully conscious of his inability to carry any such plan. Holding this opinion, he determined on approaching the Pope, and of ascertaining his view of the subject. He accordingly drew up the following memorandum for submission to the Pope, should the Cabinet concur in it:—

The Queen's Government have under their consideration a proposition for making a provision by law for the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland. Such provision to include stipends to the bishops and clergy, and adequate sums for the repair and maintenance of places of worship.

Such provision, if proposed, would be made permanent. No interference with the spiritual independence or ecclesiastical arrangements of the Roman Catholic Church is in contemplation.

The Queen's Government feel that in making such a proposition they would have not only to contend with the opposition of many of the Protestants of Great Britain, but also to overcome the repugnance of a considerable portion of the Roman Catholic body itself.

Before they proceed further, therefore, they deem it right to inform the head of the Roman Catholic Church of their views.

They consider that the poverty of the Roman Catholic clergy of the South of Ireland, and the miserable condition of their chapels, make it desirable that the State should interpose for the relief of the clergy and the due maintenance of the fabric of the places of worship.

But they feel also that if in the opinion of the Pope such provision would be objectionable on any ground, religious or temporal, the prospect of being able to carry such a measure, or if carried of making it useful for the temporal welfare of Ireland, would be greatly obscured.

This proposition is therefore submitted for the mature consideration of his Holiness, whose enlightened friendship for Great Britain, and whose regard for the Church over which he presides, are so universally known and acknowledged.

J. R.

The proposal did not find much favour in the Cabinet. Its members, indeed, were agreed on the propriety and expediency of its principle, but they were alarmed at the small amount of support which it was likely to receive, and the large amount of opposition which it was certain to incur. The Pope, moreover, flying from the Vatican, was no longer able to exercise, as a fugitive, the influence which he had possessed as a sovereign. Circumstances thus compelled Lord John to abandon a proposal which had been occupying his attention ever since the withdrawal of the Appropriation Clause. But these circumstances made it all the more necessary to press forward some other large remedial measure; and accordingly both Lord John and Lord Clarendon were increasingly anxious to devise an adequate measure of emigration. There was, however, one grave difficulty in their path. The party in the Cabinet which followed the guidance of Lord Grey, and which comprised his brother-in-law Sir C. Wood, and his cousin Sir G. Grey, was strongly opposed to spending more money on Ireland. They thought that a remedy for the over-population of Ireland could only be found in the gradual operation of natural laws, and could not be discovered by creating a fresh demand for Irish labour. The true thing to do—so Sir Charles Wood frankly told Lord Clarendon—was to do nothing. And Lord Grey only differed from his brother-in-law in this conclusion because he was in favour of a scheme which, while doing something for Ireland, would do a great deal for Canada. The Canadians were anxious to construct a railway from Halifax to Quebec, and Lord Grey suggested that a loan of 5,000,000*l.* might be advanced for the purpose, and that Irish emigrants might be

employed on constructing the line. The interest on the loan could be easily provided for.

The way in which I think we might do this, and to which to my surprise even Wood, with all his hatred of expense and of new taxes, seemed inclined to agree, is to borrow 5,000,000*l.* for the purpose (it would be wanted in about three years), charging the interest upon a duty to be imposed upon colonial timber, and looking to the sale of land on the line for a sinking fund. Our timber duties are the last remaining example of a system of the very worst Protection, and I have some curious evidence of the extreme injury instead of benefit which they have done to New Brunswick.

There were, of course, two fatal objections to this scheme. In the first place, if the differential duties on timber were to be got rid of, it was not clear why the British people, instead of the Canadian colonists, should not derive the benefit from the change; and, in the next place, the men who had withstood Lord George Bentinck's scheme in 1847, on the ground that most of the expenditure in constructing railways conferred a benefit on skilled rather than on unskilled labour, were incapacitated from contending that the construction of railways in Canada would absorb Irish labour.

Influenced by such considerations as these, Lord John himself drew up an alternative, and less complex, scheme for the promotion of emigration.

EMIGRATION.

1. A tax on property rated to the relief of the poor to the amount of 6*d.* in the pound in Ireland, and of 3*d.* in the pound in England and Scotland.

2. The proceeds of this tax to be placed in the hands of commissioners to be named by the Crown—or by Parliament.

3. The commissioners to have power to raise money by loan, not exceeding one million in any one year, nor five millions in the whole, on the credit of the State. The interest to be paid in the first instance out of the proceeds of the emigration tax.

4. The proceeds of the emigration tax in England to be applied to English emigration, and the same as to Ireland and Scotland.

5. When the poor rate of any electoral district in Ireland shall exceed 3*s.* in the pound the union to make a rate in aid. When the rate of the whole union shall amount to 5*s.* in the pound, the union

shall be empowered at their discretion to offer to the able-bodied and their families to defray the charge of emigration in lieu of the workhouse or outdoor relief.

6. The unions in Ireland to have the same power as the parishes in England to borrow money for the purposes of emigration.

7. The Commissioners of Emigration to have power to advance sums not exceeding 2*l.* a head for each member of a family desirous to emigrate, and which shall not be able to defray the expenses of emigration [? in unions where the rate is equal to 5*s.* in the pound].

8. The unions and parishes to remain liable to their present obligations to relieve the destitute until the commissioners certify that the necessary sums for emigration have been furnished to the destitute poor person to whom according to the provisions of this Act emigration has been offered.

9. The commissioners to certify that each person assisted by public funds is a fit and proper subject for emigration.

10. The commissioners for the purpose of this Act to be four unpaid and three paid commissioners.

Thus, at the close of 1848, the Cabinet had before it two proposals—one that of Lord Grey, the other that of Lord John—for promoting emigration. The former, it was plain, among other disadvantages, would not answer the main purpose of removing a redundant population from the soil of Ireland; to the latter a section in the Cabinet was stoutly opposed. It so happened, moreover, that at this particular conjuncture the weight of Lord Grey in the Council Chamber was increased by the sudden death of Lord Auckland and the appointment of Sir F. Baring as his successor. Sir Francis[1] was the fervent advocate of economy, and through his first wife he was the cousin of Lord Grey, of Lady M. Wood, the wife of Sir C. Wood, and the brother-in-law of Sir George Grey. Thenceforward, out of a Cabinet of fourteen members, four were united by ties of closest relationship. They formed a compact family party within the Cabinet, and their opinions had almost necessarily to be studied on every occasion.[2]

[1] Writing to Lord Grey on January 12, before he had been asked to join the Cabinet, Sir Francis had urged strongly that no new expense should be incurred.

[2] Oddly enough the Cabinet—so it seems from an undated memorandum of Lord John's—at first agreed by nine votes to five that some scheme for emigration should be adopted, and in the division Sir G. Grey and Sir F. Baring voted with

Lord John had the mortification to find that he could not carry his own proposal for emigration in the reconstructed Cabinet; and he wrote to Lord Clarendon and expressed his determination to throw up the Government if he met with resistance on the measures which he thought right for Ireland. Replying on January 18, 1849, Lord Clarendon said that, if Lord John resigned, he should gladly conform to his decision, but that he did not think that the rejection of the emigration scheme was in itself a sufficient reason to justify resignation, as emigration, though useful, was not absolutely indispensable, and was not likely to prove a complete remedy for the evils of Ireland.

It was, of course, impossible for Lord John to carry out his intention of resigning when Lord Clarendon was himself of opinion that the case did not warrant such a course. But, in fact, though Prime Minister and Viceroy were agreed on the measures which it was desirable to take, Lord John attached chief importance to remedial legislation, and Lord Clarendon to machinery for preserving order. And thus, while Lord John was ready to resign office rather than part with a large scheme of emigration, Lord Clarendon was ready to go on if the Habeas Corpus Act were suspended for a further period. Lord Clarendon, indeed, if he could have dictated legislation, would have invested himself with still larger powers. In the previous September he had told Lord John that the time for martial law seemed rapidly approaching; and, though he could not overlook the great fact that the country had since become more tranquil, he declared in January that the tranquillity was 'the tranquillity of disaffection subdued by fear.' Holding these opinions, he wished that the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which expired in March, should be continued for another twelve months, and he did not hesitate to express his regret that Lord John should have limited its continuance to the succeeding six months.

Lord John, however, would not have consented to meet Parliament with no other measure for Ireland than the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. He had long felt that

Lord John. The scheme, however, thus agreed to in the abstract must have been subsequently lost when its details were examined.

permanent improvement could best be sought by a firm administration of a well-considered Poor Law; and he accordingly desired, whatever other measures were taken, to make that law efficient. In many of the poorer unions of Southern and Western Ireland, the collection of a rate was impossible: for, while its nominal amount in some cases exceeded 20*s.* in the pound, the whole population was reduced to a penury which made it impracticable to extort from them as many pence.

Nothing then but extraneous help stood between these people and famine; and England and Scotland were tired of voting large sums of money for the support of a redundant population. There was everywhere a general consensus of opinion that Ireland must be compelled to maintain its own poor. Ireland, moreover, so the English argued, was already under a peculiar advantage. She was exempted from income duty; and, if that tax were extended to her, its proceeds would be amply sufficient to feed the famine-stricken people. It was answered, however, that the emergency of Ireland required immediate treatment; and that an income tax could not be collected without some preliminary assessment of the incomes of the people. Instead, therefore, of extending the income duty to Ireland, the Cabinet decided to levy a rate on the whole country, and to make its proceeds applicable to the relief of distress in the more destitute unions. The scheme as it was ultimately formulated was evidently founded on the suggestions which Lord John had already made in his memorandum on Emigration. When the poor rate in any electoral division of a union exceeded 5*s.* in the pound it was proposed that the union should be rated in aid of the division; and when the rate in the union exceeded 7*s.* it was proposed that the union should be assisted out of a rate levied over the whole country.

Even this decision very nearly broke up the Government. Lord Lansdowne desired to resign; and, though he reluctantly gave way, he wrote—

> To a measure so unjust as that of taxing the land, and the land exclusively, throughout one part of the kingdom, towards the relief of the poor in particular districts with which it is unconnected, . . . I

can reconcile myself only by considering the absolute urgency of fixing some maximum without delay to the amount of local taxation in particular districts, without which all capital and industry will cease to exist there, and by the assurance that this anomalous and exceptional measure will be defended on no other grounds, that the amount will be strictly limited to 6*d.* in the pound (the probable amount of an income tax) for each of two years to come, . . . and that the most distinct pledge will be given, as far as Government can give it, that no attempt will be made to prolong it.

Thus limited, a temporary measure, imposing a rate in aid —as it was called—of 6*d.* for a limited period of two years, was passed through all its stages and became law; while the Bill for permanently amending the Poor Law, and fixing a maximum for the rates both in electoral divisions and in unions, was passed through all its stages in the Commons and sent to the Lords. The Lords, however, struck out the maximum rate, which formed the leading feature in the measure as it left the Commons. Their action in doing so raised a curious issue. An amendment which struck out the maximum which the Commons had imposed undoubtedly enabled additional taxation to be levied. It was therefore inconsistent with the privilege, which the Commons have for two centuries claimed, that the Lords should not initiate taxation or introduce amendments into money bills. Lord John, under ordinary circumstances, would not probably have tolerated such an amendment, but would have insisted on the privileges of the Commons. For the second time, however, his hands were forced by Lord Lansdowne. Writing on the 16th of May, Lord Lansdowne said—

After what passed yesterday in the Cabinet on the subject of the rating clause in the Irish Poor Law Bill, I think it right, as I ought to conceal nothing from you, and least of all to take you by surprise, [to state] that, having once defended and voted for it as it stood, opposed to a decisive majority of the House, and supported chiefly by the reluctant votes of friends who saw the objections to it as strongly as I did, I should feel it next to impossible to propose to the House of Lords to reconsider their decision on the subject.

Lord Lansdowne's letter practically forced Lord John to determine whether he would ask the Commons to waive their

privileges, or submit to the break-up of his Administration. He chose what probably seemed to him at the time the lesser evil. A precedent was fortunately found to justify his decision. In 1838 and in 1847 the Commons had admitted amendments of the Lords on this very subject of the Irish Poor Law. Lord John was able to induce the House to follow these precedents, and thus secure the passage of the Bill.

The more extreme members of the Whig party, however, neither approved this concession nor relished the Irish policy of the Whig Administration. Mr. Roebuck, making himself their exponent, complained that the Ministry had adopted neither order nor system in the relief of distress; and that, under a well-considered scheme, the money which had been voted by Parliament might at least have been made available for purposes of improvement. In reply, Lord John availed himself of the opportunity thus afforded to him to trace the successive difficulties which the Government had been compelled to encounter, and to justify the policy of the three preceding years. Even now his speech furnishes the best concise account of the struggle which the Administration maintained, and of the victory which it ultimately gained over famine. At the time one good critic was delighted with it. Lord Clarendon wrote on the 15th of May—

> I am sorry that citizen Roebuck should have inflicted on you an Irish debate; but it was really worth while, as it drew from you a speech the most feeling, eloquent, judicious, and above all true, that I ever had the satisfaction of reading.

It is not necessary to trace further the Parliamentary treatment of Ireland during the session of 1849. But, before Parliament separated, an event occurred in Ulster which in its ultimate consequences threw some light on Lord John's character. The Orangemen of Down decided on paying a visit to their grand master Lord Roden on the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne. On their homeward march they were attacked by a band of Ribandmen at a place called Dolly's Brae; and in the battle which ensued four Ribandmen were killed and forty others were wounded. Lord Clarendon 'directed a lawyer of experience to inquire into the causes of

the affray; and, on his report, instituted proceedings against several of the Orangemen concerned in it. The magistrates, however, refused to take the information:'[1] and Lord Roden, though directly implicated, sanctioned their decision by his presence on the bench. No one could defend Lord Roden's conduct. Lord Clarendon thought that he had no alternative but to strike his name out of the commission of the peace; Lord John, to whom he referred the question, considered that a milder measure would have been preferable, but left the decision with the Viceroy and promised to defend him in any event. Lord Clarendon replied—

Your letter of the 27th embarrassed and gratified me very much. You differ from me in opinion, and state most forcibly the grounds of that difference; but, at the same time, you leave the decision to me, and assure me of your support in whatever course I adopt. That is what I call acting most honourably; and such a master makes, or ought to make, good servants.

The battle of Dolly's Brae was specially unfortunate, because when it occurred Irishmen were looking forward to a visit from the Queen. Her visit, paid in August, was not only the first occasion on which she had been to Ireland; it was the first occasion for twenty-eight years on which any British sovereign had set foot in that country. It was, moreover, accepted as a proof that sovereign and Ministry hoped that the famine which had desolated Ireland was disappearing, and that discontent was also passing away. The expectations which were everywhere formed were not disappointed. Sir George Grey, the Minister in attendance upon the Queen, wrote—

V[ice] R[egal] L[odge]: August 9, 1849.

My dear Lord John,—The newspapers will have given you a full account of our proceedings, but I send you a line, as it will gratify you to know that from all quarters I hear but one expression of satisfaction and delight at the Queen's visit, and of hope of lasting benefit from it. She has done everything admirably, and has elicited universal praise. The levée yesterday was an immense one, and lasted nearly five hours; but the Queen did not appear fatigued and was

[1] I am again using language which I have used before—*History of England* iv. 364.

in high spirits afterwards at dinner and a large evening party. She was enthusiastically cheered by crowds of people all the way going and coming back. The only thing I felt might be objected to on her first entry into Dublin was the great number of troops escorting her, but it added to the show, which was thought a great deal of. I hear, however, that the best possible effect has been produced by her driving the next day twice into Dublin without a single soldier, and they take it as a proof which has gratified the people extremely that she had full confidence in them

The review and drawing-room to-day will give plenty of occupation. . . . Clarendon has done his part very handsomely, and all his arrangements have been as good as possible.—Yours truly,

G. GREY.

The success which attended the Queen's visit, and the gradual improvement which was happily visible in the material condition of the Irish people, suggested fresh legislation for Ireland. Up to that time the Government had almost solely devoted itself to the remedies which famine had necessitated and the precautions which it had involved. The time had now come, Lord John thought, for other measures; and he decided in the session of 1850 on introducing three Bills —one to increase the time allowed to Ireland for repaying the loans which England had advanced, and thus reduce the pressure on the Irish people; another to extend the Irish franchise, in accordance with the views which he had advocated years before as a member of the Melbourne Administration; the third to remove a symbol of separation by the abolition of the Viceroyalty and the appointment of a fourth Secretary of State for Ireland. The first of these measures was passed. The second—after a compromise had been arrived at on the amount of the franchise—also became law. The third requires a little longer notice.

It had been Lord John's constant wish for many years to abolish an office which he regarded as an anachronism; and it has already been shown that, on Lord Bessborough's death, he had opened his mind on the subject to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Clarendon went to Ireland with the knowledge of Lord John's intention, and concurring in his opinion. During his stay there he modified, to some extent, his original judgment, but he acknowledged that the Lord Lieutenancy

could not be permanently retained, and that its abolition was only a question of time. He cordially agreed with the proposal which Lord John himself brought forward on the 17th of May for substituting a fourth Secretary of State for the Lord Lieutenant.

V[ice-] R[egal] L[odge]: May 20, 1850.

My dear Lord John,—Your speech was quite excellent. There was nothing which I, here on the spot, and knowing the requirements of the public, could have wished to be different; and the few people whom I have yet seen agree that it was in all respects judicious and satisfactory. . . . This division, I hope, shows that you will have no serious opposition to apprehend. It is an enviable power to make such a speech at a moment when graver matters must have been weighing upon your mind. . . .

But, though the excellence of Lord John's own arguments and the inherent strength of his case promised a successful issue for his proposal, it soon became evident that its passage was impracticable. In the lobbies Ministers found themselves supported by preponderating majorities; in the House they were exposed to interminable discussion. Irish members, reflecting the views of Dublin tradesmen, talked against time; English members of the highest authority doubted the expediency of creating a fourth Secretary of State.[1] The

[1] In later years Lord John himself came round to this conclusion.

Woburn Abbey: August 25, 1864.

My dear Palmerston,—With regard to the important question you have put to me, I have no doubt at all as to the abstract expediency of abolishing the office of Lord Lieutenant.

I consider the office as not merely useless but mischievous, and with this view I introduced a Bill some time ago into the House of Commons to abolish it—a Bill which was carried on its second reading by a large majority.

But, with regard to the manner of supplying the vacancy, I have somewhat changed my opinion. I rather think the measure would work better, and certainly would be more complete, if the Home Secretary were to take Ireland, as well as Scotland, under his care, than if a separate Secretary of State for Ireland were created.

This plan would also agree better with Lord Somers' wise notions about the Scotch Union of which you will find an account in the Hardwicke papers.

But in that case the Home Secretary must have ample assistance. Perhaps a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Ireland, and certainly an Under-Secretary (Larcom) resident in Ireland, would be required.

The Attorney-General for Ireland should take charge of the Bills on Irish

debates on Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, and the apprehensions which they created of a Ministerial crisis, were unfavourable to the prosecution of the measure; and from these various considerations Lord John felt its withdrawal inevitable. He announced his decision on the 4th of July.

Four years had passed since Lord John had kissed hands as First Minister of the Crown. During those four years Ireland had passed through the greatest crisis in her history. She had almost continuously occupied the attention of Government and Parliament. But the measures which had been introduced had necessarily been dictated by the exigences of the hour. Lord John had endeavoured to meet the crisis of famine by encouraging as far as possible local effort, and by interfering as little as possible with the regular course of trade. By his amendment of the Poor Law he had made the Act both efficient and sufficient, and thrown distinctly on Ireland the duty of supporting its own poor. He had striven to grapple with Irish disaffection by using the ordinary machinery with which the law had supplied him; and, when the gravity of the situation made exceptional legislation necessary, had preferred the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act to the measures of coercion to which previous Ministers had resorted. He

business, and have somewhat of the functions and authority of the Lord Advocate of Scotland.

The Lord Chancellor of Ireland should be confined, except as regards the choice and dismissal of magistrates, to his judicial functions.

The Cabinet has often met—*e.g.* on the Chinese and Afghan wars—in the beginning of October, to consider measures of importance.

If it were then decided to abolish the office, I think the Home Secretary should be appointed Lord Lieutenant or Lord Deputy *pro tem.*, till Parliament has had time to consider and digest the new system.

There are so many Acts of Parliament that give authority to the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Deputy, or Lords Justices only, that it is very desirable to have an authority clothed with one of these titles. The Lords Justices are too weak to remain long charged with executive powers, unless under the direction of a Secretary of State or actual Lord Lieutenant.

These are my ideas on the subject. I have but one doubt, and that is as to the physical strength of George Grey. I trust, however, that with ample assistance he would be equal to the task.—I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Writing on the 28th of August, Lord Palmerston expressed his entire concurrence with these views, though he thought the moment inopportune for making the change.

had done something to remove one great grievance by extending the Irish franchise. He had desired to redress a grave injustice by the adequate endowment of the Roman Catholic religion. He had attempted to substitute a solvent for an insolvent proprietary by facilitating the sale of encumbered estates. He had proposed to remedy a galling wrong by controlling the right of ejectment, and by recognising the rights of the tenant in his holding. He had tried to relieve an over-populated country by devising a considerable scheme for the emigration of the people. He had wished to get rid of a symbol of separation by the abolition of the Viceroyalty. Some of these proposals were defeated in the Cabinet; others of them were modified or smothered by Parliament; some of them were attended indirectly with consequences which Lord John and the wisest of his contemporaries failed to see. Examined singly, some objection may be raised to many of them. Taken as a whole they would have failed, even if they had passed, to redress all the many injuries from which an unhappy country was suffering. But it may at least be said of them that, while no previous Minister had ever fallen on harder circumstances, no previous Minister had made so honest an effort to deal with the Irish question.

CHAPTER XXI.

IN PARLIAMENT AND AT HOME.

IN relating in the two previous chapters the difficulties which Lord John had to encounter in 1848 and 1849, in connection with Ireland and foreign affairs, it has been impossible to give any detailed account either of the failures of one year or of the successes of the other. In 1848 everything conspired to make the session abortive. In the first place Lord John himself through much of the period was in such weak health that he was physically unable to exercise a commanding influence on politics; and in the next place attention was forcibly diverted from the measures announced from the throne to the terrible events which shook the Continent from Berlin to Paris, and to their consequences on this country.

Lord John, it must be recollected, was only feebly supported in the House of Commons. On the formation of his Ministry, Lord Palmerston, Lord Morpeth, Sir G. Grey, Sir C. Wood, Sir J. Hobhouse, Mr. Labouchere, and Mr. Macaulay all held offices of Cabinet rank with seats in that House. But Lord Palmerston mainly confined himself to the business of his own department; Lord Morpeth, Sir J. Hobhouse, and Mr. Labouchere were only occasional speakers; Mr. Macaulay lost his seat at the general election of 1847; and, though Sir George Grey and Sir Charles Wood were admirable in council and in office, the rapid utterance of the former and the temporary unpopularity of the latter reduced their influence in debate.

Thus the brunt of every battle fell on Lord John; and, though in readiness in debate he excelled all his contemporaries, the exertion was obviously too great for a frame which, never strong, was weakened by an illness whose effects he could not shake off. Conscious of his need for help, he made

a strong effort to retain the services of Mr. Macaulay. In writing the admirable memoir of his uncle, which should be the pattern, as it is the despair, of biographers, Sir G. Trevelyan has omitted to notice that Mr. Macaulay, at Lord John's wish, remained a member of the Russell Cabinet, and enjoyed his easy office of Paymaster General, for nine months after his defeat at Edinburgh; and that, when Parliament met, Lord John endeavoured to retain his services by suggesting that a vacancy should be made for him in Lord Zetland's borough of Richmond. The grounds on which this offer was refused are worth recording.

Oxford: April 23, 1848.

Dear Lord John,—The proposal which you made yesterday took me so much by surprise that I could not come to an immediate decision. I have since thought the matter over fully. I will not say that my tastes and wishes may not, unperceived by myself, have biassed my judgment. But I can truly say that I have done my best to ascertain what is the right, honourable, and useful course; and the result is that I have determined not to be member for Richmond.

A few weeks ago I should have felt very differently. But the events which have lately taken place on the Continent and in this island have placed me and all of us in a new position. It will soon be necessary for you to deliberate seriously on the propriety of removing some evils and anomalies which the Reform Bill spared. What the issue of your deliberations may be I cannot tell. My own opinion is that some concessions ought to be made with a good grace to the middle classes, and that, at the same time, all innovations dangerous to order and property ought to be firmly resisted. Now I feel that it would be quite impossible for me, as member for a pocket borough, to be of any service to my country in the approaching contest. On the one hand, if I should differ from the Government and from Lord Zetland, I should be bound in honour to take the Chiltern Hundreds. On the other hand, it would be impossible for me to speak with weight against violent innovations. I should make a very poor figure in opposition to a new Schedule A, while sitting for a borough which would probably appear in a new Schedule A. I should be constantly accused of holding, as the nominee of a great nobleman, language very different from that which I had held as the representative of a hundred and twenty thousand people. In short, I should bring discredit on myself, and be useless to you.

The situation in which I am placed with respect to the question of the ballot is alone a sufficient reason for my determining not to come into Parliament at the present time and in the proposed manner. My opinions on that question have undergone some change, and perhaps do not now differ very widely from yours. But I feel that if I were now, on taking my seat for Richmond, to vote against the ballot, I should destroy my public character, and with it all my public usefulness. Two months ago there was no excitement in the country about organic reforms. If a motion had been made in favour of secret voting, I might have absented myself or divided silently with the Ayes, and no newspaper would have thought the matter worth noting. Now the case is very different. That at this conjuncture a member of your Cabinet should, on such a question, separate himself from all his colleagues would, in my judgment, greatly weaken your Government. Peel and Graham, Stanley and Disraeli, Hume and Cobden, would all join to deride and condemn a Ministry which showed such signs of disunion. If any of the Radicals were to praise me at the expense of my colleagues, I need not say that such praise would be more painful to me than censure. Yet, if I do not vote for the ballot, the universal cry would be, 'You declared for the ballot on the hustings of Edinburgh ; you voted for it ; you spoke for it. You never said a word about your change of opinion till a great city turned you out, and an aristocratical borough proprietor put you in.' And what could I say in reply? I am confident, therefore, that, if I now come into the House of Commons as member for Richmond, I shall very soon go out again. By so going out I should probably inflict a serious wound on the Government. By quietly dropping out of public life I inflict no wound at all.

The truth is that there is only one way of escape from all these inconveniences. I must therefore beg you to consider my resignation as final. I will call in Chesham Place on Tuesday, and give you my key.—Ever, dear Lord John, yours very faithfully,

T. B. MACAULAY.

The programme which Lord John sketched out for the session was sufficiently ambitious. The position of affairs abroad and the Duke of Wellington's published opinion forced the Ministry to consider the arrangements necessary for defence against invasion ; the famine in Ireland, which had compelled the Government temporarily to suspend the Navigation Acts in 1847, brought the policy of those Acts prominently before the Legislature ; the miserable condition of

the large towns, where no adequate provision was made for pure soil, pure air, or pure water, gave urgency to the great question of Sanitary Reform; while the circumstance of Lord John's own election, connected as it was with that of a Jew, Baron Rothschild, as his colleague, raised a similar issue to that which Mr. O'Connell's return for Clare had brought to the front nearly twenty years before.

Thus four great measures of legislation and finance were fairly before Parliament. But, before February was over, the revolution in France and the fear of increased taxation at home, had entirely altered the situation; and a session which had commenced with a demand for greater armaments, and with the proposal of additional taxation, concluded with a general desire for retrenchment, and a serious effort to bring the expenditure of the nation within its income. This radical alteration in feeling, for which the Government could hardly be held responsible, disarranged the whole programme of the year; and the plans of the Ministers were further modified by the necessity which, as they conceived, was imposed on them of seeking special legislative powers to control turbulence and disaffection. Much of the time, which it was hoped would be available for discussing Navigation Acts and Public Health, was occupied with the consideration of measures of precaution of which the Crown and Government Security Bill and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act were the most striking. Under these circumstances, the Bills which the Government had promoted early in the session could not otherwise than suffer. The Bill for Promoting the Health of Towns was, indeed, passed; the Bill for Removing the Disabilities of the Jews was passed by the Commons, but summarily rejected by the Lords;[1] the Bill for repealing the Navigation Acts was abandoned.

[1] During the discussion of the Jewish question Lord John sent the following letter in dog-Latin to his wife :—

Sabbat, Maii 27.

Malus sum. Non tibi scripsi hesterno die. Gaudeo salute tua et prolis nostræ. Dies natalis Reginæ et concilium Cabinetti me constringit [*sic*] hodie ut non possum te videre usque ad noctem. Cras dies festivus et sanctus. Gaudeo. Non plus scribam. Pares Judæis infesti, populus infestus Paribus, faciunt caldarium piscium bellissimum.

CONJUX DEVOTISSIMUS.

Failures of this kind always throw discredit on a Government; and it so happened that the Ministry suffered in 1848 not merely from what it failed to effect, but from what it was compelled to do. The Protectionists had never forgiven the change which Lord John had made in 1846 in the sugar duties; they ascribed to it the severe distress which the West India Islands were enduring; and Lord George Bentinck, who had resigned his position as their leader, but who still retained all his antipathies to Free Trade, obtained at the commencement of the session a committee to inquire into the condition of the sugar colonies, and, by his own casting vote as chairman, carried a report recommending the virtual suspension of the Act of 1846 and the retention of a differential duty in favour of colonial sugar for the next six years. Lord John, though he disliked the report, unfortunately felt that he was powerless to defeat its adoption, and accordingly decided on proposing a compromise which gave a slight advantage to colonial sugar. The compromise was ill received by the more Radical members of the Liberal party: there was a universal expectation that the Government would be defeated on it, and the Cabinet formally decided to retire from office in that event.[1] Unfortunately, too, the chances of defeat were increased by a circumstance which was so rare that it could hardly be foreseen—Lord John's own indiscretion. In the course of the debate Lord George Bentinck had accused the Colonial Office of wilfully suppressing an important despatch, and of denying its existence. Lord John warmly defended Lord Grey, and, nettled by the attack, went on to say—

> These mean frauds—these extremely dishonourable tricks—which the noble Lord imputes to [men in high office], are not the faults and characteristics of men who are high in public office in this country. They are characteristics of men who are engaged in pursuits which the noble Lord long followed.

Warned by 'the burst of disapprobation from all sides,' Lord John attempted to explain that Lord George had him-

[1] Lord Clarendon, writing on June 26, congratulated Lord John on his approaching fall.

self detected a fraud of that nature respecting the age of a horse. But the House was in no humour for explanations; it persisted in placing its own meaning on Lord John's expression; and the prospects of a Ministerial success were evidently clouded by the indiscretion of the Prime Minister.

Reflection, however, convinced the House of Commons that it could not afford to part with the only available Ministry. Lord John's compromise was ultimately adopted by a sufficient majority. This victory, won at the end of June, gave Ministers safety for the remainder of the session. Yet, if they were secure from defeat, they could not be said to be either strong or popular. They suffered in public estimation from the failure of all their measures, and the public omitted to notice the cause of this failure. Lord John at a very early period of the session pointed out the reason.[1]

> There have been in the course of the last thirty years very great changes in the mode of conducting the business of the House. . . . When I first entered Parliament it was not usual for Government to undertake generally all subjects of legislation . . . Two great changes have since taken place. . . . The one, that . . . since the passing of the Reform Bill it has been thought convenient, on every subject on which an alteration of the law is required, that the Government should undertake the responsibility of proposing it to Parliament; and the other great change is that measures of all kinds are now discussed by a much greater number of members, and a far greater number of motions are made by individual members, than was formerly the case. The consequence of these changes has been that . . . it is found impossible by any Government . . . to bring [measures of importance] on at a time when they can receive fair deliberation.

The time at the disposal of the Government was, in other words, no longer sufficient for its work, and business suffered, not from any fault of the Administration, but from a defect in the arrangements of Parliament.

The speech had no practical effect. It did not even induce an independent member to forego his right of occupying time by bringing forward an abstract motion on the Slave

[1] *Hansard*, xcvii. 969.

Trade. But it elicited one remarkable letter which in the light of later events is worth quoting.

Paris: April 3, 1848.

My dear John,—In reading your speech the other day upon the state of business in the House, I was more than ever struck with what I have felt for many years is the hopeless inefficiency of the legislative machine to work the accumulated business of the country. . . . The period must arise when the doctrine as to division of labour must be applied to legislation, as it has [been] to everything else; and laws must be prepared beforehand for the finishing hand of the whole House, instead of as now going through so many stages there. It would be very desirable if one could at the same time secure the preparation by the hands and in the manner where most knowledge of details could be procured—if, for instance, the Irish members met in Dublin two months before the regular session for the discussion of purely Irish measures; and that laws so prepared should be subject to only one decision, affirmative or negative, in the whole House. Some proposal, having some such basis, would satisfy all that was legitimate in the desire for home legislation in Ireland, but would preserve the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. . . . —Ever yours,

NORMANBY.

This remarkable suggestion was not adopted. Time continued to be wasted in unnecessary debates, till at the close of August Mr. Disraeli was able to make an obituary notice of the protracted session the theme of one of his most amusing and animated speeches; while Lord John, in replying to it, repeated the argument which he had used five months before:—

I must remind the . . . . House that the supposed duty of the members of a Government to introduce a great number of measures to Parliament, and to carry those measures through Parliament in a session, is a duty which is new to the Government of this country.

Let me call the attention of the House to the fact that the Ministers of the Crown are chiefly appointed to administer the affairs of the empire. And when we see that sedition in England has been met with a vigorous arm by the Secretary of State for the Home Department; . . . that rebellion in Ireland has been suppressed by the measures taken by this House, and the energy shown by the Lord Lieutenant; . . . that revolution on the Continent has not shaken the institutions of this country . . . . I must say, as a

member of the Government attacked, that the administration of the empire cannot have been so very defective.

No fair person will deny that there was force in the plea: though he may perhaps doubt, if it had been raised in 1822, whether Lord John himself would have thought that it would have entitled Lord Liverpool's Administration to a verdict of not guilty.

The members of the Whig Cabinet, however, were quite as sensible as the outside public that the events of the session of 1848 had not tended to raise the character of the Administration. Supported by an insufficient majority in one House, and confronted by a large majority in the other, it had not even the advantage which other Governments had derived from the advocacy of the newspaper press. The 'Times' declaimed against it; the 'Chronicle,' the traditional organ of the Whigs, had passed into new hands; and the cause of the Administration was left without a competent advocate. Lord Clarendon, who had already adopted measures with the same object in Ireland, was anxious that the Ministers should take steps to secure the support of a friendly newspaper. Lord John was too proud to involve himself in transactions of this character. However much he might have valued the defence of a newspaper if it had been voluntarily offered, he steadily declined to secure it by other means; and throughout his career he remained, by preference, without the advantage, which Lord Palmerston never failed to secure, of some competent journal, prepared to expound his policy and to explain his reasons.

If Lord John took no steps to instruct public opinion through the newspaper press, he made a great effort, before another session arrived, to win the confidence of the people by enlarging the basis of his Administration. Circumstances afforded him ample opportunity for doing so. The unexpected death of Mr. Charles Buller in December 1848, and the still more sudden death of Lord Auckland in January 1849, deprived the Government of one of its most popular members and of one of its ablest administrators, but afforded the Prime Minister the opportunity of offering office to some of the capable men who had served in the Cabinet of Sir Robert

Peel. After communicating with Lord Lansdowne, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston, Lord John wrote to Sir James Graham,[1] who was at Netherby, and asked him to come to London and see him respecting the vacancy at the Admiralty. Sir James at once put himself into the train, travelled through the night to London, and announced his arrival by a note from Euston Square, written at five o'clock on the morning of the 12th of January. Later in the day he had a long interview with Lord John, and (to quote Lady John's account)—

inquired minutely into the proposed policy of Ministers—domestic, foreign, Irish, financial, &c. : even asked if the Cabinet were united, as otherwise he could not consent to enter it. John answered him with the utmost frankness. Sir James thanked him : said nothing could be more agreeable to him personally than to belong to a Ministry of which John was the head ; that, if he did, it would be without a wish that any more of the Peel party, of whom he considered himself independent, should be asked to join ; that he should like to consult Sir Robert Peel and give his answer in the evening ; but that, if John wished it, he would give it immediately. John said he did not, and they parted after a conversation of an hour and a half. At eight in the evening John received a note from him saying that he had by accident missed Sir Robert Peel, whom on second thoughts he preferred not to implicate in his decision ; that he had made up his mind, and would come and give John his reason at half-past nine. This set us speculating which way his mind was made up, till he came and declined. The grounds were that the Ministry were not prepared to go as far as he should think right in the Cobden line of retrenchment.

Saturday morning.—John saw Sir Francis Baring and offered the Admiralty to him. Sir Francis came in the evening and accepted.

One result ensued from the offer which was thus made to Sir James Graham. During the session of 1849, Peelites and Whigs drew closer together ; and the strange distrust which had so frequently separated Sir Robert Peel and Lord John began visibly to wear away. The more aggressive attitude which the Protectionists displayed tended to the cohesion of their opponents. At the very outset of the session the Pro-

[1] Lord John had previously offered Sir James the Governor-Generalship of India.

tectionists in either House made the mistake of moving amendments to the Address. These amendments, however, while they revealed the hostility of the aggressors, displayed also their weakness; and the Government set itself to the task before it with a resolution which it had not displayed in the previous year.

Besides the legislation which the state of Ireland necessitated, and which has already been described in a previous chapter, the two chief measures of the session of 1849 were the Bill for altering Parliamentary Oaths and the Bill for repealing the Navigation Acts. Both Bills passed the House of Commons by considerable majorities. The former met its inevitable extinction in the House of Lords; the latter was saved from this fate by the firmness of Lord John. He boldly staked the existence of his Ministry on the adoption of the measure. He used his direct personal influence to secure the attendance of peers when the House was in committee, and proxies were not available; and by these expedients he carried his proposal, though the second reading was only passed by a majority of ten. Lord John used, in his old age, to say that the repeal of the Navigation Acts was carried by the votes of the bishops; and it is a remarkable circumstance that of the twenty-five prelates who took part in the division sixteen supported the measure. But, as a matter of fact, there was a majority, though the smallest of majorities, of lay peers in favour of it; and Lord John's remark afforded, perhaps, a proof that he was always ready to place the most favourable construction on a body of men who were not usually equally tolerant towards himself.

Oddly enough, Lord Brougham found it consistent with his political opinions to oppose this great measure of reform. But the fact would hardly be worth mentioning if it were not for the happy remark which it suggested to Lord John. 'There is no wonder,' he said, 'that Brougham thinks he knows something of the Navigation Laws, as he has been fishing for seals so long.'[1]

The Ministry in 1849 acquired the increased reputation

[1] Lord Morpeth's (unpublished) *Diary*, p. 79. The repeal of the Navigation Laws was resisted by the shipowners. But experience soon showed that their

which always attaches to a Government successful in carrying a great measure. Yet, during a session in which he succeeded to a large extent in retrieving his position, Lord John frequently suffered from the physical debility which, throughout his life, so materially increased the difficulties of his political career. The short Easter recess found him grievously in need of rest; and his best friends seriously debated the propriety of his seeking relief in the calmer atmosphere of the House of Lords. At Althorp, where Mr. Greville stayed at the end of March,

Graham talked much of John Russell, and said his loss would be so great that if he was unable to face the severe work of the House of Commons, he had better go to the Lords, and retain his office.

Sir James Graham's opinion was repeated to the Duke of Bedford, who communicated it to his brother; and Lord John seems to have actually made up his mind to take a peerage; but, as he did not consider his own fortunes and the Irish estate, which the Duke had settled on him, adequate for its support, to create it with remainder to his brother the Duke. The short Easter holiday, however, enabled him sufficiently to recover his strength to struggle on. The notion of a peerage was abandoned for another twelve months, when it was revived in another shape.[2] And in the result another dozen

anticipations were incorrect. Many years afterwards one of their number thus admitted his error :—

Shepperton, Middlesex : November 9, 1868.

Dear Lord Russell,—It is now close upon twenty years since I addressed to your Lordship a series of letters, which contained a great number of plausible reasons against the Repeal of the Navigation Laws, and had an immense circulation. Two years afterwards I discovered that all my reasons were very erroneous and unsound, and that your Lordship knew a great deal better what was for the interest of the shipowners than the shipowners themselves.

I have just launched a book entitled 'The Log of My Leisure Hours,' which it really is; and, as the 8th chapter of the 3rd volume is devoted to show, in a chit-chat manner, what fools we shipowners were, and how much we, as well as the nation at large, have gained by your great and wise measure of Repeal, I have taken the liberty to request the publishers to send to your Lordship, for your acceptance, a copy of the 'Log,' and I remain, my Lord, with much respect, yours faithfully,

W. S. LINDSAY.

The Right Hon. Earl Russell, K.G.

[2] *Vide ante*, p. 61.

years passed before Lord John, on the eve of entering his seventieth year, escaped from the late hours of the House of Commons to the easier duties of the House of Lords.

Lord John, moreover, in the summer of 1849, had one consolation which had always a marked effect on his own health. Lady John gave him a fresh assurance of her gradual recovery by presenting him, on July 11, with his third son. The boy was christened three months afterwards at Windsor, the Prince standing sponsor to him, and giving him the second of his three names—Francis Albert Rollo. In the interval between the boy's birth and the christening a good deal happened. Parliament was prorogued by the Queen in person on August 1; and, while the Queen set out on her visit to Ireland, her First Minister retired to the quiet of his own home at Richmond, where he celebrated his fifty-seventh birthday by giving the children of a little school, which he had just opened at Petersham, a tea under the trees and a dance on the lawn of Pembroke Lodge. Two days afterwards he set out to attend the Queen at Balmoral. While he was at Balmoral he had a day's shooting with the Duke of Leeds, and had the satisfaction of killing his first deer, and, if the 'Times' correspondent at Balmoral was correct, the first deer ever shot by a Prime Minister in office;[1] and thence he forwarded to Lady John the following lines:—

I breathe the lightsome mountain air,
The breeze blows fresh and free;
Why is my breast weighed down with care?
I breathe it far from thee.
The mountain stream flows clear and bright,
And murmurs gently past;
My stream of life still wants the light
Which from thine eyes is cast.
The heather springs beneath my feet,
I want nor path nor guide;
Such skies and streams and walks were sweet
If thou wert by my side.

[1] The *Times* said a stag. But Lord John, writing to his wife, said, 'I have been out deer-stalking, and have killed a deer. It was a hind (113 yards off), but no matter. Mr. Ross says I am the first Prime Minister who has been out deer-stalking.'

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Lord John left Balmoral in the society of Mr. Greville, who had been summoned north to attend a council, who drew from the Prime Minister in conversation his real opinion of Lord Palmerston's conduct, and parted from him at Perth. Lord John spent the rest of the autumn chiefly at Pembroke Lodge, paying, however, visits at Woburn, at Windsor, and Bowood. At Bowood he saw for the last time his old friend the poet Moore, whose intellect was already obscured by the weight of sorrow which clouded his declining years; and at Woburn he had the satisfaction of seeing his eldest son imitating the example of his own boyhood, and playing one of the Babes in the Wood in an extravaganza composed by Mr. Stafford O'Brien for the occasion. But the autumn was not given up to amusement. Early in October Lord John brought before the Cabinet a proposal for a new Reform Bill. The time seemed ripe for the change. In resisting a motion of Mr. Hume's for a large measure of Radical Reform on the 5th of June, Lord John had been careful to define that he was in favour of some extension of the suffrage; while still later, on the 3rd of July, he had resented the notion that he was pledged to resist all Reform; declaring that he had never used the word finality which had won him his famous nickname.[1] So moderate a politician as Sir James Graham told him afterwards that he was bound to give effect to these two declarations;[2] and in conformity with this view Lord John brought the question before his colleagues in an October Cabinet. The members looked grave. Sir Charles Wood and Lord Lansdowne expressed alarm, and the others asked for time. But time did not make the proposal more palatable. The four members of the Grey party, reinforced for the occasion by Lord Lansdowne and Lord Palmerston, thought the proposal premature. They argued, with some force, that it would make a dissolution unavoidable; and that a new Parliament might possibly place a Protectionist Ministry in office. Lord John saw that it was hopeless to persevere with a project which he could not carry in his own Cabinet. But the decision was unfortunate, for it compelled him, in again resisting Mr. Hume's

[1] *Hansard*, cv. 1215, and cvi. 1302.
[2] Greville, 2nd series, iii. 294.

motion for Reform, to use the arguments which had frightened his colleagues, instead of those which had influenced himself:—

I have communicated with them [my colleagues] upon this subject; and we have not thought it advisable in the present session of Parliament to set aside other great questions for the purpose of . . . raising any question whatever on the franchise . . . Of late years many changes have been made which are still matters of grave discussion both in the House and the country. My opinion is . . . that these matters ought to be settled previous to placing before the country another question like this . . . That there is no very prevailing wish for these changes—that the middle classes, as the hon. and learned member for Sheffield said, are rather opposed to them—are certainly not conclusive reasons against these changes. It is unadvisable to wait for a storm before you put to sea; but, if you lift your anchor in a perfect calm, you may be drifted against the rocks.[1]

Mr. Bernal Osborne laughed at the leader of the Liberal party waiting for a breeze. But the captain had in reality remained in port in consequence of the refusal of his crew to sail.

If Lord John was thus unable in 1850 to proceed with the great work of organic Reform, he introduced, at the commencement of the session, a measure which, though it excited little heat at the time, may possibly be remembered when the Reform Act is forgotten. Nothing is more remarkable in the history of England than the opinion, which was generally entertained in the middle of the century, of the value of the colonies of England to the mother country. Men of mark, conscious of the gradual decay of the West Indies, irritated by the constant series of petty and expensive wars which retarded progress in South Africa, and alarmed at the inconvenient demands which were constantly arriving from Australia for free labour and self-government, almost openly declared that colonies were a burden, and not an advantage to the empire; and privately admitted that they would have welcomed the severance of the link that bound the one to the other. The constitution of the Cabinet of 1846 perhaps increased this opinion.

[1] *Hansard*, cix. 203, 205.

Lord Grey's administration of the Colonial Office deserves to be remembered with gratitude. But Lord Grey managed to make himself the most unpopular of Ministers. He was so conscious of his own unpopularity that he suggested in 1849 that he should be permitted to retire before he was broken by the weights of office and the burden of obloquy. Lord John never deserted a colleague because he was unpopular, and he determined, in the session of 1850, to place colonial policy in the forefront of his programme, and to take its management into his own hands. He communicated his intention to Lord Grey at the beginning of the year, and, on the 8th of February, 1850, brought the whole question before the House in a speech in which he reviewed the history and progress of the colonies, and the principles of colonial policy :—

It is important that you should know on what it is you will have to deliberate : if your public spirit should induce you to preserve your colonies ; or if your wisdom should induce you to amend your policy ; or, finally, if an unhappy judgment should induce you to abandon your colonies, it is essential to know what you would preserve, or amend, or abandon.

In this remarkable speech [1] Lord John showed how Englishmen, even in the worst periods of English history, had always carried to new settlements across the ocean those ideas of self-government which they had formed at home ; and he traced the progress which had been made of recent years, and especially during his own administration, in giving autonomy to the great colonies of Australia and Africa, which had sprung into existence during his own lifetime. He proposed now to take a great step in advance by separating Port Phillip, as Victoria was then called, and Van Diemen's Land from New South Wales, and by giving to all the Australian colonies the legislative institutions which New South Wales already enjoyed. A good deal of criticism was excited at the time by the form of government which Lord John proposed to give to the colonies. Following a precedent which had been already set in 1842, and acting, as he expressly declared,

[1] Lord Stanhope calls this 'a most able speech' (*History of England*, vol. vi. p. 143).

on what he believed to be the wishes of the colonists themselves, he proposed for each colony a single chamber, two-thirds of whose members were to be popularly elected. But in the result this provision was of no significance, because the chambers thus constituted were given not merely legislative but constituent powers, and, as a matter of fact, proceeded to frame their own constitutions. To this circumstance is due the fact that, though the Legislatures of the Australian colonies possess only delegated powers, they have a constituent authority; and in this respect they much more nearly resemble the Parliament of England than the Parliament, if the word be admissible, of the United States.

This great measure, designed practically by Lord John himself, and carried through the House under his direct guidance, was the chief legislative achievement of the session of 1850. The debates which took place during the same session on Ireland and on foreign affairs have already been briefly referred to in previous chapters; and it is only necessary to add a few general observations on other subjects which came before Parliament, and which affected the position either of the Government or of Lord John.

The session opened favourably for the Administration. At the outset the Protectionists in both Houses made the mistake of moving amendments to the Address, which were rejected by majorities so decisive as, in Mr. Greville's opinion, 'to leave no uncertainty in respect to agricultural questions, or as to the position of the Government.' But, before February was over, the prospect which was thus afforded was obscured: Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, which was exciting indignation at Court, was creating alarm in the country; Lord Grey's treatment of some colonial questions became the subject of vigorous Parliamentary attack; Mr. Disraeli succeeded in reducing the usual Government majority on a motion relating to the distress of the agricultural classes; while, still later, Sir Charles Wood suffered an annoying defeat on the Budget. The position of the Administration was weakened by these occurrences, and it so happened that they were threatened with a motion on which they were unable to command the support of their usual followers. Mr. Hutt

desired to get rid of the expenditure both of life and money involved in maintaining a squadron on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade. The opponents to the squadron contended that, while its maintenance caused a heavy strain on our resources, its presence did not secure the results which it was intended to promote. It converted a trade into smuggling; and the unfortunate negroes, penned in vessels built for speed and not for their accommodation, had their sufferings increased by the very measures taken in their behalf. But, on the other hand, Lord John thought, and the Cabinet agreed with him in thinking, that, after the protracted efforts which this country had made for the suppression of a detestable traffic, it could not honourably withdraw from the position which it had assumed. As he said in closing the debate—

I will not despond—I believe despondency in itself to be a main cause of failure. . . . Nothing but our being faint-hearted on this subject, and saying that we are unable to cope with the great evils to be met, will finally give a permanent sway and supremacy to the slave trade. There are, Sir, other considerations and other motives which may influence the House in coming to a decision on this question. Sir, we have been blessed with great mercies during the past year. We have more than once had to thank Almighty God for the dispensations of His goodness. It appears, then, to me that if we were now to say that the trade in man—that this unhallowed and cruel traffic, against which England, for nearly fifty years, has been working, by the efforts of her greatest statesmen and her best and bravest sailors—that if we were to decide to allow this trade to be pursued freely and unhampered—we should no longer have a right to expect a continuance of the signal blessings that we have enjoyed. I think, Sir, that the high, the moral, and the Christian character of this nation is the main source and secret of its strength; and that, . . . if we give up this high and holy work, and proclaim ourselves to be no longer fitted to lead in the championship against the curse and the crime of slavery, we have no longer a right to expect the continuance of those blessings which, by God's favour, we have so long enjoyed.

When Lady John read these words the following morning she probably thought that her prayer was at last accomplished, and that her husband was at the head of 'the most religious

and most moral Government this country ever had.' Lord Palmerston wrote—

C[arlton] G[ardens]: March 20, 1850.

My dear John Russell,—I cannot resist congratulating you upon the result of last night. It must be most gratifying to you in every point of view. Your course has been worthy the Minister of a great country, and the House of Commons has maintained its character as the organ of a noble people.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Many of his own followers, however, regarded the matter with very different feelings. If Lord John had not called them together in Downing Street on the previous day and told them frankly that the existence of the Government depended on the issue of the debate, some of them would undoubtedly have gone into the opposite lobby. Lord Clarendon, who differed from him on the subject, told him frankly that the result was due to attachment to himself and not to confidence in the Government. And Mr. Greville declared that he had never seen anything like the surprise of some people and the indignation of others at the course which Lord John had taken.

That course, however, was successful. The Cabinet prevailed; the squadron was saved; and, though several embarrassing questions arose during the next few months, no issue critical to the existence of the Administration was raised till Mr. Roebuck brought forward the motion to which reference has been made in a previous chapter, approving Lord Palmerston's foreign policy. Thus the session closed without any serious change in the aspect of affairs; and the Ministers maintained, if they did not improve, the position which they had already secured. Yet, if the annals of the session made only a slight difference in the status of the Administration, a great alteration was made in the composition of the House of Commons. For, at the beginning of July, Sir Robert Peel succumbed to the effects of a fatal accident. Lord John had for more than thirty years been identified with principles the reverse of those which were usually advocated by his great rival. For a dozen years, from 1835 to 1846, they had been sharply opposed to one another as the

leaders of the two great parties of the State; and, in the friction of political warfare, they had perhaps each of them underrated the great qualities of the other, and attributed to one another defects or faults which were due to their own imaginations. But recent circumstances had increased their mutual respect; and, though fortune or tradition still kept them apart, a communion of opinion was bringing them nearer to one another. And so it chanced that, in the last months of Sir Robert Peel's life, Sir Robert was always ready to support Lord John, and Lord John was ever ready to acknowledge Sir Robert's assistance.

During the years in which they were confronted as opponents, as well as during those in which they were co-operating as allies, few written communications—and those only of the most formal character—passed between the two men. In the autumn of the year, however, which preceded Sir Robert's death, Prime Minister and ex-Prime Minister exchanged through the Duke of Bedford their views on the odes of Horace. Lord John sent to Sir Robert through this channel an extract from one of Mr. Fox's letters on the subject, and Sir Robert replied to the Duke [1]—

November 27, 1849.

My dear Duke,—Pray thank Lord John for the extract from a letter of Mr. Fox.

I am rather surprised at the preference given by Mr. Fox to 'Quis desiderio,'[2] but I am quite a *Foxite* in the admiration of 'Ulla si juris.'[3] I dare say Lord John recollects the application of that ode to Mary Anne Clarke,[4] and the singular appositeness of every line, and almost every word.

Sed tu, simul obligasti
Perfidum votis caput, enitescis
Pulchrior multo, juvenumque prodis
Publica cura.

I will vote with Lord John in assigning a very high place to 'Quis

[1] Lord John set so much value on Sir Robert's letter that he had it copied by his private secretary, Mr. (now Lord) Arthur Russell. For the benefit of those who have not kept up their classics so well as Lord John Russell and Sir Robert Peel, I have given references to the various odes quoted by Sir Robert.

[2] Book I. ode xxiv. [3] Book II. ode viii.

[4] The lady who used her influence with the Duke of York to enable her to carry on a traffic in commissions.

multa gracilis,'[1] and also to 'Lydia, dic per omnes,'[2] but not so high as to 'Ulla si juris,' or to one not mentioned by Lord John or Mr. Fox, which I think quite perfect, 'Donec gratus eram tibi.'[3] Mr. Fox does not mention an ode from which he made a beautiful quotation towards the end of his life :—

Lenit albescens animos capillus
Litium et rixæ cupidos protervæ.
Non ego hoc ferrem calidus juventa,
Consule Planco.[4]

I am forgetting, however, that this is the day on which the November sittings of the Cabinet begin, and that Lord John has other things to think of than the odes of Horace. We cannot give him the invitation to idleness which Horace gives to some one (Mæcenas, I believe) :—

Negligens, ne qua populus laboret,
Parce privatus nimium cavere :
Dona præsentis cape lætus horæ, et
Linque severa.[5]

Believe me, my dear Duke, very faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Four months afterwards, in the course of a conversation with Lord Hatherton at Drayton, Sir Robert

spoke in the most respectful terms of Lord John Russell, praising his talents and the consistency of his character.

He added—

I have great reliance on him, and have an earnest desire to support him.[6]

Is it not a fair presumption that Sir Robert, when he wrote the above letter, was conscious, as Mr. Fox had been before him, that the grey locks of advancing age had appeased his appetite for strife, and was anxious that Lord John should know that he was ready to play a different part from that which he had filled in the maturity of his powers during the reigns of the fourth William and the fourth George?

In the following summer, however, Sir Robert Peel's life

[1] Book I. ode v.
[2] Book I. ode viii.
[3] Book III. ode ix.
[4] Book III. ode xiv.
[5] Book III. ode viii.
[6] Lord Hatherton's unpublished diary. From a long extract in the Russell papers.

was abruptly closed, and all that Lord John could do was to bear his testimony to

that long and large experience of public affairs, that profound knowledge, that oratorical power, that copious yet exact memory, with which the House was wont to be enlightened, interested, and guided.

Lord John went on to acknowledge 'the temper and forbearance' which Sir Robert had always displayed to those who held opinions opposite to his own; he declared that there was no doubt that, on the two great occasions when he proposed measures, which 'shook and afterwards subverted his power,' he did so from the motive of deep love to his country, and from that strong sense of duty which always distinguished him; he stated his conviction that Sir Robert Peel had prevented a war of classes after the passage of the Reform Act; he reminded the House that Sir Robert had given up a life which might have been one of culture and ease for Parliamentary labour; he expressed his hope that this example would not be lost on the people of the country; and he predicted that posterity would place the name of Sir Robert Peel among the names of the foremost statesmen who have adorned the annals of this country and have contributed to their lustre.

In the speech from which these sentences have been extracted, Lord John stated his readiness, if the family should desire it, to pay the statesman's memory the tribute of a public funeral; and, when this mark of respect was refused in deference to the known wishes of Sir Robert Peel, and when for a similar reason Lady Peel declined the peerage which Lord John at once offered her, he proposed and carried a motion for the erection of a public monument in Westminster Abbey.

Though, during the session, Lord John had not suffered from the constant ill-health which had so seriously interfered with his Parliamentary labours in 1848, he was frequently worn out by incessant attendance at the House of Commons. His family welcomed for him the intervals of repose which the short adjournments at Easter and Whitsuntide obtained. The former of them he spent with Sir Benjamin and Lady

Heywood near Manchester; and the visit enabled him to renew the acquaintance which he had made as a mere boy, in Mr. Playfair's company, nearly forty years before, with the chief industries of what Lady John called smoky, toiling, prosperous Manchester. The latter of them, when he was suffering from a depressing cough, he spent, so far as business enabled him to do so, in the quiet of his own house at Richmond. There, indeed, a succession of visitors constantly broke in upon his repose; and, on Sunday afternoons especially —for Sunday, both in the session and in the recess, was usually spent at Pembroke Lodge—his London friends came to be refreshed with country air, and enriched by the conversation of the Prime Minister. His wife wrote of the summer of 1850—

I think everybody liked seeing him and hearing him talk in the ease and quiet of the drawing-room or the garden. And the fresh air and beauty and repose of our blessed home always raised his spirits and gave a zest to his delightful powers of conversation. . . . He would stroll with his guests in the garden, and join, now one group, now another, and converse with equal ease on subjects as various as the flowers among which he wandered. His memory was excellent, and he abounded in historical and poetical illustrations and quotations. He had a vast store of anecdote, and was always alive to wit and pathos; his whole countenance kindling into laughter when he approached the point of a comical story; his eyes filling with tears when he told of an heroic deed, or a deep human grief. He listened as eagerly as he talked; he was absolutely free from affectation or a wish to shine; he was ready to talk, and enjoy doing so, with anybody—man or woman, young or old. Sincerity rang in every word he uttered. . . . With such materials in his mind and character, it is no wonder that his conversation was sought and valued.

There were times, however, at Pembroke Lodge, which were still more pleasant for wife and family when, alone with her or alone with them, he would read aloud some such poem as the 'Task' or the 'Excursion,' or discuss the simple but fervent faith which they held in common. It was to such quiet as this that Lady John referred in the following lines, which were headed: 'To J. R.: Pembroke Lodge, June 30, 1850.'

Here, statesman, rest ! and, while thy ranging sigh
Drinks from old sources ever new delight,
Unbind the weary shackles of the week,
And find the Sabbath thou art come to seek.
Here lay the babbling, lying Present by,
And Past and Future call to counsel high;
To Nature's worship say thy loud Amen,
And learn of solitude to mix with men.
Here hang on every rose a thorny care,
Bathe thy vex'd soul in unpolluted air.
Fill deep, from ancient stream and opening flower,
From veteran oak, and wild melodious bower,
With love, with awe, the bright but fleeting hour !
Now turn where, high from Windsor's hoary walls,
To keep her flag unstain'd thy country calls ;
Now, wandering, stop where, wrapt in mantle dun—
As if her guilty head heaven's light would shun—
London, gigantic parent, looks to thee,
Foremost of million sons, her guide to be.
On the fair land in gladness now look round,
And wish thy name with hers in glory bound.
Here may the breeze that sweeps dull vapours by,
Leaving majestic clouds to deck the sky,
Fan from thy brow the lines unrest has wrought,
But leave the footprint of each nobler thought.
With one alone, when fades the glowing west,
Beneath the moonbeam let thy spirit rest,
While childhood's silvery tones the stillness break,
And all the echoes of thy heart awake.
Then wiser, holier, stronger than before,
Go plunge into the maddening strife once more :
The dangerous, glorious path that thou hast trod
Go tread again, and with thy country's God.

At the close of the session Lord John secured a longer holiday. On the 19th of August, the day after his fifty-eighth birthday, he set out for Scotland, taking with him his wife and his four younger children. They slept at Carlisle and Glasgow, where he was much cheered by the people ; passed two days on Loch Lomond ;[1] and subsequently paid visits to Lord Breadalbane at the Black Mount and to Mr. Fox Maule at

[1] Walking on the banks of Loch Lomond the family were caught by a heavy

Drumour. Thence, sending the two younger children to Minto, Lord and Lady John proceeded with the two elder ones to the Dowager Duchess of Bedford at The Doune in Invernesshire. Lady John wrote—

John had a very pretty reception here. A number of people ranged along both banks of the Spey at a ferry by which we cross to this place, who hurrahed with all their might, while bag-pipes played. An address was presented. We crossed, stepped out on a Gordon plaid, and were received by the Duchess and her sons and daughters in a most cordial way.

Sir Edwin Landseer, who was very intimately acquainted with the Duchess, and who was staying at The Doune, availed himself of the opportunity to make the slight sketch of Lord John's two children (Lord Amberley and Lady Victoria Villiers) which still hangs on the walls of Pembroke Lodge. After staying a few days at The Doune, Lord and Lady John paid a series of visits to the Duke and Duchess of Leeds, General Duff, and others; passed a fortnight on their way South at Minto; and finally reached Pembroke Lodge on the 16th of October, in time to celebrate his step-daughter's (Miss Lister) birthday.

Lord John had happily the capacity for enjoyment which almost always accompanies a capacity for work. He went North with the panoply of a sportsman and with the ardour of a boy. There are still carefully preserved, among his other more important papers, a note from the Speaker, no mean authority on such a subject, advising him not to waste his time by trying to shoot capercailzie with a rifle, but to use his gun and load it with cartridges;[1] and a letter from his

shower, and took refuge in a cottage. The good wife, to quote Lady Russell's account, gave the children some excellent milk. Her husband on his return home said nothing till the Russells were leaving, when he inquired of Lady John, 'Is that no Lord John Russell?' His old wife asked him what he was saying. 'Why, it 's Lord John Russell—the biggest man in the kingdom!' She did not seem as much impressed as he expected. 'My belief is that she knew nothing of Lord John Russell, but was surprised, as she looked at him, to hear her husband call him the biggest man in the kingdom.' History telleth not how the old man recognised Lord John. Perhaps, if he had been asked, he would have answered, as the Welsh postman is said to have answered Lord Palmerston, 'Seen your picture in *Punch*, my lord!'

[1] I do not know whether it is necessary to remind my younger readers that in

cousin, Mr. William Russell, giving him directions, which his own experience suggested, for his behaviour while deer-stalking. Yet, though Lord John worked hard and late, nature, which had so freely endowed him with many qualities, had not given him the steady hand and quick eye which make a good shot. A Scotch gillie—Lord Lansdowne is responsible for the story—said of him, 'Forbye it hadn't pleased the Lord to make him a sportsman, he was a very decent body.' And at the Black Mount, at Taymouth, and at Braemar, Lord John failed. At last, at General Duff's, to the old General's great joy, he succeeded in repeating the achievement of the previous year, and brought down his stag.

After his return from his two months' holiday, Lord John threw himself into the many anxious affairs which will be related in the following chapter. Here it may be well to add that he saw the old year out and the new year in at Woburn. Miss Lister and his own son acted in one of the little plays which Mr. Stafford was in the habit of writing for the amateur troupe at the Abbey. No one enjoyed these performances more, or laughed more heartily at them, than the Prime Minister. And perhaps on the present occasion he was vividly reminded of his own youth. For the epilogue to 'The Eggs of Gold'—the title of the play—was spoken on New Year's Eve by his own boy, who had played the part of a page.

Ladies and gentlemen, at your desires,
My little Muse her little page inspires
With such a little epilogue as fits,
Not your great wisdom, but his little wits.
The old year dies! Oh! may the new year smile
On all we love, and on our native isle!
May it be like Dame Good-luck's wondrous goose,
And lay to each the egg that each would choose—
To the young, gay and happy hearts: to know
That they are blest, and to make others so.

1850 breech-loaders had not been invented, and muzzle-loaders were painfully loaded with powder and shot. But, even in 1850, the shot was occasionally separately enclosed in a cartridge, and was supposed to carry further and hit harder than when merely rammed down with wadding.

To boys and girls new toys and pretty stories;
A longer tail to Whigs, a head to Tories;
Health to the sick, and to the lonely friends;
Joy to the sorrowful; and, when it ends,
May we again hear Woburn's friendly call
To mirth and music, theatre and ball.
Far taller, wiser, better, and more clever,
May I be then. Such as I am, however,
Pray do not hiss me, for I'm very shy,
And I have done my best. Good-bye, good-bye!

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FALL OF THE WHIGS.

DURING his long administration, Lord John was chiefly occupied with the various questions which had their origin in Irish distress and continental revolution. But he was concurrently attending to other matters of great significance; and among these there was none to which he attached more importance, or in which he took a deeper interest, than the state of the English Church.

Lord John had always regarded with deep distrust the progress of the great religious movement which is associated with the names of Cardinal Newman and Mr. Pusey. Its votaries, he thought, were not merely traitors to the Church, but guilty of 'shocking profanation.' They were, consciously or unconsciously, initiating a movement which was leading to Rome, and they were simultaneously turning a service of remembrance into an offensive spectacle.[1] Holding such opinions, Lord John used his influence during the Ministry of Lord Melbourne, and during his own administration, to secure the promotion of men free from all taint of Tractarianism to the highest offices of the Church.

It so happened that, in the years which succeeded his accession to office, the vacancies on the bench were more than usually numerous. Lord John appointed, in 1847, an Archbishop of York; in 1848, an Archbishop of Canterbury; he filled up, in the first four years of his administration, the sees of St. Asaph, Sodor and Man (twice), Hereford, Manchester, Chester, Norwich, and Llandaff. The men whom he selected for these posts were Drs. Sumner, Musgrave, Short, Shirley, Eden, Hampden, Lee, Jackson, Hinds, and Ollivant. During the same period he sent Dr. Tait, the future Primate,

[1] These words are taken from *Recollections and Suggestions*.

to the Deanery of Carlisle, Dr. Milman to the Deanery of St. Paul's; and he offered Dr. Stanley (the late Dean of Westminster) high preferment. It is needless to add that most of these men were remarkable for the depth of their learning; while all of them were distinguished for the breadth of their views.

It is not impossible that the marked preference which Lord John was displaying for men of comprehensive opinions stimulated the very movement which he wished to defeat. The High Church party displayed increased activity; and the Bishop of Exeter declined to institute a clergyman, Mr. Gorham, to a living in his diocese, on the ground that he held heretical views on the subject of baptismal regeneration. The Bishop's decision was upheld by the Court of Arches, and Mr. Gorham appealed to the Privy Council. This tribunal reversed the judgment of the Ecclesiastical Court (in the language of Pembroke Lodge), 'to the satisfaction of all friends of liberty of conscience.' But, however satisfactory the judgment might be to moderate and reasonable people, it was eminently distasteful to a party in the Church. The Bishop of London declared that a question of doctrine should not be decided by a court composed chiefly of laymen. But the following letters will show the Bishop's opinion, as well as Lord John's:—

February 25, 1850.

My dear Lord,—What I think essential to the Queen's supremacy is that no person should be deprived of his rights unless by due interpretation of law. If the Supreme Court of Appeal in heresy were formed solely of the clergy, their opinions would probably be founded on the prevailing theological opinions of the Judicial Bishops, which might be one day Calvinistic and the next Romish. Especially if three senior bishops and two Divinity Professors were to form part of the tribunal, we might have superannuated bishops and university intolerance driving out of the Church its most distinguished ornaments. If your Lordship will speak to the Archbishop, he will inform you what I think might be done.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

The Rt. Rev. the Lord Bishop of London.

Chesham Place: March 15, 1850.

My dear Lord,—I am much obliged to your Grace for sending me the letter of the Bishop of London. I am sorry to learn that he expects a secession from the Church, more especially on the ground of the late decision given by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. For that decision, as I understand it, does not oblige any member of the Church to espouse the opinions of Mr. Gorham, and to renounce those of the Bishop of Exeter. It only pronounces that the opinions held by Mr. Gorham, respecting baptismal regeneration, do not disqualify him from holding a benefice in the Church to which he has been lawfully presented. This view of the case induces me to be very watchful in respect to any proposed tribunal to judge of doctrine. For, if such tribunal were to exclude from benefices all clergymen whose doctrines on various matters of controversy did not agree with those of the majority of that tribunal, we should infallibly lose that freedom of judgment on nice points of doctrine which has at all times been the characteristic of our Protestant Church. . . . If for . . . the present constitution of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council we were to substitute the Upper House of Convocation with the addition of some learned judges, I fear we should subject the rights and privileges of the clergy, and the patrons of livings, to an ecclesiastical body more intent on theology than on law and liberty; put in hazard the Queen's supremacy over all matters in the Church, spiritual as well as temporal; and revive those fierce disputes which, at the beginning of the last century, made the meetings of Convocation a scandal and a public nuisance. I should be quite ready to concur in the plan of adding any bishops, who may be of the Privy Council, to the present Court of Appeal; and I am sorry to see that the Bishop of London says that such a plan would 'be *wholly useless* and unsatisfactory.' Such being the case, I do not see that anything can be done at present. Indeed, I fear that nothing but the erection of a priestly supremacy over the Crown and people would satisfy the party in the Church who now take the lead in agitation. I request you to give a copy of this letter to the Bishop of London, and remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

The Archbishop of Canterbury.

It is the essential characteristic of faith that it cannot be assaulted by reason; and the position of the High Church party, relying more and more on authority, could not be shaken by Lord John's arguments. But the decision of the Privy Council produced a prodigious ferment, and, throughout the summer

of 1850, secessions and threats of secessions from the Church became frequent. Early in the autumn the Pope, restored to Rome, and upheld in the Vatican by French bayonets, thought proper to issue a Bull dividing England into twelve sees, and to appoint Mr. Wiseman, who was made a cardinal, Archbishop of Westminster. The excitement which had been created by the Gorham judgment was almost forgotten in the clamour which was produced by the Pope's action. High Church and Low Church were almost equally indignant at what appeared to be an intolerable assumption on the part of a foreign pontiff; and the Bishop of London, who had contended so strongly against Lord John in the spring, was united with him in the autumn.

Private] Pembroke Lodge: October 30, 1850.

My dear Lord,—I was much rejoiced to see your Lordship's answer to the London clergy respecting the Pope's Bull.

It may happen that this step of the Pope may strengthen the Protestant interest in these kingdoms more than anything else. Such men as Mr. Dodsworth and Mr. Bennett must at least declare themselves.

The Attorney-General was desired by Sir George Grey to read the Bull with a view to decide if it contained anything illegal. But I do not myself expect that there will be any plain violation of law found in the document.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.[1]

The Bishop of London.

It would perhaps have been well if Lord John could have satisfied himself with this letter. Shortly after writing it, however, he received a communication on the same subject from the Bishop of Durham. Dr. Maltby, who in 1850 held the see of Durham, to which he had been promoted on Lord John's own recommendation in 1836, was one of Lord John's oldest and closest friends. He had been his constant correspondent for more than twenty years; he had supplied him with much information for the religious chapters of the 'Affairs of Europe;' and he had been his frequent counsellor on questions

[1] The Bishop had written to Lord John on the 23rd to say that in his approaching charge he intended to make some remarks upon the recent assumption of authority by the Pope, and had asked whether her Majesty's Government intended to remonstrate against the proceedings of the Roman Pontiff.

affecting the Church, and on the qualifications and characters of the men who were candidates for promotion in it. It was natural, therefore, to Lord John to open his mind freely to the Bishop; and he certainly did so on this occasion.[1]

Downing Street: November 4, 1850.

My dear Lord,—I agree with you in considering 'the late aggression of the Pope upon our Protestantism' as 'insolent and insidious,' and I therefore feel as indignant as you can do upon the subject.

I not only promoted to the utmost of my power the claims of the Roman Catholics to all civil rights, but I thought it right and even desirable that the ecclesiastical system of the Roman Catholics should be the means of giving instruction to the numerous Irish immigrants in London and elsewhere, who without such help would have been left in heathen ignorance.

This might have been done, however, without any such innovation as that which we have now seen.

It is impossible to confound the recent measures of the Pope with the division of Scotland into dioceses by the Episcopal Church, or the arrangement of districts in England by the Wesleyan Conference.

There is an assumption of power in all the documents which have come from Rome; a pretension of supremacy over the realm of England, and a claim to sole and undivided sway, which is inconsistent with the Queen's supremacy, with the rights of our bishops and clergy, and with the spiritual independence of the nation, as asserted even in Roman Catholic times.

I confess, however, that my alarm is not equal to my indignation.

Even if it shall appear that the ministers and servants of the Pope in this country have not transgressed the law, I feel persuaded that we are strong enough to repel any outward attacks. The liberty of Protestantism has been enjoyed too long in England to allow of any successful attempt to impose a foreign yoke upon our minds and consciences. No foreign prince or potentate will be at liberty to fasten his fetters upon a nation which has so long and so nobly vindicated its right to freedom of opinion, civil, political, and religious.

Upon this subject, then, I will only say that the present state of the law shall be carefully examined, and the propriety of adopting

[1] The Bishop's letter, dated October 30, was primarily to thank Lord John for having complied with an application he had made to him on behalf of a meritorious scholar. He had gone on to say, 'I do not know what your opinion, or that of the Government, may be respecting the late aggression of the Pope upon our Protestant religion. I confess I think it insolent and insidious,' &c.

any proceedings with reference to the recent assumption of power, deliberately considered.

There is a danger, however, which alarms me much more than any aggression of a foreign sovereign.

Clergymen of our own Church, who have subscribed the Thirty-nine Articles and acknowledged in explicit terms the Queen's supremacy, have been most forward in leading their flocks 'step by step to the very verge of the precipice.' The honour paid to saints, the claim of infallibility for the Church, the superstitious use of the sign of the cross, the muttering of the liturgy so as to disguise the language in which it is written, the recommendation of auricular confession, and the administration of penance and absolution—all these things are pointed out by clergymen of the Church of England as worthy of adoption, and are now openly reprehended by the Bishop of London in his charge to the clergy of his diocese.

What then is the danger to be apprehended from a foreign prince of no great power compared to the danger within the gates from the unworthy sons of the Church of England herself?

I have little hope that the propounders and framers of these innovations will desist from their insidious course. But I rely with confidence on the people of England; and I will not bate a jot of heart or hope, so long as the glorious principles and the immortal martyrs of the Reformation shall be held in reverence by the great mass of a nation which looks with contempt on the mummeries of superstition, and with scorn at the laborious endeavours which are now making to confine the intellect and enslave the soul.—I remain, with great respect, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

If you think it will be of any use, you have my full permission to publish this letter.

When this letter first appeared it was received with a chorus of approbation from peer, prelate, and people. Lord John, on this occasion at any rate, had not waited for the breeze to bear him forward. He had himself fanned the flame which was propelling his vessel. But, even in the midst of unprecedented enthusiasm, some whispers of dissatisfaction reached the Minister's ears. High Churchmen not unnaturally resented being called 'the unworthy sons of the Church of England.' Moderate Roman Catholics deplored the application of such a phrase as 'the mummeries of superstition' to a service which they regarded as sacred.

Even so old a friend as Madame Durazzo wrote to say, 'Votre lettre à l'évêque de Durham m'a blessé au fond de l'âme;' while reports from Ireland continually assured him that no member for a Roman Catholic constituency would have a chance of re-election if he were to support a measure which denied territorial titles to Roman Catholic bishops. Yet, even if Lord John had desired to retreat from a position of difficulty, the enthusiasm which his letter had created among the Protestants of England would have made withdrawal impossible. He was compelled, when Parliament met, to put words in the Queen's mouth announcing a measure to resist the Pope's aggression; and on the first Friday in the session he rose to introduce a Bill for the purpose.

Lord John Russell, so Mr. Greville once said, always spoke well when a great speech was required of him; and his speech on this occasion was no exception to the rule. The House, so far, was with him; and after four nights' debate his motion was carried by an enormous majority. But it was already plain that, though the vast majority of the House was prepared to resist the aggression of the Pope, Lord John could not command the support of his usual followers on other questions. In the week, over which this debate was protracted, Mr. Disraeli secured a night for the discussion of agricultural distress, and was only defeated by a narrow majority of fourteen. On the Monday which succeeded its termination, Sir Charles Wood brought forward the Budget, and his proposals were received with disappointment and disapprobation. On the succeeding Thursday Mr. Locke King asked leave to introduce a Bill for equalising the county with the borough franchise; and, though Lord John distinctly undertook[1] to deal with the matter himself in the following year, and asked the House, on the faith of this assurance, to reject Mr. Locke King's motion, his party went into the lobby against him and defeated him by a majority of two to one. It had been intended to renew the discussion on the Budget on the following evening; but Lord John

[1] This undertaking was given without previous consultation with the Cabinet, and Lord John's conduct in giving it was subsequently resented by some of its members.

asked that the committee should be postponed; and the House broke up in some confusion, the members speculating whether the Minister was intending to reconstruct the Budget or to retire from his position.

The blow could never have come in its final shape if the Cabinet had not refused to sanction the introduction of the measure of Reform which Lord John for two years had urged on it. Even in the preceding month, the Prime Minister had been forced to yield his opinion to that of his colleagues. He wrote to the Queen on the 20th of January, 1851—

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to state that the Cabinet are generally of opinion that no Bill for extending the franchise should be brought forward by the Government in the present year.

Lord John Russell acquiesces reluctantly in this opinion, and will so state to the Cabinet this day.

After Lord John's defeat, Lord Minto wrote—

Eaton Square: Thursday night.

My dear Lord John,—. . . If my cold did not keep me at home, I should have walked to Chesham Place to give a vent to some of the indignation that is boiling over. If the saddle could be put upon the right horse it would be all very well; but as matters stand the blame and the discredit appear to fall upon you. If I were in the place of those who rejected your proposal, I could not consent to suffer you to be the scapegoat for my misdeeds; and I am willing to think that others may feel as I should have done, and may desire to have it understood that you had wished to propose a measure of your own. I shall be quite ready to throw out such a suggestion on Saturday, if you do not disapprove of it. . . . These are hasty thoughts, which, especially if they be angry thoughts, are seldom worth much. But the expectoration relieves me.—Yours ever,

MINTO.

Lord John dissuaded Lord Minto from carrying out his suggestion, anxious perhaps that his own retirement should not lead to any bitterness among his friends. For neither he nor the Cabinet was in doubt as to the course which should be pursued. On the following morning he placed his resignation in the Queen's hands, and advised her to send for Lord

Stanley. Lord Stanley, however, declined to attempt the formation of an Administration until an effort had been made to combine the Whigs with the followers of Sir Robert Peel; and, by the Queen's desire, Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and Lord John met at the Palace with a view to ascertain whether such a combination were possible. Lord John thereupon drew up the following memorandum :—

Saturday night, February 22, 1851.

Lord John Russell having been informed by the Queen that Lord Stanley declines to form a Ministry at present, and her Majesty having called on Lord John Russell to attempt the reconstruction of a Ministry of which he should be at the head, proposes to Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham the following points as the basis of an agreement.

A Cabinet to be constructed anew of not more than eleven members, with reference only to their fitness for the several offices and their willingness to adhere to the following conditions :—

1. The present commercial policy to be inviolably maintained, and any commercial or financial measures to be in harmony with this policy.

2. The financial measures of the present year to be open to revision.

3. The Bill 'to prevent the Assumption of Ecclesiastical Titles, &c.,' to be persevered in so far as the preamble and the first clause, but the remaining clauses to be abandoned—much misapprehension having prevailed in Ireland with respect to those clauses.

4. Notice to be given of a Bill to extend the right of voting for members of Parliament in the counties, cities, and boroughs in England and Wales, such Bill to be introduced immediately after Easter.

5. A Commission of Inquiry to be instituted into corrupt practices at elections in the cities and boroughs of the United Kingdom.

The following was Lord Aberdeen's and Sir James Graham's answer :—

Argyle House : February 24, 1851.

Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham, in obedience to the Queen's commands, have considered the points which Lord John Russell proposes as the basis of agreement in his attempt to reconstruct a Ministry, of which her Majesty has chosen Lord John Russell to be the head.

1. Adherence to the commercial policy, transmitted by the late Sir Robert Peel to Lord John Russell, presents no difficulty. It is desirable that all future commercial and financial measures should be framed in the spirit, and with the declared object, of that policy, so far as varying circumstances will allow.

2. There can be no objection on the part of Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham to a reconsideration of the financial measures lately submitted by Sir Charles Wood to the House of Commons.

3. A Bill has been introduced into the House of Commons, after a full statement of its contents, with the consent of a large majority of the House, the object of which is to prevent the assumption of ecclesiastical titles by Roman Catholic prelates in the United Kingdom. It is now proposed to strike out of this Bill all the clauses except the first, thereby reducing the efficacy of the measure. What remains of the Bill will be almost inoperative: but it must be remembered that the omission of the three last clauses will probably give rise to great disappointment and disapprobation on the part of those who represent the popular feeling in Great Britain so much excited in hostility to recent proceedings on the part of the Court of Rome. On the other hand, the small remnant of the Bill will still be resented as penal and offensive by the great body of her Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects.

Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham have never admitted the policy of any such legislation; and, while they condemn the tone assumed by the Pope in his brief, and by Cardinal Wiseman in his pastoral letter, they see no sufficient grounds for legislative interference: and they cannot be parties to an attempt from which they anticipate no good, and see reason for apprehending many serious evils.

4. It is not possible to acquiesce in giving notice of a Bill for the extension of the suffrage in England and Wales, not only without any previous careful consideration of its details, but without any knowledge of its contents. There may be no objection to the principles of such extension, if safeguards can be provided which will preserve the balance of the constitution, and which will strengthen and not impair the existing form of government. Delay in the introduction of such a measure, when its necesity has been admitted in Parliament by the First Minister of the Crown, must indeed be attended with inconvenience: but the possibility of framing a Bill on this most difficult and most important subject before Easter is questionable.

5. The proposed Commission of Inquiry into corrupt practices at elections in the cities and boroughs of the United Kingdom, if unobjectionable, would seem to afford a just ground for delay in the

introduction of the promised Bill for the extension of the franchise: but this commission may lead to changes in the system of representation which cannot be foreseen, and might produce an increased desire for secret voting.

Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham have thus communicated, in the first instance, their opinion on the conditions which Lord John Russell proposes as the basis of his new Government.

It is stated also by Lord John Russell that the number of the Cabinet is to be limited to eleven, and that the choice of the members within this narrow limit is to be made with reference to their fitness for the several offices. Lord John Russell, to whom the formation of the new Ministry has been confided by her Majesty, will necessarily be the sole adviser of the Queen in making this selection. It is not necessary for Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham to dwell on this portion of Lord John Russell's memorandum, or to reserve their right of independent judgment with respect to the colleagues with whom it may be intended to associate them; because on the preliminary points of public policy herein discussed there is not that agreement with Lord John Russell himself which would justify the acceptance of a proposal to join his Government on the conditions specified above.

Sir James Graham, speaking for himself alone, and judging by the measures of the late Government in connection with recent inquiries by committees of the House of Commons into the expenditure of the army, navy, and ordnance, into official salaries, and the fees and charges of the courts of law, would feel it his duty in Government to insist on a more rigid economy, and on a reduction of the public expenditure, such as Lord John Russell, according to the belief of Sir James Graham, is not prepared to sanction.

Lord John at once replied—

Downing Street: February 24, 1851.

Lord John Russell wishes to explain some points in his former memorandum which do not appear to have been clearly understood by Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham.

On the third point Lord John Russell wishes to state that in his opinion the main object of the Bill with respect to the assumption of ecclesiastical titles was to assert the national independence from the pretensions of a foreign prince. If this object had been attained, he was willing to waive those parts of the Bill which had excited an alarm in Ireland of an intention to interfere with the spiritual acts of the Roman Catholic bishops and clergy, and thereby affect the

religious liberty which is so justly held dear by all classes of the Queen's subjects. Such an intention never existed.

On the fourth point Lord John Russell will only observe that of course all the details of a Bill for the extension of the suffrage must be considered before any notice is given of its introduction. But the time of such introduction is of less importance than a previous agreement that there is no positive bar to the consideration of such a measure.

With regard to the suggestions relating to the number of the Cabinet, and that the selection was to be made solely with reference to the fitness of its members for their several offices, Lord John Russell only meant to preclude a nomination of four for one party and four for another, in reference to their previous agreement with different sections of the Cabinet. He considers such arrangements the cause of weakness and internal dissension. But Lord John Russell did not intend to submit a single name to her Majesty without the previous assent of Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham. But, as there is not that agreement on the preliminary points of public policy which would justify the acceptance of a proposal to join Lord John Russell in forming a Government, it is only necessary to explain that Lord John Russell meant the most entire and full confidence in Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham both in framing and carrying on the Government.

With respect to the latter points to which Sir James Graham has adverted, Lord John Russell has no means of judging what are the points upon which Sir James Graham would insist on a more rigid economy than Lord John Russell is prepared to sanction. The efficiency of the public service ought in his opinion to be always kept in view in any reductions that may be made, but no office should be maintained on any other grounds, which could be safely abolished or reduced.

Argyle House: February 25, 1851.

Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham have received the explanations which Lord John Russell was desirous of giving on certain points arising out of their recent correspondence. These explanations seem to remove any doubt or misunderstanding; but, as they do not materially affect the principal point of difference respecting the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and as the negotiation is now closed, it cannot be necessary to carry the discussion further.

Lord John Russell has intimated a wish that publicity should not be given to the written communications which have passed on this occasion. Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham readily acquiesce in this desire. They will not allow any copies to be taken of their

correspondence, nor will they make any public use of it, unless compelled by unforeseen circumstances, which they cannot anticipate, to recur to it in their own defence.

Sir James Graham added in a private note—

I can assure you, on the part of Lord Aberdeen and of myself that we are actuated by no unfriendly feeling, and that we earnestly desire not to add to your difficulties or to give you any unnecessary pain.

Lord John announced the failure of the negotiation to his old colleagues in the following note :—

February 24, 1851.

Lord John Russell received this evening an answer from Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham on certain general terms which he had proposed as the basis of reconstructing the Government.

Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham object decidedly to *any* legislative measure on the subject of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.

This puts an end to the negotiation, and Lord John Russell has returned his commission into her Majesty's hands.

There has been no question between Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and himself with regard to persons.

Lord John Russell begs his colleagues to receive his cordial thanks for their able support during four trying years, and their disinterested kindness on this occasion.

The negotiation had failed ; and, after the Queen had again applied to Lord Aberdeen and Lord Stanley, she sent, on the advice of the Duke of Wellington, for Lord John and asked him to resume the Government. He complied with her wish, and it is difficult to see how he could have done otherwise. Yet his resumption of office involved the consequences which had ensued from the return of the Whigs to power under Lord Melbourne in May 1839. A Government was maintained in office, not by its own strength, but by the weakness of its adversaries ; and an Administration tolerated rather than supported cannot avoid incurring discredit. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was modified ; the Budget was recast ; the Ministry on other occasions experienced several annoying defeats ; and the session closed with an almost universal conviction that the Ministry had lost ground, that the existing system was worn out, and that

'there must be a new departure taken, with a better crew on board the Government vessel, and an avowed and definite destination in view.'[1]

Lord John was at least as conscious as other persons of the necessity both of a new departure and of additional allies. Yet he was not responsible for the failure of the Government to embark on large measures, or to obtain extraneous support. He had been thwarted by his colleagues in his desire to introduce a fresh Reform Bill in 1849; he had failed to secure the help which he had over and over again sought from the followers of Sir Robert Peel. Four days after the session was over, he endeavoured to supply one deficiency by drawing up an outline of a fresh Reform Act. Before four weeks were over, he made another attempt to secure the presence of Sir James Graham in the Cabinet.

The progress of ideas on the subject of Parliamentary Representation has been so rapid that schemes of Reform propounded a generation ago are only the dry bones of history. It is hardly worth while to publish at length the elaborate memorandum which Lord John drew up on August 12, 1851. In this minute he proposed the semi-disfranchisement of either twenty, thirty, or forty of the smallest boroughs—the exact number to be determined afterwards—the allotment of their members in equal proportions to the most populous counties and the largest towns; the reduction of the county franchise to 20*l.*, of the borough franchise to 5*l.*, rateable value; the formation of various trades and professions into guilds, whose members should have a right to choose two or three of their number to vote at the election of a member for the borough in which they resided; the abolition of the property qualification of members of Parliament; and the repeal of the provision which made it necessary for a member of Government exchanging one office for another to undergo re-election. This proposal, forwarded to the Queen on the 12th of August, was carefully criticised by Prince Albert, and subsequently submitted to the Cabinet. Objections were raised to the curious provision for representing trades; and this part of the scheme was omitted from it. On the recom-

[1] The opinion is Mr. Cobden's. See his *Life*, vol. ii. p. 91.

mendation of Sir C. Wood the disfranchising clauses of the Bill were also omitted, and the Cabinet decided to throw some neighbouring towns into all boroughs having less than 500 electors. The Bill was ultimately introduced by Lord John in this shape at the commencement of the session of 1852. But the discussions upon it had very nearly led to the disruption of the Ministry. Lord Palmerston was anxious that boroughs having more than 300 electors should be left undisturbed. Lord Lansdowne strongly objected to 'tying places together more or less distant and wholly unconnected with each other.' He refused to be responsible for such a proposal, and left it to Lord John to determine whether he should resign at once, or when the Bill was finally matured, or when it was brought up to the House of Lords.[1] He was ultimately prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation 'on finding that any other course would cause an immediate dissolution of the Government;'[2] and the Cabinet, therefore, was ultimately able to produce its measure without giving overt evidence of an irreconcilable difference of opinion. This circumstance was the more fortunate because the Cabinet had again failed to obtain extraneous assistance. An overture to Sir James Graham, which Lord John made in September 1851, and an attempt to obtain the Duke of Newcastle's services in January 1852, proved equally unsuccessful;[3] and in the interval the crisis had occurred which had led to Lord Palmerston's abrupt dismissal from the Foreign Office. It

[1] The letter in which this paragraph occurs almost verbatim is only dated Sunday. It refers to a letter as 'written not long since,' which bears date November 23. It was probably written early in December. The paragraph in the ensuing letter, in which Lord Lansdowne announces the withdrawal of his resignation, was addressed to Prince Albert on January 22, 1852.

[2] On the 8th of December Lord John had told Lord Lansdowne, 'I do not see any chance of carrying the Bill as a Minister without your assistance. If, therefore, you insist on resigning, I shall tender my resignation along with yours and propose the plan agreed to by the Cabinet as a private member of Parliament.'

[3] It is hardly necessary to give the particulars of these negotiations. That with Sir James Graham has already been correctly related by Mr. Greville, *Memoirs*, Pt. II. vol. iii. p. 412. That with the Duke of Newcastle will also be found *ibid.* p. 436; and it is only necessary to add to it that the office which was proposed to the Duke was the Irish Viceroyalty, from which Lord Clarendon had been for some months anxious to retire.

may be desirable, before relating this history, to trace Lord John's movements in the previous autumn.

When Parliament adjourned in the middle of August 1851, the family at Pembroke Lodge was in some anxiety. Lord John's second step-daughter, who afterwards became Mrs. Warburton, had for many months shown symptoms of great delicacy, and her medical advisers insisted on her leaving England and on passing the winter in a warmer climate. She and her sister (Lady Melvill) and a French lady, engaged as their companion, sailed in September, and were ultimately joined by their brother, Lord Ribblesdale, in Italy. During the sixteen years which had elapsed since his first marriage, Lord John had known no such parting from his first wife's children. The reason which had necessitated it made it the more painful; and perhaps on this account, as well as for the sake of the change which he sorely needed, he carried his wife and four of his own children with him to North Wales. Lady John shall tell the story:—

September 15.—We, and four of our children, set out for a little tour in Wales. First day to Bangor: after which our resting-places were Llanberis, Beddgelert, Tan-y-bwlch, and Capel Curig, a few days being spent at each, then [Sept. 30] beautiful drive to Llanrwst, where we changed horses: there found great crowd, bells ringing, and loud hurrahs, which gave me a good opinion of the Llanrwstians. Got here [Rhyl] at six; found an evergreen arch erected for us at the inn gate. Next day we drove to Penywern to call on Lord Mostyn, one of John's staunchest supporters; stopping on the way to see Rhuddlan Castle; also saw the remains of the house in which Edward I. passed the Statute of Rhuddlan, securing to the Welsh their judicial rights and independence. Lord Mostyn and about twenty gentlemen came with addresses to John from Rhyl and St. Asaph. Next day we went to St. Asaph to lunch with the Bishop [Short], who took us a lovely drive to Denbigh, where we got out to see the castle, and John was received with ringing of bells and loud cheers. Oct. 11 we arrived at Pembroke Lodge. So happy to be here again, with all our old interests and the new one of the school, that I no longer regret Snowdon and the sea.

Lord John, however, was already meditating a more important journey. Years had passed since he had visited Paris, which had once been such familiar ground to him; and

in the course of October he decided on crossing to France and paying a short visit to Lord Normanby. Lord Palmerston, writing to him on the 21st of October, urged him to put off his excursion, or, at any rate, to ask Louis Napoleon whether such a visit would be inconvenient, and whether he would prefer the Prime Minister coming at some quieter time. Lord John took the latter course; and the President sent him, on the 30th of October, a message through Lord Normanby to say that he would be very glad to see him. Things, however, moved rapidly in Paris: the Chamber declared 'open war,' to use Lord Normanby's phrase, against the President; and Lord John, fearing to mix himself up in the internal politics of France, wrote to Lord Normanby and put off his visit. The state of affairs in Paris amply justified his decision, which a new crisis in the Cabinet at home would under any circumstances have necessitated.

For a few weeks after the issue of the Queen's memorandum in August 1850, the relations between the Foreign Office and the Court had been a little happier. But the autumn had not far advanced before the old difficulty recurred. Lord Palmerston sent an unauthorised despatch to Baron Koller, the Austrian Ambassador; and was forced by Lord John, after a sharp and disagreeable controversy, in which Lord Palmerston threatened to resign, to withdraw his letter. The Queen watched this controversy with the more anxiety because Prince Albert differed radically from Lord Palmerston's policy on the dispute which had arisen between Germany and Denmark respecting Schleswig-Holstein. It is necessary to defer to a later chapter the history of this complicated negotiation. It is sufficient here to say that the Queen, throughout the controversy, condemned the conduct of Denmark and disapproved the policy which Lord Palmerston pursued.

It is needless, therefore, to say that throughout the autumn of 1850 and the whole of 1851 the difficulty which had only been temporarily terminated in the former year was constantly recurring. On Thursday, October 23, 1851, M. Kossuth, who had been the soul of the Hungarian uprising, landed at Southampton; and it was demi-officially announced, to the

Queen's intense but natural annoyance, that Lord Palmerston intended to receive him. Lord John urged Lord Palmerston not to do so, and, failing to prevail with him, wrote as follows :—

Pembroke Lodge: October 30, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I must once more press upon you my views concerning an interview with Kossuth.

I wrote to you some time ago that I hoped you would not see him.

I wrote to you afterwards from Windsor Castle that I thought your seeing him would be improper and unnecessary.

I wrote to you again yesterday to say that I thought that, if upon his first arrival he had asked to see you to express through you his thanks to the Queen's Government for the efforts made by them for his safety and liberation, and you had at once seen him, it might have been thought a natural proceeding. But that, after his denunciations of two sovereigns with whom the Queen is on terms of peace and amity, an interview with you would have a very different complexion.

The more I think on the matter, the more I am confirmed in this view.

It might have been right—although we did not think so—to interfere in the war waged by Russia in Hungary. But it cannot be right that any member of the Administration should give an implied sanction to an agitation, commenced by a foreign refugee, against sovereigns in alliance with her Majesty.

I must therefore positively request that you will not receive Kossuth, and that, if you have appointed him to come to you, you will inform him that any communication must be in writing, and that you must decline to see him.—Yours faithfully,

J. Russell.

Lord Palmerston replied—

Panshanger: October 30, 1851, 6 P.M.

My dear John Russell,—I have just received your letter of to-day, and am told your messenger waits for an answer. My reply, then, is immediate, and is, that there are limits to all things ; that I do not choose to be dictated to as to who I may or may not receive in my own house ; and that I shall use my own discretion on this matter. You will, of course, use yours as to the composition of your Government. I have not detained your messenger five minutes.—Yours sincerely,

Palmerston.

Lord John, after sending these letters to the Queen, replied—

Pembroke Lodge: November 1, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I received your answer to my letter yesterday morning.

The question between us is one regarding the public welfare, and must be decided by argument and not by passion.

If my letter was too peremptory, yours was, I think, quite unjustifiable.

I do not see how it is possible for you either in your private house or elsewhere to be other than the organ of the Queen towards all foreign powers.

It is possible that the Austrian Minister at our Court may be directed to take his leave upon your receiving Kossuth, and rumours to that effect are circulated, though perhaps not authentic.

The question, therefore, is a public one, and as such I have summoned a Cabinet to consider it on Monday at two o'clock.

I trust you will be there, and I shall be perfectly willing to hear your reasons for thinking the matter ought to be left to your discretion.

Above all, let us endeavour to come to a fair and impartial decision.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

When the Cabinet met on the Monday, Lord John thus put the matter before his colleagues:—

I have called the Cabinet together with a view, not to any collective resolution, but in order to gather the expression of their opinions on a subject which appears to me one of considerable importance.

As some members of the Cabinet have lately joined us,[1] I wish to state the circumstances which have led more immediately to our present meeting. When the leaders of the Hungarian insurrection, defeated by the forces of Austria and Russia, fled into Turkey, a demand was made upon the Sultan to deliver them up, no doubt for trial and execution. The Sultan refused, and appealed to us and to France for support. The Cabinet unanimously resolved to give that support. The Emperor of Russia soon perceived that he had made a false step; retreated very skilfully; allowed the Polish refugees to leave Turkey; and the question, as regarded him, was at an end. The Austrian Government behaved very differently. Circumstances

[1] Lord Seymour and Lord Granville had been lately admitted to the Cabinet.

of a suspicious nature, reported by Sir S. Canning, indicated an attempt to waylay the Hungarian refugees by Croat soldiers, and their lives did not appear safe.[1] Palmerston then urged the Sultan to allow them to depart. After various communications, and the most able remonstrances on the part of Sir S. Canning, the Sultan fixed the 1st of September in the present year for their departure. He kept his word. It appears to me that our duty ended here. We had supported the Sultan against a barbarous and unusual demand on the part of two great powers. We had further, after saving their lives, procured the liberty of the refugees, thus rescuing them from death or from perpetual imprisonment. We had done this without war. Our policy had been creditable and successful. We had nothing to do with the Hungarian cause. We had seen in the Hungarians the defeated parties in a civil war. Kossuth determined to come to England. I thought it best that no member of the Government should see him. Palmerston thought otherwise. Although I differed from him, there was something plausible in his opinion.

If Kossuth, upon landing in England, had asked to see Palmerston in order to convey to the Queen his thanks for his life and liberty, and to express his acknowledgments to Palmerston as the organ of the Government, the course might have been natural and defensible. Kossuth has not chosen to do so. He has chosen to make speeches at Southampton and Winchester, exciting the people of England to a crusade against the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of Austria, the Queen's allies. He has done so with very great ability—no one can deny that. But it appears to me that, after this unusual conduct of his, it would not be right that the Foreign Secretary should receive him. I make no distinction between a reception at the Foreign Office or in Carlton Terrace. Palmerston cannot divest himself of the character of the Queen's Secretary of State. Mr. Canning lived at the Foreign Office ; it would have been absurd to say that by going from his Office through a door into his dining-room he changed his character. It is said —I know not with what truth—that, if Kossuth is received, the

[1] In the summer of 1850 Lord John wrote, on this subject, to the Queen, 'Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit some drafts from Lord Palmerston. One of them relates to the supposed plot of the Austrian police to inveigle Hungarian refugees, with respect to which your Majesty has intimated that no further inquiry ought to be made by order from here. Lord John Russell concurs with your Majesty, although he thinks the evidence of a plot of some kind very strong, and hitherto uncontradicted.'

Austrian Minister will be withdrawn. I believe there has been no intimation of this kind. Nor should I mind his being withdrawn if we were in the right. But, if we were in the wrong, and a debate were to arise on the subject, I should feel very differently. I again say I call for no resolution of the Cabinet. I beg pardon for having made so long a speech.

The Cabinet was unanimous in agreeing with Lord John, and Lord Palmerston gave way. But unfortunately, while abandoning his intention of seeing M. Kossuth, he consented to receive some deputations at the Foreign Office who presented him with addresses in which the Emperors of Austria and Russia were spoken of as 'odious and detestable assassins.'

The Queen at once expressed to Lord John her grave annoyance at Lord Palmerston's conduct, and Lord John, on receiving her letter, wrote to Lord Palmerston, who replied—

Carlton Gardens: November 28, 1851.

My dear John Russell,—I am exceedingly sorry that the Queen should have been annoyed at what took place the other day about the presentation of addresses of thanks to me from Finsbury and Islington. . . . . But the fact simply was that, having received a letter asking me when those addresses could be presented to me, I told my private secretary to say in reply that I would see the deputation . . . . and I do not well see how I could have refused to do so. . . . My interview with them could not have lasted ten minutes; and in the conversation which took place I said nothing which I have not said before in the House of Commons and elsewhere, except an observation upon the doctrine propounded at some of the late meetings by Kossuth and Cobden that there ought to be no secrecy in diplomatic negotiations. Those expressions in these addresses which were offensive to the Austrian Government I of course repudiated at once. If I had been as much in the habit of receiving deputations as you and Charles Wood are, I should probably have stipulated, when they entered my room, that our interview should not be manufactured into a commodity to be sold to the newspapers. But it seems that a trading penny-a-liner came in as a member of the deputation; and, as the price of his commodity would depend upon the number of lines which it would contain, he swelled it out into proportions incommensurate with the reality; and, as he wrote from memory, not content with making me repeat the same things

many times over, he put words into my mouth about the nationality of countries which were nonsense. . . .—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Lord John forwarded this explanation to the Queen, and wrote to Lord Palmerston—

Pembroke Lodge: November 29, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I have sent your letter on the Islington deputation to the Queen, as the best account that could be given of the matter. . . My own opinion is that if, as you say, you had been as much used to deputations as C. Wood and I, you would have asked to see the addresses; and, if they were objectionable, not have received the deputation; and secondly, if you had received it, you would have had a short-hand writer in the room—a precaution I am frequently obliged to take, especially in the case of metropolitan parishes. Having said this, I must express my disgust at the false colour which has been put upon the whole affair in newspaper articles. Nothing seems too gross for these unscrupulous writers. Now for the moral. Seeing the persevering enmity which the foreign policy of the Government excites, and the displeasure with which it is viewed in high quarters, I think it behoves you to guard most carefully against misapprehensions as well as misrepresentations. I think you owe this to me and to your other colleagues, who have stood by you in defence of the course which has been pursued in regard to our foreign relations. I think you owe it to the country, which in these difficult times ought not to be exposed, in case of a rupture, to encounter unnecessary odium from the Governments that be. I trust, therefore, without swerving an inch from our policy, you will avoid as much as possible giving cause for irritation and hostility. —I remain, yours very truly, J. RUSSELL.

Five days later, by the Queen's desire, the correspondence was brought before the Cabinet. The Ministers present, so Lord John informed the Queen, regretted that

Lord Palmerston had not taken the precaution of ascertaining the tenour of the addresses to be presented before he consented to receive them, and that he had admitted unfaithful reporters to his room in a case where misrepresentation might be so mischievous. The Cabinet, however, declined to come to any formal resolution. Mr. Labouchere and Lord Grey might probably have been willing to do so; but Lord Lansdowne and all the rest of the Cabinet were decidedly opposed to such a step.

However much the Queen may have regretted the deci-

sion at which the Cabinet thus arrived, her knowledge of her duties as a constitutional sovereign was too accurate to suffer her to dispute it. She gave way. But, before she received Lord John's letter announcing the decision of the Cabinet, the circumstance had occurred which was to lead immediately to Lord Palmerston's fall.

On the 3rd of December news reached London of the *coup d'état*. The Queen was at Osborne, and did not receive intelligence of the event till the morning of the 4th. She at once wrote to Lord John—

Osborne: December 4, 1851.

The Queen has learnt with concern and astonishment the extraordinary proceedings at Paris. She thinks it absolutely necessary that we should remain entirely passive and take no *part*, either for or against what is going on. The Queen hopes, therefore, that Lord Normanby will be very cautious, and keep entirely aloof: for a word from him at such a moment would be misconstrued.

Lord John concurred with her Majesty's opinion; and, on the following day, instructions were sent to Lord Normanby by Lord Palmerston in accordance with it. Lord Normanby, however, calling on the French Minister to state his instructions, heard that Lord Palmerston had personally expressed his approval of the *coup d'état* to the French Ambassador in London. He communicated what he had learned in a despatch; on seeing which the Queen sent to Lord John the letter of the 13th of December, which has already been printed in Sir T. Martin's 'Life of the Prince Consort.' Lord John at once forwarded the Queen's letter to Lord Palmerston, and asked for an explanation. Two days passed and no explanation came.

W[oburn] A[bbey]: December 16, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I have no answer from you in reply to one I wrote you enclosing a communication from the Queen respecting your declarations to Walewski. I cannot but consider this as a mark of disrespect to the Queen. Neither did you answer my former letter on the same subject.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston thereupon sent to Lord John the long letter which has already been published by Mr. Ashley, justifying instead of explaining his conduct; and on the

same date, in an official despatch to Lord Normanby, which was not submitted to Queen, Prime Minister, or Cabinet, repeated his approval of the *coup d'état*, thus formally committing himself to a policy on which both Queen and Cabinet had decided to maintain a strict neutrality. Lord John at once wrote—

Woburn Abbey: December 17, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,—I have received your letter of the 16th, which has been brought to me by a messenger this morning.

I have also received Lord Normanby's despatch of the 15th and your reply of the 16th, which appears to have been sent to Paris without my concurrence or the sanction of the Queen.

It appears to me that in your letter to me you mistake the question at issue.

That question is not whether the President has been justified in dissolving the Assembly and annulling the constitution; but whether you were justified, as the Queen's Secretary of State, in expressing an opinion upon the subject.

Now upon this matter, I am sorry to say, I cannot entertain a doubt.

If the British Government wished to express an opinion upon the recent events in France, the Cabinet should have been consulted, and the opinion, when formed, openly avowed.

If, as I conceived was the course taken, the British Government refrains from expressing any opinion upon the internal affairs of France, the Queen's Secretary of State ought not to express an opinion which is naturally considered as that of the British Government.

I must now come to the painful conclusion—while I concur in the foreign policy of which you have been the adviser, and much as I admire the energy and ability with which it has been carried into effect, I cannot but observe that misunderstandings perpetually renewed, violations of practice and decorum too frequently repeated, have marred the effects which ought to have followed from a sound policy and able administration.

I am therefore most reluctantly compelled to come to the conclusion that the conduct of foreign affairs can no longer be left in your hands with advantage to the country.

If instead of retiring from office you will accept the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, which I know that Lord Clarendon, without looking for any other office, will be happy to relinquish, I shall most willingly recommend you to the Queen to fill that high position, either with or without a British peerage.

Recent inquiries have convinced me that it would not be prudent at present to abolish the Viceroyalty of Ireland. I do not expect for some years that such a measure can be wise and expedient, though I retain my opinion as to the impolicy of permanently retaining two separate Governments in the British Islands.

Or if there is any other course by which I can meet your views, I shall be happy to do so. I have been too long your colleague not to appreciate highly your very eminent talents, and a capacity for business which has never been surpassed. Nor do I esteem less highly your very friendly conduct as a colleague, and the support I have received from you on important and critical occasions.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

Here is Lord Palmerston's answer:—

Broadlands: December 18, 1851.

My dear John Russell,—I have received your letter of yesterday from Woburn, and shall be prepared to give up the seals of the Foreign Office whenever you inform me that my successor is ready to receive them. I have the satisfaction of thinking that the interests, the honour, the character, and the dignity of the country have not suffered while those seals have been in my keeping. As to the arrangements which you suggest, there are obvious reasons why I must decline to avail myself of them.

With regard to the particular question which you say in your letter is the point at issue between us, I have to say that there is a well-known and perfectly understood distinction in diplomatic intercourse between official conversations in which the opinions of Governments are expressed, and by which Governments are bound, and unofficial conversations which have not that character and effect: and nothing passed between me and Count Walewski, on the occasion to which he referred in the despatch or the letter quoted by M. Turgot, which in any way fettered the action of her Majesty's Government. The opinion which, as explained in my former letter, I then expressed was my own; it was expressed as such; I am satisfied it was well founded; and I think the expression of it was conducive to the maintenance of a good understanding with the French Government and thereby to the interests of the country.

The doctrine which you lay down in your letter is new and not practical. For, if everything that passes between a Secretary of State and a foreign Minister were to be deemed as official and formal communications from their respective Governments, and if the Secretary of State were to be precluded from expressing any opinion on passing events except as the organ of a previously consulted

Cabinet, there would be an end to that easy and familiar personal intercourse which tends so usefully to the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Governments.

I have only to add that my answer to Normanby's despatch of the 15th was sent direct because the question to which he asked for an answer regarded myself personally.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

On receiving this communication, Lord John wrote the letter, which has been already published by Mr. Ashley, in which he said—

No other course is open to me than to submit the correspondence to the Queen and to ask her Majesty to appoint a successor to you at the Foreign Office.

It is not necessary to continue any further the history of a controversy between two men of great eminence, of great patriotism, and distinguished for great services. But it may be desirable to add one letter which Lord John wrote to Lady Palmerston, who, it will be recollected, was one of his oldest friends, and who seems to have fancied that her husband was the victim of a conspiracy.

Pembroke Lodge: December 28, 1851.

Dear Lady Palmerston,—The tone of your letter might justify me in making no reply. But I must, in justice to others, say that there has been no conspiracy. What I did, I did alone to save others from the responsibility. If Palmerston had been fully aware of the difficulties I had to contend with, I think he would have furnished me with means of explanation as soon as I asked for them. I deeply regret the whole matter, and the loss of your friendship adds greatly to the weight. Perhaps a time may come when you may judge me more fairly.—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

It has never been the object of this book to obtrude the author's judgment on his readers, and it is with diffidence that he adds three observations on this unfortunate controversy :—

1. It is plain that, to the last, Lord Palmerston either misunderstood or ignored Lord John's true complaint. That complaint was not that Lord Palmerston had expressed privately his own opinion to Count Walewski in the ordinary

course of official communication, but that he had done so knowing that that opinion was opposed to the decision of the Cabinet.[1]

2. It has been usually assumed that Lord Palmerston was removed because of this private expression of opinion to Count Walewski; but the true grounds of his removal were more serious, viz. that, after the Queen and Lord John had complained of this expression of opinion, he had deliberately repeated it, not in a private letter, but in an official despatch to Lord Normanby.

3. It is difficult to see how, under such circumstances, Lord John could have longer resisted the Queen's demand for Lord Palmerston's removal. And, instead of charging him with impatience at his colleague's conduct, most persons have thought that he submitted too long and too patiently to Lord Palmerston's disobedience. But it was characteristic of Lord John that, in his old age, he criticised adversely his own decision :—

> Baron Stockmar . . . seems to have acquiesced in the opinion that my conduct upon that occasion was dilatory and undecided. My own judgment upon it is that it was hasty and precipitate. I ought to have seen Lord Palmerston, and I think I could, without difficulty, have induced him to make a proper submission to her Majesty's wishes, and agree to act in conformity with conditions to which he had already given his assent.

Verily in 1875 Lord John must have forgotten, as he had already long forgiven, some of the difficulties which had so sorely tried him from 1846 to 1852.

[1] Lord Palmerston complained, and the complaint has been repeated in Mr. Ashley's biography, that he had done no more in expressing approval of the *coup d'état* than Lord John himself had done in private conversation with the French Ambassador. But Lord John distinctly denied the truth of the statement. Writing to Lord Lansdowne on October 26, 1852, he said, 'I never told Walewski that I approved of the *coup d'état*. I always confined my good wishes to the measures taken to put down the Socialists.'

CHAPTER XXIII.

DISRUPTION AND COALITION.

I cannot say that the new year is a happy one to me: political troubles are too thick for my weak sight to penetrate them. But we all rest in the mercy of God, who will dispose of us as He thinks best.

In these words Lord John acknowledged his step-daughter's (Mrs. Maurice Drummond's) congratulations on the first day of 1852.

Political troubles were very thick. The removal of Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office had fatally weakened the Administration. Lord John failed to secure elsewhere the help which he sorely needed; he was unable to enlist the Duke of Newcastle, or Sir James Graham, or any other prominent member of Sir Robert Peel's party, in the ranks of his Administration. His inability to do so proved the hopelessness of his task. His fall was only a question of time.

During the few weeks, indeed, through which his Ministry survived, Lord John showed no outward evidence of failure. He had the satisfaction, during their course, of introducing a new Reform Bill. He never made a better or more successful speech than that in which, on the first night of the session, he explained the history of his difference with Lord Palmerston. He never made a more brilliant apology for a friend than his defence of Lord Clarendon on the eve of his fall. Of the first of these speeches Mr. Greville said—

In all my experience I never recollect such a triumph as John Russell achieved, and such a complete discomfiture as Palmerston's. Lord John made a very able speech, and disclosed as much as was necessary, and no more.

Of the second of these speeches Lord Clarendon said—

I have had nearly forty letters from persons of very different opinions, but all agreeing that your speech on Thursday night was not only one of the most effective you ever made, but one of the finest that was ever heard in Parliament.

On the evening that succeeded this speech, Lord John was defeated by a small majority in a small House, and at once resigned office.

The cause of his resignation is so well known that it is hardly necessary to restate it. The *coup d'état* in France had been followed by what Mr. Cobden called the second of his famous three panics; and Lord John, though far from sharing the universal alarm, brought forward the scheme, which had been matured four years before, for reorganising the local militia. Lord Palmerston, in perfect consistency with the opinion which he had expressed in the Cabinet in 1848, moved an amendment to extend the operation of the measure. As he said, in his own light-hearted way—

I have had my tit-for-tat with John Russell, and I turned him out on Friday last.

Lord John's Administration had lasted almost exactly five years and eight months; a period which exceeds by eleven months that during which his rival, Sir Robert Peel, had held office. During the whole of it he had been exposed to difficulties from which Sir Robert had been free. In the Parliament of 1841 the Conservatives had enjoyed a predominating majority. In the Parliament of 1847 Lord John could only secure a majority in the Commons by the combination of various and not always concurring parties. During much of the time, moreover, his wife's health and his own delicate constitution forced him to abstain from many of those social gatherings by which public men in England do so much to conciliate and consolidate their followers. His own fortune, though sufficient for the modest requirements of his household, was hardly equal to the exigencies of his position; and it is a well-known fact that Lord John stated openly to a committee of the House of Commons that he had never been in debt till he had become Prime Minister of

England.[1] The members of his Cabinet, too, were rather attached as friends than united in policy; and Lord John was not always able to carry in Council the measures which he would have liked to bring forward in the Senate.

Few Prime Ministers had ever done more to encourage letters, science, and art. He gave the Royal Society ,1000*l.* of public money to be spent on scientific research; he made Sir John Herschel Master of the Mint; he made Mr. Tennyson Poet Laureate. A man of letters himself before he was a statesman, he was always seeking for literary society, and striving to reward literary merit. Just as in his youth he had delighted in the company which had gathered round the tables of Holland House, so in his age he would temper his dull political dinners by inviting such a man as Mr. Dickens to his table. 'Nothing so flat,' so he used to say, 'as the *cream* by itself. It has been well described to be like table-land, high and flat.'[2] No man ever placed the claims of literature on a higher level. Soon after he became Prime Minister the students of Glasgow desired to elect him their Lord Rector. He wrote—

Downing Street: November 13, 1846.

Dear Rutherford,—I should be very sorry to be the cause of preventing the election of Mr. Wordsworth as Lord Rector of Glasgow. Cannot you represent to the students that I think this would be a good opportunity of making the distinction purely literary? It is a great honour to be thought of for the honour, but I should greatly prefer seeing it conferred on Mr. Wordsworth, whose genius has performed so much in which men of all political parties find delight.—I remain, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

No man ever took more pains that the pensions which the Crown is enabled to bestow should be conferred on desert. A writer in 'Blackwood' has recently mentioned that, when Lord John heard that Mrs. Somerville was in pecuniary difficulty, he contrived to increase by 100*l.* the pension which Sir

[1] The exact words of his evidence are, 'I know, for my own part, that I never had a debt in my life till I was First Lord of the Treasury. I have now paid it off; so that it was no great encumbrance to me.'

[2] Lord Morpeth's *Diary*, p. 103. Lady Russell thinks that Mr. Moore was the author of this excellent saying.

Robert Peel had conferred on her.[1] In his first year of office he secured a pension of 200*l.* a year for Dr. Chalmers's widow; he gave a pension of 300*l.* to Father Mathew; of 200*l.* to Mr. Leigh Hunt, telling him that 'the severe treatment he formerly received in times of unjust persecution of liberal writers enhanced the satisfaction' with which he made the announcement; he conferred a pension of 100*l.* on the children of Mr. Hood; in the following year, he conferred pensions on Mr. Adams the astronomer, on Mr. Sheridan Knowles, on Mr. Carleton the author of 'Irish Stories,' and on Professor McCullagh's sister; while in his last year of office he conferred a pension on Professor Wilson, he procured a grant for Mr. Hind, and he gave a pension to Mrs. Jameson. These are a few instances of the use which he made of the Pension list. Of the many applications which were made to him in connection with it, perhaps it is permissible to give a sample, which is too good a specimen of its author's skill to be buried for ever under the heavy mass of a Prime Minister's correspondence.[2]

Devonshire Terrace: Wednesday evening, December 18, 1850.

My dear Lord,—Allow me to thank you for your ready and kind reply to my note, and to put you in possession of the exact state of Mr. P——'s case. . . .

For some few years past he has been living in a fifth story in a house in the Rue Neuve Luxembourg in Paris (on the proceeds of an amateur theatrical performance for his benefit, of which I undertook the management and stewardship, and which I have dispensed to him half-yearly); and such is the nervous affection, of his hands particularly, that, when I have seen him there, trembling and staggering over a small wood fire, it has been a marvel to me, knowing him to live quite alone, how he ever got into or out of his clothes. To the best of my belief, he has no relation whomsoever. He must either have starved or gone to the workhouse (and I have little doubt that he would have done the former) but for the funds I have doled out to him, which were exhausted before you generously

[1] Years afterwards he used his influence successfully with Mr. Gladstone to obtain pensions for the Misses Somerville.

[2] The candidates for pensions are, I presume, found in tolerably close array among the papers of Prime Ministers. It is more interesting to add that, among Lord J. Russell's papers, I have found a letter from Mr. Hallam, written after his son's death, resigning the pension for which he had no longer any need.

assisted him from the Queen's Bounty. He has no resource of any kind—of that I am perfectly sure. In the sunny time of the day he puts a melancholy little hat on one side of his head, and, with a little stick under his arm, goes hitching himself about the boulevards; but for any power he has of earning a livelihood he might as well be dead. For three years I have been in the constant expectation of receiving a letter from the portress of the house to say that his ashes and those of his wood-fire, both of a very shrunken description, had been found lying together on the hearth. But he has lived on; and for a few hours every day has so concealed his real condition out of doors that many French authors and actors (who treat him with deference as an English man of letters) would stand amazed to know what I now tell you. I have endeavoured to put him before you precisely as he is, and neither to exaggerate his claims nor to invest him with any interest that does not attach to him. He has lived in Paris, to make the least of his poverty and the most of his means. Mr. Justice Talfourd, Mr. Hardwick, the police magistrate, Mr. Forster, the editor of the 'Examiner,' and I, are (I think) his only English friends. We all know him, just as I have described him.

I do not think he would hold a small pension very long. I need not add that he sorely needs it—and I do not doubt that the public are well acquainted with his name and works.

With every apology I can offer for troubling you at this length, I am, my dear Lord, your very faithful and obedient servant,

CHARLES DICKENS.

The Lord John Russell.

Mr. Dickens had not long to wait.

Devonshire Terrace: December 24, 1850.

My dear Lord,—I have conveyed to Mr. P. by to-night's post the joyful intelligence of her Majesty's gracious approval of your generous suggestion in his favour; and I do not doubt that he will endeavour to express to you (over that brighter fire) some of the happiness he owes to you. . .—I am, my dear Lord, your faithful and obliged servant,

CHARLES DICKENS.

While, however, Lord John was duly sensible of the claims of authors, some of whom were personally unknown to himself, he never forgot the poet who had been the friend of his youth and of his age; and who, more than twenty years before, had declared that the only place he desired of him was that little corner of his friend's honest heart, which

he believed to be his, and which Lord John knew that he valued.

Lord John saw Mr. Moore for the last time in December 1849. That evening the poet had a fit,

from the effects of which he never recovered. The light of his intellect grew still more dim; his memory failed still more : . . . on the 26th of February 1852 (the day after Lord John resigned office), he expired calmly and without pain at Sloperton Cottage.[1]

When his will—written nearly a quarter of a century before—was opened, it was found that he had

confided to my valued friend Lord John Russell (having obtained his kind promise to undertake the service for me) the task of looking over whatever papers, letters, or journals I may leave behind me, for the purpose of forming from them some kind of publication, whether in the shape of memoirs or otherwise, which may afford the means of making some provision for my wife and family.

The promise had been given when Lord John was comparatively young, and when he had never known the fatigues of office. It was redeemed when the author was growing old, and when he was wearied with the incessant labours which must fall to the lot of any man who fills the first place in this country for half a dozen consecutive years.

Yet Lord John never hesitated. He ran down to Bowood in the middle of April to talk the matter over with Mrs. Moore. He found that

Mr. Longman, anxious to comply with the wishes of Mr. Moore, at once offered for Mr. Moore's papers, on condition of my undertaking to be the editor, such a sum as, with the small pension allowed by the Crown, would enable Mrs. Moore to enjoy for the remainder of her life the moderate income which had latterly been the extent and limit of the yearly family expense.

And he at once addressed himself to the new task.

He used such despatch that the four first volumes appeared in 1853, the two succeeding volumes in 1854, the two concluding in 1856. The years in which they were thus being prepared for the press were, in a political sense, the

[1] This extract, and the following extracts, are taken from the introduction to Mr. Moore's *Memoirs*.

most unhappy of Lord John's life; they were not free from heavy private sorrow. Yet it may be reasonably hoped that he was occasionally sustained by the reflection that, while he was incurring the obloquy of his old allies and the attacks of his opponents, he was himself silently working for the relief of his early friend's widow. And in this sense the motto which he placed on the title-page—*Spirat adhuc amor*—has a double significance; for while Lord John, no doubt, thought it applicable to the translator of Anacreon and the author of the 'Melodies,' in another sense it may be equally applied to the editor, who, for the love he bore his old friend, voluntarily undertook, when weary with political toil, the drudgery of selecting and publishing a mass of manuscript.

This circumstance, moreover, exempts, or rather ought to have exempted, the book from ordinary criticism. It is easy, no doubt, to show that Lord John in his preface affords many proofs that he regarded his friend's poetry with the favour with which it was originally received, rather than with the discriminating criticism which has been since applied to it; and it is equally easy to complain that the publication of Mr. Moore's journal has not tended to raise the poet's reputation. But it is a fair reply to the first charge that, if Lord John to some extent exaggerated the charm of Mr. Moore's verses, later critics have hardly done adequate justice to the generous sentiments which everywhere pervade them; and, in the next place, if Mr. Moore in his journals attached too much importance to the social recreations which so frequently diverted him from graver pursuits, and laid too little stress on the happy hours which he passed at his own fireside, the fault is Mr. Moore's and not Lord John's.[1]

The labour of editing a vast mass of manuscript is not light. But it was perhaps characteristic of Lord John that, while he was undertaking the heavy task of supervising the publication of Mr. Moore's remains, he was simultaneously preparing Mr. Fox's correspondence for publication. These

[1] The publication of Mr. Moore's diaries led to somewhat angry remonstrances on the part of Lord Londonderry and Mr. Croker, who were aggrieved by certain passages in the journals. But I have not thought it necessary to refer to the controversies to which these memoirs gave rise.

letters, which formed the basis of the life which was subsequently published, and which must not be confounded with that work, had come into Lord John's possession after Lady Holland's death in 1845. Lord John seems to have commenced the task of selecting those which were to be made public in the winter of 1851–2. He was actively engaged on the work in the summer of that year; and its four volumes were published at various intervals from 1853 to 1857.

More real interest attaches to Lord John's literary work in the summer of 1852 than to his Parliamentary labours in the first six months of that year. The Parliamentary session of 1852 was memorable for the weakness of the Government and the disorganisation of the Opposition; it was marked by only one great legislative achievement—the passage of the Militia Bill—and Lord John made what most people thought the mistake of opposing this measure. His opposition at any rate revealed the internal differences of the Whigs, since he failed to carry with him his closest political friends;[1] and the defeat which he sustained increased the bitterness with which some of his supporters were beginning to regard him, and loosened still further the ties which bound his followers to him. Under these circumstances the dissolution of Parliament was almost as welcome to Lord John as to the Ministers themselves; while his election enabled him to show that, if he had partially lost the allegiance of some of his Parliamentary friends, he retained the confidence of the electors of the City.[2]

In other respects the election brought small comfort to the Whig party. The Conservatives showed that they had an unexpected hold on the English constituencies. Whigs of

[1] Of the seven members of the Russell Cabinet in the House of Commons, two only (Lord John himself and Mr. Labouchere) voted against the second reading; two (Sir F. Baring and Lord Seymour) voted for it; three (Sir G. Grey, Sir C. Wood, and Mr. Fox Maule) stayed away.

[2] The final state of the poll was: Masterman, 6,195; Russell, 5,537; Duke, 5,270; Rothschild, 4,848; Crawford, 3,465. Lord John's address to the electors on this occasion was one of very great length. It contained an elaborate vindication of the Free Trade measures of the previous ten years, a promise of Parliamentary Reform, and of the removal of those 'useless and degrading disabilities' under which an oath, instead of being 'a bond of union,' became 'a badge of distrust or a source of religious discord.'

mark, like Sir George Grey and Mr. Cornewall Lewis, were unsuccessful. So far as Great Britain was concerned its representatives were almost evenly divided between the Conservatives and the Opposition. In the Parliament of 1847 the balance between the Whigs and the Conservatives had been held by the Peelites. In the Parliament of 1852 the balance between Protectionists and Free Traders was held by the Irish brigade.

This circumstance constituted only one of the difficulties which Lord John had to face. He could not but be conscious that, while the Conservatives arrayed against him formed a compact, disciplined, and spirited body, the troops on his own side were loosely organised, mutinous, and sullen. They were discontented with their position and dissatisfied with their chief. It is true that the various criticisms which were applied to his conduct answered one another. Some men complained that he had parted from Lord Palmerston; others that he had endured him too long: some that he had introduced a Reform Bill; others that his measure had not been larger. The High Church party still remembered the Ecclesiastical Titles Act with indignation; the Low Church party was sulky because it had not been enforced. Lord John could almost use the words which Mr. Punch put into his mouth:—

Grumbling, grumbling everywhere,
And all my friends did shrink—
Grumbling, grumbling everywhere,
A fact that none could blink.
Ah well-a-day! in what bad books
Was I with old and young:
And, by every one, Lord Palmerston
Into my teeth was flung.[1]

Throughout the session these complaints were passed from

[1] From the *Rime of the Ancient Ministere*. It is perhaps a sign how tired and disheartened Lord John was when he left office that, instead of laughing at Mr. Punch's parody of the *Ancient Mariner*, he felt it more than the attacks of graver papers. When he read it he said, 'That is hard on a man who has worked as I have for Reform;' and then he added in Milton's words, Yet bate I not
'one jot
Of heart or hope, but still bear up and steer
Right onward.'

mouth to mouth. Lord Palmerston was openly proclaiming that, though he should not object to act with Lord John, he would never consent to serve under him again; and lesser men face to face with this difficulty, conveniently oblivious of their leader's great services, and only recollecting his failures, thought that the sole solution of the dilemma was a fresh combination, in which Lord John might continue to lead the House of Commons with Lord Lansdowne or Lord Clarendon as Prime Minister. During the session these complaints hardly reached Lord John's ears. In the recess, which he spent at The Gart, a place near Callander which he hired from Admiral Houston Stewart, they were brought home to him. Lord Minto told him that there was an intrigue to oust him from the leadership; and Lord John, pained at the statement, mentioned the matter in a letter to Lord Clarendon. The answer which he received described the situation so accurately that it is worth quoting :—

G[rosvenor] C[rescent]: August 31, 1852.

My dear Lord John,— . . . I believe I am pretty well acquainted with all that has been saying and doing lately, and I think no one of your friends *can* be more vigilant than myself upon whatever concerns your honour and interests. But I affirm that nothing has taken place to which the denomination of intrigue can be correctly applied; and, if Lord Minto believes there is an intrigue against you, he must have some facts of which I am unaware, but of which I should be glad to be informed. As I have said before, it is quite impossible for any man to be First Minister of this country during six not ordinary but critical years without making to himself enemies; it is equally impossible, too, that during that period some errors should not have been committed and remembered. In the Liberal party there are wide differences of opinion; Graham, Palmerston, Cobden have their partisans. Some people think you disposed to go too far; others think you stop short of the mark: the Roman Catholics as a body are still bitter about the Durham letter; many Protestants think that letter was not boldly acted upon: the ambition of many is disappointed; some complain about the distribution of patronage; others consider they have met with discourtesy, &c., &c.; and each one of these knots of complainants becomes a centre of fresh discontent, which swells for want of anything of countervailing character. Now all this, be it just or unjust, is sufficient to account for the exist-

ing state of feeling without explaining it by intrigue; and the whole may be summed up in these words: 'Lord John has been Minister for six years; he has done or left undone many things we dislike; the recollection of these is fresh in our minds; and we don't feel we can at present serve cordially under him as a leader.' Now that's all, and that's not an intrigue. . . . I should have preferred speaking to writing upon these points; but I have not hesitated to write, because the idea of an intrigue is disgusting and painful, and I wished, if possible, to remove it from your mind, for, as far as my knowledge goes, I am certain that none has existed. . . .—Yours sincerely,

CLARENDON.

Under the circumstances which have thus been detailed, the course suggested by expediency to Lord John was plain. Time was necessary to heal wounds, to obliterate memories, and reconcile differences. It was, in other words, Lord John's interest to wait and do nothing. To do nothing, however, is one of the most difficult things for mortal man to do well; and it was more difficult for Lord John because his more earnest friends were clamouring for action. The Free Traders, in fact, could not be held; and even so late as November, when the new Parliament was assembling, Mr. Cobden told Lord John that, if no one at the very outset of the session brought forward a substantive motion pledging the House to maintain Free Trade, he would—even if he stood alone—do so himself.

Under these circumstances Lord John was almost forced forwards; and the conciliatory attitude of some of Sir Robert Peel's friends facilitated his movement. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 25, Sir James Graham bore warm testimony to the steady perseverance which Lord John Russell had displayed—whether in office or in opposition—in endeavouring to check corrupt practices at elections. This language afforded a welcome contrast to the abuse which was being showered on Lord John by his own supporters, and he seems to have privately thanked Sir James for it. Sir James replied—

Private] Grosvenor Place: June 27, 1852.

My dear Lord John,—I am glad when it is in my power to say or to do anything which is agreeable to you. You have no reason

to be pained by the puny attacks of malevolence and detraction. The services which you have rendered to your country are memorable and lasting. Envy may do its worst, but your fame will live in history. 'The past is well stored; it is beyond the reach of fortune.' The future is dark indeed and uncertain, but your principles will lead you right and sustain your character, whether official power is granted or withheld. My hope is that, henceforth, our communications may always be friendly and unreserved. . . .—I am, yours sincerely,

JAMES GRAHAM.

Such a letter was almost certain to lead, as it was plainly intended to lead, to further communications both with Sir James Graham and Lord Aberdeen, Sir James's chief political friend; and accordingly, on the 21st of July Lord John wrote the following letter:—

The Gart: *July* 21, 1852.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,—I see you are arrived at Haddo,—and the elections are nearly over,—two reasons for my writing to you on the aspect of public affairs.

The Ministry have gained more than was expected, and may count from 310 to 320 votes. Still Parker says truly that, if I had advised a dissolution, and had got no better a return, I should be thinking of my latter end as a Minister. Disraeli thinks of no such thing.

It is evident that there are two legs on which the Ministers hope to stand. 1st, abuse of Sir R. Peel's corn law as having been 'conceived in panic and carried with precipitation,' and consequently a pretended necessity for an adjustment of burthens to enable the landed interest to bear an unjust pressure of taxes; 2nd, the hounding on the Protestants to run down the Catholics.

Such being the pillars of Lord Derby's Government, I cannot imagine that the friends of Sir Robert Peel can thoroughly support him. There remain three other courses.

They may remain aloof as they have done since Sir R. Peel's death.

This, I think, would only tend to prolong a state of weakness and uncertainty—a bad weak Government in office with too powerful an Opposition.

They may act in friendly concert with the Whigs, preserving their own independent position.

They may join with the Whigs and form a fusion, either with or without Cobden.

Next as to the course which ought to be pursued when Parliament meets.

1st. I think there ought to be no vote of want of confidence proposed on the Address.

2nd. I think there ought to be an amendment affirming the wisdom of the commercial policy pursued since 1842, and especially in 1846.

3rd. I think there ought to be a vigorous attack on the glaring corruption by which many of the late elections have been carried.

4th. Any proposal for Reform of Parliament should be deferred till the meeting in February, and made the subject of conference with the leaders of all sections of Liberals. *I* cannot give way on ballot, or the duration of Parliament, nor should I be disposed to go below 5*l.* rating for the borough franchise. A 12*l.* rating in the counties might in some degree counteract the mischief of the Chandos Clause.

The main point, however, is to ascertain whether Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert would be disposed with you and the Duke of Newcastle to concert with the Whigs the course to be adopted when Parliament meets. And I beg of you the favour to ascertain this point for me. When that is ascertained, we may consider at our leisure the merits and defects of any particular proposition.

I can truly say that no pretensions of mine shall stand in the way of such a concert. I shall be quite ready out of office to support a Liberal Ministry, if it is found, as may be the case, that the Radicals and Irish members would be gratified by my exclusion. You and I know that official life is no unmixed blessing; and I feel at the present moment all the delights of freedom from red boxes, with the privilege of fresh air and mountain prospects.

Lady John, however, is not very well, and I cannot easily remove from here for a long time.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

The men whom Lord John had asked Lord Aberdeen to consult were scattered for the holidays, and some time elapsed before Lord Aberdeen was enabled to reply. The nature of his reply may be sufficiently inferred from Lord John's further communication :—

The Gart: August 13, 1852.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,—Having had my full of shooting yesterday, I sit down to write to you somewhat more at length on the subject of our correspondence. I shall take your wise advice, and come to no decision calculated to interfere with my perfect liberty of action in the course of any future events which may occur, and the character of which it is impossible accurately to foresee. It should

be explained that what I told Graham I would not do, was to lead the House of Commons for any peer Prime Minister in the House of Lords. I pointed out one obvious reason for this that, while I led the House of Commons, the Irish patriots would be as obnoxious to the charge of following me as if I were Prime Minister. This appears to me common sense ; and I cannot imagine circumstances so to alter as to make such an arrangement desirable, putting out of view any personal feelings of my own. . . . I know all the objections made to me as a leader and still more as a Prime Minister. But I never could ascertain that any one other person, or any other definite principles, were preferred. If you would take the lead in a Ministry, I should be ready out of office to give you my cordial support. In the meantime I hope to have your advice on every step to be taken, and shall weigh it with the utmost attention.

As to the immediate course to be taken on the meeting of Parliament, nothing more need be said till the time approaches.

I remain, dear Lord Aberdeen, yours very faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Aberdeen, in replying to this letter, said on the 28th of August—

You have made a suggestion respecting myself which there is no necessity now to discuss ; but which, under the most favourable circumstances, would be entertained by me with the utmost reluctance, and of which I cannot even contemplate the possibility.[1]

[1] In the course of the correspondence the Duke of Newcastle, oddly enough, suggested that the word 'Whig' should be dropped. Lord Aberdeen wrote of this suggestion—

'Haddo House : September 16, 1852.

'My dear Lord John,—It was no doubt rather a strong proceeding on the part of the Duke of Newcastle to suggest, to you of all men, the propriety and expediency of sinking the title of Whig. It is true that neither he nor I have the least desire or intention of assuming the appellation ; but I presume that you would never think of acting with us unless you were persuaded that our views were liberal ; and assuredly, in any connection with you, we should not be prepared to abandon a Conservative policy.

'Although the term may appear a little contradictory, I believe that "Conservative Progress" best describes the principles which ought practically to influence the conduct of any Government at the present day. This was Peel's policy, and I think will continue that of all his friends. For one, looking at the actual state of affairs, I have no objection that the progress should be somewhat more rapid than perhaps he ever intended.—Ever most sincerely yours,

'ABERDEEN.'

'The term Whig,' Lord John replied, 'has the convenience of expressing in one syllable what Conservative Liberal expresses in seven ; and Whiggism, in two syllables, means what Conservative Progress means in other six.'

So, for the moment, the matter rested, and the correspondence practically ceased. Lord John sent his own impressions of it to Lord Lansdowne in a letter which is worth copying :—

The Gart, Callander : August 28, 1852.

My dear Lansdowne,—In pursuance of the views I explained to you at Lansdowne House I have had a correspondence with Lord Aberdeen. He again has communicated with the Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Gladstone. The substance of the communications, which I am not allowed to copy, is that—

1. Lord Aberdeen is as friendly as possible.

2. The Duke of Newcastle is desirous of a union of Liberals, but thinks it ought to be understood that, if the present Government is overthrown, Lord Aberdeen should be the next Prime Minister. He objects to me, and hardly less to you, for that post.

3. Mr. Gladstone is strongly for Free Trade, but evidently wishes it to be in the keeping of the Protectionist party.

Little is to be made of all this, except that we all agree in defending the Free Trade policy. I content myself therefore with thanking Lord Aberdeen for his friendliness, and declaring that if he forms a Ministry he shall have my most cordial support. I should say the same thing to you if I thought you were disposed to go to sea in command of the fleet. I hope at all events you will make no irrevocable resolution on the subject. . . .

The prospect is not very pleasant ; and Clarendon, from whom I hear constantly, thinks ill of it. But I am of opinion with Joseph Parkes that 'the thing called the British Constitution will carry us through.' . . .—Ever yours truly,

J. R.

Thus at the end of August very little had been done towards arriving at any definite agreement. In the first half of September, the Duke of Bedford met Lord Palmerston at Brocket, and had a long conversation with him on the position of the Whigs. Lord Palmerston declared that he was personally friendly to Lord John, but unwilling to serve under him again. As the Duke wrote to Lord John on the 17th—

Pam's conversation yesterday was full and explicit. It puts an end to all chance of your acting together again unless you will act with him in the House of Commons, under another head in the House of Lords. He still clings to Lansdowne ; but I hold that out of the question.

Soon after the Duke had sent his report of this conversation to his brother, Lord Palmerston forwarded his own account of it to Lord Lansdowne, in a very long letter which has already been printed by Mr. Ashley; and Lord Lansdowne in reply declared that after all that had been urged he could not help asking himself the question 'whether there is even now any person placed in a better position to form a Government than Lord John,' or under whom both Peelites and discontented Whigs would sooner rally.

Lord John might have fairly insisted on the same view. But, though he was sore at the treatment which he was experiencing from his friends, he made up his mind that he would not sacrifice the chances of union to his own wishes and his own claims. On his return to London[1] he saw Lord Lansdowne, but the latter shall tell the story:—

Bowood: October 22, 1852.

My dear Palmerston,—As I must confess that my own conviction remains unshaken on the subject of our recent correspondence, I do not know that I should have reverted to it, were it not that, having occasion to go down to Richmond the day before yesterday on business, John Russell, who heard I was there, called upon me, and said he had been anxious of seeing me in reference to the conversations which had passed between you and his brother at Brocket, and of stating to me distinctly that, without offering me any opinion on the subject, he should be prepared himself to take office in any

[1] Immediately before he left Scotland Lord John was publicly presented with the freedom of the boroughs of Stirling and Perth. On both occasions he made important speeches, which won him much admiration from men of very different opinions, and were subsequently published in a pamphlet form. The speech at Stirling had an interest of its own, because, made on September 22, it contained the first tribute spoken by any public man to the memory of the great Duke of Wellington. The speech at Perth was an elaborate vindication of that policy of Conservative Progress which its author thought was implied by the term Whiggism. 'It was justly said as a proverb of old, "He yields everything who denies what is just." That has never been our policy. We have been always for granting what was just in order that we might be strong in refusing what was unrighteous.' The favour with which the speech at Perth was received raised Lord John's spirits. 'Since my Perth speech,' so he wrote to Lord Minto on October 3, 'I feel less than I did that the taking office under a peer would be a degradation. As leader in the House of Commons my place would be sufficiently high; but then I would not serve under a younger man and a younger politician than myself.'

Administration at the head of which I consented to be placed; and, being made aware that you had communicated to me the particulars of that conversation, he expressed his earnest desire that I should, in justice to himself, acquaint you at once with my having seen him, and with what he had settled.

I must say that, retaining, notwithstanding what you say, my own opinion on the whole subject, it is with considerable reluctance that I comply with his request; but I could not do otherwise.—Sincerely yours,

L.

Some of Lord John's friends, however, were not ready to consent to their leader's supersession: and Sir Francis Baring, in particular, made the following vigorous protest against it:—

Critchell: October 22, 1852.

My dear Lord,—It may be very absurd to talk about combinations of which one may never be asked to form one. But there is a remark in your letter received this morning which I cannot pass over without a word. I do not quite understand the full meaning of your assent to Lord Lansdowne being at the head of a new Government. If you mean that you are prepared to act under Lord Lansdowne, as nominal head, for the purpose of conciliating feelings and making a strong Government, I can only say that, without discussing the wisdom of such an arrangement, you will have shown yourself ready to make a sacrifice such as few men would make, and which I do not think any man could have asked or expected you should have made. If it is intended that a Government should be formed of the Liberal party in which you are not to be included, I can only say, with every respect to Lord Lansdowne, that I have long looked up to you as the ablest advocate of the principles which I profess; that I cannot feel confidence in a Government from which you are excluded; and when I consider the reason I will not be a party to ostracise our best leader because Lord Palmerston desires it. —I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

F. B.

Such was the state of affairs at the opening of Parliament. It is hardly necessary to relate how, on the first available night of the session, Mr. Villiers brought forward some resolutions declaring the Act of 1846 to have been 'a wise, just, and beneficial' measure; how Mr. Disraeli, objecting to 'these odious epithets,' offered to accept a colourless declaration in favour of Free Trade; how the difference was ultimately

adjusted by the adoption of an alternative which was suggested by Lord Palmerston; how Mr. Disraeli—this preliminary obstacle surmounted—was forced to disclose his hand and to produce his Budget; how his plausible and effective statement was torn to shreds by Mr. Gladstone's instructed eloquence; or how the Government was finally defeated, and at once resigned office.

The final division took place on the morning of the 17th of December. Two days before Lord John had spent a night at Woburn, where his brother had invited him to meet Lord Lansdowne and Lord Aberdeen. The three statesmen had therefore an easy opportunity for arranging plans and smoothing difficulties. But, important as their conversation must have been, more significance attached to a question put to Lord John by the Duke. The Duke asked his brother what course he thought the Queen ought to take in the event of the resignation of the Ministry. Lord John replied that he thought she should send for Lord Lansdowne and Lord Aberdeen. Lord John did not know—when he answered the question, or indeed till three days later—that the Duke had put it to him at the Queen's own desire; and he not unnaturally felt, when he gained the knowledge, that his brother had not treated him quite fairly in concealing this fact from him. The Queen acted on the advice which she thus received, and sent for the two peers whom Lord John had indicated. Lord Lansdowne, who had already reached his seventy-third year, was laid up with gout and was unable to obey the Queen's summons. Instead of doing so, he sent a letter to the Queen, expressing his own strong disinclination to accept office, and recommending her to 'desire Lord J. Russell and Lord Aberdeen to meet and to determine what arrangement of persons and situations would be best with the double view of official aptitude and of selecting those whose appointments would be most gratifying to the feeling of the friends and supporters of both parties.' Before the Queen received this letter, Lord John had engaged in further conference with Lord Aberdeen, and had told him that, though he could say nothing decisive, he thought he should accept office under him.[1] Cheered by the result of

[1] I make this statement on the authority of Lady John's diary. But it seems

the interview, which took place on the 18th of December, Lord Aberdeen, on the following morning, went to the Queen and accepted her commission to form a Government.

Reflection, however, made Lord John doubt whether he had strength to discharge the heavy duties of the Foreign Office (the post which he would otherwise have preferred) while he was acting as Leader of the House of Commons. But, while he was harassed by these doubts, he received the following appeal from the Queen :—

Osborne : December 19, 1852.

The Queen has to-day charged Lord Aberdeen with the duty of forming an Administration, which he has accepted. The Queen thinks the moment to have arrived when a popular, efficient, and durable Government could be formed by the sincere and united efforts of all parties professing Conservative and Liberal opinions. The Queen, knowing that this can only be effected by the patriotic sacrifice of personal interests and feelings to the public, trusts that Lord John Russell will, as far as he is able, give his valuable and powerful assistance to the realisation of this object.

On the morning of the 20th, on which he received the Queen's letter, Lord John carried his doubts to Lord Lansdowne. While the two friends were discussing the question, Mr. Macaulay was announced, and the whole circumstances were laid before him. Mr. Macaulay threw in all the weight of his eloquence on the Queen's side, and perhaps he never made a more decisive or more dexterous speech than that which he delivered in Lord Lansdowne's library. Recollecting that Lord John, in speaking of the Duke of Wellington at Stirling, had said in September—

While many of the qualities which he possessed are unattainable by others, there are lessons which we may all derive from the life and the actions of this illustrious man. . . . It may never be given to another man to hold the sword which was to gain independence for Europe . . . but there are qualities which the Duke of Wellington displayed of which we may all act in humble imitation. That sincere and unceasing devotion to our country—that honest and upright determination to act for the benefit of the country on every occasion

clear that Lord Aberdeen, believing perhaps that hesitation was equivalent to acceptance, regarded Lord John's accession to office as settled.

—that devoted loyalty . . . these are qualities that are attainable by others, and . . . which should not be lost as an example.'[1]

—Mr. Macaulay pressed home this argument with great force. To quote his own account :—

I reminded him that the Duke of Wellington had taken the Foreign Office after having been at the Treasury, and I quoted his own pretty speech on the Duke. 'You said, Lord John, that we could not all win battles of Waterloo, but that we might all imitate the old man's patriotism, sense of duty, and indifference to selfish interest and vanities when the public welfare was concerned ; and now is the time for you to make a sacrifice. Your past services, and your name, give us a right to expect it.'

Moved by the arguments of the most eloquent talker in England, Lord John retired from the interview ; and, after some consideration, offered to lead the Commons, and to sit in the Cabinet, but without office. He wrote on the 22nd of December to Lord Aberdeen—

I should have been willing to accept the seals of the Foreign Office under you, had my health admitted of my doing so. But I feel that a laborious office, with the conduct of the business of the House of Commons, is more than I ought to undertake.

During the two following days this offer was discussed and rediscussed among the projectors of the new Administration. Most of Lord Aberdeen's friends, and many of Lord John's, held that the arrangement was both new and unconstitutional ; and they deprecated it on this ground. But Lord John could reasonably reply that the alternative which seemed otherwise open to him—that he should hold the seals of the Foreign Office, the most laborious department of the State—was impracticable. Since 1827 no man had led the House of Commons and transacted the duties of that department. Since 1853 no other man has attempted it. Lady John, writing privately to her sister, declared that the Foreign Office, even without the leadership of the House of Commons, would kill her husband in six months. And Lord John himself, when he had contemplated taking the Foreign Office four years before, had thought it impossible that he

[1] I have substituted the exact words of the Stirling speech for the reference to it which Mr. Macaulay inserted in his diary.

should continue in the Commons, and had meditated a reluctant migration to the leisure of the Lords. But this was not all. Since 1853 England has been so accustomed to septuagenarian Prime Ministers that age has ceased to be regarded as a disqualification for work. But age was considered a much more serious drawback in the middle of the century. Mr. Macaulay told Sir Robert Peel in 1846 that no man had ever led the House of Commons after sixty years of age; and, though the great historian's memory was for once at fault, it was quite true that no man sixty years old had led the House of Commons during the preceding one hundred years. Sir Robert himself had been so impressed by this circumstance that he had asked the Queen never again to offer him office. But Lord John in December 1852 had already completed his sixtieth year; he was two years older than Sir Robert Peel had been at his fall, and he was constitutionally and physically frailer than any of his leading contemporaries. It was surely, under such circumstances, in no sense surprising that he should have hesitated to assume the lead of the Commons and the management of the most laborious department of the State. Men might differ on the propriety of Lord John's decision to enter the Cabinet, but no man had the right to question Lord John's reluctance to accept work which he felt was beyond his powers.

Ultimately, after three days' discussion, a compromise was effected. Lord John agreed to take the Foreign Office for a few weeks, resigning it, at his own option as to time, to Lord Clarendon. This arrangement, which of course compelled him to vacate his seat, and to submit himself for re-election to his constituents, was rendered more agreeable to Lord John by Lord Aberdeen's intimation that he proposed ultimately, if possible, to retire in Lord John's favour, and by the suggestion (which Lady John, at any rate, understood that Lord Aberdeen had agreed to) that in the meanwhile Lord John should have a general superintendence over all the departments.[1]

[1] It is worth while making these two points quite clear, as a good deal turns on them. With regard to the first, the Duke of Bedford, writing to Lord Aberdeen on December 21, 1856, said, 'I remember your having told me, when you

The conditions which were thus made were full of danger. It is never wise either for a Minister or for an individual to commit himself to a particular course six months afterwards. The actions of wise men are determined by concrete circumstances, not by abstract considerations. It was still more doubtful whether it was expedient to give any member of the Cabinet who was not Prime Minister a general superintendence. Such a duty necessarily falls to the head of the Government, and the same function cannot, without confusion, be concurrently discharged by two different persons. Be this, however, as it may, a few days' deliberation had removed the initial difficulty, and Lord Aberdeen was able to address himself to the task of filling up the places in the Administration. But

were at the head of the Government, that it was your wish to retire in favour of my brother when circumstances should permit. Something has lately occurred which makes me desire to know when you first informed him of this wish, whether before or after your Administration was formed. I have asked John, but he refers me to you for accuracy, with some very friendly and affectionate expressions towards yourself, which he did not of course intend me to repeat to you.' Lord Aberdeen replied that he had formed a resolution in his own mind to retire in Lord John's favour 'whenever circumstances should permit, and as soon as I could do so without breaking up the Government; for that I did not think it would be fair to the Queen or to my colleagues to do. I cannot recollect having specifically declared this intention to Lord John himself before the formation of the Government, but I think that I must have done so to others; and I can little doubt that from the first he must have looked to such a contingency. At all events I kept it constantly in view myself, and, in the summer of 1853, when, by the acceptance of the Vienna note, it appeared that the difference between Russia and Turkey was entirely settled, I thought the time had come when something might be attempted. At that time I had a conversation with Lord John, at which I very clearly explained to him my views and intentions.' He added in a second letter: 'They [my wishes] were not the result of any engagement or obligation on my part, but the whole procedure was perfectly spontaneous and free. It must also be recollected that I always explicitly declared that any step to be taken by me, having in view the substitution of Lord John as the head of the Government, must have the assent of the Cabinet, and that I would not agree to break up the Administration on this point.' With regard to the second point, Lady John, writing to Lady Mary Abercromby on the 24th of December (the day after the arrangement was made), said, 'He has only consented to be so [Foreign Minister] till Parliament meets, when he will keep his place in the Cabinet and the leadership, and have no office, but a general superintendence of all. This is an excellent arrangement, dignified and useful, for they will require superintendence.' I have put the promise in the text in more hesitating language, because I have reason to believe that Lord Aberdeen's friends think that Lady John, in this respect, misunderstood what had passed between Lord John and Lord Aberdeen.

here at once fresh embarrassments arose. The Whigs not unnaturally supposed that, as they contributed the bulk of the support on which the new Ministry relied, they should be adequately represented in the Cabinet. The Peelites, brushing away mere numerical considerations, pointed to the ability of their own leaders. The Whigs declared that Lord John did not fight their battles adequately; Lord Aberdeen, on the contrary, complained that the Whigs were insatiable. And this unfortunate source of difference between two great men continued throughout the duration of the Ministry. A year after its formation, when the relations between the two Ministers were strained, Lord John wrote to Lord Aberdeen—

> The Whigs write to me imagining that I have some influence in politics and ecclesiastical appointments. It is a mistake.

And Lord Aberdeen replied—

> To say the truth I thought that I had done little else than comply with your wishes either at the formation of the Government or ever since.

Such differences showed that there was no real cohesion between the two men; and that misunderstandings between them were in consequence certain to arise. It may, however, fairly be assumed that Lord John did not deserve Lord Aberdeen's reproach. For, if the Prime Minister thought him unreasonable, his own friends complained that he did not fight their battles for them; and it is a tolerably fair presumption that, when two parties to a question both blame the man who stands between them, the latter is not acting unfairly to either of them. If, indeed, injustice was done on either side, it certainly was not done to the Peelites. The Whigs stood to the Peelites in the House of Commons as nine stands to one; the Peelites stood to the Whigs in the Cabinet as six stands to six. Even this proportion could only be reckoned by counting among the Whigs Lord Cranworth, who had practically withdrawn from politics, and Lord Palmerston, who could no longer be considered a supporter of Lord John.[1] In Ireland, the new Lord Lieutenant, Lord St.

[1] I have excepted from the computation Sir W. Molesworth, who represented the Radicals.

Germans, and the new Chief Secretary, were both members of the party which was identified with the name of Sir Robert Peel; while Whig statesmen of great experience and proved ability, like Lord Carlisle, Mr. Labouchere, and Sir George Grey,[1] had no place or part either in the Cabinet or in the Government.

The arrangement which was thus made between Lord Aberdeen and Lord John was publicly disclosed three weeks afterwards by a paragraph in the 'Globe' on the 15th of January. Under the influence of this article, and probably stimulated by the inquiries of the Queen, Lord Aberdeen spoke to Lord John on the subject.

Lord John thereupon wrote to the Prime Minister—

Pembroke Lodge: January 19, 1853.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,—I am sorry you have raised again the question of my position.

I understood you and Clarendon to have agreed that I should take the Foreign Office, and vacate it whenever I might choose. The time I have chosen is the commencement of the session, when fully to perform my duties in the Foreign Office and in the House of Commons would break down any man.

The performance of this agreement is simply a matter of good faith. Had I been inclined to take an office the dutles of Home Secretary, which I have tried, are perfectly compatible with the lead in the House of Commons, and in some degree assisted it.

I have fulfilled all that the constitution requires by vacating my seat. I can without office advise the Crown, as I have sworn to do by my oath as a Privy Councillor.

So pray let things go on as they have been settled. They rest on public grounds originally, and now on compact.—I remain, yours very truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Aberdeen, replying on the same day, admitted that it had been agreed that Lord Clarendon should relieve Lord John at the Foreign Office after a short time, and allowed that the time must depend on Lord John's own convenience. But he added—

[1] Sir George Grey, it is fair to add, had lost his seat; but his exclusion was the more marked because neither Lord Grey nor Sir F. Baring was included in the Cabinet.

A very grave question remains for consideration which assuredly has never been settled, and on which I have not been able to form any decided opinion. This is the possibility of your representing the Government and acting as leader in the House of Commons without holding any office at all.

I have always felt that there were serious constitutional objections to such a position ; but my great desire to agree to whatever may be most agreeable to yourself, and my belief that you must be a better judge of this matter than myself, would induce me, if possible, to get over these scruples. I know, however, that some of our colleagues entertain a very strong opinion on the subject, and I have reason to believe that the Queen would also regard any such arrangement with feelings of great repugnance.

Lord John, after some conversation with Lord Aberdeen, wrote again :—

Pembroke Lodge : January 21, 1853.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,—Without further discussing at present the period at which I should leave the Foreign Office, I must refer to a paragraph in your letter which, I own, surprised me a good deal. You say, 'A very grave question remains for consideration, which assuredly has never been settled, and on which I have not been able to form any decided opinion. This is the possibility of your representing the Government, and acting as leader in the House of Commons, without holding any office at all.' Certainly this is a very grave question ; but, unless I had thought it had been settled, I never should have joined your Government. I did so in the belief that it had been finally decided. To suppose that I should have taken the Foreign Office to descend at Easter to the Duchy of Lancaster, to vacate my seat again in new circumstances, seems to me strange. I think your recollection must have failed you. Clarendon and Lady John are the only two persons who, at the last, were witnesses to the arrangement. You heard Clarendon's account yesterday. Lady John took a note at the time, which I here copy : '23rd December : Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon gave me their words of honour as gentlemen that, on the meeting of Parliament, John should leave the Foreign Office, and not be asked to take any other office.' Now, although I believe this is a perfectly accurate account, and one that was repeated at the time to several of my friends, I admit that, if objections fatal to such a plan on constitutional grounds could be started, I should be bound to take an office or leave the Government. But, as I have weighed all such objections and find them frivolous and superficial, I must expect you to perform

your part of the agreement. A vote of the House of Commons would, of course, alter the position. It would compel my retirement. But then I should have nothing to say against your conduct, and you might re-form your Government as you thought best.

It is not my fault that all this was not stated to the Queen at the time.—I remain, ever yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

It is only fair to Lord Aberdeen to give his answer:—

Argyll House: January 21, 1853.

My dear Lord John,—I rather wish that you had adhered to Clarendon's advice not to send your answer to my letter; for I hoped that the whole affair was finally settled at our meeting yesterday: any continued discussion can now have no good effect, and I think that I perceive some indications in your last letter which make me doubly anxious to bring it to a close.

You will permit me, however, to say that much of this misunderstanding must after all be attributed to your own uncertainty of purpose.

Before being sent for by the Queen, it was my intention not to accept the commission without the certainty of your accepting the Foreign Office and the lead in the House of Commons. When, therefore, you voluntarily expressed such an intention the day before I went to Osborne, you relieved me from all doubt. When I returned from Osborne on Sunday night I found you precisely in the same frame of mind. But on Monday morning a change took place in your intentions. This change greatly affected my position. But, after much discussion with you at that time, I certainly imagined that you had agreed to take the Duchy if the objection to your being in the Government without any office should have been valid. I may have been mistaken; but, although I made no minute of our conversation, I wrote to the Queen immediately after it had taken place, and reported it as I have now stated. Indeed, I understood this intention to have been changed in consequence of the opinion expressed by Sir G. Grey.

The question of being in the Government without any office was never decided or further discussed, because your acceptance of the Foreign Office fortunately put an end to all difficulty.

I confess I am surprised to find you speak of *descending* to the Duchy of Lancaster. Surely you take a wrong estimate of your own position and character. For you there can be no ascending or descending in the Government: and you know perfectly well it is not my fault that you do not now occupy the position in which I am placed.

Now, with respect to the time of resigning the Foreign Office, I have no doubt that Lady John's minute is correct. I had hoped, and believed, that you intended to hold it during a portion of the session : but essentially you were yourself to be the judge.

I hope you may be right in thinking that the objections to your position in the House of Commons without office are 'frivolous and superficial.' You are a much better judge than I am of such matters ; and, at all events, I am ready if you think fit to make the experiment. But, if it should not prove successful, and any serious consequences should ensue, I cannot say that I should be disposed to accept the office, which you assign to me, of remodelling the Government.

I trust this matter is now finally settled, so far at least as I am concerned. We shall shortly see what is the opinion of the House of Commons and of the public, and I hope you may have reason to be satisfied with your decision.

I will only add that where there is the most sincere desire to act without the slightest reserve, and with the utmost cordiality, I am quite sure the sooner this kind of correspondence is brought to an end the better.—Ever most truly yours,

ABERDEEN.

No one who has read this correspondence is likely to doubt the wisdom of Lord Aberdeen's concluding paragraph. At the same time no one will doubt that Lord Aberdeen would have been wise if he had taken more pains in December to appreciate, to understand, and to explain Lord John's intentions. Whatever suggestions may have been made as to Lord John's accepting the Duchy instead of the Foreign Office, it is difficult to imagine how any experienced statesman could have supposed that he would have accepted the Foreign Office as a stepping-stone to the Duchy. The fact that such a course would have exposed the member of the House of Commons who took it to two successive elections, ought alone to have shown the Prime Minister that it could not have been seriously contemplated.

Thus the correspondence terminated ; and though Lord John, when Parliament met on the 10th of February still retained the seals of the Foreign Office, he resigned that office before twelve days were over ; and from that time till the end of the session led the House of Commons without taking charge of any department. The session proved in many

respects a memorable one. It witnessed the introduction of Mr. Gladstone's first and greatest Budget;[1] it threw open the civil service of India to public competition; it gave a final death-blow to transportation. In the course of it Lord John himself introduced a measure enabling municipalities to rate themselves, under specified conditions, for the support of voluntary schools; and, though the measure failed, and is chiefly interesting from what it promised for the future Lord John succeeded in introducing a new principle by providing for the payment of a capitation grant on account of children attending schools in rural districts. These and other achievements in the session of 1853, however, have a greater reference to history than to biography. It is perhaps sufficient to say that Lord John throughout the session displayed tact and ability which enabled him to retrieve his position and to increase the reputation which he had long before won. Writing on the 5th of August his brother said, 'I do not think you personally ever stood so high in public estimation as you do now.' While seven weeks afterwards, on the 27th of September, Lord Clarendon wrote—

I know at the end of the session I said to the Duke of Bedford that the whole country did justice to your self-sacrifice, which had made a fusion of parties practicable at a moment of crisis; that you had rendered the leadership of the House of Commons *consensu omnium* an office by itself; and that the event showed you had been right, and all who opposed the course you mapped out for yourself, the Queen and Prince inclusive, had been wrong. If you could poll the country, I believe it would be found nearly unanimous in these opinions.

While early in the following session Mr. Cayley, in asking for a committee to consider the duties of the leader of the House of Commons, and the expediency of attaching office and salary thereto, used this language:—

If he were to say the noble Lord the member for London possessed, as qualities fitting him for the office, that he had a greater

[1] People often misunderstood Lord John; and it was hinted in 1853 that he was jealous of Mr. Gladstone's success. Here is his true opinion written to Lady John: 'Gladstone's speech was magnificent. . . . It rejoices me to be a party to a large plan, and to do with a man who seeks to benefit the country rather than to carry a majority by concessions to fear.'

constitutional knowledge, perhaps, than any other member of the House; that he exhibited more tact and readiness and temper in debate than any other member; that his courage under all circumstances was proverbially undaunted; that his services had been such as to add lustre to the name he bore; and were he to add as a crown to those qualifications that he possessed that mild simplicity of demeanour without which real dignity can scarcely exist, he should but affirm that which every member of the House would re-echo, only in terms more appropriate than he could pretend to do.[1]

Two other occurrences during the session deserve mention. In April Lord Aberdeen renewed the intimation which he had given at Christmas, that he intended to retire at the end of the session; in May embarrassment arose from a debate on the old grievance of the Irish Church. Mr. Moore, who represented the Roman Catholic county of Mayo, moved for a committee to inquire how far the ecclesiastical revenues of Ireland were applicable to the benefit of the Irish people; and Mr. Lucas, the member for Meath, in supporting the motion, avowed that it was aimed directly at the abolition of the Church. It fell to Lord John to reply to Mr. Lucas. He commenced his reply by complaining that the concessions which Parliament had made to the Irish Roman Catholics had 'been met by revilings and reproaches.' He went on in very generous language to express a wish 'that there was nothing in the oaths taken by members of Parliament which should preclude Roman Catholics from discussing subjects of this kind; from asking, if they thought proper, for the total abolition of the Church of Ireland, and voting for its subversal and suppression;' and to deny that there was anything in the Act of Union 'which should prevent you making a change in favour of the people of Ireland in respect to an article which was intended for the benefit of Ireland.' He naturally referred to the desire, which he had himself so frequently shown, to apply part of the revenues of the Church to the education of persons of all religious denominations. But he admitted that the compromise which he had himself favoured had been disliked both by the Protestants, who had resisted all spoliation, and the Roman Catholics, who so steadily required the disen-

[1] *Hansard*, cxxx. 377.

dowment of the Church. Mr. Lucas had himself demanded equality. But equality could only be obtained in two ways: by the disendowment of the Church—a course for which Lord John was not prepared—or by the redistribution of the ecclesiastical revenues among Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, and Protestants, according to their numbers. But such a course he was also unprepared to take.

It has been but too evident of late years that the Roman Catholic Church, acting under the direction of its head, himself a foreign sovereign, has aimed at political power, and is at variance with a due attachment to the Crown of this country and to the general cause of liberty. I am convinced that, if the Roman Catholic clergy, as ecclesiastics, were to exercise greater political influence than they do now, that power would not be exercised in accordance with the general freedom that prevails in this country, and that neither in respect to political circumstances nor upon other subjects would they favour that general freedom of discussion, and that activity and energy of the human mind, that belong to the spirit of the constitution of this country. I am obliged, then, to conclude, most unwillingly but most decidedly, that the endowment of the Roman Catholic religion in Ireland in the place of the endowment of the Protestant Church of that country is not an object which the Parliament of this country ought to adopt or to sanction. These opinions of mine may lead to conclusions unpalatable to many who belong to the Roman Catholic Church. They may lead to a persistence in a state of things that I quite admit to be anomalous and unsatisfactory. But I am obliged as a member of Parliament to consider that which is best adapted to maintain the freedom and permanence of our institutions. I must look around me at what is passing elsewhere. I must regard the influence which, if not exercised, has been attempted to be exercised in the United Kingdom of late years. Seeing these things, I give my decided resistance to the proposal of the hon. gentleman.

Such sentiments were not new in Lord John. They can be traced in the 'Life of Lord Russell;' they are directly expressed in one paragraph in the 'Essay on the Constitution;' and though, in the interval between 1835 and 1849, their author had laboured in the cause, first of Appropriation, and second of part endowment of the Roman Catholic religion, they had flared up in their original force in the Durham letter. The strong religious feelings which formed so striking

a feature in Lord John's character were again obtaining a mastery over the liberality of his political views; and he was repeating the opinions of that famous document. His language was, of course, enthusiastically cheered from the Opposition benches, but was at once condemned in strong terms both by Mr. Bright, and, on the part of the Roman Catholics, by Mr. Fitzgerald. But the evil did not stop at this point. The Roman Catholic members of the Government signified to Lord Aberdeen through Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, that they could no longer remain in the Administration; and Lord John himself wrote to the Prime Minister—

I cannot but think that you ought not to be made to pay the penalty of my hasty speech. But I feel so much the inconvenience to you of the loss of Mr. Monsell and of the Roman Catholic members of your Government, that I think you had better, as an alternative, allow me to retire, and retain their services.

Lord Aberdeen at once replied—

Argyll House: June 2, 1853.

My dear Lord John,—Although I hope to see you to-morrow, I write a line to-night in answer to your letter.

You will not be surprised that I should not listen for a moment to the alternative you propose; but I entreat you calmly to consider the actual position of the Government and see what it may be possible for us to do.

The Duke of Newcastle tells me you had spoken to him; and, as he has some influence with the Catholic party, I have desired him to see Mr. Monsell and ascertain in what manner they might perhaps be satisfied. I have mentioned to the Duke your own impossible proposal; not for the purpose of being communicated to them, but only in order that he might speak with a full knowledge of the serious consequences that might ensue. In truth, however, the only alternative I can admit is the resignation of the Catholic members or their remaining in office. I shall know to-morrow what may be the result of the Duke's interference. . . .

I shall say nothing of the personal state of matters, except to Clarendon and Graham, and I trust that in the course of to-morrow we may devise some means for settling this untoward circumstance.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The unfortunate circumstance was eventually settled.

Lord Aberdeen wrote a letter to Mr. Monsell, which was published, assuring him that the opinions which Lord John had expressed were not shared by many members of the Government; and with this explanation, in which Lord John himself concurred, Mr. Monsell and his friends expressed themselves satisfied.

The months through which the session of 1853 was protracted left deep impressions on Lord John's domestic life. In February his step-mother, the Dowager-Duchess of Bedford, died, somewhat suddenly, at Nice; in July his mother-in-law, Lady Minto, died, after a long illness, at Nervi. If, however, older faces were dropping out of the family circle, fresh and younger additions were being made to it. In May his step-son, Lord Ribblesdale, was married to Miss Mure of Caldwell.[1] In June his step-daughter, Isabel, was married to Mr. Warburton. Three out of his four step-children had thus taken their flight from the nest where they had been so long sheltered; but in March another child (Lady Agatha Russell) was added to its inmates. This child, their parents' first and only daughter, was born during the Easter recess, and its birth 'made the Easter holiday at Pembroke Lodge even happier than usual.'

While the session lasted, Lord John was, of course, compelled to be much in town, but he usually contrived to sleep three nights a week, Wednesday, Saturday, and Sunday, in the fresher air of Richmond; and, when he was able to leave town early enough, he either rode down to Pembroke Lodge, or drove to Hammersmith, where he was met by his roan horse, Surrey, and his children on their ponies. In the autumn Lord John carried his family down to Scotland, where the Duke of Argyll had placed Roseneath at his dis-

[1] Lord Ribblesdale had been educated at Eton and Oxford. He caused Lord John some anxiety in 1851 by purchasing Colonel (better known as General Jonathan) Peel's racehorses. To Lord John's remonstrance he wrote, 'Every man, say I, his own *métier*. We are all good for something, as your friend Horace justly remarks to Mæcenas in his first ode: "Sunt quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum," &c. And again, "Hunc si nobilium turba Quiritium," &c. We of the nineteenth century remain the same as in Horace's time. I should take as much interest in a race in which I had a horse running, as you in the issue of an election for a Government borough.'

posal. There they remained some weeks, yachting,[1] riding, walking, reading. The urgency of the Eastern question, however, compelled Lord John to return suddenly to London in September. Its growing acuteness made Lady John fear that future journeys would unavoidably be entailed on him; and, alarmed at the consequences of rapid railway travelling to and from Scotland, she persuaded him to cut short his stay in the North, and to return to London. For the long peace of thirty-eight years was drawing to a close, and the Aberdeen Administration was drifting into the whirlpool of war.

[1] The Commission (Ireland) of Inland Revenue placed the 'Seamew' at Lord and Lady John's disposal.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CAUSES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.

AT the time when the Aberdeen Administration was formed the English public was agitated by one of those alarms which seem periodically to affect the people of this country. The assumption by Napoleon of the imperial title, and the suspicion that the master of legions would desire to fortify his dynasty by some military achievement, influenced men's minds. There was a general belief that the first object of a new Napoleon must be to avenge the defeat by which the old Napoleon had been crushed. 'Panic' pamphlets were again issued broadcast from the printing-press; panic letters and speeches succeeded one another in the newspapers; and a people brooding over panic literature, and communicating their fears to one another, persuaded themselves that the dreaded hour had at last come, and that the invasion of England was at hand.

There is never smoke without fire: but, in the political as in the material world, the smoke is frequently the greatest when the fire is feeblest. The people were right in supposing that the conversion of a Republic into an Empire did not make for peace; they were only wrong in inferring that, if war broke out, it would necessarily be with England. Even, however, on this point there was some ground for alarm. And there is still among Lord John's papers a singular document which purports to be a translation of a series of confidential questions issued by Napoleon III. on the possibility of a French expedition, secretly collected in different ports, invading, conquering, and holding Australia. How the paper reached the Foreign Office, what credit was attached to it, what measures were suggested by it, there is no evidence to show. This only is certain. Lord John dealt with it as he occasionally dealt with confidential papers which he did not

think it right to destroy, but which he did not wish to be known. He enclosed it in an envelope, sealed it with his own seal, and addressed it to himself. It was so found after his death.

Whatever reason Lord John may have had for watching the new Emperor with caution, during his short tenure of the Foreign Office he laboured for peace; and he soon had distinct evidence that, if Napoleon were meditating hostile expeditions in December, he was desirous in January of standing on the best of terms with England and the English Court. Before the end of the month a wedding took the place of a war;[1] and in February Lord John brought upon himself a painful correspondence with Lord Mount-Edgcumbe by the vehemence with which he denied in the House of Commons the positive statements which that nobleman had made in the 'Times' of preparations in the French dockyards which could only be for aggression.

While, however, the cloud of war with France was slowly lifting, a new question in Eastern Europe was creating a new anxiety. The Sultan, endeavouring to stamp out insurrection on the borders of Montenegro, found himself confronted by Austria; while a struggle for the possession of the Holy Places between the Greek and Latin Churches subjected him to inconsistent demands from Russia and France. Lord John strove to effect a settlement of both questions. He told Lord Westmorland—the British representative at Vienna—to spare no effort to secure a pacific solution of the Montenegrin difficulty; and, in language which was unusual in a despatch, but which was very characteristic of Lord John, he told Lord Cowley, the British Minister at Paris, that—

> We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to conflict between two of the great powers of Europe; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men—when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind—the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.[2]

[1] Napoleon was married to the Empress Eugénie in January 1853.

[2] In sending Lord Aberdeen a draft of the despatch, Lord John said, 'I hope you will not think there is too much of the Gospel in it for a Foreign Secretary.'

Lord John had the satisfaction of seeing the Montenegrin question easily settled. The dispute respecting the Churches proved more difficult of solution. It was embittered by the foolish conduct of the Russian Czar, who, in recognising Napoleon III., had the folly to style him 'Mon cher ami' instead of 'Monsieur mon frère.' The religious quarrel was in this way supplemented by a personal dispute, and the unfortunate Sultan found himself between two antagonists neither of whom seemed likely to abstain from attacking the other because they could only reach one another through his own weak frame.

Conscious of the grave nature of the crisis which was imminent, Lord John persuaded Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who was on leave in England, and who offered to resign his mission on the change of Government, to return to Constantinople. No blame can attach to him for so doing. Ninety-nine men out of every hundred of his fellow countrymen would, in fact, have warmly applauded his decision: and the hundredth man would hardly have foreseen its consequences. Yet the appointment was, in one sense, the most unfortunate circumstance in British history during the present century. It set the Ministry on the slope which led it, at a constantly increasing speed, to the Crimean War.

Lord Aberdeen, indeed, was almost alone in foreseeing some of the consequences of Lord Stratford's appointment.

Argyll House: February 15, 1853.

I think that it will be necessary to be very careful in preparing instructions for Lord Stratford, if, as I presume, we must consider his memorandum as giving an outline of what he would desire.

'The assurances of prompt and effective aid on the approach of danger,' given by us to the Porte, would, in all probability, produce war. These barbarians hate us all, and would be delighted to take their chance of some advantage, by embroiling us with the other powers of Christendom. It may be necessary to give them a moral support, and to endeavour to prolong their existence; but we ought to regard as the greatest misfortune any engagement which compelled us to take up arms for the Turks.

Lord Stratford is not very consistent in his descriptions of the Turkish Government. He refers to their present course of rashness, vacillation, and disorder; and speaks of their maladministration as

hopeless. At the same time he looks to their power of carrying into effect a system of internal improvement—particularly in the essential branches of justice, revenue, roads, police, and military defence.

I do not believe that any power, at this time, entertains the intention of overthrowing the Turkish Empire, but it is certainly true that any quarrel might lead to this event ; or, as Lord Stratford says, it might take place without such a deliberate intention on the part of any one of these powers.

We ought by all means to keep ourselves perfectly independent, and free to act as circumstances may require. Above all, we ought not to trust the disposal of the Mediterranean fleet—which is peace or war—to the discretion of any man.

Before Lord Stratford reached Constantinople, Prince Mentschikoff arrived at the Porte on a special mission from the Czar. His first action, in refusing to call on Fuad Pacha, the Foreign Minister, led to a ministerial crisis in Turkey; and the excitement was such that Colonel Rose—the chargé d'affaires at the Porte—was induced to send for the British fleet. Fortunately the Admiral refused to comply with Colonel Rose's demands without special instructions from home.[1] Fortunately, too, Lord Stratford on his arrival was able to settle the dispute about the Churches. But he soon learned that Prince Mentschikoff was the bearer of a much larger demand for the acknowledgment by the Porte of the right of Russia to protect the Greek Church and its members in Turkey. Lord Stratford thought such a demand inadmissible, and urged the Porte to reject it. The Sultan mustered courage to act on his advice, and Prince Mentschikoff and the whole of his suite left Constantinople.

The crisis which had thus occurred brought Russia and Turkey to the brink of war, but it did not apparently necessitate the forcible interference of this country. Except, indeed, for the single consideration that the Porte had acted on the advice of Lord Stratford, and that the Ministry had approved its Ambassador's counsel, it was difficult to see how any British interest could be affected by the claim of Russia to protect

[1] Ministers had already so little confidence in Lord Stratford's discretion, that Lord Clarendon wrote to Lord Aberdeen (March 18, 1853), 'One good thing of Rose having sent for the fleet will be that Lord Stratford will wish to be without it.'

the members of the Greek Church who were subject to the Sultan. No doubt the warlike measures to which Prince Mentschikoff's departure pointed affected England a little more closely. The first cannon shot seemed not unlikely to shiver the frail fragments of Ottoman rule ; and the Ministry was aware, from the famous conversation which Sir George Seymour had had with the Czar, that his Imperial Majesty already contemplated the partition of the Turkish Empire. The Czar's intentions, however, made much less impression on the minds of Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues than they produced—when published at a later date—on the British people. They made little impression on Lord Aberdeen, because eight years before the Czar had addressed him in similar language ; and Lord Aberdeen had recorded his remarks without protest in the Foreign Office. They made little impression on Lord John because Sir George Seymour, in reporting them, had privately told him that he believed the Emperor on the whole to be in favour of maintaining the existing order or disorder in Turkey.

At that time there were two courses by which peace might in all probability have been preserved. The Ministry might have said to the Porte, 'If war ensue, England will be no party to it.' Such language, used plainly and without reservation, would probably have forced the Sultan to make terms with Russia. Or, again, it might have said to the Czar, 'If war ensue, England will at once range herself as Turkey's ally.' Such language would, in all probability, have induced the Emperor to pause. If Lord Aberdeen had been supreme in the Cabinet, he would perhaps have taken the first of these courses ; if Lord John and Lord Palmerston had been uncontrolled, they would have taken the second of them. But, while the presence of Lord John and Lord Palmerston made it impossible for Lord Aberdeen to take the one course, the presence of Lord Aberdeen made it impracticable for Lord John and Lord Palmerston to take the other. It resulted, therefore, that the Ministry, as a whole, had no firm mind on the matter ; and, while the ship of State was drifting without clear direction, the tiller was grasped by Lord Stratford, and the vessel steered into the whirlpool of war.

If the Ministry, as a whole, spoke with an uncertain voice, there was no doubt about Lord John's opinions. Writing to Lord Clarendon on the 20th of March, he said—

The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and *he must be resisted.*

While, in a second letter on the same day, he wrote—

The vast preparations at Sebastopol show a foregone purpose, and that purpose is, I fear, to extinguish the Turkish Empire. . . . In case I am right in this conjecture the crisis is very serious. My own opinion is that, in case of the invasion of Turkey by Russia on any pretence, we ought to send a message to Petersburg, and *demand* the evacuation of the Turkish territory, and, in case of refusal, to enforce this demand both in the Baltic as well as in the Dardanelles.

We should of course enter into concert with France.

When news reached London that Prince Mentschikoff had withdrawn from Constantinople, Lord John declared on the 31st of May, writing to the same correspondent, that it was

absolutely necessary that the fleet at Malta should go at once to Vourla, and that orders for this purpose should go to-night or to-morrow at latest.

And three weeks later, while the Cabinet was still drifting, Lord John made a serious effort to give point and precision to British policy. In a long memorandum, he endeavoured to forecast the future and to prepare for it. Thus he wrote:—

On the whole, supposing peace not to be made during the Russian occupation of the Principalities, three separate stages of suspense and conflict appear to be approaching.

1. While Russia holds the Principalities, and persists in her present demand.

2. While Russia, having invaded Turkey, is marching on Constantinople.

3. When Russia, having taken Constantinople, is setting forth terms of peace, distinguished by 'moderation.'

Our policy in the first case is already decided on. . . .

In the second stage we must, I conceive, aid the Sultan in defending his capital and his throne.

In the third stage we must be prepared to make war on Russia herself. In that contest we ought to seek the alliance of France and

Austria. France would willingly join ; and England and France together might, if it were worth while, obtain the moral weight, if not the material influence, of Austria in their favour. It is not necessary to point out how this might be done.

J. RUSSELL.

June 19, 1853.

Right or wrong, Lord John had evidently a policy, and was prepared to act on it. His memorandum had the effect of eliciting the opinions of the five most important members of the Cabinet. Lord Clarendon simply expressed his concurrence with Lord John both as to the 'stages' that were approaching and the modes of dealing with them. Lord Lansdowne thought that any further invasion of Turkey by Russia should be regarded as a ground for war by England and France ; that this opinion should at once be intimated to Russia, and that Russia should at the same time be informed that, in the event of any catastrophe, England would consider the Greek nation the natural heir of the Mahometan power. Such an intimation, he thought, would make Russia pause a good while before it ventured on move the second. Sir James Graham was inclined very much to agree with Lord Lansdowne, but, at the same time, thought it undesirable to decide beforehand on any policy. Lord Palmerston agreed with Sir James Graham that there was no use in determining on a policy till the contingency contemplated had arisen ; but, in the meanwhile, he was in favour of compelling Russia to evacuate the Principalities by the force of remonstrance and demonstration. Lord Aberdeen was averse from indulging in warlike speculations, and wished to preserve his freedom to act at the proper time as wisdom and our true interests might dictate.

It was the natural consequence of these divergent opinions that no intimation was sent to the Czar of the probable policy of England. In July Lord Palmerston, during Lord John's temporary absence from the Cabinet, made one more effort for securing a stronger policy.

C[arlton] G[ardens] : July 7, 1853.

My dear John Russell,—. . . I tried again to persuade the Cabinet to send the squadrons up to the Bosphorus, but failed ; I was told that Stratford and La Cour have power to call for them. This is no doubt

stated in public despatches, but we all know that he has been privately desired not to do so. I think our position, waiting timidly and submissively at the back door while Russia is violently threatening and arrogantly forcing her way into the house, is unwise with a view to a peaceful settlement, and derogatory to the character and standing and dignity of the two powers. . . .

We cannot deny that the presence of our squadrons in the Bosphorus would greatly encourage the Porte, greatly discourage insurrections in any part of Turkey, and greatly tend to make the Emperor pause. . . . Words may properly be answered by words, but acts should be replied to by acts; and the entrance of the Russians as invaders into the Turkish territory ought to be followed and replied to by the entrance of the squadrons into the Bosphorus. . . .

Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Bold advice, which, if it had been taken, would have at once made this country an avowed principal in the quarrel, and might possibly, even at the eleventh hour, have induced the Czar to pause. But advice which there was no chance of the Cabinet adopting. For Lord Aberdeen was labouring for peace: and, though he was not strong enough to enforce his own policy on his colleagues, he was able to withstand the counsels of those who would have made ready for battle.

It so happened that the abstinence from any warlike movement in July was of the less importance because, almost for the first time, a fair prospect existed of terminating the dispute by negotiation. The four neutral powers agreed on what was afterwards known as the Vienna Note, which they determined on presenting for simultaneous acceptance both at Petersburg and at Constantinople. Lord John formed a strong opinion that the Turks should be allowed no discretion in the matter. The Turks, so he thought, should be plainly told that they 'must' sign the note. Lord Stratford, so he urged, should receive positive instructions to that effect; if Lord Stratford hesitated, these orders must be repeated and enforced; and Turkey must be distinctly told that if she did not choose to accept the Austrian note, both in words and substance, we could no longer aid her in her contest with Russia. He wrote to Lord Clarendon on the 20th of July—

The Emperor [of Russia] should be allowed to choose the French

or the English project as he likes best: [1] and whichever he chooses must be imposed on the Turks. But the Czar should not be allowed to haggle or botch or make mischief.

And again on the 20th of August—

I think the positive orders given to Stratford must produce their effect; if not, they must be repeated and enforced. The Turks must be told that if they will not make this moderate concession, which is after all scarcely more than their own last note, they must be prepared to see the Principalities occupied all the winter, for we cannot abet them in their obstinacy.

On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia must not be permitted to go beyond his present position. He has no case for the invasion of Turkey. If he crosses the Danube, our fleet must go up to the Bosphorus.

But, if he remains quiet, holding his material guarantee, he will have before the spring the diplomatic security he asks.

The only danger is that the war party in Turkey may bring on a war by some imprudence—an attack on outposts, or the like. In that case Russia can hardly be kept in a leash, and we must take fresh counsel with our three allies.

In the meanwhile the session of 1853 had come to a close, and Lord John, freed from his Parliamentary labours, took his wife and children down to Roseneath. During his stay at Roseneath he went to Minto to see his father-in-law, who, it will be recollected, had a few weeks before lost his wife. The sympathy which is generated by affliction predisposed him, probably, to pay more than usual attention to all that fell from Lord Minto; and Lord Minto had, throughout the summer, been disposed to regard the obstinacy of the Turks with a little more complacency than Lord John. However this may be, while Lord John was in his father-in-law's society, he received the following letters from Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon:—

Argyll House: Sunday.

My dear Lord John,—Wodehouse [2] has just sent me the copy of a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, by which it appears that the Emperor has accepted our note, and is ready to receive the Turkish Ambassador as soon as it has been accepted by the Porte.

[1] Drafts of the Vienna Note were prepared originally both by France and England.

[2] The present Lord Kimberley, then Under Secretary at the Foreign Office.

I think this settles the affair, unless it should be necessary to make your declaration to the Porte, which I so greatly admired.

Ever yours truly,

ABERDEEN.

F. O. : August 25, 1853.

My dear Lord John,—I enclose a copy of the telegraphic despatch just received from Constantinople, which realises our fears that the difficulty now would be more Turkish than Russian. . . . I have all along felt sure that Stratford would allow of no plan of settlement that did not originate with himself. Musurus has just been here, and was in despair when I told him that the note had not been accepted. He thinks his Government has committed a great mistake.

Yours sincerely,

CLARENDON.

Downing Street : August 26, 1853.

My dear Lord John,—I always expected some difficulties to arise at Constantinople, but those which have taken place are very vexatious. We received yesterday a telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford of the 19th, in which he said that the Turks proposed to make some modifications of the note sent by the four powers for their acceptance, but he did not mention what they were. To-day we have a message from Lord Westmorland, who gives us the proposed alterations. . . . They are not of great importance ; but, after what the Emperor has already done, I doubt if he will accept them. At all events, after his prompt acceptance of our note, and his ready agreement to the alterations made by the English Government in the interests of the Porte, it is clear that we have no right to ask him. It is just possible, however, that for the sake of peace he may yield ; and perhaps it may be right to make the attempt. Should it fail, we are bound to make the Turks agree to the terms we have prescribed, or to let them take their own course. . . .—Ever most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

The course which Lord Aberdeen thus suggested was not entirely in accordance with the opinion which Lord John had expressed, and to which the Prime Minister had assented. Instead of insisting on the Porte accepting the note as it was originally drawn, the Prime Minister was already hoping that Russia, for the sake of peace, might adopt Lord Stratford's modifications. And this distinction, slight as it seemed at the time, was pregnant with mighty consequences. For it soon became plain to Lord John that, however possible it might

have been to insist upon the note without modification, it was impossible to do so after the English Government had once pressed those modifications on Russia. The Ministry ought therefore to have persevered with the policy on which Lord John had himself insisted in the preceding month, and which, singularly enough, in his later years, when his memory had partially failed, he thought that he had continued to urge.[1] It is certain, however, that at the time he thought differently. He wrote to Lord Clarendon on the 27th of August—

Your letter and Lord Aberdeen's on the Turkish question are very unsatisfactory. The Turks are immense fools not to snap at what has been offered them. But still I hope the Emperor of Russia will accept the modifications.

He added on the 29th—

I think this Eastern question has got into as entangled a position as can well be. If we act against Russia, it seems a bad return for her last compliance. If against the Turk, it will be considered that we have given him false hopes and allowed him to fall a victim to our shabbiness. Add to this that a retreat *re infecta* from the Dardanelles will lower us in the sight of Europe, and we shall at the same time abandon our interests, which are bound up in the exclusion of Russia from the Dardanelles. I keep to my opinion that we ought to endeavour to gain the winter for further negotiation. But, if this cannot be done, I am for the Turk against the Russian.

On the following day (the 30th) he wrote to Lord Aberdeen—

Hitherto we have shown great forbearance to Russia. It now becomes us to show a similar indulgence towards Turkey, when she becomes in her turn wilful and wrong-headed.

And he attached so much importance to the fresh crisis that he left Scotland and hurried up to London to consult those of his colleagues who were in town.

Upon his arrival in London Lord John laid a memorandum, dated the 3rd of September, before Lord Aberdeen, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston, who met him at the Foreign

[1] See the curious correspondence between Lord John and Sir A. Gordon, published originally in the *Times*, and republished in Kinglake's *History of the Crimean War*, vol. i. Appendix.

Office, dealing with what he called two questions of great importance.

The first is, supposing the Eastern question to be still unsettled, what is to be done respecting the fleets? The second is, supposing the Emperor of Russia not to agree to the altered note, what is to be the next step on our part?

The decision of the first point Lord John thought could be deferred for three weeks.

But, when the time comes, I can have no doubt what the instructions ought to be. Firmans ought to be asked of the Sultan for the entry of the fleets within the outer castles of the Dardanelles. If he refuses them our honour is safe, and we may retire to any good anchorage farther off.

On the second point Lord John was more emphatic:—

Supposing the Emperor of Russia to agree to some of the amendments and reject others, there remains a fair ground for the conference to attempt a compromise. But, if he reject altogether the amended note, we must recur to the original pretexts of quarrel. The *pretence* of the Emperor of Russia was that his influence in behalf of the Greek Church in Turkey, as sanctioned by treaty and confirmed by long usage, had been treated with neglect. His *demand* was that concessions should be made to him such as could only be made as the fruit of a successful war. . . . When the Sultan, astonished at this demand, asked his allies for advice, they said he was the best judge of his own honour and dignity. All he now asks is to make some amendments to save his honour and dignity in a note presented to him by these four powers. Such being the case, we surely cannot again present to him the same note unamended, with whatever explanations we may accompany it. What we might do is to forward to Petersburg through the conference the note of Reshid Pacha of July 23.[1] It is a very good and sufficient note. If the Emperor of Russia rejects both the amended note of the conference and the Turkish note of July 23, we must conclude that he is bent on war, and prepare our measures accordingly.

J. RUSSELL.

The policy which Lord John laid down in this memoran-

[1] This note will be found in Eastern Papers, pt. ii. p. 31. It was drawn up by Lord Stratford. Reshid Pacha was the Sultan's Prime Minister. Lady Russell recorded a story in her diary that Lord Palmerston, writing to Lord John, said we have our own wretched Pacha at home.

dum may have been right or may have been wrong. But, whether right or wrong, there can be no doubt that it differed essentially both from the opinion which he had expressed three weeks before, and from the course which in the seclusion of his old age he fancied he had recommended, and he thought should have been adopted. The Czar's unconditional acceptance of the note, however, had given Russia an advantage which she was not likely to throw away. She could fairly claim that she had done all that the allies had thought it right to ask, and that they were not justified in asking her to do more. And so clear was this position that, when news reached London on the 13th of September that she refused to accept the Turkish modifications, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston—for Lord John, in the interval, had returned to Roseneath—agreed to urge the Vienna conference to recommend the Porte to sign the unmodified note, declaring at the same time that the allies understood the note in the sense of the Turkish modifications.

Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord John—

Argyll House: September 16, 1853.

The Russian answer is such as we expected; indeed, more favourable, for the Emperor adheres to the Vienna note, from which he might have been freed, according to the terms of his acceptance. He also expresses a desire to evacuate the Principalities. We have not yet received the despatch, but it appears to contain further statements of a conciliatory character.

Palmerston was with us yesterday; and we agreed to propose at Vienna that the four powers should declare that they adopted the Turkish modifications as their own interpretation of the note, and that they were prepared to adhere to this interpretation in all time hereafter. This would be a virtual guarantee to the Porte, of more value than any they could expect. Indeed, the declaration is so strong, that I entertain some doubt of its being agreed to by Austria and Prussia. But it is still more doubtful whether Lord Stratford will allow the Turks to accept it.

I entirely agree with you in thinking that Nesselrode has not established the points you mention in his notes; but I think you do not state them quite fairly. He wished to show that the occupation of the Principalities, however exceptional, did not establish an entirely new principle of action in Europe, as had been asserted,

and that measures of violence and coercion, without actual war, were not rare. The bombardment of Antwerp, and blockade of the Scheldt, were of this kind, although constituting an undoubted *casus belli* for the King of the Netherlands. The French occupation of the Morea, in 1828, and our destruction of the Turkish fleet, are similar instances. The object of these acts does not affect their character, for about that there may be great difference of opinion. Austria and Prussia thought we were wrong in coercing the Turks in 1828, and Russia, Austria, and Prussia thought we were wrong in coercing the King of the Netherlands in 1832.

We think Russia wrong in the present occupation of the Principalities without being at war, not because there is anything new or unprecedented in the act itself, as the means of enforcing a demand, but because we think the demand itself unjust.

In asking the Porte to sign the unmodified note, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Palmerston were, like Lord John, guilty of inconsistency. If they had intended to take this course, they ought to have done so on the 1st of September. By asking the Czar on that day to consent to the modification of the note, they made it possible for the Porte to argue that they had admitted the necessity for modifying it. And the terms[1] in which the Czar refused their request increased their difficulty; for he made it plain that he attached a meaning to the note different from that which the allies who drew it up had intended it to bear, and similar to that which Lord Stratford and the Porte had contended that it did bear.

But the proposal of the three Ministers was not merely inconsistent with their previous decision; it was opposed to the course which Lord John had himself recommended in his memorandum of the 3rd of September, and on which, when he returned to Scotland, he believed that his colleagues had agreed. He not unnaturally, therefore, was intensely annoyed when he learned their decision.

He wrote to Lord Clarendon on the 17th—

It is good to make attempts to retain the blessings of peace; but I own I cannot but think your proposal at Vienna premature. We do not yet know in what sense the Emperor may have rejected the modifications, and it would be strange to give an interpretation to

[1] These terms were not known in England till a little later.

the note at Constantinople which is contradicted by the very powers to whom it is to be offered.

As to the guarantees to Turkey, I confess I see none in your proposal. You only propose to say that the note does not confer any *droit d'ingérence* between the Sultan and his subjects. 'To be sure not,' the Czar may say, 'it only admits and confirms a right I have always had and always exercised, and which I mean to keep and exercise.' And, if so, what does the Porte gain?

I must say I much lament the step you have taken. I think it is degrading Turkey, not to reject her modifications, but to reject them after submitting them to the Emperor of Russia.

The conference at Vienna in Westmorland's hands has been an instrument very injurious to peace. In your hands in London it would have been otherwise. . . . I am vexed about the last move, and you must not be surprised, if it is accepted at Vienna, if I were to decline any responsibility.

Two days afterwards he wrote to Lord Aberdeen—

The only hope I have is that Turkey may instantly reject such a proposal. But even that will not wipe away the shame of having made it. . . . It is unwise and unfair to propose again a note which his [the Sultan's] Ministers have declared they can none of them sign. All this makes me very uneasy; and, if the Austrians agree to Clarendon's terms, and forward them to Constantinople, I do not see how I can remain a member of your Government.

That evening Lord John spoke at a public meeting at Greenock, and he alluded to the crisis in terms which must have been much more intelligible to his colleagues, who read them, than to his audience, who listened to them—

While we endeavour to maintain peace, I certainly should be the last to forget that, if peace cannot be maintained with honour, it is no longer peace.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, Austria refused to be a party to the new proposal of the three Ministers, and it fell to the ground. Lord Aberdeen was able to announce to Lord John that the project was at an end. He added—

The comical part of this affair is that the proceeding which you thought so unfavourable to the Turks, and which had nearly produced such serious consequences, was not only approved by Palmerston, but in great part written at his dictation.

But, though the new project had fallen, its proposal led

Lord John to meditate on the whole proceeding and on his own position in the Cabinet; and, when Lord Clarendon expressed to him the pain with which he had read his letter of the 17th of September, Lord John replied on the 23rd—

The fatal facility of the electric telegraph led you and Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston to take a step of which the best that can be said is that it has done no harm.

After remarking that he had not meant to write in an unfriendly tone, he added of his own position—

That which I have held this year has been, and is, and must be, a degrading one. I have deserved it, and I have borne it as I best could. Lord Aberdeen, by his kindness and good feeling, has done all in his power to make it tolerable. Still, on more than one occasion, I have had to summon all my patience to my aid. But you have made me feel my degradation more than I ever felt it before. You assumed that I was to be the chief organ for defending in the House of Commons that which I had no share in deciding, and of which I had previously recorded my disapproval. It was impossible that I could so lower myself, or that I should not feel the blow you had inflicted on me more than all the other humiliations I have endured.

I am sure you did not see the matter in this light, and I make every allowance for the difficulty of your course. . . . *Liberavi animam meam*, and I hope never to revive the subject with you.—And so I remain, yours very truly,

J. Russell.

With the failure of the proposal Lord John felt that the necessity for his resignation had passed away. But, anxious and ill at ease, he determined to bring his stay at Roseneath to an abrupt conclusion and to return to London. In the meanwhile he drew up an elaborate memorandum on the situation for circulation in the Cabinet:—

Russia and Turkey.

The present situation of affairs makes it necessary to look back, around us, and forward. The question between Turkey and Russia is to be looked at, 1st, as one of right; 2nd, as one of power.

In respect to right there can be no doubt in any honest mind.

The Emperor of Russia protects the members of the Greek Church in the enjoyment of certain privileges at the Holy Places. The French Government claimed in virtue of treaty certain privileges

inconsistent with those enjoyed for many years by the Greek Church. The Sultan hesitated, equivocated, and yielded to each alternately, as the pressure came from one or the other power.

The Emperor of the French, with great generosity, made allowances for the Sultan's weakness, and acquiesced in his concessions to Russia without admitting their justice.

The Emperor of Russia, on the contrary, not only demanded reparation and security, but transferred his grievance in respect of the Holy Places to all the subjects of the Porte of the Greek Church, thus assuming a right to protect not 12,000 pilgrims, but 12,000,000 Turkish subjects. . . .

In point of right Russia must be put out of court. . . .

Second, the question of power.

It is evident that the great military force of Russia, always organised, makes her more than a match for Turkey. The treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople are documents proving this fact; it is admitted by Lord Stratford and every one else.

It therefore became the duty of England and France, as good friends of the Sultan, to advise him to make greater concessions than he was in point of right at all called upon to make. . . .

He has thought he could not make [these concessions], and Nesselrode has done much to justify his repugnance.

On the other hand he incurs the greatest danger of overthrow by Russian arms, the invasion of his provinces, and the capture of his capital. In his European provinces the Christians, being as five to one to the Mahometans, may join the invaders, or at least take the opportunity to throw off the yoke.

What can England and France do to relieve him from this danger? They can scour the Black Sea in the spring and summer, and sweep away every Russian sail that may appear on it. . . .

But Lord Stratford raises another question. . . . He says that, if the exclusion of Russia from the Protectorate and the Principalities be the important object it has hitherto been deemed, success can only be obtained if England and France are ready to stop at no sacrifice ready to secure it.

This suggestion raises a much wider question. If England and France are to stop at no sacrifice necessary to secure success, they must become principals, not auxiliaries, in the war . . . [and] employ their mighty resources at every point where Russia can be resisted or attacked.

It is one thing to give aid to the Sultan in defence of his territorial and sovereign rights; . . . it is quite another to embark on so vast a contest.

Before we do this, it would be necessary to explain to the Sultan very clearly for what objects we engage.

Should it be to maintain the present Government of the European provinces of Turkey? Let us hear Lord Stratford's solemn language to Reshid Pacha.

'I have frequently had occasion of late, and indeed for some years past, to bring to the knowledge of the Porte such atrocious instances of cruelty, rapine, and murder, as I have found with extreme concern in the Consular reports, exhibiting generally the disturbed and misgoverned condition of many parts of Roumelia, and calling loudly for redress from the Imperial Government. The character of these disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with truth to be in general that of Mussulman fanaticism, excited by cupidity and hatred against the Sultan's Christian subjects. I will not say that my friendly and earnest representations have been entirely disregarded. On the contrary I have sometimes had the satisfaction of being instrumental towards the suppression of crime, the alleviation of individual suffering, and the recall of incapable magistrates. But the evil, nevertheless, has not been permanently removed, and the effect of every partial check has been of short duration.'

Here is matter for serious reflection, outrages caused by 'Mussulman fanaticism excited by cupidity and hatred against the Sultan's Christian subjects:' existing in spite of the earnest representations of Lord Stratford; continued for many years, and in spite of the obvious interest of the Sultan to conciliate his Christian defenders.

It is true we are promised that, if the present danger is averted, milder counsels will prevail, justice will be more fairly administered, and cruelty more sharply corrected.

But how can we rely on such promises when we know that at the seat of government itself corruption gives a licence to the cruelty which ravages the provinces? If the urgency of danger does not secure the Christians from oppression, will the ease of security ever do so?

It is to be feared that Lord Stratford is building upon sand. His own eminent qualities have but partially succeeded in effecting improvements; can any man with less ability, less knowledge of Turkish character, less influence over the Divan, hope to do more?

I must conclude, therefore—

1. That if Russia will not make peace on fair terms, we must appear in the field as the auxiliaries of Turkey.

2. That if we are to act in conjunction with France as principals

in the war, we must act not for the Sultan, but for the general interests of the population of European Turkey.

How and in what way requires much further consideration, and concert possibly with Austria, certainly with France.

October 4, 1853. J. RUSSELL.

This remarkable memorandum defined Lord John's views with precision. While he had hitherto, in company with Lord Palmerston, been foremost in the Cabinet in resisting Russian aggression; unlike Lord Palmerston, he was not prepared to support the Porte against its Christian subjects. In the meanwhile, the pacific section of the Cabinet was desirous of making one more effort to avert the war, on which Turkey had already entered. Lord Aberdeen desired to draw up a new note, which the four powers should present to the Porte, accompanying it with a declaration that, while its acceptance by the Porte could not fail to secure for it a more decided support from the allies, they could not permit themselves to be drawn by unfounded objections to it into a policy inconsistent with the peace of Europe. The objections which Lord Palmerston felt to this declaration have been already published.[1] Lord John's objections to it were equally strong: and it was in consequence abandoned.

So far it seemed desirable to follow the course of this negotiation. In the meanwhile another subject had been discussed in the Cabinet which had even a more direct reference to Lord John. In August, when it seemed probable that the Russian acceptance of the Vienna Note had terminated every difficulty, Lord Aberdeen told Lord John that the time had arrived for carrying out his intention of retiring in Lord John's favour. On submitting the matter, however, to his other colleagues, he found that many of them 'would not entertain the proposal.' The increasing tension of the situation in the East increased the objections raised to the Prime Minister's abandoning the helm: and, to quote his own words, he could not 'at such a moment think of running away.' From Lord Aberdeen's point of view it was difficult to gainsay the force of this reasoning. The true objection to his conduct was not that he failed to carry out his intention; but that he had

[1] Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, ii. 288.

announced an intention without ascertaining whether it would be possible to fulfil it. But, from Lord John's point of view, Lord Aberdeen's reasoning was defective. Rightly or wrongly, Lord John thought—and he thought in common with nine-tenths of his fellow-countrymen—that Lord Aberdeen's love of peace, and friendship for the Emperor of Russia, were powerful elements making for war. Peace, so it seemed to him and others, could best be secured by the resignation of the Prime Minister; and (as has been already shown) he seriously doubted whether he was himself justified in continuing to serve in the Administration. On the other hand, there was something distasteful to his chivalrous temperament in deserting a Ministry which was passing through a grave crisis; and, satisfied by the failure of Lord Clarendon's proposal in September and by a decision of the Cabinet authorising Lord Stratford to direct the fleet to pass through the Bosphorus and engage in defensive operations in any part of the Euxine, he continued in power.

This determination, however, forced Lord John to consider another subject. In the statement, which he had made on behalf of the Ministry at the commencement of the session of 1853, he had said that it was proposed to defer the measure of Parliamentary Reform which it was intended to introduce till the spring of 1854. If this pledge were to be redeemed the time had evidently arrived for preparing the measure; and accordingly, early in November, after Lord John's return to Richmond, the Cabinet appointed a committee of its members to consider its details. When the committee met Lord John laid before it the outlines of a scheme in which he proposed the disfranchisement of all boroughs with less than 300 electors; the semi-disfranchisement of those with less than 500 electors; the division of the 70 seats thus vacated between the largest counties and the largest towns; the reduction of the county franchise from 50*l.* to 20*l.*; the reduction of the borough franchise either to the household franchise established in municipalities or to a 6*l.* rating; the creation of what have since been called triangular constituencies, in which no elector should vote for more than two out of the three candidates; and the disfranchisement of freemen. But it was soon plain that one member of the committee, Lord Palmerston, not merely

objected to many parts of this scheme, but was also prepared to question the necessity for Reform at all. He went so far, indeed, as to declare that the supposed necessity for change arose not from any popular demand, but from the declarations which Lord John himself had made in the House of Commons. Such an insinuation was neither quite generous nor quite just. Of all the members of the Whig party Lord John had suffered most from his determination to resist any tampering with the Reform Act. Lord John, however, shall speak for himself:—

Pembroke Lodge: November 16, 1853.

My dear Palmerston,—I received your letter just before our meeting yesterday, and had no time to consider it before I came here. In the first place I deny entirely the historical truth of the assertion that the necessity for Reform arises principally if not solely from declarations made by me in the House of Commons without any previous concert or agreement with my colleagues. The facts are that from 1837 I have stood both in Government and in Opposition the brunt of the attacks made on the Reform Act. In referring to Lord Grey's and Lord Althorp's declarations that it was a final measure, in resisting the ballot, in opposing Hume's motions, I have had no assistance, and was left alone to bear the unpopularity of my course. At length I told my colleagues that I thought a further reform should be made. With the exception of Lord Grey and Hobhouse all agreed, but urged postponement. When this was the decision I thought myself justified in declaring that the Government would itself propose a further reform. Still my declaration was thought so little explicit that Page Wood, Vernon Smith, and others put us in a minority, my colleagues as usual remaining silent. We resigned; and, when we came back, Fox Maule, as the organ of the Government, promised Reform in the next session. Accordingly at the beginning of the session of 1852 it was announced in the Queen's Speech. So much as to the past.

The necessity for Reform now exists not in any declarations of mine, but in the existence of abuses and defects which it becomes our duty to remedy. I am sure I need not remind you of what Mr. Burke says of early reformations. The capitulations made with the Catholic Association and the Anti-Corn Law League are not to me inviting examples to follow.

Next, are there these abuses?

You admit the inadequacy of the electoral body in very small places, but object to a Schedule B. You do so, however, on a ground

which I do not think can be maintained—that taking the general nature and effect of the plan it tends without necessity to produce a great derangement of legislative and political power to the injury of land, and the advantage of the manufacturing, commercial, and working classes. If you will consider the plan further, I think you will see—

First, that like the Reform Bill it takes away power from individuals or classes who are weak and odious, and gives it to large bodies of the same class who are strong and popular. Thus Wilton, Harwich, Honiton, &c., lose their power, but it is transferred to Kent, Devonshire, Lincolnshire, &c., agricultural counties rich and populous, where the privilege once placed can be maintained. Secondly, in giving more members to Manchester and Leeds, we should not give members of the same class. The Conservative minority of these towns would for the first time have representatives. Thirdly, the proposition to give all the surrendered seats to counties would excite violent and natural opposition. The precedent of the Reform Bill is much safer, more constitutional, and would practically produce greater harmony. The object should be not to set town against county, but to blend and unite them. As to the franchise for the educated classes, I am quite ready to adopt it, in any shape in which it can be made workable. But, if the freemen are to be disfranchised, I think a large extension to householders indispensable. I am quite ready to discuss Graham's plan, or the 6*l.* rating, or the 7*l.* value in lieu of the 10*l.* value. I lean at present to the municipal franchise.

As we shall have an opportunity of discussing the whole matter on Friday, I will say no more but that I remain yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston's objections to Reform were not removed by Lord John's arguments. But, at the same time, it was soon plain to Lord Palmerston that, with the single exception of Lord Lansdowne, he had no supporter either in the committee of the Cabinet or the Cabinet itself. Early in December he communicated his objections to Lord Aberdeen. A few days afterwards he wrote a letter to Lord Lansdowne in which he stated that he could not agree to the extent of disfranchisement, the extent of enfranchisement, and the addition of the municipal franchise in boroughs to the 10*l.* household franchise. He added that he doubted whether the measure could pass through the two Houses, that he did not choose to be a party to a contest between them, or to be dragged through the dirt by John Russell. Though he

thought his presence in the Cabinet useful in modifying the system of foreign policy which, injuriously to the interests and dignity of the country, there was a disposition in other quarters to pursue, he could not consent to stand forward as one of the authors and supporters of John Russell's sweeping alteration.

On the 10th he forwarded a copy of this letter and of Lord Lansdowne's answer to the Prime Minister, who at once showed them to Sir James Graham. Sir James, on the 11th, communicated their substance to Lord John, adding—

It is clear that his [Lord Palmerston's] part is taken; and that he hopes by raising the war cry to drown the demand for an extension of the suffrage. This is the game which has been played before, and, as you wisely foresee, is about to be played again. But there is a nobler and a better one quite open, and be it yours.

Propose a sound, but popular, measure of Parliamentary Reform; and, without making any undue concessions to Russia, cement the union of the four powers, maintain the integrity of Turkey, and preserve the peace of Europe.

Cordial concord and co-operation between you and Lord Aberdeen may secure both objects to the great advantage of the nation and to your own immortal honour.

But cordial concord is necessary; and those who agree on Reform must not quarrel on the Eastern question.

You should see Lord Aberdeen as early as possible to-morrow, and I am quite sure that a perfect agreement between you is not only practicable but easy: and present circumstances, to say nothing of the past, absolutely demand it.

Accordingly on the following day (December 12) Lord Aberdeen and Lord John met. Probably no record exists of their conversation. Yet its purport may easily be inferred, for, on the 13th, Lord Aberdeen wrote to Lord Palmerston and told him that no material alterations could be made in the Reform Bill; and on the same day he wrote to Lord John—

I cannot say that my conscience is perfectly at ease in consequence of sacrifices I have made to the opinions of others;[1] but I am so fully aware of the necessity of removing every shade of difference that I have made every effort to meet your views. My great hope and ground of confidence is that you have assured me *your policy is a policy of*

[1] *i.e.* on the question of the war, not on the question of Reform.

peace. This, honestly and conscientiously carried out, excludes the possibility of any material difference.

It may be added that at the interview which thus took place, Lord Aberdeen and Lord John considered what measures on the part of Russia should constitute a cause of war, and what acts should lead to coercive measures without a declaration of war; and they determined that the passage of the Danube by a Russian army should lead to coercive measures and involve the interception by the English fleet of Russian vessels in the Black Sea. Lord John desired, though he did not insist, that this decision should be communicated to the Russian Court.

Within forty-eight hours of this important conversation two things of the highest importance happened: (1) Definite news reached England of the destruction of a Turkish fleet by a Russian squadron at Sinope; and (2) Lord Palmerston, replying to Lord Aberdeen's letter, resigned office. Lord Aberdeen, on receiving Lord Palmerston's resignation, at once asked Lord John to take the Home Office. Lord John refused, and urged that the appointment should be given to Sir George Grey. Lord Aberdeen reluctantly deferred to Lord John's wishes, and Sir George Grey, who was in Northumberland, was summoned to London. Lord Aberdeen hoped that the Cabinet had been reconstituted by this slight change. Perhaps Lord John thought so too, for he wrote to Lord Lansdowne—

Pembroke Lodge: Dec. 15, 1853.

My dear Lansdowne,—On going over with Lord Aberdeen Palmerston's letter to him with his letter to you enclosed, it seemed to us that he differed so entirely in all the elements of our Reform Bill that there was no chance of an agreement. The same thing appeared to Sir James Graham, and on Palmerston being told so by Lord Aberdeen he has resigned. Indeed he will probably tell you so to-day if the weather does not prevent his journey to Bowood.

I feel with you that the Government is much weakened by this secession. But I see no reason why we should not continue our consultations, both on the Reform Bill and on the Eastern question, and submit ourselves to the judgment of the House of Commons and of the country.

There is to be a Cabinet, I believe, on Saturday, which I hope

you will be able to attend. We shall be ready to go to Bowood on the day in next week which you may fix. . . .—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Lansdowne's reply undeceived Lord John :—

Bowood : December 16.

My dear J. Russell,—. . . Had a full Cabinet been summoned—as, to say the truth, I think there should have been—before it [? was told Palmerston] in the name of three members of the Cabinet (very important members, doubtless) that his suggestions could not even be taken into consideration, I should instantly have gone to attend it at any inconvenience to myself. But I cannot, though I shall not at present withdraw formally from the Cabinet, see any advantage in my going there till I have had an opportunity of talking fully to you in private, and ascertaining how far there is any chance of those who are making themselves responsible for the whole measure consenting to any modification of its provisions. . . .—Ever yours truly,

LANSDOWNE.

Thus when the Cabinet met on Saturday the 17th they had not merely to confront the secession of Lord Palmerston, but to realise that the retirement of Lord Lansdowne could, in all probability, be only averted by concessions which could not be otherwise than distasteful to Lord John. And these concessions he was at once urged to make both by Sir J. Graham and the Duke of Argyll. Probably, indeed, Lord John would more willingly have sacrificed his own opinions to Lord Lansdowne than to any other man alive. Lord Lansdowne was his oldest and closest political friend, with whom he had long been in the habit of consulting and to whom he had constantly deferred. And the very Cabinet which Lord John was attending showed him how ill he could spare Lord Lansdowne's presence. For, while Lord John was insisting that the massacre of Sinope demanded energetic measures, the Cabinet decided to wait, before doing anything, for news from Constantinople; and it even refrained from adopting the conditions on which Lord Clarendon and Lord Aberdeen had agreed that the passage of the Danube by the Russians should be made the ground for naval movements in the Black Sea. Lord John left the Cabinet deeply dissatisfied, and employed his Sunday in writing a letter of reproach to Sir James

Graham, in which he indicated plainly that he could not go on. His feeling under the circumstances was only natural; and, though the publication hereafter of Lord Aberdeen's correspondence or of Sir J. Graham's memoirs, by any writer who has access to Sir James's papers, will show that Sir James thought that Lord John should not have insisted on the appointment of Sir George Grey on the 14th if he contemplated breaking up the Government within four days, it is fair to recollect that the threatened resignation of Lord Lansdowne, and the refusal of the Cabinet to accept conclusions on the Eastern question to which Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon had agreed, had in the interval altered the whole conditions.

Lord John's annoyance was, at any rate, fruitful in results. Sir James Graham wrote to him that, 'in deference to his opinion and wishes, a despatch had been written to the French Government which, it was trusted, would be satisfactory to him.'[1] And Lord John received the satisfactory assurance at Bowood, where he was paying his promised visit to Lord Lansdowne. Nothing could have been more opportune for Lord John. Lord Lansdowne's influence with him was always exerted in behalf of compromise and moderation. He was, of course, more likely to yield when he found that deference had been shown to his own opinions; and Lord Lansdowne and he soon agreed on a compromise on the Reform question, under which a little more weight was to be given to county constituencies and a little less weight to towns.

This compromise arranged, Lord John returned to London, where he found that another negotiation had been actively taking place in his absence. Lady Palmerston had hinted to some of her husband's old colleagues that Lord Palmerston had acted hastily in resigning, and that he was ready to return. The Duke of Newcastle, Mr Gladstone, and Sir Charles Wood in consequence of these hints had long conversations with Lord Palmerston; and, on the 20th, Lord Aberdeen communicated these reports to Lord John, adding—

I have told Wood and Gladstone, who have both spoken to me

[1] This was the famous despatch, actually sent on the 24th, approving the suggestion of the French Government that the allied fleet should enter the Black Sea, and 'invite' any Russian vessels of war to return to Constantinople.

on the subject, that it is a matter which I must place entirely in your hands before I could move at all: but that I should be quite ready to follow your advice.

On the 23rd Lord Palmerston himself wrote to Lord Aberdeen to withdraw his resignation, and the Ministry accordingly by the end of the year was reconstituted on its old basis.

Lord John could not but regard Lord Palmerston's return to office with mixed feelings. On the one hand he could not help perceiving that it again left the details of his favourite measure open to discussion, or remembering that the letter in which Lord Palmerston had announced his dislike of the Reform Bill was not too courteous to himself. On the other hand, Lord Palmerston's presence in the Cabinet strengthened the hands of those who, like Lord John, had all along thought that the best chance of preserving peace lay in using firm and decided language, and who concluded that, if war should unhappily occur, the party of action would require to be reinforced. Whichever of these considerations prevailed—and Lord John was influenced by both of them—the storm in the Cabinet had the effect of clearing the air. The details of Reform were rapidly settled to Lord John's satisfaction, and the reconstructed Cabinet spoke thenceforward with a firm voice on the Eastern question.

While, however, harmony was established in the council chamber, the public out of doors was lashed into unusual excitement by the news of the Ministerial crisis. Most people declined to believe that Lord Palmerston would have left the Cabinet, on the eve of war, because he was unable to agree upon the details of a Reform Bill. They inferred that he had really resigned because he was dissatisfied with the Eastern policy of the Cabinet; and they assumed that Lord Aberdeen's reluctance to strong measures was increased by the attitude of the Court and the counsels of Prince Albert. It was roundly asserted, both in Liberal and Conservative newspapers, that the Prince was interfering unconstitutionally both in foreign and domestic affairs; and the charges which were made against him were couched in language and assumed a character of unusual and unjustifiable violence. Both the

Queen and the Prince felt bitterly the injustice of accusations which their position made it impossible for them to repel. But they were, of course, forced to wait for the meeting of Parliament for their justification. On the 31st of January, the first night of the session, the Prince's conduct was explained and defended by Lord Aberdeen in the House of Lords, and Lord John in the House of Commons. Nothing could be more complete than the vindication which Lord John thus gave. The whole fabric of accusation dissolved like a bubble. Mr. Greville wrote with perfect truth—

John Russell made a very good speech, and took the bull by the horns about the Prince, entered at once into the subject, and delivered an eloquent vindication of and eulogium on him in his best style. It was excellent.

The Prince himself was warm in his acknowledgments; the Queen hastened to express her gratitude and pleasure; and Lord Strafford told the Duke of Bedford that he had never recollected such an impression produced by any speech.

This preliminary debate was, however, only the prelude to much more decisive matters. Four days later Baron Brunnow called on Lord Clarendon to announce his recall; while, on February 17, in a debate on foreign policy, Lord John traced the whole progress of the Eastern question and frankly admitted the imminence of war. He concluded—

For my part, if most unexpectedly the Emperor of Russia should recede from his former demands . . . we shall all rejoice to be spared the pain, the efforts, and the burdens of war. But if . . . peace is no longer consistent with our duty to England, with our duty to Europe, with our duty to the world . . . we can only endeavour to enter into this contest with a stout heart. May God defend the right! And I, for my part, shall be willing to bear my share of the burden and the responsibility.

This dignified language excited unbounded admiration when it was uttered. Lord Charles Russell, who, as Serjeant-at-Arms, was in close communication with members on both sides of the House, told the Duke of Bedford that 'the general remark was, "This is the best thing he has ever done;"' and Mr. Punch made the speech the subject of a poem which Mr. Leech illustrated with one of his best cartoons.

The general apprehension of war was not favourable to the great measure of Reform on which Lord John had set his heart. He gave notice of its introduction for the 13th of February. But on the 10th Lord Jocelyn, who by marriage was nearly connected with Lord Palmerston, asked him whether it was his intention to proceed *bonâ fide* with the measure. Lord John replied that he intended not only to introduce the Bill on the promised day, but to fix the second reading for the 13th of March. He carried out the first part of this programme; but the House, which by this time was thinking of nothing but war, received the proposal with apathy, while Lord Palmerston spared no effort to promote the postponement of the measure. For a time it seemed possible that the struggle between the two men might lead to the dissolution of the Ministry. But the increasing tension of the Eastern question, and the necessity of providing for the war, induced Lord John partially to give way, and at the end of February he told Lord Aberdeen that he was prepared to postpone the Bill. The only members of the Cabinet who seem to have had serious doubts on the propriety of this decision were Sir James Graham and Lord Aberdeen himself. The Prime Minister, however, while expressing his anxiety for the success of the measure, placed himself frankly in Lord John's hands,[1] and Lord John on the 3rd of March announced his decision to postpone the second reading till the 27th of April. The announcement was received with almost universal satisfaction, though one or two members could not resist the pleasure of eliciting a short-lived cheer by striking at Lord John. Thus Sir John Shelley, who represented Westminster, either said, or was understood by Lord John to say, that the proposal of the measure was a sham; while Mr. Disraeli contrasted a phrase of the Prime Minister's, that 'the Government

[1] Lord Aberdeen added, 'I wish that I could feel as much at ease on the subject of the unhappy war in which we are about to be engaged. The abstract justice of the cause, although indisputable, is but a poor consolation for the inevitable calamities of all war, or for a decision which I am not without fear may prove to have been impolitic and unwise. My conscience upbraids me the more, because seeing, as I did from the first, all that was to be apprehended, it is possible that by a little more energy and vigour, not on the Danube, but in Downing Street, it might have been prevented.'

in introducing the Bill had been influenced by a feeling of personal honour,' with a 'sententious dogma' of Sir George Grey that a statesman was not to be hampered by feelings of personal consideration arising out of pledges which he may have given. Lord John, in repelling Sir John Shelley's insinuation, declared that he felt utter indifference to it, coming as it did from a man 'who has no right to speak in the name of Reform;' and, after enumerating the battles which he himself had fought in the cause, added, 'Does the hon. gentleman think he has a right to treat me——' and the House drowned the rest of the sentence with its cheers. Of Mr. Disraeli he said very happily he

> 'Faggoted his notions as they fell,
> And, if they rhymed and rattled, all was well.'[1]

And then, rising to a higher strain, he went on—

> Sir, I should be ashamed of myself if I were to prefer a concern for my own personal reputation to that which I understood to be for the interests of my country. But it seems to me that the character of the men who rule this country—whether they be at the moment in office or in opposition—is a matter of the utmost interest to the people of this country, and that it is of paramount importance that full confidence should be reposed in their character. It is, in fact, on the confidence of the people in the character of public men that the security of this country in a great degree depends.

In writing to Lord John the following morning the Queen expressed herself as 'particularly pleased' with this language. But, in truth, it was hardly necessary for Lord John to lay down such a doctrine. Men might, nay did, criticise his faults of manner or his mistakes of policy. But those who approved, and those who condemned, would have alike agreed that in character he was, like Bayard, 'sans peur et sans reproche.'

The temporary postponement of the Reform Bill, however, did not terminate the existing difficulty. The drift which was ever bearing the Ministry towards war increased in force; with the approach of war the disinclination both of the Cabinet and of Parliament to deal with Reform became constantly stronger, and Lord John had to face the prospect of a

[1] The lines are from *Absalom and Achitophel*, and are applied by Dryden to Doeg.

fresh postponement. Writing confidentially to Lord Aberdeen on the 23rd of March, he said—

There can be no doubt that the great majority, perhaps nearly the whole, of the two Houses of Parliament wish for postponement till another year. But, in order to enable you and me to take that course, we ought to be able to assure Reformers that the question is only one of time. . . . I feel strongly that we could give no such assurance, because, 1st, with two out of three of the advocates of postponement, the question is not one of time but of principle. They use the plea of war now, and will easily find a plea as good, if not better, next year. 2nd, No one will venture to say what may be the state of the country next year. War usually brings with it distress—distress, discontent ; . . . and the discontent may assume the shape of a demand for a much larger measure of Reform.

After considering the possibility of dividing the Bill, and of proceeding with only a portion of it, a compromise which he concluded was impracticable, he went on—

The next course is one which I should gladly adopt. It is that the Government should give up the Bill for the present, and that I should retire. I am pledged to Reform ; and, what is much more, I think a period of increased taxation a fit period for giving enlarged franchises. Others who have not that opinion, and are not so deeply pledged, might honourably and usefully continue the Government. I hope this course may be adopted, and I could then, out of the Cabinet, yield at once to the general desire. The only other course remaining would be to move the second reading of the Bill on the 27th of April. It involves a probability of defeat—a choice of continuing in office, thus defeated, dissolving Parliament, or resigning upon defeat. But, while I point out this course as an alternative, I must repeat that the course which I should prefer would be that I should leave the Government, alone. All the departments are filled, I should not leave the army or the navy uncared for ; and, during the first year of the war, the leadership of the House of Commons would be easy for my successor.

Lord Aberdeen, replying on the following day, said—

You have stated very clearly the different courses which it is open for us to pursue, and the advantages—or rather disadvantages—attending on each. But there is a preliminary consideration, which may render any choice impracticable. When you propose to the Cabinet . . . to read the Bill a second time . . . I suspect that you

will be met by some of our colleagues with a decided objection to your proceeding any further with the Bill at all. I am further of opinion that this view will be shared by a majority of the Cabinet, and that you will be prevented from moving anything as a member of the Government. You have not taken this contingency into account, which, nevertheless, I regard as certain.

Lord John replied on the 25th—

I had considered the state of the Cabinet, but it did not seem to me a sufficient reason for not proposing the course which I thought the best. I had not, indeed, considered that the majority of the Cabinet would object to go on at all with the Reform Bill. If they do so, I can only object on my part to going on any longer with them.

So stood matters on the 25th of March. During the next few days Lord Aberdeen ascertained that, while the prosecution of the Bill would lead to the immediate retirement of Lord Palmerston and Lord Lansdowne, any other course would involve the resignation of Lord John and Sir James Graham. The secession of the two first would deprive the Government, so he thought, of the necessary efficiency; the loss of the two last would virtually destroy it. He told Lord John on the 4th of April that, though he had anticipated that the Queen would be affected by the aspect of affairs, he found that these feelings prevailed to a greater degree than he had expected; and he asked Lord John to consider whether under the circumstances it were practicable for him to postpone the Bill. Lord John replying on the 6th said—

The more I think of the alternative the less I like it. . . . In making the declaration of postponement, any promise I could make would be disbelieved; and I should not believe it myself – then how could I hope to persuade others? Such being the case, it remains to be considered whether I can withdraw the Bill, making no promise for the future. I will consider this point carefully.

Two days' consideration did not overcome Lord John's scruples, and on Saturday, April 8, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen and resigned his seat in the Cabinet.

On the meeting of the Cabinet, however, Lord John, urged from all sides to postpone the Bill, and to withdraw his resignation, yielded to the unanimous wish of his colleagues. Sir Charles Wood wrote to him—

Chesham Place: April 10, 1854.

Dear Lord John,—We had got into conversation on other matters so much yesterday before you joined us that I had no opportunity of doing what was the main object of my ride—to thank you not only for what you did, but for the manner in which you did it, on Saturday.

I think the general feeling of your colleagues was one of gratitude for the sacrifice which you made of your own feelings and wishes for what they believe to be a great public object.

You may be assured, so far as my own opinion goes, and that which I can collect from others, that, so far from having impaired your character or means of usefulness, you will have raised both most essentially by the course which you have taken.

Your position will be strengthened comparatively and positively as we go on. . . . —Yours ever,

C. WOOD.

But the sacrifice was very great. Lord John frankly told the Queen, who had expressed to him her warm approval of his conduct, that he was 'affected by deep feelings of mortification on reviewing the proceedings of the Cabinet, at which,' he added, 'Lord Aberdeen was the only person who behaved with a due regard to the honour of the Administration; and, in the comparative quiet of the Sunday, he concluded that a Cabinet in which Lord Palmerston's objections to Reform had prevailed was not one in which he ought to remain. He communicated his scruples to Lord Palmerston on Monday morning, who endeavoured to combat them, adding very generously—

If you have brought your mind to the conclusion, in which I certainly do not participate, that our respective views and opinions on the question of Parliamentary Reform make it impossible for us to continue members of the same Cabinet, I must claim for myself the right to be the one whose retirement should remove the difficulty. And it stands to reason that this ought to be, because it is evident that the head of the Government and the majority of the Cabinet incline to your views rather than to mine; and it is therefore demonstrable, with reference both to time present and to time future, that I am the person who must necessarily give way. . . . My retirement would be the more easy because the Government would not thereby lose, in a moment of European crisis, a leader of the House of Commons, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, or a Minister of War, three offices in regard to which it might justly be urged that any change at the present moment would be injurious to the public service. . . . —Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Another colleague made a still more striking appeal :—

Belgrave Square : April 11, 1854.

My dear Lord John,—I have now served under your lead for sixteen months, and I have learned to take a strong interest in whatever concerns your political and personal position. . . . Surely this is a moment when no one ought to evade what are great difficulties and great responsibilities. . . . Whatever course you take, the country will believe, as I shall believe, in the rectitude of your motives, but there will have been a sacrifice to be made and a service to be rendered which will not have been done, and I cannot think you will stand in the position you ought if you leave it undone. . . .

I earnestly hope that you will not lightly abandon [the] position, which you occupy under engagements not only to party but to the country. It will be a great political error and a great public misfortune, and I doubt whether the country, on whom the loss will fall, will think your course justifiable.

Pardon me for writing so freely ; I would venture to do it for no reason but that stated in the first sentence of this letter.

Whatever course you take, I shall recollect with pleasure the period during which I have served under you, and learned to know the many noble qualities of one to whom I was once politically opposed.—Believe me, my dear Lord John, most faithfully yours,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

Moved by this appeal, and the entreaties of his Queen and colleagues, Lord John consented to go on ; and on the night of the 11th April he accordingly explained in the House of Commons the reasons which had induced the Government to postpone the measure. It is hardly necessary to refer to the speech which he then made. Many people still recollect how Lord John declared that he was well aware that the course which he was pursuing exposed him to the taunts and sarcasms of his opponents, of which he should not complain, and to the suspicions of his supporters, which could hardly be entertained without weakening and destroying his utility and his position ; and how, when his voice broke down from emotion, he was sustained by sympathetic cheering from every part of the House. The scene, in fact, was as remarkable as it was unusual, and from the letters of congratulation which poured in upon him it is only necessary to give a few extracts.

Lord Aberdeen wrote—

I cannot help congratulating you on the success which attended your decision last night. Had it been otherwise, I should have reproached myself as having been more or less instrumental in leading you to adopt it; but I felt that there would be no danger to yourself. It is true that we have lost the Reform Bill, which is undoubtedly a great sacrifice; but we have preserved your honour, character, and influence, not only undiminished but increased.

Sir Francis Baring said—

The reception you met with in the House will have shown you that *they* know how to estimate the conduct of a man who risks his position for what he considers his duty.

Lord Clarendon said—

You cannot doubt the unanimity of public opinion, or that the House of Commons regards your honour as precious public property.

Lord Oranmore, 'as a Reformer of fifty years,' congratulated Lord John

on the universal testimony to your noble conduct.

While Mr. Vernon, as a very humble member of the Peelite party, wrote—

The cheers from every part of the House of Commons which greeted the touching sentences at the close of your speech must have convinced you of the general sentiment: . . . and, I speak from knowledge, the eyes of young men and of old were brimming with tears of sympathy and almost affectionate respect, than which perhaps no richer tribute, no more grateful homage, could be wished for or received by a statesman and a patriot.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE FALL OF LORD ABERDEEN.

THE sympathetic cheers which sustained Lord John on the withdrawal of the Reform Bill of 1854 only partially allayed the mortification which he felt at the loss of the measure. He was disappointed to find that both his colleagues and his party were ready to sacrifice a project, which he thought just and necessary, for the purpose of concentrating attention on a war which he disliked. Nor was there anything either in the causes of the war or in the conduct of the negotiations which reconciled him to the sacrifice. He had thought, throughout 1853, that war might have been avoided if the Cabinet had resolved on a more definite policy or spoken with a firmer voice. He thought, throughout 1854, that the best chances of a speedy peace consisted in more vigorous measures than those which his colleagues undertook. He wished the war to be short and sharp; and the summer wore away in inaction.[1]

These circumstances oppressed Lord John with grave public anxiety. It so happened that, throughout 1854, he was also worn with private trouble which came very near to him. Lady Russell wrote years afterwards—

> When I look back to 1854 I wonder that his health and strength did not fail under the weight of public cares and the acute trials in our home.

Domestic trouble always produced a marked effect on Lord John's public course; and those, who think that in 1854 he was occasionally betrayed into an irritation which

[1] Punch's cartoon of Lord Aberdeen and Lord John as two washerwomen, in which Lord John (Johanna) asks his colleague 'When's the fighting goin' to begin, George-ena?' not incorrectly expresses Lord John's desire. He wished the fighting to begin in order that it might quickly end.

was unusual with him, should recollect that throughout the year he was racked with public and private anxiety.

It was the misfortune of the Aberdeen Cabinet that the two men who from their position and character exerted the chief influence, and who were bent on the same end, were intent on attaining it by contrary routes. Lord Aberdeen and Lord John both desired peace; and, if either of them had held his own course throughout, peace might probably have been secured. If Lord Aberdeen's will had prevailed, the Sultan would have been forced to make terms with his opponent, or would have been left to fight his battle alone. In that case the campaign of 1877 might possibly have been fought out in 1854. If, on the contrary, Lord John's advice had been strictly followed, Russia would from the first have been told the consequences of her action. She would in that case have in all probability discovered some means for withdrawing her claims. But, while Lord John was strong enough to shape the policy of the Cabinet, he was never able to regulate its words. He could secure the presence of the fleet in the Bosphorus or the Euxine, but he could not compel Lord Aberdeen to say to Russia, 'Thus far shalt thou go and no further.' And so it happened that, while the Czar was irritated by the action, he was encouraged by the language, of the Cabinet; for the acts were the acts of Lord John, and the voice was the voice of Lord Aberdeen.

As war became visibly nearer, the Prime Minister reproached himself for not having struggled more stoutly for his own policy. Lord John frankly replied that if peace were the sole object the fleet should never have left Malta. Lord Aberdeen thought differently. He replied—

Argyll House: March 3, 1854.

I have not the least wish to continue a correspondence upon a subject which in my view of the case could only lead to my own condemnation; but I cannot help expressing my dissent from your opinion that war could only have been prevented by detaining the fleet at Malta. On the contrary, I believe that there were, in the course of the negotiations, two or three occasions when, if I had been supported, peace might have been honourably and advantageously secured. I will especially refer to the opportunity afforded by

the transactions which took place at the meeting of the two Emperors at Olmütz. But I repeat that the want of support, although it may palliate, cannot altogether justify to my own conscience the course which I pursued. However, there is no use in further discussions upon that which is past ; we must now look to the future.

Most people acquainted with history will differ from the conclusion which Lord Aberdeen thus expressed. War became inevitable from the moment when the Vienna Note was modified by Lord Stratford and the British Cabinet adopted its envoy's modifications. It so happened, however, that even on February 22, 1854, a chance was presented, not, perhaps, of preserving peace, but of strengthening the alliance against Russia. The Austrian Minister told the French Ambassador at Vienna that, if the Western powers would fix a delay for the evacuation of the Principalities the expiration of which should be the signal for hostilities, Austria would support the summons. The British Cabinet, informed by telegraph of this conversation, despatched a message to Vienna to ascertain whether, if war consequently arose, Austria would side with the allies.[1] But, though the Cabinet thought it prudent to ask the question, for some reason Ministers did not think it necessary to await the answer. They actually despatched their ultimatum to St. Petersburg on the day preceding that on which the Austrian reply to their inquiry was received.

There is nothing in the Russell papers which explains the reasons that induced the Cabinet to take this course. Yet it is at least plain that Lord John thoroughly realised the importance of securing Austria as an active ally. In a paper, which he drew up for the Cabinet early in March, he declared that 'every one seemed to wish that the war should be short and sharp ;' and he went on to ask—

> Will it not be advisable to direct Lord Westmorland and Bourqueney [2] to ask Austria positively what she will do, and what would induce her to join us in the war ?
>
> Is it not advisable to go a long way to obtain the aid of Austria ?
>
> Will not her aid make the difference of a long or a short war ?

[1] See Kinglake's *Crimea*, ii. 112.

[2] The British and French Ambassadors at Vienna.

The views of two members of the Cabinet on this memorandum are preserved. Lord Lansdowne thoroughly agreed with Lord John's proposal for ascertaining the intentions of Austria; Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, declared that his 'beau-ideal of the results of the war' were changes so vast as virtually to involve the reconstruction of the maps of Europe and of Asia. Well might Lord Aberdeen plaintively observe, 'We have the plan sketched out for a thirty years' war.'

Three days after Lord Aberdeen thus complained of Lord Palmerston's policy, the Queen communicated to both Houses of Parliament the failure of the negotiations and the declaration of war; and on the following Friday, the last day of March, both Houses agreed on addresses to the Crown assuring it of their support. These addresses were drafted by Lord John, though the language of the concluding paragraph was slightly modified at Lord Aberdeen's suggestion. In moving the address in the Commons, Lord John again recapitulated the progress of the negotiations, and declared that he should not consider any terms of peace honourable or just which did not provide for the security of the Turkish Empire. Mr. Layard, who rose when he sat down, expressed his pleasure at this language.

I would say that on the three occasions on which he has addressed the House on this most momentous question he has made speeches worthy of the subject, worthy of his own great reputation, and worthy of a Minister who ought at such a moment to have the affairs of the country under his direction.

But he went on to draw 'a damaging contrast' between the sentiments 'so nobly expressed' with the language which Lord Aberdeen had used on other occasions, and which, at that very moment, he was probably using in another place. He expressed, in short, unbounded confidence in Lord John and no confidence whatever in his colleagues. In using such language Mr. Layard only gave expression to the prevalent feeling. And his judgment was so far correct that wide differences of opinion existed in the Cabinet on the proper conduct of the war. Difference was first visible on the constitution of the department under which the war would be conducted.

The nominal control of the army rested with the Secretary of State for War. But in 1854 the Secretary of State for War was also Secretary for the Colonies. Much of his time was occupied with administrative work which had no connection with the campaign; while the control of the finances of the army was under a Secretary at War who received his orders, not from the Secretary of State, but from the Commander-in-Chief. Add to this that the ordnance was under a Board, the commissariat under the Treasury, the militia under the Home Office, and that the Secretary of State for War exercised no direct authority over any of these departments.

More than twenty years before, during Lord Grey's administration, Lord John had served on a commission to devise some more rational scheme of military administration; and he had himself desired to constitute a Board, under the Secretary at War, responsible for all the military departments. But the plan necessarily roused much antagonism. The commissioners were not unanimous in its favour; the Prime Minister disliked it; and nothing was done. The scheme, moreover, had one imperfection. 'The rapidity and concentration required are with difficulty obtained under a Board.' Efficiency is obtained by the concentration of responsibility, and not by its diffusion.

Writing on April 24, 1854, Lord John reverted to the scheme which he had thus proposed more than twenty years before, and said—

I will asume, as a groundwork for the proposal I have to make, that the working of the present system is defective; that more rapidity and unity are required; that evils ought to be more speedily corrected, and control over the military departments be made more general and effective. These things being taken as proved [I propose]. . . to make the Secretary of State for War in fact what he is in name; to confine his duties to functions chiefly military; and to give him control over the Commander in Chief, Secretary at War, Board of Ordnance, and Commissariat, constituted as these departments at present are. For this purpose nearly the whole of the colonies [1] must be withdrawn from

[1] Lord John explained later in his memorandum that he meant all the colonies except the Mediterranean colonies, which, as military posts, should remain under the Secretary of State for War.

this department, for the load of business would be too great for any man unless this was done. If this was done, the Secretary of State for the War Department would be responsible for the efficiency of the army, for the lodging, clothing, feeding, and paying the army, for the disposition of the troops according to the exigencies of the public service.

Lord John, however, was not satisfied with making this large and comprehensive proposal for an improvement of the machinery. In writing to Lord Clarendon on the 25th of April, he said—

I am of opinion that this is the moment to press forward. . . . I am therefore inclined to propose to the Cabinet on Friday—

1. That we should ask for 10,000 more men for the army, 5,000 more for the navy, and embody 15,000 militia. On Saturday we may discuss our propositions to Sweden, including a subsidy.

2. As to Greece, I think 3,000 men should be sent to Santa Maura or Corfu from *here*, to be disposed at Prevesa or Arta as garrisons; but not to scour the country for rebels.

Two days later, on the 27th, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, and recommended that 5,000 additional troops should be sent to Constantinople; that the French should be asked to send there as many men as they could spare; that the allied armies, thus reinforced, should be advanced to Schumla; that 3,000 men should be sent to Prevesa; that the French should be requested to occupy Volo; that Sweden should be asked to join the alliance, and to furnish a force of 50,000 men in return for subsidies of 100,000*l.* a month from both England and France; and finally, that 15,000 men of the militia should at once be embodied, while the Cabinet should consider in what manner such large expenses should be met.

These expenses, large as they may be, will probably be much less than the expenses of a protracted war. England, it has been said, cannot make a little war. However this may be, I am sure she ought not to make a large war on a little scale.

Lord Aberdeen did not much relish the advice which was thus given to him. He was indeed ready to strengthen the allied forces, and to advance them towards the Danube; he had no great objection to the occupation of Prevesa and Volo, provided the garrisons were solely employed in the

defence of those towns and were not suffered to interfere with Grecian insurgents. But he disliked any arrangement with Sweden; he thought that any blow against Russia must be struck in the South and not in the North, and

For this reason, if I subsidised at all, I would much rather engage Austria to bring her 150,000 men into the field [i.e. into the Principalities], where we most want them, and where they would do much to bring the whole affair to a successful termination.

There was evidently a wide difference between Lord John and Lord Aberdeen on the measures to be taken. Lord Aberdeen, moreover, took no steps for effecting the proposed alterations in the machinery. On the 5th of May Lord John wrote again :—

I do not find that you mentioned to the Cabinet on Wednesday night the proposed plan for the division of the War and Colonial Departments. I do not know, therefore, how to answer Mr. Rich to-night. It is impossible for me to defend the present system, and equally impossible for me to say, as the organ of the Government, that a better will be adopted.

It is now time that I should answer you respecting the personal part of the question.[1]

I think the time is arrived when I ought either to take office or to cease to be a member of your Government. . . .

Had I full confidence in the Administration of which you are the head, I should not scruple to take office under you.

But the late meetings of the Cabinet have shown so much indecision, and there is so much reluctance to adopt those measures which would force the Emperor of Russia to consent to a speedy peace, that I can feel no such confidence.

Indeed the sooner I can be relieved from my share of the responsibility the better.

Still Lord Aberdeen did nothing. He was, perhaps, partly hampered by the knowledge that the scheme of Lord John tended to place the army more directly under the control of Parliament, and was in consequence eminently distasteful in the highest quarters.

On the 10th of May Lord John wrote to Lord Clarendon—

[1] It is evident from what follows that Lord Aberdeen had proposed to Lord John that on the separation of the Colonial Office from the War Office Lord John should take one of the two departments.

Having read the letters relating to the East, I must impress upon you to urge the adoption of the Emperor Napoleon's views relating to Sweden. It is our fate never to adopt an onward movement from within; but, when it comes from France, we submit to do what is right and politic.

Two days later he wrote again :—

I see from Stratford's and Wyse's letters that they deprecate the foolish policy adopted by Lord Aberdeen and the Cabinet of asking Austria to put down the Greek insurrection, and not appearing ourselves. However, Napoleon has dispersed that together with other whimsies. The great want of all is a head of the English Cabinet. If a head could be found, all might be well; but I cannot imagine how we can go on any longer without any head at all.

Following up these letters, on May 20 Lord John circulated a fresh memorandum in the Cabinet formally proposing the separation of the War Department from the Colonial Office and the subsidising of Sweden. The Cabinet unanimously adopted the first of these recommendations. With the exception of Lord Palmerston, Lord Clarendon, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, no member of the Cabinet thoroughly approved of the second of them. It was necessarily abandoned, and Lord John thought that with its abandonment one chance of ending the war rapidly was lost. Under these circumstances he wrote the following letter :—

Pembroke Lodge: May 28, 1854.

My dear Lansdowne,—As I consented to serve under Lord Aberdeen at your recommendation, I wish to submit to you my views and impressions at the present moment.

These views and impressions are derived, however, not from any transient feeling, but from a long observation of the course of the Government.

It seems to me that the presence of many able men in the Cabinet only tends to discordance of opinion and indecision; that no question is put before us in a shape to bring out a definite result.

In a time of peace and ease this position might be tolerable; but I do not think that in a time of war, and that a war of the greatest importance, it can be consistent with the interests of the country. The Government, in fact, wants direction; and, in wanting direction, wants everything that is essential.

The recent deliberations upon the policy to be pursued in refer-

ence to Sweden, Austria, and Greece afford abundant illustrations of what I say.

Two courses are open to me. One, to leave the Cabinet on the grounds I have stated. The other to bring forward some master proposition, upon which to stake my continuance as a member of the Government.

If the latter course is in your opinion the best, I would propose to bring the matter to an issue by recommending a clear understanding with Austria as to her objects and intentions. If they agree with ours we should proceed to state that we are ready to guarantee a loan, or to advance a grant of money for the purposes of the war.

Which do you advise? One of the two courses I must adopt.—Yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

It so happened that events helped to settle the matter. On the day on which this letter was written Mr. Drummond asked a question in the House of Commons as to the proposed organisation of the War Office; and the temper of the House was so clearly in favour of a change that the time for making it had evidently come. On the following morning Lord John suggested to Lord Aberdeen three courses: (1) that the Duke of Newcastle should remain Secretary of State for War, and that Sir George Grey should enter the Cabinet as Colonial Minister; (2) that the Duke should take the Home Office, Lord Palmerston the War Office, and Sir George Grey the Colonial Office; or (3) that the Duke should take the Colonial Office, Lord Palmerston the War Office, and Sir George Grey the Home Office. He added—

I rather think this arrangement the best. With regard to myself, let me go on at present as I am.

Lord Aberdeen at once replied—

Argyll House: May 30, 1854.

I saw the Duke of Newcastle this morning, after receiving your letter, and obtained his full concurrence in the proposed change. With respect to the personal part of the affair . . . I think it would be unjust to the Duke, under present circumstances, to remove him from the War Department. Your suggestion of Sir George Grey for the Colonies would be perfectly welcome to me if it were not for the hope of your reverting to your original intention of taking that department. It was from the great advantage to be derived by the

Government from your occupation of the office, as well as the improvement of your own position, which made every one look at the division of the Colonial Office with so much satisfaction. It will be indeed a great disappointment if you should persevere in abandoning this intention. But the fact of the division of the office I consider as being now finally settled.

Writing on the following day, Lord John concurred that 'it would be unjust to the Duke of Newcastle, under present circumstances, to remove him from the War Department if he preferred to retain that office.' At Lord Aberdeen's request he saw Sir George Grey. Sir George himself put in writing the substance of his conversation with Lord John:—

In order to prevent any misapprehension, I think I had better state in writing the substance of what I said to you in conversation to-day. I entirely concur in the opinion that it is very desirable that you should take some office. I think it will strengthen the Government and improve your position in the House of Commons. I further think that, if the Duke of Newcastle is to hold the office of Secretary of State for War, the best arrangement would be that you should take the vacant place of Colonial Secretary, if you felt that you could satisfactorily combine the business of the Colonial Office with the leadership of the House of Commons. In this case I think there ought to be no other change. . . . But if, on the ground of health or any other reason, you do not wish to take the Colonial Office, I will not decline it, if at the same time you become President of the Council.[1] I should feel differently if you were to remain as you now are without office.

Lord John himself wrote to Lord Aberdeen—

Pembroke Lodge: June 5, 1854.

I have seen George Grey this morning. He is ready to accept the Colonial Office, if offered to him, provided I accept office at the same time.

What are you disposed to do in this matter?

Before I accept office I must have it understood that the Cabinet will in future be more ready, or rather I should say more pressed, to clinch matters of urgent importance than it has hitherto been. . .

Lord Aberdeen, after some conference with Lord John, concurred.

[1] Lord John's taking the Presidency of the Council and sacrificing Lord Granville has been made such a subject of reproach that it seemed well to give the exact facts.

Downing Street: June 7, 1854.

. . . You well know how entirely I agree with Sir George Grey in thinking that it [your own acceptance of office] will greatly strengthen the Government and improve your own position in the House of Commons. As you and he both think that the Presidency of the Council is the office you ought to fill, I will endeavour to carry it into effect. I found yesterday that Granville was in Staffordshire; but I have sent to him, and expect him in London to-day, when I will communicate freely with him on the whole matter. I do not expect that he will create any difficulty.

Lord Aberdeen, however, had hardly despatched this letter before he changed his mind. He probably reflected that the addition of Sir George Grey to the Cabinet would strengthen the Whig element in the Administration, and that some of his own friends would dislike being passed over; while he shrank from the disagreeable duty of asking Lord Granville to take an inferior office to make room for Lord John, and Mr. Strutt to retire from the Duchy of Lancaster to make room for Lord Granville. Later in the evening he accordingly wrote again:—

Blackheath: June 7, 1854.

. . . I understand that Sir George Grey makes your acceptance of office an indispensable condition of his doing so; but I do not know if this is also the case with you. Should this not be the case it may deserve your consideration how far it would be expedient to delay the acceptance of office by Sir George Grey until the end of the session. This would relieve us from all difficulties about Strutt; and, if you took the Presidency of the Council, and Granville went to the Colonies, the Cabinet would remain as it is for the present. . . . I do not for a moment look to anything like party in the Cabinet; but, if a new member should be introduced, I am not certain that Cardwell and Canning might not feel aggrieved.

Lord John replied— Chesham Place: June 8, 1854.

Had I been able to take the Colonial Office,[1] matters might have been much more simple. But as that cannot be, and as I am pronounced unequal to so much labour with the lead of the House of Commons, I think it necessary that the other arrangement should

[1] In refusing the Colonial Office Lord John acted on medical advice. Writing on June 12, Lord Clarendon said, 'I return the doctor's note, which is quite conclusive. If I had seen it before, or you had expressed a similar apprehension, I should not have said the little I did in favour of your taking the Colonial Office.'

be carried into effect at once. I have spoken to Sir George Grey, with your consent, and he is ready to accept the Colonial Office. Granville is ready to give up the Presidency of the Council. . . . As to Lord Canning and Mr. Cardwell, I cannot think that they will stand in the way of George Grey's accession to the Government. Strutt is the man to retire; and, if a Whig is to be added to the Cabinet, that will go but a small way to compensate the partiality of the original distribution of offices. . . . The heavy pressure of the war accounts for the continuance of the Government: otherwise the position would not be tenable. . . .

Lord Aberdeen gave way. The functions of the Secretary of State for War were separated from those of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord John's position was strengthened by his own appointment to the Presidency of the Council,[1] and by the presence of Sir George Grey in the Cabinet. In deference, however, to the scruples of the Prime Minister, and perhaps to objections in other quarters, the military offices, nominally placed under the Secretary of State, were neither consolidated nor reorganised, and the full advantages which Lord John had desired to secure were not attained. But the policy of the Cabinet was thenceforward more vigorous. Instead of confining the war to Turkey, its members agreed to strike a blow at Sebastopol. Lord Aberdeen himself cordially approved this decision, while the famous Cabinet at which the instructions to the armies were finally agreed upon was held at Pembroke Lodge.

The great master of the English language who has told the story of the Crimean war has related, in a passage which is not likely to be forgotten by those who have read it, how, before the reading of these instructions 'had long continued, all the members of the Cabinet except a small minority were overcome with sleep.' It is perhaps impossible to remove the impression which eloquence has produced by the plain state-

[1] Lord John was, I believe, the only commoner who has held the Presidency of the Council since the days of the Tudors: and, as the President of the Council has high rank assigned to him when a peer, and has no special rank when not a peer, a difficulty arose in Court circles as to the precedence to be given to him. I have not ventured to enter into this matter. The mysteries of rank in a country where the great offices in the State follow the subordinate offices of the Household are too deep for me.

ment of one who happened to be present. Yet it may be well to cite Lord John's own account of the sleeping Cabinet :—

Mr. Kinglake has detailed, and has preserved in his fifth edition, a story regarding the dinner of the Cabinet at Pembroke Lodge, which, although accurate in the immediate purport of his relation, would give a very false impression of the real deliberations of the Cabinet. Some days before that dinner, a Cabinet meeting was held in the day-time at which the whole question of sending an expedition to the Crimea . . . [was] very carefully and very maturely discussed. Lord Palmerston for some months had been bent on sending an expedition to the Crimea, and I had only withheld my assent till the siege of Silistria should have been proved to be a failure. . . . Some days afterwards I gave a Cabinet dinner at Pembroke Lodge, and as the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of the Chancellor, had been present at the previous deliberation, they cared little for criticising after dinner the exact form of the sentences in which the number of the troops and the disposition of the fleet were minutely specified.

It is no doubt true that several members of the Cabinet went to sleep during this discussion. It is what they had often done before when the style of a despatch or the phrases of a Bill to be introduced into Parliament were discussed after dinner. . . . The fact was, the expedition to the Crimea had occupied the anxious thoughts of the members of the Cabinet for several months, and the dinner at Pembroke Lodge, at a round table in a small room, seemed better adapted for rest than for new exertions from the critical faculty.

The session was protracted to the second week of August; but the conduct of the war necessarily engrossed the attention of all parties, and the legislative proposals of the Ministry suffered in consequence. Ministers found themselves in constant minorities. They proved themselves unable to carry many of their principal measures, and Lord John had the mortification of reflecting that, though their promise had been great, their performance was small. At last, on the 13th of July, in a conversation rather than a debate on some Irish measures, Mr. Disraeli exhausted all his powers of sarcasm to damage and annoy the Ministry :—

What have her Majesty's Ministers been doing during the last six months? . . . I want to know, if they have been at war, what conquests they have achieved? If they have been at peace, what

beneficial arrangements, what advantageous legislation, they have accomplished? Have they reformed Parliament? Have they revised Parliamentary oaths? Have they educated the country? Have they even educated Scotland? What corrupt constituencies have they punished?

Lord John declared in reply that Mr. Disraeli seemed

to consider that motions, in which the character and the institutions of the country are involved, constitute a game in which it is perfectly competent to him to embarrass the Government when he can; to utter his sarcasms, to come down with his taunts, and not to consider what important consequences will follow. If the right hon. gentleman can find that his party will go with him upon a great question, upon which a Government must stand or fall, let him take that course and act as his predecessors have done. But, if there is a question upon which he and his party are really not bound by any principle of theirs to oppose the Government, . . . let them act with that regard to character and to integrity of conduct which have distinguished their party in former times.

Mr. Disraeli was not likely to stop his taunts in consequence of an appeal of this character. The forms of Parliament gave him an opportunity for reply, and he amused the House by arguing that, as the Government had been defeated on many measures of first-rate importance, Lord John was bound to tell the House

what is the character of the great question which he wants the decision of the House to be asked upon . . . I need not remind the House that, generally before the Reformed Parliament, which he [Lord John] wishes to reform again, and since the Reformed Parliament, whenever any Government has found itself in extreme difficulty—not perhaps in as frequent minorities as the present Government, for in this respect its fortune is peculiar and unprecedented . . . they have gone to some eminent man on their side, such as Lord Ebrington, and said, 'This is intolerable, this is painful, this system of constant minorities . . . . and we call upon you as one of our most distinguished supporters to come forward . . . . and propose a vote of confidence in the Administration.' . . . And this is the course which the noble Lord ought to pursue if he means to have the confidence of the House of Commons proved in the present Government. . . . I do not want the opinion of the House of Commons to be tested, or else I would ask the House to express an opinion on the subject. I do not wish to disturb the Government. I admire

their powers of sufferance. I am willing, as one of a grateful community, to do justice to their patriotism. Sir, when the Coalition Government was formed, I was asked how long it would last, and I ventured to reply, 'Until every member of it is, as a public character, irretrievably injured.'

In other and happier days Lord John would have seen in such language an opportunity for combat, and have even welcomed the attack of an adversary whose rapier was as keen as his own. In 1854, dissatisfied with his own position, and worn out with private care and public anxiety, he had no heart for the fray. Writing that evening to the Queen an account of what had passed, he could not refrain from expressing his mortification and disclosing his wounded feelings, while the next morning he sent a note to Lord Aberdeen :—

The present position of parties in the House of Commons makes it incumbent upon me to ask you to relieve me from the duties of leader on behalf of the Government in that House.

The frequent defeats we have sustained, the number of measures we have been forced to withdraw, and the general want of confidence which prevails among the Liberal party, form a sufficient motive and justification for the step I now take.

You have been, on the other hand, successful in the House of Lords. This only makes it more incumbent upon me to be the first to move. The weakness of the Government lies in the House of Commons, and a change of leader may remedy the defect.

The Queen sent a very kind and sensible reply begging Lord John not to show by his manner that Mr. Disraeli had succeeded in producing feelings of mortification; while Lord Aberdeen answered—

I have been surprised and distressed at receiving your letter, and trust that a little reflection may enable you to take a different view of the course which it will be best for you to pursue. . . .

In the result it was decided to hold a meeting of the supporters of the Government at the Foreign Office, in which Lord John had the opportunity of explaining to them that, unless the Government were better supported, it could not go on. And with this compromise Lord John was so far satisfied that he was again persuaded to withdraw his resignation.

When Parliament was released from its labours, Lord John took his wife and children down to Yorkshire, and obtained some weeks of sorely needed rest at Filey and Scarborough.[1] The corporation of Scarborough welcomed him with an address, in which, after alluding to his own great services, they could not resist adding a word for their own town and its exemption from cholera; referring, with the natural instincts of a community dependent on visitors, to the excellent sanitary condition of the borough. Lord John's reply was very happily worded :—

You have the happiness to enjoy the advantages of a healthy position, and an exemption, which I trust may long continue, from epidemic disease. Your vigilance as a municipality will, I doubt not, be exerted to mitigate those evils which grow with the growth, and strengthen with the strength, of our proud and populous cities.

So long as I am allowed to take a part in the proceedings of Parliament, my attention will be directed to the task of domestic improvement. Progress is conservative of institutions such as ours, which are founded on the principle that the liberties of the kingdom are the birthright of the people.

After leaving Filey, Lord John before settling at Pembroke Lodge paid a series of visits at Castle Howard, Harewood, Woburn, and Clifton (the Dean of Bristol's[2]); and during the last of these visits he was entertained at a civic banquet by the corporation of Bristol, and he delivered an inaugural address to the members of the Bristol Athenæum.[3]

While Lord John was still at Filey news arrived of the landing in the Crimea, the Battle of the Alma, the reported capture of Sebastopol, and the flank march. Members of the Ministry naturally received these tidings with great satisfaction. To Lord John they brought an additional consolation.

[1] During his stay in the North he crossed England and spent a few days on the lakes on his way to Minto. He was persuaded to address a meeting at Skelwith Bridge, on the occasion of the opening of a new school; and there Mrs. Fletcher—as she relates in her autobiography—renewed an acquaintance with him which had commenced more than forty years before in Professor Playfair's company at Edinburgh.

[2] Mr. Gilbert Elliot, a distant cousin of Lady John.

[3] It was in this address that Lord John expressed his regret at 'the want of a true national history which would do justice to our struggles for religion and liberty.'

For, brooding over the results of the last session, the divisions in the Cabinet, and his own position, he continued to desire the independence which he could only gain by severance from the Administration. It was almost impossible, however, for him to leave his colleagues during the crisis of a campaign: but the prospect of military success afforded him an opportunity of escaping from a situation which had become embarrassing. He announced his intended resignation to Lord Clarendon, who, replying on the 25th of September, wrote—

I was very sorry to get your letter yesterday, but I quite agree with you that, if the Government is to be broken up, the best time would be immediately after success at Sebastopol. It would be the fairest course towards our successors; and, what is of far more importance, would give them a chance to carry on the war successfully. That must be our first thought.

While Lord John was still hoping for success at the seat of war he drew up a memorandum, which he apparently refrained from circulating, but which is worth quoting as containing his opinions:—

Chesham Place: October 18, 1854.

It is presumed that no one would wish to see, still less to take part in, a repetition of the session of 1854. The numerous defeats sustained by the Government, the rejection or withdrawal of measures of great importance mentioned in the Queen's speech, could not again happen without great injury to parliamentary government, and much discredit to those who should remain in office in defiance of intelligible proof of their not possessing the entire confidence of the House of Commons. . . .

It is worth while then, before another session is commenced, to examine the causes of so lamentable a state of public affairs.

One supposition may as well be mentioned at the outset of the inquiry.

Lord John Russell has been so long the leader of the House of Commons that—like Sir Robert Walpole—he may at any time fall before the public lassitude. Many of his opinions are old-fashioned and out of date. He has offended some by his zeal for Parliamentary Reform; others because their private interests have not received from him the attention they thought their due; add to this the extreme divergence of views entertained by supporters of Government, and the certainty of offending some of them by the line adopted or the language held by their recognised leader.

If this be the evil, the remedy is at hand. Lord John Russell has only to retire and take his seat on the back benches.

Lord John then went on to specify other difficulties connected with the attitude of the House of Commons on particular questions, and added—

All these various causes have contributed to shake the Ministry. And the capture of Sebastopol will not repair the injury that has been done.

But Sebastopol was not taken. On the contrary, in the middle of November very different news reached this country. The allied armies, instead of capturing the town by an attack from the north, were slowly preparing to besiege it from the south. At Balaclava and at Inkerman they had been themselves assailed by superior forces of the enemy, and had suffered losses which they could ill endure. Neither Ministers nor the public were unaware that the expeditionary force, intended to carry a town by *coup de main* in the early autumn, was unprovided with the equipment for a siege or with the necessaries for a winter campaign. The people and the press, confronted with failure and apprehensive of disaster, denounced the supineness of the Ministry; and Lord Minto, whose advice had influenced Lord John on more than one critical occasion, wrote to his son-in-law :—

November 16, 1854.

My dear Lord John,—Even Pembroke Lodge is too distant to enable you to learn how very great is the clamour and indignation gathering against the Government for its neglect of timely and sufficient exertion in the conduct of this war. The want of supreme directing authority and of a commanding influence in the Cabinet is rung in our ears from all quarters, and the feeble apologies of the 'Morning Chronicle' only make the case worse by its summary of the very insufficient reinforcements either sent out or intended.

We are playing for too great a stake to allow any personal scruples or considerations to lose us the game.—Yours affectionately,

MINTO.

Moved by this letter, Lord John reverted to the advice which he had given six months before for the concentration of responsibility in the Secretary of State for War; and, writing

on the following day to Lord Aberdeen on the personal arrangements connected with the War Department, said—

I will treat the subject in its two points of view: first, as to the official arrangements for the new department, with a view to the general efficiency of the public service; secondly, as to the immediate requirements of the great war in which we are engaged.

In the first point of view I have already said that I do not think a Secretary at War can be maintained together with a Secretary of State for War. Sidney Herbert has in the fairest and handsomest manner said nearly the same thing.

I have also told you that I do not think the war estimates ought to be brought forward in the House of Commons by a person of rank and position inferior to a Secretary at War. It is of great importance, when questions relating to the discipline or promotion, favour or punishment, of officers and soldiers, are brought forward in the House of Commons, to have a Privy Councillor—a Minister, either in the Cabinet or next in rank to the Cabinet—to satisfy the House upon points which are determined by military officers sitting in the Horse Guards. . . . I come, therefore, on this head to the conclusion that the Secretary of State for the War Department must be in the House of Commons.

From the other point of view the prospect is equally clear.

We are in the midst of a great war. In order to carry on that war with efficiency, either the Prime Minister must be constantly urging, hastening, completing the military preparations; or the Minister of War must be strong enough to control other departments. . . . In the present case it seems to me that the last example is the most applicable. If, therefore, the first considerations here presented lead to the conclusion that the Secretary of State for the War Department must be in the House of Commons, the latter considerations point to the necessity of having in that office a man who, from experience of military details, from inherent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House of Commons, can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and success. There is only one person belonging to the Government who combines these advantages. My conclusion is that, before Parliament meets, Lord Palmerston should be entrusted with the seals of the War Department.

Lord Aberdeen took four days to consider this proposal, which he declared was 'unexpected,' and which he communicated to Mr. Sidney Herbert, and, at Lord John's request, to the Duke of Newcastle. But neither conference nor

consideration commended it to his judgment. He admitted, indeed, that the Secretaryship at War could not be maintained. But he did not see why a Privy Councillor's office should not be constituted charged with all the financial concerns of the army. Such an office would avoid the necessity of affirming the 'objectionable' principle that the Secretary of State should always be in the House of Commons, and avoid such 'a dislocation of the Government' as that suggested by Lord John. Moreover—

Palmerston, within a few months, is as old as I am ; and, without disparaging his inherent vigour of mind, he possesses no immunity from the effects of age. When I look at the laborious and responsible duties discharged by the Duke of Newcastle and Herbert, I fear that I could not honestly advise the Queen to entrust Palmerston or any other man with so great a responsibility.

Naturally enough Lord John was not satisfied with this refusal. The people, outside the Cabinet, were clamouring for a more efficient conduct of the war ; the Duke of Newcastle had hardly the strength of will which is requisite in a War Minister ; and his task, difficult under any circumstances, was the harder from the fact that he had no undivided control over the military departments. Returning to the subject a week later, Lord John recapitulated his old arguments, combated Lord Aberdeen's objections, and concluded—

What you want, therefore, I must repeat, is a Minister of War of vigour and authority. As the welfare of the empire and the success of our present conflict are concerned, I have no scruple in saying so.

Keep up, if you think right, as a temporary arrangement, a Secretary at War. Make it clear that it is temporary ; that is to say, only to last till more complete consolidation can take place. But let Parliament and the country be assured that you have placed the conduct of the war in the hands of the fittest man who can be found for that duty.

Lord Aberdeen, however, was not shaken. Writing on the 30th of November, he concluded a long letter—

On the whole, believing that any change like that proposed would be a doubtful advantage to the public ; feeling very strongly that it would be an act of unfairness and injustice towards a colleague ; and thinking, also, that all such changes, unless absolutely necessary, only

tend to weaken a Government, I must repeat that I could not honestly recommend it to the Queen.

Lord John replied more concisely :—

Pembroke Lodge : December 3, 1854.

. . . After your last letter, I have no hesitation in saying that I revert to my original opinion, and must propose to the Cabinet that the office of Minister of War should absorb that of Secretary at War ; and that the office should, for the present at least, be held by a member of the House of Commons.

Lord John at once forwarded the whole of this correspondence to Lord Palmerston. The latter, however, replying in a long letter on the same day, told Lord John that he doubted the expediency of abolishing the office of Secretary at War ; that he thought that 'no broad and distinct grounds' could be alleged for desiring the removal of the Duke of Newcastle from the War Office ; and that at any rate it would not be right to break up the Government for this reason, it being 'easier to break up a Government than to make a better and a stronger one.' Lord Palmerston's opinion, of course, made it impossible for Lord John to insist on the alteration which he desired ; and, when the Cabinet met on the 6th of December, instead of demanding a change in the machinery, he contented himself with dwelling in general terms on the absence of vigour in the prosecution of the war. He formally declared that, though he was ready to continue in office during the short session which it was found necessary to hold before Christmas, and defend all that had been done, he was determined to retire after Christmas. And, when it was objected that it would be unconstitutional to go into Parliament with such a determination, he replied that, if such were the opinion, he would request Lord Aberdeen to convey his resignation on the following morning to the Queen, which at all events would be perfectly constitutional. The other Ministers were naturally concerned at the increasing tension between the Prime Minister and the leader of the House of Commons ; and Lord Lansdowne, whose long friendship for Lord John and whose influence with Lord Aberdeen fitted him for the duty, endeavoured to mediate between the two.[1]

[1] Sir C. Wood, who was more closely connected with Lord John than any

Chesham Place: December 9, 1854.

My dear Lansdowne,—You made a very fair remark the other day when you said that I ought to bring some definite proposition before the Cabinet. I was only deterred from doing so by the consideration that Aberdeen had declared that he could not honestly advise the Queen to adopt the course which I consider to be required by the public interest.

However, I believe you are right, and I therefore think it due to you to inform you beforehand what are the propositions I have to make.

1. I should propose that the Secretary of State for the War Department should have all the more important functions hitherto exercised by the Secretary at War.

2. That for the present he should have a seat in the House of Commons.

. . . . . .

You may communicate this letter to Lord Aberdeen if you think fit. He has lately shown such a disposition to pass me over, and to transfer to others that confidence which a leader of the House of Commons ought to have, that I have some difficulty in writing to him or speaking to him upon any matter.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Lansdowne replied—

Private] Lansdowne House: Sunday afternoon.

My dear J. Russell,—I am much obliged to you for having in your letter of yesterday so frankly and distinctly stated your views . . . and fully appreciate the motives which have led you to come to a determination on these matters without consulting with any of your colleagues.

I have, according to your permission, communicated your letter to Lord Aberdeen. . . .

I ought to add that Lord Aberdeen, in reading the passage in your letter relative to him, emphatically disclaimed any intention of showing you want of confidence as leader of the House of Commons, and expressed his readiness to show the contrary.

I am sure I feel as much as any one that the Government was formed on an abnegation principle. So let it continue to be, above all at a crisis which calls for it more than ever; and I should not have dwelt upon the Duke of Newcastle's hard position if I had not

other member of the party except Lord Lansdowne, also wrote strong and long letters to him on December 7 and 9, to dissuade him from breaking up the Government.

at the same time felt that a condemnation of a great department of the Government by the Government itself would deeply affect its power of serving the public. But I will say no more, and ought perhaps not to have said so much, for I understand your letter as rather intended to communicate than to invite opinions. Otherwise I should have called instead of writing.—Yours sincerely,

LANSDOWNE.

I will take care of your letter in case you wish to have it returned to be copied.

Lord John seems to have had some subsequent conversation with Lord Lansdowne and his other colleagues, and, a few days later, thus announced his decision :—

Chesham Place: December 15, 1854.

My dear Lansdowne,—I send you back my letter, not that you may make any further use of it, but that you may put it in the fire.

I believe that my proposition respecting the War Office, if accepted by Lord Aberdeen, would have produced greater vigour and efficiency in carrying on the war, but I do not feel myself justified in taking upon myself to retire from the Government on that account at this moment.

Notwithstanding Lord Aberdeen's denial, I still maintain that he does not treat me with the confidence which can alone enable a leader of the House of Commons to carry on business with satisfaction—as Lord Grey treated Lord Althorp, and Lord Melbourne treated me. Of course, on my side, I am absolved from the duty of defending acts and appointments upon which I have not been consulted.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

But, though Lord John consented to remain in office, he was painfully conscious of the defects in the military arrangements of the Government ; and on the 30th of December he drew up the following memorandum in order that the Cabinet might have specifically before it the various points which required immediate attention :—

MEMORANDUM.

In order to find a remedy for the wants and evils under which our Crimean army is suffering, it is necessary to enumerate some of the principal of those wants and evils.

1. The soldiers are one night in the trenches out of two ; sometimes it is said two out of three.

2. When they return from the trenches they are in wet clothes, boots, and stockings, and have no change ; so that their clothes dry on them.

3. Horses and mules are dying for want of provender—hay and chopped straw especially.

4. In consequence of the want of horses and mules, the soldiers have been kept on half and sometimes quarter rations for days together.

5. No huts have been provided for the soldiers, and wood is very scarce.

6. The sick have not been moved in time, and are miserably cared for in camp.

Taking these as the principal wants and evils, it is necessary in the next place to point out the causes and the remedies.

1. When the allied armies took up their position in front of Sebastopol, they were nearly equal in number ; but the British had in the Crimea the whole of their force in the East immediately disposable, and the French had only a part of theirs.

The consequence has been that, while the English have been overworked, and their numbers scarcely increased by reinforcements, the French army has doubled its strength, and can afford to guard the trenches with one-third or one-fourth of its force.

As the British army cannot be greatly increased, and the number of young soldiers must become proportionately greater than it has been, the most obvious remedy appears to be to concentrate the British force, and ask the French to occupy part of the line now in the hands of their allies.

2. There must have been great mismanagement to cause the want of clothes for officers and soldiers.

From September 28 to November 12, all kinds of supplies might have been landed at Balaclava, and had only to be carried seven or eight miles to reach the most distant division.

The only remedy is to have coats, shirts, boots, and warm clothing supplied, and this remedy, it is presumed, has been adopted.

3. The death of horses and mules from overwork and want of food may be partly owing to the loss of twenty days' forage by the hurricane of the 14th of November. But there must have been negligence. In this case inquiry is necessary ; and an immediate remedy ought to be supplied, if it has not been already, by the Commissariat.

4. The soldiers cannot fight unless they are well fed. Upon this, as upon every other subject, there seems to be a want of communication between the English and French camps. The generals appear

only to meet when some operation is contemplated, or on the day of battle.

Had General Canrobert been informed that our troops were not fed, it cannot be doubted that 300 or 400 horses and mules would have been lent for the purpose of carrying up provisions.

If in January the same evil recurs, our allies must be asked to aid us with their means of transport.

In February, it is to be hoped, the railway will be established.

5. It is believed that, about October 8, Lord Raglan wrote to say that, if the army had to remain on the heights during the winter, huts would be required, and the narrow position then occupied did not furnish wood to make them.

The huts do not appear to have yet arrived in the Crimea.

It is presumed, however, that they have for some time left this country.

6. The want in this respect seems to have been supplied for the moment by our allies.

Huts for the sick have of course been forwarded.

Finally, there appears a want of concert among the different departments. When the navy forward supplies, there is no military authority to receive them; when the military wish to unload a ship, they find that a naval authority has ordered it away.

Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons should be asked to concert between them the mode of remedying this defect. Neither can see with his own eyes to the performance of all the subordinate duties, but they can choose the best men to do it, and arm them with sufficient authority. For on the due performance of these subordinate duties hangs the welfare of the army.

Lord Raglan should also be informed exactly of the amount of reinforcements ordered to the Crimea, and at what time he may expect them. Having furnished him with all the force in men and material which the Government can send him, the Government is entitled to expect from him in return his opinion as to what can be done by the allied armies, and in what manner he hopes to restore the strength and efficiency of the armies for the next campaign.

Probably the troops first sent over will require four months' rest before they will be able to move against an enemy.

J. RUSSELL.

December 30, 1854.

Lord John, however, was still dissatisfied with the action which the Cabinet was willing to take; and on January 1, 1855, he drafted a letter to Lord Aberdeen expressing his dissatisfac-

tion at the position of the Ministry and at the conduct of the war, and asking him to submit his resignation to the Queen. But the letter was not sent; instead of despatching it Lord John, on the 3rd of January, wrote to Lord Aberdeen—

Nothing can be less satisfactory than the result of the recent Cabinets. Unless you will direct measures yourself, I see no hope for the efficient prosecution of the war. . . . The French Government have, through Palmerston, expressed their readiness to concert with us a plan for the next campaign. Surely the circumstances are grave enough to induce us not to pass by this offer. It seems to me that the Duke of Newcastle, or Sidney Herbert, or Lord Hardinge, ought to go to Paris to consult with the Emperor and Marshal Vaillant.

Lord Aberdeen received the proposal coldly. Writing on the 4th of January, he said—

I was a little surprised by your letter yesterday, for I had thought that the recent Cabinets were rather satisfactory. . . . I was not aware that Palmerston had made any proposal, on the part of the French Emperor, to concert with us a plan for the next campaign. . . . We ought clearly to profit by the offers of French assistance whenever it can be of use; and, if sufficient instructions cannot be given to Lord Cowley to answer the purpose before his return to Paris, I have not the least objection that either the Duke of Newcastle, Sidney Herbert, or Lord Hardinge should go, provided their presence there can really be thought advantageous at this moment.

It so happened that, almost at the moment at which he received Lord Aberdeen's reply, Lord John had another letter which induced him to go himself to Paris. Lady Harriet Elliot, Lady John's youngest sister, who was seriously ill, was ordered to the South of France for the winter. She left England with Lord Minto late in the autumn, paid a visit to her sister, who was married to Mr. Abercromby, the British Minister at the Hague; and from thence was moved to Paris. She suffered so much, however, during her journey, that Lord Minto told Lord John that she must rest, under any circumstances, for some days before proceeding further, and that her future journey must depend on her strength. Lady John was naturally distressed at the serious news; and Lord John determined to take her over to Paris to pay, as it proved, a farewell visit to Lady Harriet. Melancholy as was the cause of the journey, Lord John did not neglect the public

duties, in which he was so keenly interested, during his stay in France. He saw the Emperor, and had many conferences both with him and his Ministers on the conduct of the war. He returned to London on the 16th of January, joined the Cabinet which was sitting, and took part in its deliberations on that day and on some subsequent day. On the 23rd of January Parliament met; Mr. Roebuck at once gave notice of a motion on the conduct of the war; and Lord John, feeling, after what had occurred, that he could not undertake the defence of the Ministry, wrote the following letter to Lord Aberdeen :—

Chesham Place: January 23, 1855.

My dear Lord Aberdeen,—Mr. Roebuck has given notice of a motion to inquire into the conduct of the war.

I do not see how this motion is to be resisted. But, as it involves a censure upon the War Department, with which some of my colleagues are connected, my only course is to tender my resignation.

I therefore have to request you will lay my humble resignation of the office which I have the honour to hold before the Queen, with the expressions of my gratitude for her Majesty's kindness for many years. —I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen, yours very truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Aberdeen replied—

Argyll House: January 24, 1855.

My dear Lord John,—I laid your resignation before the Queen to-day, who received it with expressions of much concern. I found, however, that her Majesty was already in possession of your intentions by a letter from yourself.

I thank you for the kind expressions contained in your note which accompanied your letter of resignation. I can only say that, whether in office or out of office, I trust that nothing can alter the warm regard with which I am ever truly yours,

ABERDEEN.

In a narrative such as this, in which facts have been uniformly allowed to speak for themselves, it is not necessary to add much to these letters. It is, however, no secret that Lord John's colleagues thought his resignation ill-timed and ill-judged; and it would no doubt have been better if Lord John had announced his intention to retire in the Cabinet. His wife, writing to her own father, said exactly the same thing :—

I think it would have been much better if he had told the assembled Cabinet his intention. I begged him, as far as I durst, to tell at least some of his colleagues before he wrote to Lord Aberdeen.

But she added the reason which prevented his doing so :—

He felt it might induce him to forgo his purpose against his conscience. You, who know him well, understand this, and will also understand what it has cost him to separate from those with whom he has acted so long.

Lord Wriothesley Russell, writing of the abuse which was showered on his brother, said with much truth—

It makes one sad, as well as indignant, to hear the world speaking as if straightforward honesty were a thing incredible, impossible. A man, and above all a man to whom truth is no new thing, says simply that he cannot assert what he knows to be false, and the whole world says, 'What can he mean by it? Treachery, trickery, cowardice, ambition, what is it?'

And it is difficult to see how Lord John, holding his opinions, could have remained in office. Deeply dissatisfied with the conduct of the war; impressed with the conviction that his colleagues were wrong in not grappling with the whole subject of military administration; and that sufficient energy and foresight had not been shown either in Downing Street or in the Crimea, it was hardly possible for him to answer Mr. Roebuck. But he was also firm in the belief that inquiry is the peculiar function of the House of Commons; and that, where cause for inquiry existed, it cannot properly be refused. He himself wrote in a retrospective memorandum—

As the moment approached, I felt more and more strongly the reasons in favour of inquiry. Let me refer to some of those reasons.

Inquiry is the proper duty and function of the House of Commons. When the British arms have suffered a reverse, this duty has always been performed. Thus when Minorca was lost in 1757 Mr. Fox consented to an inquiry. Thus when General Burgoyne capitulated in 1777 the House of Commons inquired into the causes of the disaster. Thus when the Walcheren expedition failed in attaining the chief objects of the enterprise the House of Commons inquired. Inquiry is, indeed, at the root of the powers of the House of Commons. Upon the result of the inquiry must depend the due exercise of these powers. If from vicious organisation the public affairs are ill

administered, the remedy is better organisation. If from delay and confusion in the execution of orders injury has arisen, the subordinate officers should be removed. If from negligence, incompetency, or corruption, the Ministers are themselves to blame for the failure which has been incurred, those Ministers may, according to the nature and the degree of their fault, be censured, or removed, or punished.

Strong as these reasons were, it would have been difficult for Lord Aberdeen to have conceded the inquiry which Mr. Roebuck was proposing. Mr. Roebuck's attitude was one of hostility, and hostile motions must be met, and not evaded. Lord Aberdeen, moreover, had no desire to stave off a difficulty which was certain, sooner or later, to arise. Wearied with the constant differences in his own Cabinet,[1] and the frequent offers of Lord John to resign, he made on this occasion no attempt to extricate himself from embarrassment by concession.

It is not unnatural that Lord Aberdeen should have been somewhat weary of receiving Lord John's constant offers to retire from the Cabinet. Administrations, in this country, are usually based on compromise ; and a dozen or fourteen men can hardly hope to maintain uniformity of action unless they are prepared to surrender some of their own opinions to the judgment of their colleagues. A Minister who is always resigning becomes in consequence an inconvenient colleague, whose presence is only tolerated, because it is essential to the existence of the Administration. Yet it is not fair to judge Lord John's conduct in 1853 and 1854 by the rules which are applied ordinarily to statesmen. It should never be forgotten that he had not entered Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet of his own will. He had joined it against his own wishes and against his own judgment, because his presence was thought indispensable by his sovereign, the Prime Minister, and his own friends. He was entitled, under such circumstances, to expect a deference to his own views which it would be impossible for every member of a Cabinet to claim ; and he had a right to resume his own independence whenever he found that his presence in the

[1] I have not thought it necessary to refer to other causes of difference which distracted the Cabinet. One especially, relating to the removal of a high official by Mr. Gladstone, was the subject of a prolonged and warm correspondence.

Cabinet was ceasing to be useful. It was, no doubt, a subject of complaint at the time that Lord John did not do this. Instead of retiring he constantly threatened to resign. But the men who, over and over again, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, on the ground that it would be fatal to the fortunes of the Government and the interests of the country, are not entitled to use this argument. Lord John was constantly asking to resign because Lord Aberdeen would never accept his resignation. Throughout 1853 and 1854 the leader of the House of Commons was playing the part of Moses to the Prime Minister's Pharaoh. The King of Egypt probably thought the Israelite a very troublesome and unreasonable suitor for constantly asking leave to retire from the fleshpots of Goshen; he very likely omitted to remark that Moses only applied again and again for permission to march because again and again Pharaoh refused 'to let the people go.' The verdict of history, at any rate, instead of blaming the Israelite as importunate, has condemned the monarch as obstinate; and experience has shown that, so long as the Pharaohs of modern life refuse to let their servants go, so long will the Israelites of to-day weary them with applications to be permitted to resign.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE VIENNA CONFERENCE.

THE retirement of Lord John Russell virtually terminated the Aberdeen Administration. Though the remaining members of the Cabinet consented, at the request of the Queen, to withdraw the resignation which was at once determined on, and to face Mr. Roebuck, their decision only postponed the inevitable end for half a dozen days. Mr. Roebuck's motion, supported by Lord John, was carried by so large a majority that the members who composed it forgot to cheer, and began to laugh. The great Coalition Government was at an end.

Upon Lord Aberdeen's resignation, the Queen in the first instance sent for Lord Derby, who professed himself unable to form a Government; she next applied to Lord Lansdowne, and, on his advice, saw Lord John. Lord John, however, was unable to obtain the support which would alone hvae justified him in attempting the task; and the Queen thereupon placed herself in Lord Palmerston's hands, who succeeded in reconstructing the old Administration.

On receiving the Queen's commission, Lord Palmerston at once asked for Lord John's assistance. Lord John did not feel himself justified in accepting office. But a new offer of a very different character was immediately afterwards made to him, and was at once accepted.

While war was being carried on with all its horrors in the Crimea, some prospect was afforded of securing peace. Negotiations had for some time been in progress for holding a conference which was about to meet at Vienna; and Lord John was invited to represent this country.

He thus declared his acceptance of the invitation :—

Pembroke Lodge: February 11, 1855.

My dear Clarendon,—I have reflected further on the proposal you made me yesterday; and, as not only you but the Queen and Palmerston think I might be of use in such a mission as you contemplate, I feel it a duty not to decline it.

It is right, however, that I should tell you my views upon two points of great importance, in order that you may, even now, withdraw your proposal if these views appear to you erroneous or inadmissible.

In the first place I think the admission of Prussia to the conferences will be a less evil than excluding her from them. Admitted, she will be partial to Russia, but held in check by the opinion of Germany, and the representations of the Western powers. Excluded, she will be altogether alienated. . . . But, putting aside policy, I think that, considering all our proposals are to be made with a view to the balance of power, and that Prussia has taken a part in all great consultations for this purpose since 1814, it would not be *right* to exclude her now.

If you concur in these views, I should expect you to support them at Paris and Vienna; but if they are not approved by France and Austria, I do not know that we could insist upon their adoption, and we certainly could not decline to enter upon negotiations because Prussia was not represented at the Conference.

The next point is one of still more importance. You say very truly that the alternative to be desired is either peace to Europe or the negotiations broken off leaving Austria in the field.

But in order to attain this latter result we must be prepared to carry Austria with us in the negotiations. If she could say to us, 'You have refused fair terms of peace,' she would also say, 'Therefore I must keep my neutral position.'

Buol has given his hearty assent to the principle of putting an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, and we must endeavour to concert with him *at the moment of negotiations* the mode of carrying that principle into effect.

If Austria, France, and England make this mode, in whatever shape it may be, the subject of a joint proposition to Russia, and Russia rejects it, Austria cannot refuse to go with us.

If we make a separate proposition on the part of the Western powers, and Austria does not support us, we lose Austria.

If, on the other hand, out of compliance with the pacific dispositions of Austria, we make an unsafe peace, we lay the seeds of humiliation to England and France and danger to Europe.

This appears to me the difficult problem to be solved.

If you agree with me I shall feel sure of your support in the mission, and I will at once undertake it. But, if you disagree, it is better that I should not go than that I should fail in executing your instructions, and be disavowed at home.

Let me add that in my opinion, if the first conference gives fair hopes of success, an armistice should be established.

If you concur in the early party of this letter, I would propose to go by Berlin, and see the King of Prussia. I have seen the Emperor Napoleon and M. Drouyn de Lhuys so lately that going to Paris would be only a loss of time.—I remain, yours very sincerely,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Clarendon and Lord Palmerston warmly concurred in Lord John's views, and Lord John at once accepted the mission.

His acceptance gave great satisfaction. Lord Palmerston wrote—

Your having undertaken the conduct of this matter will be a plain proof to all the world that England goes into the negotiation in earnest and in good faith; and, if we do not succeed, it will be demonstrable that the impediment lies with Russia and not with us.

Sir Charles Wood wrote—

The best news I have heard is what Clarendon tells me. You have a field open at Vienna which may do more good both to your country and Europe than it has often been in any man's power to achieve. And you have advantages for doing it which no one else has.

The Duke of Argyll wrote—

I have heard nothing in the way of politics for a long time which gave me so much pleasure as the announcement that you would undertake the mission of peace-maker at Vienna. . . . God grant you success in this great work—the noblest which any man can undertake: and I look to the straightforward way in which you will set about it . . . as the best ground of hope for your success.

But a long chapter might easily be filled with the letters of honest joy at Lord John's acceptance of the mission.

These letters did not blind Lord John to the difficulties before him. As he wrote years afterwards—

The circumstances of the time were unfavourable to the prospects

of peace. With Sebastopol untaken, and the pride of Russia unchecked, it was not probable that she would consent to terms which, in the opinion of the allies, would afford security to the integrity and independence of Turkey. Before the mission was proposed to me I remember that, in pointing out in conversation the difficulties of such a mission, I said, 'It would be awkward to go to Vienna with a return ticket.' . . .

Still, however unfavourable the prospect, I thought it my duty not to decline a task which offered even a possibility of peace. The circumstances which had recently occurred—my abrupt retirement from the Queen's service was a reason the more for not avoiding the arduous duty thus imposed on me.

Be it observed, however, once for all, that, in appointing a person to negotiate at Vienna who had held for several years the highest station in the Queen's political service, the Ministers appeared to give a pledge that they really meant peace: that is to say, that they meant to accept such terms as the state of the war would warrant them in demanding from the enemy. . . .

One more remark by way of introduction. It seemed to me probable that there would arise, after various propositions had been discussed, some new plan of pacification which would not exactly square with the views of any of the belligerents, but which might form a basis for fresh conciliatory proposals. In that case, I determined beforehand to leave Vienna, and bring home the proposals. I even communicated this intention to one person high in the confidence of the Government.

Almost at the moment at which he accepted this important mission, Lord John received news of his sister-in-law's—Lady Harriet Elliot's—death at Paris. The circumstance made Lord John's parting from his family more painful, and, as a matter of fact, he lingered a few days in England before setting out on his journey.[1] He left London on the 20th,

[1] Lord John had an additional reason for not starting at once, since he had the misfortune to catch a severe cold which confined him to bed. Lord Minto, who returned from Paris while Lord John was thus laid up, suggested to him that the opening conference, at which Russia would only be formally asked to adhere to the general basis which had been agreed upon by the allies, might as well be managed by Lord Westmorland, the Ambassador at Vienna; and Lord John wrote on February 15 to Lord Clarendon, 'It has occurred to me that Westmorland, when he gets his full powers, might have a first conference [at which Gortchakoff's signature to the bases might be obtained]. Walewski has some notion that he [Gortchakoff] would refus this. If he were to do so my going to Vienna would be a fool's errand.' Lord Minto subsequently repeated the suggestion to Lord

reached Paris that evening, and had long and important conversations with the Emperor, Lord Cowley, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Baron Hubner, and Count Hatzfeld. These conversations confirmed the impression which he had formed that the best chances of success at Vienna lay in bringing Austria into line with the allies; and that the action of Austria depended, to a great degree, on the position of Prussia, since the former power feared to move while her flank was exposed to a possible attack from the latter. These considerations suggested that the key of the situation lay at Berlin; and Lord John wrote to Lord Clarendon and told him that he was pressed to make his stay there a little longer than the single day he had originally contemplated.

While Lord John was still in Paris, an event took place in London which materially changed his position. The Palmerston Cabinet made up its mind to accept—as it could indeed hardly have refused, Mr. Roebuck's inquiry; and the immediate friends of Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, Sir J. Graham, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, at once resigned. Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John—

This being the present state of things, we have come back to the position in which we were on the Monday after the Sunday when I received the Queen's commands to endeavour to form a Government, and when I addressed myself to you. I now, therefore, with the unanimous concurrence of all my colleagues, address myself to you again. We do not ask you to forego your journey to Berlin and Vienna, because we think that great public evil would arise from your doing so. But your stay at Vienna will probably not be very long. . . . Our wish then is to know whether, under the peculiar circumstances in which the Government and the country are placed, you would be induced to give us your assistance in any way, and in any office, in either House of Parliament. The Colonial Office has been suggested by some as one to which you have paid great and

Clarendon, who displayed some temper to Lord Minto in rejecting it. His anger was really due to the circumstance that he entirely misunderstood Lord John's intention, and thought that he wanted, under Lord Minto's advice, to recede from the mission he had undertaken. But Lord John wanted nothing of the kind. He only thought it would be wise for the Government to obtain such preliminary guarantee as Prince Gortchakoff's signature would afford, that Russia was in earnest in her desire to treat. The event, it will be seen below, very much justified Lord John's hesitation.

successful attention ; Granville places the Presidency of the Council entirely free ; George Grey would readily leave the Home Office and go to some other. Let me know by return of messenger your feelings and intentions. We suspend till your answer any definite arrangements.

Lord Clarendon wrote by the same messenger, urging Lord John in any event to go on to Vienna, and adding—

I shall say nothing except repeating what I have often said before, that no Government calling itself Liberal has a chance of standing without you.

Lord John replied to Lord Palmerston—

Paris: February 23, 1855.

My dear Palmerston,—I have received your letter by messenger, and, having had a telegraphic message last night, was tolerably prepared for your communication.

The causes of the resignations of your colleagues I will not enter into, but it is obvious the decision to resign is more hurtful to your Government than if they had persisted in declining to join you. . . .

In these circumstances I feel bound to give you any assistance in my power, and I also feel that such assistance as I can give will be most effective in the House of Commons.

I am not very particular as to the office I may fill; but, as I know the business of the Colonial Office, as I shall not have to bear, in addition to the labours of that office, that of leading the House of Commons, and as the Colonial Office can be placed in my hands without displacing any one, I prefer that office to any other. . . .

I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

By the same messenger he wrote to Lord Clarendon—

Paris: February 23, 1855.

My dear Clarendon,—I have accepted the Colonial Office as you will have learnt by the telegraph. It has this advantage that any other Secretary of State may perform the functions of the office till I return from Vienna.

I feel with you that, however small may be the hope of peace, I should not be justified in abandoning the mission now, and that the benevolent, as well as the malevolent, might say afterwards that a chance of peace was thrown away to satisfy party exigencies.

But, while I do this from my own sense of duty, I hope you will not ask me to connive at a waste of time at Vienna, in order to postpone the inevitable discussion on the third point.

My view is that the first and second points should be previously discussed, but only in general terms to see if agreement is likely. And the same course may be taken with regard to the third point. . . . All speculation, however, may be closed by Gortchakoff's refusal to sign the protocol. . . .—Yours truly,

J. R.

Lord Palmerston replied—

Downing Street: February 24, 1855.

My dear John Russell,—We are all delighted with your answer to our proposal. Your accession will give universal satisfaction to the Liberal Party, and beyond measure strengthen the Government. . . .

While Mr. John Abel Smith wrote—

Belgrave Square: February 25, 1855.

My dear Lord John,—Lord Palmerston sent for me early this morning, and showed me your telegraphic message of yesterday. I have never seen any one so thoroughly pleased and relieved as he seemed to be. He walked about the room as if he was treading on air. He seemed to appreciate—as he ought—your self-sacrifice, and spoke of your magnanimity in just and well-deserved terms of praise. You have seized a happy moment to prove that your recent conduct had no tinge of personal interest in it. You have saved Lord Palmerston's Government, and secured the tenure of power to the Liberal party. I trust the House of Commons and the country will do you justice. I have been into the City, and, as far as I can judge, there is but one feeling of hearty approval of your acceptance of office, and I see no reason to fear the slightest trouble or opposition in your re-election. . . . Your writ will be moved on Monday. . . .

I am, my dear Lord John, most faithfully yours,

J. A. SMITH.

On the day after that on which he accepted the Colonial Office, Lord John left Paris for Brussels. There he had an important interview with the King of the Belgians, who gave him valuable information about the views of the Prussian, Russian, and Austrian Courts. On the following day he set out for Berlin, arriving there on the morning of the last day of February. During the three days he stayed in Prussia he had interviews with Baron Manteuffel, the Prussian Minister, the King, and the Prince of Prussia (the Emperor William). During the same time he received news, which could not but have an important effect on his mission, of the sudden illness and death of the Emperor Nicholas.

It was Lord John's object in going to Berlin to withdraw Prussia from the isolated position in which she has unfortunately placed herself by the narrow view which she has taken of her position and duties as a great power.

He had not been in Berlin twenty-four hours before he found that this object was impossible.

The King holds in his hands the direction of the whole of the foreign policy of his kingdom. Baron Manteuffel, and various other instruments, official and non-official, are taken up and laid aside, supported or disavowed, exactly as the King pleases. Nor is there any man in Prussia who seems to have sufficient independence of mind to resent the manner in which he is flatly contradicted or quietly dismissed. It seems to be the King's special object to refrain from taking any part in the present war. He has no partiality for Russia as a power. He has no sympathy with the cause which the allies have undertaken to uphold.

The Prince of Prussia, on the following day, used firmer and clearer language. But Lord John saw that the decision was with the King and not with the Prince; and accordingly, without even troubling himself to present his credentials, he set out for Vienna, where he arrived on the 4th of March, where he was met at the station by the Emperor of Austria's own carriage, and where Lady John and his children joined him a few days afterwards.

The Western powers, in the course of the summer, had formally defined the object of the war, and had subsequently elaborated the protocol drawn up for the purpose into four conditions or points. These famous points as they were originally framed were shortly as follows: (1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee; (2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments; (3) the Treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and (4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects of whatever religion. In the latter half of November 1854, the Czar, in consequence of Prussian advice, offered to accept these four points as the basis of peace. The offer induced the allies to define their meaning a little more exactly. In

particular, they declared that the revision of the Treaty of 1841, under the third point, involved the termination of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. This declaration did not induce Russia to recede from the negotiation. On the contrary, though the meaning of the allies was distinctly pointed out in a memorandum prepared by Baron Bourqueney, the French Minister at Vienna, and handed to Prince Gortchakoff, the formal offer to treat was renewed.

It was foreseen, when Lord John left England, that the third point was likely to cause the chief difficulty ; it was doubted whether Russia was sincere in her offer, and whether she was not striving merely to gain time, and give Austria an excuse for not actively joining the allies. In consequence of this doubt Lord John was instructed,[1] at the very outset, to get Baron Bourqueney's memorandum embodied in a protocol and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries. This preliminary object secure, Lord John was instructed to take the four points in their natural order.

Lord John had hardly arrived at Vienna before he was brought face to face with the difficulties which he had to encounter. In some preliminary conversations which he had with Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, the talk naturally turned on the difficult third point. Lord John declared that the true way of terminating the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was to limit the force which she should be entitled to maintain to (say) four ships of the line. Count Buol, on the contrary, contended that the object could be secured by a counterpoise, or in other words by authorising the allies to maintain in the Black Sea a force equal to that kept up by Russia ; he added that, though he was willing to adopt Lord John's proposal as the best and most practicable arrangement, 'if the Russian Ministers positively declined to accede to such a condition, he should be ready to discuss other means of carrying the third point into effect.' Lord John, therefore, before he entered the Conference, was aware that, while the third point was likely to occasion the most

[1] I use the word because Lord John was, of course, furnished with instructions from Lord Clarendon. But, in preparing these instructions, the Ministry was mainly guided by Lord John's own advice.

difficulty, he could not rely on the support of Austria in the negotiation upon it.

The next few days revealed further difficulties. Lord John had been specially instructed to obtain the incorporation of Baron Bourqueney's memorandum in a protocol; and he believed on leaving London, 'that the Austrian Minister would give his willing assent to its insertion in the first protocol.' He had not been at Vienna a week before he found Count Buol would do nothing of the kind.

> He thought the proposal to record in a protocol the four bases might naturally be objected to by the Russian Plenipotentiaries; . . . that, the demur being on a point of form, those who raised the point of form would be accounted responsible by the public opinion of Europe; that, on the part of Austria, he was not ready to accept such responsibility.

He offered, however, in opening the Conference, to state the bases of the negotiation in terms which were consistent with Baron Bourqueney's memorandum; and, as the Count's speech would of course be embodied in a protocol, Lord John telegraphed for leave, and the Cabinet unanimously consented, to accept this alternative.

The attitude which Austria was thus assuming caused some disappointment both to Lord John and to his colleagues in London. Lord John, however, had reason to be satisfied with the general language held by Count Buol; and he was determined not to break from Austria on a matter which was after all only one of form. His colleagues, in assenting to his recommendation, declared that they were influenced in doing so by their reliance on himself, and they acknowledged with gratitude the great advantage which they derived from reading his despatches, which Lord Clarendon declared were 'admirable both as narratives and guides.'

The work which had been done at Vienna had hitherto been merely preliminary. But on March 15 the Conference was formally opened. Count Buol, in his introductory remarks, fulfilled his promise of clearly and satisfactorily defining the bases of negotiation; the French and English Plenipotentiaries reserved to themselves the right of requiring other stipulations, should the interests of Europe necessitate

them ; and the Plenipotentiaries proceeded to the discussion of the first point. No serious difficulty arose upon it ; and during three sittings on March 15, 17, and 19, the substance and form of the protocols, determining the affairs of the Principalities, were definitely settled.

Even this progress was not obtained without difficulty. On the eve of the Conference, the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna told Lord John that 'he felt embarrassed by the absence of detailed instructions from his Court.' Lord John, in reporting the conversation to Lord Clarendon, said that the Porte might safely leave to its allies to watch over its interests, and that, at any rate, it could 'not be too soon undeceived if it entertains, and is prepared to act upon, the opinion that it is at liberty to protract the negotiations as may best suit its habitual indolence, or any ulterior objects which it may have in view.' But, though Lord John was personally prepared to proceed without the presence of a duly instructed Plenipotentiary from the Porte, he had good cause to regret the absence of the information which would in this way have been available. And he had soon reason to suspect that the absence of a properly credited Turk was not due to the dilatory character of the Porte alone, but to the perverse action of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Lord Stratford was specially instructed by Lord Clarendon to keep him constantly informed of everything ; he did nothing of the kind. Lord Clarendon wrote, on the 28th of March—

It is too bad of Stratford not to have written to you, and not to have sent you a proper Turk, for I begged him to do both. . . . But it 's just like him. He never will help anybody else, and will always thwart any business which is not carried on at Constantinople, where he can have the principal finger in the pie.[1]

While on the same day Lord John wrote to Lord Clarendon—

[1] Writing officially on March 26, Lord John said : 'A conference upon the third point is to be held to-day. I cannot but lament that, while subjects vitally affecting the Turkish Empire are under consideration, her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries and the Conference have not the assistance of a Turkish Ambassador fully informed of the views of his Court. The Sublime Porte, as I am informed, has never been taught to look on these negotiations as serious. I am sorry that her Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey should not have been aware of this misconception of our character and our intentions.'

Ali Pacha does not set out for ten days from the day Stratford wrote; at least he 'will not be surprised.' Not a word more from him to me, though I wrote to him from London. If you will recall him you will do the public great service.[1]

And Lord Clarendon replied on the 3rd of April—

I am sure that Stratford is the cause of your not having the assistance of a Turkish Plenipotentiary; but, if you will look at the enclosed extracts from my letters to him and their dates, you will find that he had sufficient notice as well as indication of our wishes. Nevertheless, I yesterday got a letter from him dated 19th ult., in which he says that Ali Pacha will probably go in four or five days; that he had not thought it right to prevent his departure, but that he heartily wished he was not going.

There is no pleasure, in writing the life of a great man, in commenting on the shortcomings of the persons with whom he was directly or indirectly associated. But, to form a correct judgment on the Vienna Conference, it is at least necessary to understand the difficulties with which the British representative had to deal. And these difficulties cannot be thoroughly appreciated without some reference to the conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

But, in the meanwhile, other embarrassments were arising. The Plenipotentiaries, having arrived at an agreement on the first point, were proceeding to the consideration of the other bases, and forwarding the protocols on which they had already agreed to their respective Governments. The second point was easily settled. The 23rd of March was fixed for the discussion of the third and crucial point. But the difficulties connected with it, which had been partially dwarfed by distance, looked larger as the discussion came nearer. The representatives of the allies were instructed not to agree to the Austrian project of counterpoise; Prince Gortchakoff frankly admitted that he would not consent to the Anglo-French proposal of limitation; and Count Buol, anxious to compromise the dispute, suggested to Lord John that Russia should

[1] Lord Stratford's words were: 'The Porte has been invited to send an additional Plenipotentiary to Vienna, and I should not be surprised if Ali Pacha or some other Minister of distinction were selected for the duty, though I know not whether the suggestion is seriously entertained at present.'

be asked to maintain no greater force in the Black Sea than she had at that time. Lord John, writing on the 21st of March, and again on the 23rd, strongly recommended the British Government to accept this compromise. The object of Russia, he argued, was to separate the allies from Austria. The object of the allies, therefore, should be to continue acting with Austria; and, if Austria proposed the compromise and undertook to stand by it, it should in his judgment be adopted.

Lord John's first despatch to this effect was received in London on the 24th; and he could easily have received a telegraphic reply on the 25th of March No such reply came. But on the 26th a message was sent by telegraph to say that the Ministry approved a project for neutralising the Black Sea which had been forwarded from Paris to Baron Bourqueney; and on the 28th[1] a further message was despatched to say that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, was himself starting for Vienna.

Nothing could have been more unfortunate than these occurrences. It so happened that the crisis of the negotiation occurred on the 26th of March; and, on that day, the British Plenipotentiary had no knowledge of the decision of the Government on the suggestion which he had himself pressed on them; while he had knowledge that a new suggestion, which had neither been detailed nor described to him, and which, so far as it was known, was inconsistent with his original instructions, was on its way from Paris. While Lord John was in this painful and difficult position, the Conference met. In accordance with an arrangement that had been previously concerted, Count Buol asked the Russian and the Turkish Plenipotentiaries to declare their own views as to the manner in which the Russian preponderance in the Euxine could best be terminated; and, on Prince Gortchakoff declaring that

[1] On the same day Lord Clarendon, writing privately to Lord John, sent him a list of the vessels which Russia still had at Sebastopol, and added, 'If we were to leave her that force, as Buol proposes, it is impossible that Turkey should defend herself against what such a force could do in the way of attack.' Lord Lansdowne, writing privately on the 27th, and Lord Palmerston on the 28th, also pointed out the objections which, as they thought, existed to the new Austrian proposal.

he was prepared to discuss any proposition that might be made, but was not prepared to make any himself, he was persuaded by Count Buol to apply to his Court for definite instructions. Prince Gortchakoff's consent to make the reference was generally regarded by the Plenipotentiaries as affording a last and solitary chance for the maintenance of peace. But even this slight chance was destroyed by Baron Bourqueney immediately alluding to his unfortunate alternative of neutralising the Black Sea. 'Prince Gortchakoff at once pointed out that such a plan would leave Russia disarmed in the presence of Turkey armed.' Count Buol, though he took no part in the discussion, subsequently declared that neutralisation was beyond and out of the four points; and Lord John himself thought that the substitution of neutralisation for the terms on which the Plenipotentiaries had hitherto insisted was unfair to Russia, rendered the Western powers liable to a charge of insincerity, and afforded the Austrian Minister an easy way out of his promises to observe his engagements.

While, then, during the first three weeks after Lord John's arrival at Vienna, the negotiations had proceeded with comparative smoothness, the neglect of the Government at home to telegraph an immediate reply to the Austrian proposition, the perverse counsels of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and the new project of neutralisation suddenly flung into the Conference chamber from Paris, and supported—though unexplained—from London, tended, at the commencement of the fourth week, to create embarrassment and difficulty. By an unlucky conjuncture—almost at the very moment at which Lord John was complaining that he could get no answer to his own despatch of the 21st, and that a new proposal, unexplained and inadmissible without explanation, was flung upon him—he received an abrupt telegram from London that his colleagues could not agree to the arrangement which he had made for settling the first point. In some natural concern, he wrote the following note to Lord Panmure, who had just joined the Cabinet as Secretary of State for War, and who had, as Mr. Fox Maule, served under Lord John in the Home Office during Lord Melbourne's administration.

Vienna: March 28, 1855.

My dear Panmure,—I cannot quite understand what H.M.'s Government is about. I have been sent here with very general instructions, and left to grope my way as I could; and now, when I am acting to the best of my judgment, comes one telegraphic message after another disapproving of what I am doing. Lastly, to crown all, at the moment the third article was coming under discussion, a new proposition was launched, which gave the Russians a triumph, and made Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and me look small, while Buol was obliged to remain silent.

It is really very incomprehensible, only I hear to-night that Drouyn de Lhuys is coming, which I am heartily glad of.

But explain to me whether I have lost the confidence of my employers.—Yours ever,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Panmure replied—

I grieve to read your letter. The very fact of your instructions being general proves the full confidence reposed in you; and I can assure you, as a colleague and a friend, that such confidence is as strong as ever. We are not to blame for these electric shocks which have so disheartened you. It arises [*sic*] from the singular course taken in Paris. The new proposition emanated from thence without our knowledge or consent, and so led to the triumph of Russia and your annoyance. Drouyn de Lhuys has been here, and has gone on with definite instructions, if he is only honest enough to act up to them. I cannot help fearing, however, you may find his views somewhat more Austro-Russian than he acknowledges to have.

If the matter had not been too grave for laughter, Lord John could have hardly read this letter without amusement. For it was a candid confession that the Ministers would only adhere to their own bases so long as their imperial ally at Paris had no new project of his own to press on them.

How much Lord John felt may be inferred from a passage in one of his wife's letters. Writing to her father on the 1st of April, she said—

The change of views of our home Government has annoyed John terribly; and he feels that he has been sent out on a bootless errand to obtain the consent of Austria and Russia to terms which he is all of a sudden told are no longer held desirable, but are to be exchanged for others to which it is impossible that Russia should accede.

He himself wrote to Lord Clarendon on the same day—

I could not write to you any other than an angry letter, so I will not write at all. Perhaps, for the sake of the public service, you will think it advisable not to lower your special envoy too much in the estimation of foreign Courts.

Lord Clarendon hastened to reassure him, and Lord John wrote eight days later—

The letters and despatches brought by the two last messengers have relieved my mind very much. I confess I was very much hurt when I received the dry, cold, short, sharp despatch respecting the Principalities.

To Lord Lansdowne he wrote more fully :—

Vienna : April 1, 1855.

My dear Lansdowne,—Many thanks for the kindness which dictated your letter.

It is quite true that those at a distance can sometimes judge better than those who are nearer. But it is true also that those who are at a distance do not make a fair allowance for the difficulties of those who are playing the game.

Now this was my position.

Against my frequent remonstrances and suggestions it had been determined to have the Conference here, instead of Brussels or Frankfort, which I pointed out as preferable.

It was obvious that here not only the Austrian Plenipotentiary would have the advantage of being Minister of Foreign Affairs, but his Court would have that influence which always affects the resident Foreign Minister at any Court.

Add to this that, not being myself experienced in diplomacy, I naturally expected to have much aid furnished me. But, with the exception of the valuable assistance of Mr. Hammond, I have had no such aid. The Turkish Minister, from whom I expected information relating to his own country, was by nature incompetent and by instruction silent.

Notwithstanding all this, I contend that the concessions have been made on the Russian side, and not on mine. Buol wished to negotiate on bases already known. I said this was too vague, and pinned him down to the four points very well and accurately defined. If the whole memorandum of December 28 was not accepted, it was because Clarendon refused my proposition to have that question cleared up before I came to Vienna.

In fact, the concessions of the three first points, with a limitation of the Russian fleet, would be a retrograde move on the part of

Russia which she has not made for a century and a half. It would have been gained by Alma, by Inkerman, and by six months of hardship and privation heroically borne.

I am told that our prestige of power must be maintained. I quite agree to this. But we have another prestige: that of keeping our word and being true to our engagements.

If the four points were not thought sufficient guarantees for peace they should not have been brought forward. If it was intended, after using them as a bait for Austria, to throw them aside and forfeit our word, I was not the man to employ on so discreditable a task.

I hope Drouyn de Lhuys will be able to see the danger of a false step before he makes it.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

In the meanwhile the reference which Prince Gortchakoff had made to St. Petersburg afforded an interval in which Ali Pacha arrived from Constantinople, in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys joined the Plenipotentiaries from Paris, and in which the new neutralisation project was elaborately explained by Lord Clarendon. Two schemes were, therefore, definitely before the representatives of the allies. To quote Lord John's own words :—

One, called limitation, proposed that only four ships of the line should be maintained in the Black Sea by Russia, and two each by the allies of Turkey. The other mode, proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, contemplated a much further reduction of force—namely, to eight or ten light vessels, intended solely to protect commerce from pirates and perform the police of the coast. . . .

Such being the proposals in contemplation, it was suggested by Austria, and agreed to by France, Great Britain, and Turkey, that Russia should be invited to take the initiative, and propose the measures to which she was willing to assent for putting an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea. This course produced a delay, but no proposals from Russia.[1] Her Plenipotentiary declared himself ready to listen to any proposals that might be made on behalf of the belligerent powers. The proposals of the allies consisted in the alternative of limitation or neutralisation. Both were rejected.

And, on the 21st of April, Lord John telegraphed to Lord Clarendon that 'after the absolute refusal by the Russian Minister

[1] This is literally accurate, though it may mislead; as, after the rejection of the allies' terms, Russia made proposals of her own, which were thought inadequate.

of the propositions of the English and French Ministers, the Conference had adjourned *sine die*.'

But, to continue Lord John's own account [1] :—

At this point Count Buol made a strong endeavour to keep alive the negotiation which seemed about to expire. Frequent communications ensued between the Ministers of the belligerent powers and those of Austria. . . . After much discussion and repeated attempts to overcome obstacles, Count Buol proposed the following scheme :—

1. In case of the increase of the Russian fleet beyond the number actually existing, Turkey to have power to maintain a force equal to that of Russia ; and England and France each to have a naval force in the Black Sea equal to half the force of Russia. Should this plan not be acceptable to Russia, an alternative to be proposed, viz. that Russia should engage not to increase the number of her ships actually afloat in the Black Sea.

2. A triple treaty of alliance to be formed between Austria, France, and Great Britain, engaging the three powers to defend the integrity and independence of Turkey in case of aggression. . . .

In considering these propositions, I endeavoured to represent to my own mind what would be the condition of Great Britain and her allies in three different cases : (1) If the terms should be refused by Russia ; (2) if the terms, modified in London and Paris, should be accepted by Russia, and form the foundation of a treaty of peace ; (3) if the terms should not be approved in London and Paris and the war should continue.

1st. If the proposed terms had been refused by Russia, Austria would have withdrawn her Minister from Petersburg, and would have been ready to conclude a military convention with France and Great Britain. . . . 2nd. In the second case a peace would have been concluded by which all the concessions would have been on the side of Russia, and none on the side of Great Britain and France. . . . I cannot conceive how such a peace could be called humiliating or dishonourable. It might have been called insecure : and, indeed, the real objection to the plan of pacification was not that it would leave to Russia the preponderance in the Black Sea, but that Russia and her rivals would be brought continually in presence—in short,

[1] The careful memorandum from which these extracts are taken, I have reason to think, was written by Lord John (probably at Florence) in 1856. The official account of the Austrian proposal will be found in Lord John's despatch of April 21, or in Lord Clarendon's despatch of May 8 (Eastern Papers, pt. xv. p. 14).

that such a peace would be nothing more than an armed truce. The answer to this objection, which I felt as strongly as any one, is that war begets hostilities, animosities, and violence, while a state of peace produces forbearance, conciliation, and mutual concession. The league of Austria with England and France to resist aggression upon Turkey would have been a powerful restraint upon any monarch less ambitious of military glory than Charles XII. or Napoleon.

After all, the security of the Porte is not with England a vital question like the independence of Belgium or of Portugal. It is a European object, to attain which Great Britain is bound to contribute her full share, but no more. To call upon this country to carry on war 3,000 miles off, at an immense cost, and with a yearly drain of her best blood, would be on the part of her Government a lavish waste of her resources and an improvident application of her mighty powers.

With these views, therefore, I stated to Count Buol that I should be prepared to recommend to my Government the acceptance of the Austrian proposals to send her alternative to Petersburg, and make the continuance of an Austrian mission at that Court contingent upon its favourable reception. But I told him at the same time that I did not expect my Government would approve of the plan proposed.

It is evident from this memorandum that, while Lord John thought the new proposal was of inferior convenience to the original project for limitation, he concluded that, with Austrian aid, it might afford adequate security for the integrity of Turkey. Austria, in his judgment, held the key of the situation; and he remained consistent in his desire—whether peace or war prevailed—to bring Austria into active co-operation with the allies. Thus thinking, he forwarded to Lord Clarendon the heads of the new proposal, and added—

Should the Government of her Majesty, in concert with that of France, be of opinion that such a peace can be accepted, they will instruct Lord Westmorland accordingly. If not, I hope to be allowed to be heard personally before a final decision is made.

And leaving Vienna on the 24th, he set out for London.

Two days before he started, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote—

Particulière] Vienne: le 22 April, 1855.
8 heures du soir.

My dear Lord John,—Je reçois votre billet daté d'aujourd'hui 4 heures 40, et je vous en remercie.

Je vous envoie la rédaction du projet dont nous avons parlé ce

matin. Ainsi que nous en étions convenus, j'ai vu le Comte Buol : il gouta fort ce projet que je lui ai remis confidentiellement, et il croit que l'Empereur François Joseph y donnera son assentiment.

Comme Plénipotentiaire et d'après mes instructions actuelles, je ne puis ni le proposer, ni l'accepter, ni le discuter officiellement, mais je puis le recommander à ma Cour, et c'est ce que je vais faire.

Je me place au même point de vue que vous, et je dis, 'If Russia is a standing danger, an alliance with Austria must be a standing guarantee.'—Yours very sincerely,

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Vienna : April 24, 1855.

Dear Lord John,—Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys has just been with me. He has received an answer from his Government to the messages of the day before yesterday, which is *against* his project. He is now more convinced than he was before of the value of this project, and he consequently leaves Vienna to-morrow morning for Paris that he may personally support it. He will try to see you on his journey : but he earnestly requests you will telegraph to London your own views, desiring that, if they make a favourable impression on our Government, a telegraph to that effect may be sent to the French Government so as to meet him (D. de Lhuys) on his arrival at Paris. He is anxious you should reach London as early as possible in order to give your personal support to his project with your colleagues.

I send the messenger Haviland with this letter to catch you at Leipzig, and he will then go straight on to London, so that you may send by him any communication which you wish should reach London before yourself. . . .—Believe me, dear Lord John, yours most sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

Lord John arrived in London on Sunday, April 29. His own memorandum will supply the continuation to the story.

I found that neither Lord Palmerston nor Lord Clarendon considered the plan of counterpoise, together with the defensive treaty of alliance between France, Great Britain, and Austria, would furnish a sufficient security for the independence and integrity of Turkey. . . .

The opinion of the Emperor of the French, accepting the principle of the Austrian proposal, but not the details,[1] was communicated to

[1] Lord John, in this respect, understated his case. The Emperor modified the details of the arrangement, but agreed to its details as modified. Here is M. Drouyn de Lhuys's account :—

Particulière et confidentielle]

Mon cher Co-Plénipotentiaire,—Je maudirais l'interruption des conférences, si elle me privait du droit et du plaisir de m'entretenir directement avec vous.

J'ai eu ce matin avec l'Empereur une conversation de trois heures. Voici une

Lord Clarendon by Count Walewksi and to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Lord Palmerston, however, thought that further reference should be made to the Emperor for his final views on the proposal before us. What happened in the interval which then ensued I am not able precisely to say.[1] I know that Lord Cowley used his utmost efforts to induce the Emperor not to adopt the advice of his Minister. It is said that Lord Palmerston employed very strong language through Count Walewski to the same purpose.

What I know is that on Friday morning I heard from Count Walewski the contents of a telegraphic despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys informing the Ambassador that the Emperor refused to accept the Austrian propositions, and recurred to the conditions communicated to Russia at the Conferences of Vienna.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys at once tendered his resignation to the Emperor, and thus announced it to Lord John :—

My dear Lord John,—Ce n'est plus comme votre collègue que je reçois la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire hier, *but as a private individual*, car j'ai donné ce matin ma démission à l'Empereur. J'espère que vous me permettrez, sous ce nouveau titre, de continuer à vous exprimer quelque fois mes sentimens de haute considération et d'attachement sincère.

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Paris: 5 Mai, 1855.

Lord John thereupon wrote to Lord Clarendon—

rédaction modifiée que j'ai faite sous ses yeux et qui a son entière approbation. Sous cette forme Sa Majesté est prête à accepter l'arrangement. Cette nouvelle forme conserve toutes les garanties officielles, évite la désagréable mention du *statu quo ante bellum*, et consacre l'alliance perpetuelle de l'Autriche, pour défendre la Turquie contre les aggressions par terre ou par mer. Je ne prévois pas d'ailleurs d'objection sérieuse de la part de l'Autriche, dont cette rédaction ménage les scrupules. Je suis plus que jamais dans les idées que je vous exprimais à Vienne, et dans lesquelles je vous voyais vous-même me marquer la voie. Je compte avec une ferme confiance sur votre puissante action pour les faire prévaloir. Créer à l'ambition russe un éternel ennemi, n'est-ce donc rien !—Yours very sincerely,

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Paris: 1ère Mai, 1855.

J'envoie à Walewski cette nouvelle rédaction. Je vous laisse juger de la mesure dans laquelle vous croirez convenable de parler de la communication confidentielle que je vous fais.

Lord John's answer to this letter has been published by Mr. Kinglake in *Hist. of Crimean War*, vol. viii. p. 345.

[1] The curious on this point may satisfy their curiosity by referring to Mr. Kinglake's account, *Hist. of Crimean War*, vol. viii. p. 346, *seq.*

Pembroke Lodge: May 6, 1855.

My dear Clarendon,—I was at Panmure's when your box arrived here, and did not get back till past eight. I am very much concerned at the removal or resignation of Drouyn. I cannot separate myself from him; and, having taken at Vienna the same view which he did, his resignation entails mine. I am very sorry for this, and wished to avoid it. But I have in some measure got Drouyn into this scrape, for at first he was disposed to advise the Emperor to insist on a limitation of ships, and I induced him not to give any advice at all to the Emperor. Afterwards we agreed very much; and, if he had stayed in office there, I might have gulped, though with difficulty, the rejection of my advice here. However, I shall wait till Colloredo has made a definite proposal, and then make the opinion I shall give upon it in the Cabinet a vital question with me. It is painful to me to leave a second Cabinet, and will injure my reputation—perhaps irretrievably. But I see no other course. Do as you please about communicating to Palmerston what I have written. I fear I must leave to you and Hammond to judge of the papers to be given. . . . But I hope you will not tie your hands or those of the Government by giving arguments against what the nation may ultimately accept. I hold that a simple provision, by which the Sultan would reserve the power to admit the vessels of powers not having establishments in the Black Sea, through the Straits at his own pleasure at all times, . . . and a general treaty of European alliance to defend Turkey against Russia, would be a good security for peace. If the Emperor of the French were to declare that he could not accept such a peace, of course we must stick by him, but that does not prevent our declaring to him our opinion. Walewski spoke to me very strongly at the Palace in favour of the Austrian plan, but I suppose he has now made up his mind against it.—I remain, yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Clarendon replied—

G[rosvenor] C[rescent]: May 7, 1855.

My dear Lord John,— . . . I am very sorry you did not come in just now, as I wanted most particularly to see you. I now write this *earnestly to entreat* that you will say nothing to anybody at present about your intended resignation. The public interests and your own position are so involved in the question, and so much harm of every kind may be done by a hasty decision, however honourable and high-minded the motives may be, that I do beg of you well to weigh *all* the points of the case; and let me frankly add that you will not act with fairness, and as I am sure you must wish to act, towards your colleagues, if you do not hear what some of them may have to say.

As you allowed me to do as I pleased about informing Palmerston, I did not think it right to leave him in the dark upon a matter which seems to me of vital importance. I need not tell you that your intention causes him the deepest regret, and he feels as I do how essential it is that nothing should be known of it at present. We are not even in possession of the facts that led to Drouyn's resignation.—Yours sincerely,

CLARENDON.

Moved by this appeal, and by Lord Palmerston's personal entreaties, thrice repeated, Lord John withdrew his resignation. Its withdrawal, however convenient it may have seemed to the Government at the time, was one of the most unfortunate circumstances in Lord John's political career. It directly led to misunderstandings and to obloquy, such as few public men have ever encountered.

It was obvious, in fact, that Lord John could only continue in the Cabinet by surrendering his own opinions. As he himself wrote—

I was ready to incur the responsibility of advising the acceptance of the terms proposed in conjunction with the French Government. But I was not prepared to advise that we should depart from or even hazard our alliance with France for the chance of a peace on terms which I could not consider entirely satisfactory. . . . Moreover, it was impossible for me to know the full weight of the motives which might have swayed the Emperor. The immediate result of our acceptance of the Austrian terms might have been the instant acquiescence of Russia, and the consequent evacuation of the Crimea. How would the French army have borne a retreat from before Sebastopol, relinquishing a siege which had cost so much blood and so much suffering? Might not the discontent of the army have disturbed the internal tranquillity of France, and even menaced the throne of the Emperor?

The Emperor of the French had been to us the most faithful ally who had ever wielded the sceptre or ruled the destinies of France. Was it possible for the English Government to leave the Emperor of the French to fight unaided the battle of Europe, or to force him to join us in a peace which would have sunk his reputation with his army and his people?

This consideration struck me with such conviction that I ceased at once from urging Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon or the Cabinet to accept the Austrian terms. Lord Clarendon's reply rejecting those conditions was agreed to and despatched.

Though Lord John does not say so in this memorandum, it is evident that he must have become acquainted through Lord Cowley with the famous answer which Marshal Vaillant had given to the Emperor in Lord Cowley's presence:—

> I am not a politician [said Vaillant], but I know the feelings of the army. I am sure that if, after having spent months in the siege of Sebastopol, we return unsuccessful, the army will not be satisfied.[1]

Thenceforward Lord John ceased to press on his colleagues a policy which—if Marshal Vaillant was right—might have led to the disaffection of the army on which the Emperor's throne was dependent. He felt that, anxious as he had been at Vienna for terms which would have ranged Austria with the allies, he could not purchase the help of Austria by breaking up the alliance with France. In his own words—

> From that moment it appeared to me that, unless Austria should offer terms more acceptable to the Emperor of the French . . . we had no course left but to pursue the war with the utmost vigour.

The decision at which Lord John had thus arrived was perfectly intelligible to those who had all the facts before them. But it had the fatal defect that it could not be defended without a complete knowledge of the surrounding circumstances: and that the chief of these circumstances—the reluctance of the Emperor of the French to risk the discontent of his army—could not by any possibility be explained to a popular assembly. And this impossibility, which Lord John ought undoubtedly to have foreseen, when, in an unfortunate hour for himself, he yielded to Lord Clarendon's and Lord Palmerston's counsels and withdrew his resignation, soon involved him in an inextricable dilemma. On the 24th of May Mr. Disraeli brought forward a resolution condemning both the language and the conduct of the Government, and pledging the House to the prosecution of the war. A large portion of his speech was occupied in commenting, with all the power of sarcasm at his command, on the conduct of Lord John both as Minister and Plenipotentiary; and, at the close of the evening, Lord John himself rose to defend his own action and the policy of the Government. He stated, as he was perfectly

[1] Kinglake's *Crimea*, viii. 348.

entitled to state, the reasons for the securities which the allies had demanded. He omitted—he could not have avoided omitting—all reference to the proposal which he had himself brought home from Austria, and which had not been disclosed; and he argued strongly for curbing the power of Russia, and going on with the war. The speech made a great effect in London, and is said to have swelled the majority by which Mr. Disraeli was defeated on the succeeding evening; and the House adjourned for a short Whitsuntide recess, relying on the warlike policy of the Government, and on the vigorous language of Lord John.

The speech, however, made a very different impression at Vienna. Count Buol determined to give his own version of the story, and, of course, in doing so was free from the considerations respecting the French Emperor which had influenced Lord John. He issued a circular to the representatives of Austria at foreign Courts, in which he disclosed for the first time the proposals which he had himself made for the termination of the dispute, and added—

> The Ministers of France and England, in confidential interviews, showed themselves decidedly inclined towards our proposals, and undertook to recommend the same to their Governments with all their influence.

The publication of this despatch raised a storm of obloquy such as few public men have ever encountered. How, it was asked, could Lord John reconcile his conduct at Vienna with his language in Parliament? If it were true that Lord John thought that the terms of Austria were reasonable, why had he not redeemed his promise and advocated them in the Cabinet? Why, at any rate, was he still a member of the Government which had refused them? and why was he urging the vigorous prosecution of a war which he had himself thought ought to have been concluded? Lord John had never been the favourite of the newspaper press. In the preceding February he had increased the animosity of journalists by expressing, in strong and indiscreet language, his 'disgust' at the attacks which had been made on Lord Raglan 'by a ribald press.' The 'ribald' press had now the opportunity of avenging itself on its censor. It fell on him with a fury which

was both unprecedented and unrestrained. And the attack was not, of course, confined to the newspapers. On the 29th of June Lord John was asked in the House whether Count Buol's statements in his circular were accurate, and admitted that they were so. On the 6th of July Mr. Milner Gibson raised the whole issue in the House of Commons. But the debate, though it afforded Lord John an opportunity for explanation, only increased his difficulties and accentuated his embarrassment. For while, on the one hand, he could not avoid speaking, he could not, on the other, give the true reasons which had influenced him. Even for the sake of saving his own character, he could not say that the Emperor of the French was afraid that the acceptance of the Austrian terms would lead to the disaffection of his army, and the disaffection of his army to the fall of his dynasty, and that a generous nation could not force on a faithful ally terms involving such a sacrifice. He was forced, therefore, to leave unsaid the words which were necessary for his own defence. Thus his explanation fell flat and inadequate on his audience. And then, as if the embarrassment were not sufficient, Lord John's own unrivalled reputation as a debater rose up and bore witness against him. For this tame and ineffective apology was not emanating from an unpractised orator, but from the man of whom it had been truly said, 'He always spoke well when a good speech was required of him.' Bad, indeed—so it was concluded—the case must be, if this was all that the most practised debater of the century could urge in support of his own character.

Thus the storm of calumny, which had already burst on Lord John's head, was renewed with redoubled fury; and Sir E. Lytton Bulwer gave notice of a motion that Lord John's conduct at Vienna had shaken the confidence of the House in the Ministry. This notice gave rise to one of the most painful incidents in Lord John's career. For, while his colleagues in the Cabinet, who were acquainted with the facts of the case, were ready to stand by him, the subordinate members of the Government, who were ignorant of the circumstances which had influenced Lord John, refused to support him. It was to these men that Lord John, in the subsequent debate, applied the quotation—

Those you make friends
And give your hearts to, when they once perceive
The least rub in your fortunes, fall away
Like water from ye, never found again
But when they mean to sink ye.

Contrary to his own opinion, Lord John had remained in office for the sake of imparting strength to the Administration: he would not remain another hour when he found that his presence in the Cabinet had become a cause of weakness to it. On the 12th of July he told Lord Palmerston that he must retire; and on the 13th sent in his written resignation in the following terms:—

Chesham Place: July 13, 1855.

My dear Palmerston,—After our conversation last night you will not be surprised at receiving from me a request that you will be so good as to lay before her Majesty my resignation of the office I hold.

It has become obvious that my continuance in office would only embarrass and endanger your Administration. It is for the advantage of the Queen's service, therefore, that I should retire.

I beg you will assure her Majesty that, if I could be of any use in the present critical state of affairs by remaining in her service, I would readily devote myself to the performance of my duties as a Minister. But neither the Crown nor the country would derive any benefit from my resistance to the present clamour.

I may wish to make a statement on Monday, but I have no desire to add anything to what I have already related of the decisions of the Cabinet.

I wish you every success in the conduct of this great war, and remain, yours faithfully,

J. Russell.

Lord Palmerston replied—

Piocadilly: July 13, 1855.

My dear John Russell,—I have received, I need not say with how much regret, your letter of this morning, and have sent it down to the Queen. But, whatever pain I may feel at the step you have taken, I must nevertheless own that as a public man, whose standing and position are matters of public interest and public property, you have judged rightly. The storm is too strong at this moment to be resisted, and an attempt to withstand it would, while unsuccessful, only increase irritation. But juster feelings will in due time prevail. In the meanwhile I must thank you for the very friendly and hand-

some terms in which you have announced to me your determination.
—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Three days later, in the House of Commons, Lord John explained the circumstances of his resignation. He laboured still under the radical difficulty that he was unable to state the true reasons which had influenced him. All he could do was to allude in vague language to 'circumstances quite independent of the merits of the propositions themselves,' and which 'did not in the least alter my opinion of the merits of those propositions,' 'which made it appear to my mind impossible to urge [their] acceptance upon the Government. But his calm and dignified language made a deep impression on the House. His old friend Lord Enfield wrote to him—

Five-and-twenty years have passed since I first took my place behind you in the House of Commons, and nothing has ever occurred to weaken my allegiance or to shake my confidence in a leader so specially qualified to direct the Whig party.

At no period during that quarter of a century have I felt more proud of our choice than I do *now*, or more indignant with the timidity of some and the malignity of others. . . .

Believe me, my dear Lord John, that you have a numerous and staunch body of supporters, who respect and love you, and the warmth of whose attachment is only made more fervent by these unscrupulous attacks.

While Sir G. C. Lewis wrote—

The dignified and impressive speech which you made yesterday evening was listened to with respect and attention by an audience partly hostile and partly prejudiced. It will, in my opinion, go far to remove the imputations, founded on error and misrepresentation, under which you laboured, and I shall be much surprised if, after a little time and a little reflection, persons do not come to the conclusion that never was so small a matter magnified so far beyond its true proportions.

On the following evening Mr. Roebuck drew attention to the report of the Sebastopol Committee, and founded on it a motion visiting 'with severe reprobation every member of that Cabinet whose counsels led to such disastrous results.' A man less generous than Lord John might have seized the opportunity to sever himself from the responsibility attaching

to his old colleagues. He, who had unceasingly urged the consolidation of the military departments, and had voluntarily undertaken the ungrateful task of recommending the supersession of the Duke of Newcastle, might fairly have pleaded that he was responsible neither for imperfect organisation nor for inefficient administration. He took, however, the far worthier course of maintaining that 'every member of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet is and remains responsible for that expedition and the consequences of it.' Lord Granville wrote to him the next day—

Private] London: July 20, 1855.

My dear Lord John,—I cannot tell you how pleased I am with what has taken place this week.

I ventured to mention the word reaction to you on Monday. My pet belief is that the further people go in a foolish direction the more certain they are to come rapidly back to an opposite point.

Your magnificent speech of last night seems to have completed what your very calm and dignified statement in the midst of so much noise had begun on Monday.—Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

While a correspondent wholly unknown to him sent him even a more gratifying tribute :—

9 Upper Cornwall Street, St. George's East: July 22, 1855.

My Lord,—I am a working man ; and, from what I have read in the newspapers, I have been induced to take the liberty of writing this to thank you for what you have done for me and my order.

Allow me, sir, to express a hope that you will not be depressed in spirits in consequence of the brutal attacks of the whole press on your fair character. The press do not in so doing represent the people (at least of my order), who, on the contrary, look to you as the only man that can carry England through her troubles. . . .

I know, my Lord, the great good you have achieved for my order, and therefore feel anxious for your welfare. In conclusion, I beg you will excuse the liberty I take in trespassing upon your valuable time.—Your obedient servant,

SOLOMON HAILES.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OUT OF OFFICE.

THE circumstances of Lord John's retirement in July 1855 differed widely from those which had marked his resignation in the previous February. In February grave dissatisfaction with the policy of the Ministry had led to his withdrawal from office. In July he was in full accord with his colleagues. It is impossible to read the correspondence with Lord Aberdeen which preceded one event without pain. The letters in which Lord John and Lord Palmerston recorded their reluctant decision to part company can give the reader nothing but pleasure. Whatever differences may have separated Lord Palmerston from Lord John in previous years, no trace of them rankled in the breast of either on their separation in July 1857.

Towards the other members of the Cabinet, with perhaps one exception, Lord John bore nothing but good will. Of Lord Clarendon, for a time, he entertained other feelings. He thought that the Foreign Minister had aggravated his difficulties by neglecting to obtain Prince Gortchakoff's formal adhesion to the four points before he set out for Vienna; that he had placed him in a false and embarrassing position by springing on him the neutralisation proposal; though he acquiesced in Lord Clarendon's refusal to produce all the Vienna correspondence, he considered that his own letters had not been given in sufficient detail; and that the fact that he had only adhered to the Austrian proposal for the sake of securing Austrian co-operation had not been sufficiently emphasised. Some traces of the bitterness which he felt can be detected by any one who reads with care a speech which he made at the close of the session on the conduct of the war. These feelings, however, soon wore away; and, before the

autumn was over, Lord Clarendon and Lord John were again corresponding on their former terms of intimacy.[1]

Lord John undoubtedly resented the conduct of inferior members of the Government. He naturally thought that, after his great services, he should not have been condemned by his former followers almost without a hearing. But, though he felt bitterly the conduct of those whom he had regarded as his friends, he carried with him into his retirement that calm demeanour which enabled him to conceal his sense of the wrong; and, without attempting to remonstrate or to reply, waited patiently for the reaction which his own conscience told him must ultimately come.

No man had ever earned retirement better. It was nearly five-and-twenty years since he had first accepted office under Lord Grey; and his friends had placed him in a situation for which his frail and feeble constitution, it was hoped, would be equal. During the interval, which had since passed, he had done harder work than any member of the House of Commons. For nearly twenty out of the five-and-twenty years he had been a Minister of the Crown; for fourteen he had led the House of Commons; for nearly six years he had led the House of Commons as Prime Minister. He had fairly won a right to the rest which had at last been forced on him. And the respite was in another sense welcome. Lord John could not look back at the history of the three preceding years without seeing that he had occupied a false position. His acceptance of office under Lord Aberdeen, almost forced on him by the solicitations of his friends and his sovereign, had led to nothing but embarrassment and difficulty. While he remained in office, experience had already shown that he could not recover the influence which he had lost. It was essential, for the sake of his own reputation, that he should pass a definite period as an independent member of Parliament.

For nearly four years Lord John remained out of office:

[1] The overture came from Lord John. On the news of the fall of Sebastopol he wrote to Lord Clarendon and told him what, in his opinion, the Government ought to do. Lord Clarendon replied that he had read Lord John's letter to the Cabinet, where it had been received with cheers from all quarters.

but this period of release from official work was anything but one of idleness. Lord John's literary instincts were so strong that they were certain to assert themselves at a fresh opportunity. At the time of his retirement the heavy task, which he had undertaken in 1852, of editing Mr. Moore's Memoirs, was practically finished: the final volume was in the printer's hands. The duty, to which he had concurrently committed himself, of editing Mr. Fox's correspondence, was approaching completion; while, as for minor literary labours, such as prefaces and introductions to other people's works, they were—like silver in the days of Solomon—of not much account in the life of Lord John.[1]

The gradual conclusion of these labours suggested to him another work; and it occurred to him very naturally that, after editing Fox's letters, he had peculiar qualifications for writing his life. Sir George Lewis, whom he consulted on the subject, advised him to expand his project into a History of England from the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the Peace of Paris in 1815; and Lord John thus disposed of the suggestion:—

My dear Lewis,— . . . I have thought much of your suggestion of giving an account of our whole history from 1763 to 1815, instead of hanging all my remarks on the biography of Fox. But, although I might have attempted such a task twenty years ago, or even in 1841, I must now confess *non eadem ætas, non mens*; and, if I can extend and connect Mr. Fox's life, so as to bring in his speeches and letters, it is as much as I can hope to accomplish. Besides, biography has no dignity, and neither forces one to insert long and tiresome accounts of battles (except in case of a General), nor to omit small and interesting details. Mahon, though intentionally fair, is trifling and depreciating; and, if I can raise biography as much as he lowers history, I think I shall have done much.

Besides, it is well to have a hero, and a hero with a good many faults and failings. Pitt's ambition was unscrupulous; but his other failings were confined to a love of strong liquor. Heaven save us from such another Minister! . . .—Yours,

J. R.

[1] Lord John wrote in 1853 a preface to the letters of Rachel Lady Russell, and in 1854 he edited, or at any rate wrote a graceful introduction to, his sister-in-law's (Mrs. Grove Cradock's) *Calendar of Nature*. Mrs. Grove Cradock was the Miss Lister whose letters in 1840 and 1841 have already been given.

The biography which was thus projected is one of the best known of its author's works. Since Sir G. Trevelyan has only carried his own narrative down to 1774, it is practically the only life of the great Whig statesman. It is not only the best known, but it is also one of the best, of its author's productions. One of the greatest masters of the English language has lately said that Lord John was one of the few men of his time 'able to write a sentence so naturally that it recalled the very sound of his voice.'[1] Perhaps of all its author's works the 'Life of Fox' is the one which most naturally illustrates this saying. Whether he is reading the political history which it comprises, or the personal and literary details which form so agreeable a feature in the concluding volume, the reader feels that he is not merely engaged on a 'Life of Mr. Fox,' but that he is listening to Lord John. This feature in the book may be a merit or a demerit. Authors of less distinction are wise to sink their personality in their subject, and to let their hero speak instead of using their own voice. But, when Prime Ministers become authors, a contrary rule, if not logically permissible, has at least its advantages. It is very interesting to know what Mr. Fox thought of the 'Odyssey' or the 'Task;' but it is quite as interesting to learn what Lord John thought of Mr. Fox.

The first volume of the 'Life' was published in 1859; the second in 1860. Official labours deferred the publication of the third, which did not appear till 1866. But the preparation of this work formed Lord John's chief occupation during his four years of immunity from official toil. Other labours, however, of a similar character diversified his studies. In November 1855 he delivered a lecture on the obstacles which have retarded moral and political progress to a company of 4,000 persons assembled under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association in Exeter Hall; in May 1856 he delivered another lecture to his old constituents at Stroud on the study of history; in the autumn of 1857 he attended and spoke at the first meeting of the Social Science Congress at Birmingham; and in the following October he presided over

[1] Kinglake, *Hist. of Crimean War*, viii. 87.

the second meeting of the Congress at Liverpool. The addresses which he made on these several occasions must have required both thought and time. The first of them was subsequently published, and will repay perusal, especially by those who wish to understand its author's opinions. The main obstacle to moral and political progress was, in Lord John's opinion, the abuse of the functions of Government. The attempt of authority to suppress inquiry and to direct opinion had interfered, over and over again in the world's history, with improvement; and progress, therefore, depended on that civil and religious liberty which was both the basis of the lecturer's creed and the object of his career. In certain countries, however, the human conscience was no longer shackled by Government or by laws. In these, Lord John added—probably with special reference to his audience—other obstacles to moral and political progress remained. The vice of intemperance, the want of education, were interfering with the advancement of the poor; just as sensuality, excess, selfishness, evil-speaking, and want of charity were retarding the development of the rich. Civilisation had shown, in the days both of Augustus and of Louis XIV., that it was powerless to deal with these evils.

It is to Christian principle, Christian morals, and a Christian spirit, that we must look for a better and higher civilisation than any that has been attained. . . . Some there are who shut their eyes to one truth lest it should impair another that they deem more sacred. But one truth can no more quench another truth than one sunbeam can quench another sunbeam.[1] Truth is one, as God is one. Go forward to meet her in whatever garb, welcome her from whatever quarter, she comes: till at last, beyond the grave, you shall hail her in a blaze of glory which mortal eye can only strain in vain to contemplate.

The lecture was received with extraordinary enthusiasm. M. Panizzi, who was present, declared that Lord John's

[1] The metaphor, as it originally stood, was more elaborate, and referred to the inability of one ray of light to quench another ray, or of one sound to destroy another sound. But it was pointed out to Lord John that his metaphors were wrong. 'Two rays of light have the power of extinguishing each other, and two waves of sound have a similar power, under certain circumstances;' and he consequently slightly modified the passage.

success was 'splendid,' 'a triumph.' Professor Owen, who merely read it in the 'Times,' said of it—

It is worthy of being printed in letters of gold—or, still better, in good legible type of printer's ink—and [read] by millions, that the excellence of its teaching and the beauty and truth of its illustrations, may be known wherever the English language is spoken or read. I should calculate the good it will do as equal to that of all the speeches and sermons which have been spoken and preached in the present century.

Three years afterwards, in the address at Liverpool, Lord John travelled over another but a very wide field: Bankruptcy Reform; the codification of the statute book; the statistics and prevention of crime; the punishment of criminals; the gradual abolition of transportation which was making it a necessity for us to consume our own crime; the reformation of juvenile offenders; the happy and increasing influence of women on society; the extension of education; and the requirements of sanitary reform.

It was remarkable that Lord Shaftesbury, who had presided over the lecture in 1855, was present at the Social Science Congress in 1858, and, to quote his diary—

refused to move a vote of thanks to Lord J. Russell, because I could not honestly praise him (a political intriguer, and the unfeeling adversary of the wretched chimney-sweeps).

The extract is only equalled by the statement in the same diary, which has already been quoted, that its author had long considered Peel and John Russell among the most criminal of mankind. But, as hasty entries of this kind, never intended for the public eye, have been published, it is right to contrast them with Lord Shaftesbury's true and deliberate opinion of Lord John:—

To have begun with disapprobation; to have fought through many difficulties; to have announced, and acted on, principles new to the day in which he lived; to have filled many important offices, to have made many speeches, and written many books; and in his whole course to have done much with credit, and nothing with dishonour, and so to have sustained and advanced his reputation to the very end, is a mighty commendation.

During most of the period in which Lord John was thus

reverting to the old literary pursuits in which he took so deep an interest, he continued chiefly to reside at Pembroke Lodge. In 1857 he let his London house to Lord Panmure, sleeping the few nights in which Parliament detained him in town at an hotel. But during the four years he paid many visits to his friends, and made some longer excursions. In August 1855 he was the guest of his old friend Lord Fortescue in Scotland, but was unfortunately hurriedly recalled to Pembroke Lodge by Lady John's serious and sudden illness. Later in that year he resided for many months at a property which he had just bought in the immediate neighbourhood of Stroud. Rodborough Manor, the name of this estate, is in the parish of Amberley, and the purchase was therefore destined ultimately to confer a second title on its owner. Lord John never resided at Rodborough after the autumn and winter of 1855–56. The place was let soon afterwards to Lord Ribblesdale; and, at a still later date, was occupied by Lord John's son, Lord Amberley. Later still it was sold, and passed away from the family of the man who has made the name of the parish in which it was situated familiar as a household word.[1]

In 1856 the whole family took a longer and more interesting excursion. On the 16th of July Lady John and her four children crossed from London to Rotterdam, spending the next eight days with her sister Lady Mary Abercromby,

[1] At Christmas, 1855, Lord John paid a visit to Woburn, taking with him his eldest daughter (Lady Georgiana Peel) and his youngest son. He was detained there longer than he had expected, from his son being attacked by croup, and he received the following consolatory letter from his eldest son :—

My dear poor Papa,—As you get so very few letters, I thought I would write to you. We were so very sorry to hear that Rollo was ill, and that you would not be home for such a long time. The weather has been very cold, but to-day is a most beautiful day. . . . At eleven we drove in the brougham to Mr. Lycett. His room upstairs was very cold. We walked home very quick and got nice and warm. My feet now are itching dreadfully, which makes me write badly. . . .

I had a very nice letter from Rollo, and I shall write one to him to-morrow. It had no stop all the way through, but was full of little lines, which is a very funny plan of Georgy's. Good-bye, dear papa.—From your affectionate son,

J. RUSSELL.

If Lord Amberley had been spared to undertake the task, which I have attempted to discharge, of writing his father's life, he would hardly have pitied his 'poor papa' for getting so very few letters.

whose husband represented this country at the Hague. On the 25th they joined Lord John and his two eldest daughters at Antwerp. The family thence travelled slowly to Switzerland, resting on their way at Bonn, Mayence, and Heidelberg. They reached Basle on the 4th of August, and Lucerne on the 5th, and settled in a villa near Lausanne on Lord John's sixty-fourth birthday. The villa was delightfully situated on elevated ground, with a chestnut wood at its back and a glorious view of the mountains in front; and the children were naturally in raptures at a place and at a life so new to them. Lord John was equally pleased with his abode. Revolving in his own mind his projected 'Life of Fox,' and meditating on the advice of Sir G. Lewis to enlarge it into a greater work, he wrote—

I have got some books here, and a terrace—which I walk up and down, preparing to appear as a second Gibbon.

The Russells remained at Lausanne till the end of September, when they set out for Italy, crossing the Simplon in merciless rain; staying a few days in Piedmont, and dining with Sir James Hudson to meet men so well known in Italian story as Cavour, Azeglio, Massari, Farini, La Marmora, Rattazzi, and Mamiami. From Turin they proceeded to Florence, where Lord Minto had already arrived, and where they occupied for the next three months the Villa Capponi, the property of the old Marquis Gino Capponi.

We looked from our beautiful villa [1] upon the glorious town on one side, and Fiesole and the Apennines on the other; and we soon forgot the dreariness of our neglected garden with its mouldering statues and weedy walks.

Lady John had never before been at Florence. Thirty years had passed since Lord John—to use his own expression—had last seen the Raphaels; and his wife and he had therefore ample to occupy their time in visiting and revisiting the galleries and churches of the City of Flowers. But they had also other interests to occupy them. The Villa Capponi soon became the centre of all that was liberal in Florence;

[1] The Villa Capponi stands outside the Porta San Gallo, nearly due north of Florence.

while at Lord Normanby's, who represented the United Kingdom at the Court of Tuscany, the Russells had the opportunity of meeting all that was reactionary. The Tuscan Government regarded the presence of Lord John with grave uneasiness, and is said actually to have set a watch at the Porta San Gallo to spy out his visitors.[1] Yet the Government may have been almost pardoned for its suspicion, for Count Capponi himself thought that the visit of Lord John had a political object, and that he had come to Florence to ascertain the chances of revolution in Tuscany.

The Russells remained at Florence till the 12th of January, when they bade adieu to their Italian friends and English relations, and turned their faces homewards. They travelled to Pisa, and thence drove—for no railway had at that time penetrated one of the most beautiful roads in the world—through Spezzia, Sestri, and Genoa, to Nice. As they passed Carrara, Lord John delivered the following impromptu :—

O'er these beautiful regions the German bears sway :
See yonder his fortress all frowningly stand.
His hand is the iron his soldiers display,
His heart is the marble that whitens the land.

The Russells rested for a few days at Nice, where Lord John had a private interview with Count Cavour ;[2] and, travelling slowly, only reached London on the 3rd of February. During 1857 and 1858 they made no such long excursions as in 1856. They passed most of these years at Pembroke Lodge ; and such change as they obtained they gained from visits to friends in various parts of England.

Changes, in the meanwhile, were occurring in Lord John's domestic circle. His sister-in-law the Duchess of Bedford died in the summer of 1857. His father-in-law, Lord Minto, showed symptoms in 1858 of the gradual decay to which he succumbed in 1859. But, while its older members were

[1] *Gino Capponi : Memorie, raccolte da Marco Tabarrini*, pp. 304, 305.

[2] Count Cavour wrote to him—

Jeudi, 22.

Mon cher Lord John,—Désirant causer quelques instants avec vous sans crainte d'être dérangé, j'irai aujourd'hui à trois heures vous chercher à votre hôtel avec mon collègue, M. Rattazzi, &c.

C. CAVOUR.

gradually dropping like the leaves in autumn, the younger branches of the old Russell tree were green with budding foliage. In April 1857 Lord John's eldest son was sent to Harrow, where his two younger brothers subsequently followed him. The future Lord Amberley gladdened his father's heart by taking a good place in the school, and by maintaining his position. The few letters which he wrote from Harrow, and which have still been preserved, show that he appreciated, in a manner rare in a boy, the books that he was reading: while he formed a warm friendship for Dr. Vaughan, the head master, addressing him, on his resignation in 1860, in a poem which, if it cannot be compared with his father's similar address to Professor Stewart, was the work of a younger pen. Dr. Vaughan won the boy's affection in another way. For Lord John, recollecting his own education, and the advantages which he had derived from Professor Playfair's society, thought of removing his son in 1858 from Harrow and of sending him to Edinburgh. And Dr. Vaughan's advice coincided with the boy's wishes, and induced his father to leave him at the school.

Harrow on the Hill: October 2, 1858.

My dear Papa,— . . . I have just been to the doctor with my list of work. He sent for me to come into his study, and spoke to me very kindly. He wished to know whether I was going to leave, and I said I was. He thought it was principally on the ground of health: I believed it was, but added that, in the fifth form, I had plenty of time to go out, and did not suffer in health at all. He advised me to tell you this, as he thought it might have some weight with you. Dear old Vaughan! I am very fond of him, and should very much like to stay. I am sure the beautiful sermons we have from him every Sunday might hide a multitude of other disadvantages in the school. I do not mean that there are many disadvantages. The longer I stay, the fonder I get of Harrow; the higher I am when I leave, the more pleased shall I be on looking back to my school-life when I am an old Harrovian. But, if I go to Edinburgh, it would give me all the trouble and awkwardness of a new boy over again. But, whatever your decision on the point may be, I shall, I hope, be satisfied with it, and trust to your superior wisdom to do what is best. . . .

Good-bye, from your most affectionate son,

J. Russell.

Like father, like son. The letter bears much resemblance to that which Lord John himself had written to his father the Duke from Spain nearly fifty years before.

It was no difficult matter, however, to trace the hereditary likeness between Lord John and many of his children. In his eldest son's appreciation of the books which he was reading at school, in the interest which he was taking in politics, in his criticisms of the masters he was under, and of the sermons which he heard, he was unconsciously displaying all the qualities which his father had shown fifty years before. Like his father, too, he was writing poetry. His present to his mother on her birthday in 1857 was a poem on the Pembroke Lodge gardener. The boy, too, as well as his brothers and sisters, was displaying that taste for the drama which had been so strong in Lord John. In 1856, while they were at Florence, they acted a drama 'The Three Golden Hairs,' which had been specially arranged by the two elder sisters. It was reproduced at Pembroke Lodge on the last day of 1857, and its success suggested in 1858 a more ambitious performance. 'Dewdrop and Glorio, or the Sleeping Beauty in the Wood,' was written, and dedicated to Lord J. Russell, by his two eldest daughters. It was subsequently privately printed with some illustrations from the pencil of Lord John's eldest stepdaughter (Mrs. Maurice Drummond), and copies of it have probably reached some of the hands into which this memoir may fall.

For this play Lord John wrote the epilogue, which was spoken by his daughter Victoria in the character of Rainbow:—

> The Princess Dewdrop bids me reappear
> To ask you how you like our Christmas cheer:
> She feels uneasy, for she thinks mayhap
> That, while she took her century of nap,
> You too might sink in sympathetic doze,
> And need my wand your eyelids to unclose.
> But gladly she'll acknowledge her mistake,
> And hear that I have found you all awake.
> Now saw you ever on this mortal stage
> So well-preserved a beauty for her age?

Some, who had long retained their youthful charms,
At forty-five have set the world in arms ;
And some, 'tis whispered, of their faces thrifty,
Have killed a lover with their frowns at fifty :
But never yet was in a ball-room seen
A beauty of one hundred and sixteen !
Still without spectacles her books she'll read,
Few wrinkles shows ; and still, in case of need,
Can join her subjects in a merry jig—
And those fair locks you see are not a wig.
And now, farewell ! To each indulgent guest
Be granted days of joy and nights of rest :
Rosebud and Rainbow from their fairy hall
Wish you a merry Christmas—one and all.

Lord John was delighted with his children's performance ; and he wrote to Lord Minto—

Our play answered very well. My six bairns are all good actors, and can earn their living on the stage if Bright destroys our old nobility !

Domestic happiness, however, only formed one part of Lord John's social life. During these years of comparative freedom from Parliamentary and official toil, he found new pleasure in meeting friends and opponents at Grillion's ; and in August 1857 his excellent social qualities procured his election to 'the Club,' his proposer being Lord Lansdowne, his seconder Lord Stanhope, and his election being announced to him by the chairman of the evening, Dr. Hawtrey, the Provost of Eton.

While Lord John was enjoying the pleasures of home and the relaxations of society, his growing family was imposing on him new expenses. It has been already related that he had never been in debt till he was Prime Minister. His defeat in 1852 did not afford him pecuniary relief. He had to maintain the position and incur the expenses of a leader of the Opposition on an income which many country gentlemen would consider slender. Nor did the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Government improve the case. Throughout 1853, and till June 1854, he laboured in the service of the public without fee or reward, and his income proved unequal to the many calls upon

his purse. The debts which he incurred during those months very nearly reached 4,000*l.* From June 1854 he occupied a slightly better position as President of the Council; while for a few months in 1855 he drew the salary of a Secretary of State. But from the summer of that year he was again thrown on his own moderate resources, and incurred the anxiety of meeting an expenditure which he could not easily reduce with an inadequate income.

People, whose pecuniary position saved them from the difficulty which Lord John thus incurred, were always ready to complain that he should have insisted on leading the House of Commons in 1853 without office, or that he should have taken the Presidency of the Council and 2,000*l.* instead of the Colonial Department with its 5,000*l.* a year. They had not the generosity to reflect that both decisions exposed Lord John to pecuniary embarrassment, and that men do not wilfully refuse themselves some thousands a year without good reasons or reasons which they think good. After Lord John's final retirement in 1855, the pressure became too great to be any longer neglected. It compelled him in 1857 to let his London house. But, even with the additional income which he thus obtained, his expenditure exceeded his receipts by many hundreds of pounds. It was technically competent for Lord John to have terminated this embarrassment by applying for the pension to which Ministers of the Crown are entitled under certain conditions after certain service. But it would have been little short of a scandal if the brother of a Duke of Bedford had availed himself of a provision intended for poor men. He was saved from the difficulty by the Duke in 1857 taking a step which ordinary persons—recollecting his own wealth and his brother's eminence—will think that he might have taken before. Instead of doling out assistance from time to time, in a manner which must have been both distasteful and unsatisfactory to Lord John,[1] he settled on him, once

[1] Mr. Greville has some strong remarks on this. But, in the Duke's behalf, it should be recollected that he had inherited an embarrassed estate, and that he had retrieved himself from his difficulties by his own careful management, aided, no doubt, by the prodigious growth of the London property. Nothing is so common as for a man, who has practised economy when it was a duty, to go on practising it when it is unnecessary.

for all, an adequate annuity. Thenceforward, though Lord John was never a rich man, he was in comfortable and easy circumstances.

If Lord John had been influenced by pecuniary motives, he would probably, both in 1856 and in 1857, have sought some opportunity for rejoining his old colleagues, and securing the emoluments which usually accompany power. His accession would have been eagerly welcomed. But from 1856 to 1859 he had no desire for office, preferring to give an independent support to Lord Palmerston's Administration. His doing so was made the easier in 1856 from his being thoroughly in accord with the Government in concluding peace at Paris. Some men, indeed, there were who told him—though not quite accurately—that the terms which were agreed to at Paris did not materially differ from those which he had brought home from Vienna; while he would have been justified by the event in contending that his own proposal promised to be more durable than that to which Lord Clarendon agreed. In his satisfaction, however, at the conclusion of the war, he felt no jealousy at Lord Clarendon's success. He wrote of Lord Clarendon's Mission—

He goes to make a peace, of which few people will be proud, but most people will be glad.

He said afterwards in debate—

I believe that the conditions of peace are honourable to her Majesty's crown, and that they fully accomplish the great objects for which the war was undertaken.

His pleasure at the conclusion of peace increased his anxiety to support the Government which had concluded it: and throughout 1856 the Administration could rely on his loyal assistance. The part which he played in Parliament during that year need not be minutely related. In the course of it, however, he brought forward one motion of great importance. The cause of education owed already more to Lord John than to any living statesman. As member of the Government which had authorised the first grants for the purpose, as leader of the House of Commons which had sanctioned the proposals of 1839, as the Prime Minister

who had devised and expounded the policy of 1847, he had shown, in every stage of his career, his sense of the importance of the work. He recommended in 1856 a much more extensive policy. There were in the country—so he estimated—4,000,000 children of school age; exactly one half, or 2,000,000, were borne on the books of some school. But only one fourth of them, or 500,000, were at a school under inspection; while the remainder were at schools where the teaching was so inefficient that the master of one of them on being asked whether he could read replied, 'Yes, I can summat.'[1] To remedy this state of things Lord John wished to largely increase the inspecting staff; to empower the inspectors to inquire into the available means of education in each district; and, when the Privy Council, on the report of the inspector, declared a district inadequately supplied with the means of education, to authorise the magistrates in quarter sessions to supply the deficiency by a compulsory school rate. Lord John desired to evade the religious difficulty by allowing the committee of the school to make provision for religious instruction; and by exempting all children from receiving it whose parents or guardians conscientiously objected to it.

This scheme, which was formulated by Lord John in a long series of resolutions, contemplated of course a great advance on any arrangements which had been hitherto sanctioned; and the result showed it went beyond anything to which Parliament was, at that time, willing to agree. The House, after much debate, defeated Lord John by a decisive majority; and his resolutions are now chiefly worth recollecting because they afford proof that at sixty-four, as at twenty-four, he was in front of his age.

Lord John took a much more active part in the session of 1857 than in that of 1856. Though he only landed in England, after his long absence in Switzerland and Italy, on the 3rd of February, he was in his place in the House of Commons that evening and took part in the debate on the Address. The speech from the throne had alluded, among other things,

[1] Lord John said that there were 8,000 Church of England schools whose masters did not receive more than 28*l.* a year, or 11*s.* a week, and a great many schools where the teachers only received 21*l.* a year, or 8*s.* a week.

to the war which had broken out with Persia; to the acts of violence to the British flag which had led to hostilities in China; and to the suspension of diplomatic negotiations with the Government of the Two Sicilies. The first of these allusions enabled Lord John to indicate a strong opinion that 'it was the constitutional duty of the Government'—on deciding on war—to call Parliament together, and to lay before it the circumstances justifying its inception. The last of them enabled him, while expressing his regret that a firmer policy had not been pursued towards Sicily, to dwell on the whole Italian question, to praise the Government of Piedmont, to denounce the occupation of the Roman States by Austria, and to state his conviction that it would be easy, in conjunction with France, and without risk of war, to procure the withdrawal of Austria into her own provinces of Lombardy and Venice.

It was evident from these remarks that Lord John was no longer in that perfect accord with the Government which he had displayed in 1856. But at the same time he showed no desire to withdraw from Ministers that general independent support which he made it his business to give them. And though, on the 19th of February, he both spoke and voted for Mr. Locke King's motion for the reduction of the county franchise, and carried with him the bulk of the unofficial Liberals into the lobby,[1] on the 23rd of February he warmly supported Sir G. Lewis's Budget—writing two days afterwards, in reply to Sir George's thanks—

February 25, 1857.

Dear G. Lewis,—I was very happy to give such support as I could to your very honest Budget, when it was unfairly and unscrupulously attacked. My speech ought to have been much more effective, but, if it tended to steady the House, I am satisfied. I have my misgivings about the feasibility of paying off so early as the law provides a large portion of our war-debt; but it is a noble and generous attempt, and ought not to be relinquished till retrenchment has been tried to the utmost practicable extent. Your task is not an easy one, and I shall be sorry to add to your difficulties by any course I may find it my duty to pursue.—Yours sincerely,

J. RUSSELL.

[1] Lord Palmerston only defeated the motion by 192 votes to 179, and the 192 were chiefly office-holders or Conservatives.

On the day after that on which this letter was written, Mr. Cobden brought forward the motion which procured Lord Palmerston's defeat, and resulted in the dissolution of 1857. The circumstances on which the motion was made were as follows: 'The Chinese had boarded the "Arrow," and rescued twelve of their countrymen from it on a charge of piracy. The British Consul, Sir John Bowring, remonstrated on the ground that malfeasants on a British ship should not be seized, but should be demanded from the Consul. Technically Sir John was in error. The "Arrow" was not a British ship, its licence had expired; but Sir John Bowring sent word that unless the whole of the men were restored in eight-and-forty hours, with apologies for the past and pledges for the future, the English men-of-war would begin operations. The men were returned; yet, on the following day, naval and military operations were begun: a great number of junks were destroyed, the suburbs of Canton were burnt and battered down, the town was shelled, and this iniquitous devastation was the beginning of a long and costly war.'[1]

Lord John thoroughly disliked these high-handed proceedings. He thought that Sir John Bowring ought never to have resorted to warlike measures without instructions from home; and that the Government, however difficult its situation, ought to have adopted some means of showing that it disapproved its agent's measures. He declined to admit that the character or the interests of this country required that it should support its representatives when they were undoubtedly in the wrong. As he himself said finely—

> We have heard much of late—a great deal too much, I think—of the prestige of England. We used to hear of the character, of the reputation, of the honour of England. I trust, sir, that the character, the reputation, and the honour of this country are dear to us all; but if the prestige of England is to be separate from those qualities . . . then I, for one, have no wish to maintain it. To those who argue, as I have heard some argue, 'It is true we have a bad case; it is true we were in the wrong; it is true that we have committed injustice: but we must persevere in that wrong; we must

[1] I have taken this account from Mr. Morley's *Life of Cobden*, ii. 188, using, though slightly rearranging, his words to fit them to my own text.

continue to act unjustly, or the Chinese will think that we are afraid,' I say, as has been said before, 'Be just, and fear not.'

The effect of this speech was extraordinary. Two such different authorities as Mr. Greville and Mr. Gladstone admitted that, if the House had immediately divided, the Government would have been defeated by an overwhelming majority.[1] Mr. Greville, indeed, while admitting that Lord John's speech was 'powerful, one of his very best efforts, and extremely successful with the House,' went on to declare that it was 'exceedingly bitter,' and 'did all the mischief he wished to do.' Mr. Greville, however, in 1857, saw most things through Lord Clarendon's spectacles; and Lord Clarendon was well aware that Lord John did not thoroughly approve his foreign policy. Those who read Lord John's speech to-day will be puzzled to find in it the bitterness which Mr. Greville detected, and will probably agree with Mr. Morley that Lord John, in supporting Mr. Cobden, 'obeyed an honest instinct for justice.'

Almost immediately after his speech, Lord Aberdeen told Lord John that, if the Ministers were beaten, or had only a small majority in their favour, they would probably desire to dissolve; that the Queen was opposed to dissolution; and that, in the event of her refusing it, and asking his advice, he should recommend her to send for Lord John, whom it was his wish to see at the head of a Ministry which should include Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, and Lord Aberdeen's other friends. Lord John replied that, in his judgment, his right position was one of independence; and after two days' reflection, during which he had the opportunity of consulting Sir Francis Baring, he called on Lord Aberdeen, repeated the opinion, and announced that he did not mean to abandon the independence which he had gained.[2]

A few hours after Lord John expressed this determination

[1] Greville, *Memoirs*, 2nd series, ii. 92; Morley's *Life of Cobden*, ii. 191.

[2] It is right to add that at this interview Lord Aberdeen told Lord John that 'what he had said of the Queen was only conjecture, as he had not seen her since the summer.' He added that when he called on Lord John 'it was not as messenger from his friends or as having any regular proposal to make, but that he wished to express his own opinion.'

to Lord Aberdeen, the debate on Mr. Cobden's resolution terminated, and Lord Palmerston was defeated by a majority of sixteen. On the 5th of March the Minister announced in the House the intention of dissolving Parliament so soon as a Mutiny Act could be passed and the necessary financial arrangements made. In making the announcement, however, he omitted—with characteristic indifference—to say one word on the policy which he would pursue in China. Silence he was not suffered to preserve. Mr. Cobden at once rose to demand an explanation on the subject; while later in the evening Lord John supported Mr. Cobden's demand. The House, so he argued, was about to undergo what Mr. Fox used to call a penal dissolution.

> After a debate of four days we came to the conclusion that the policy which the Government had deemed worthy of approval was, on the contrary, deserving of our censure. Are we then to remain entirely mute . . . without asking what is to happen during the interval of three months?

Unable to resist the pressure, which was thus put upon him, Lord Palmerston confessed that he proposed to send a special Plenipotentiary to China; and Lord John, though he thought this concession further weakened the Government, was satisfied with the assurance.

While, in Parliament, the opponents of Ministers were rejoicing at their victory, the feeling out of doors was rising steadily in Lord Palmerston's favour. Nothing, in truth, is so popular with the mob as what, for want of a better name, may be called the Civis Romanus policy; and Lord Palmerston, with much adroitness, availed himself of this feeling, declaring, in his address to his constituents, that

> An insolent barbarian, wielding authority at Canton, had violated the British flag, broken the engagements of treaties, offered rewards for the heads of British subjects in that part of China, and planned their destruction by murder, assassinations, and poisons.

The issue, so the electors seemed to think, was between the insolent barbarian on the one side, and Lord Palmerston on the other. In a storm of passion they swept away many of the politicians who had voted with Mr. Cobden. Some of

the greatest men in England—Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright in particular—were defeated at the polls; and a Parliament was returned pledged to support Lord Palmerston's policy.

It seemed at one time absolutely certain that Lord John would share the fate of Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright, and be defeated in the City. His chief supporter, Mr. John Abel Smith, met him on the 6th of March, and told him he had no chance whatever. Doubting—so Lady John wrote—

whether he had made much impression, he called on me the next day to ask whether John had determined what to do. I said I thought he meant to fight the battle. He looked most woeful, and said, 'As sure as I stand here he will not be member for the City.' I told him I believed he thought it best at all events to stand. 'Ah, that's all very well if he had even a chance of a tolerable minority, but if he has only two or three votes!' He added that John had as much chance of being Pope of Rome as of being member for the City.

Lady John, of course, reported this conversation to her husband, who made up his mind to bow to the inevitable; and accordingly wrote to Mr. Smith, enclosing a letter to Mr. Dillon, a leading Liberal, and announced his intention of withdrawing from the representation. But a night's rest placed him in better heart; and on the following day, a Sunday, the 8th of March, he wrote a second letter to Mr. Dillon to say that, as the dissolution could not take place for three weeks, he wished to postpone his own determination for some days. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dillon received and read the letter of the 8th a few minutes before Mr. Abel Smith handed him the letter of the 7th. He replied to both letters on the 9th, stating with regret that, if Lord John were a candidate, he could not vote for him. A few hours showed that Mr. Dillon was not singular in his opinions. The Liberal Registration Association met the next day. Rumours reached the meeting of Lord John's intention to resign; and the members, without waiting to test their truth, proceeded to choose four candidates, substituting Mr. Raikes Currie, who in the previous Parliament had represented Northampton, for Lord John. Any man, under such circumstances, might have withdrawn from a contest which seemed to offer no-

chance of victory. Lord John, however, was never so great as when he was confronted by circumstances under which other men would have quailed. Even Mr. Greville, who so strangely misunderstood him at the time, said, 'He is a gallant little fellow, likes to face danger, and comes out well in time of difficulty;' and on this occasion Lord John certainly proved the truth of Mr. Greville's opinion. Instead of shrinking from a contest which his best friends told him was hopeless, he asked the electors to meet him at the London Tavern on the 19th of March. He told them at this meeting that he called them together to appeal against a decision of the Liberal Registration Committee; he complained of the unfair treatment which he was himself experiencing after sixteen years' service to the City:—

> If a gentleman were disposed to part with his butler, his coachman, or his gamekeeper, or if a merchant were disposed to part with an old servant, a warehouseman, a clerk, or even a porter, he would say to him, 'John [the audience of course began to laugh], I think your faculties are somewhat decayed, you are growing old, you have made several mistakes; and I think of putting a young man from Northampton [his auditors laughed still more] in your place.' I think a gentleman would behave in that way to his servant, and thereby give John an opportunity of answering. That opportunity was not given to me. The question was decided in my absence; and I come now to ask you, and the citizens of London, to reverse that decision.

And he sat down amidst a roar of honest enthusiasm, which left him in no doubt of the feelings of those whom he was addressing.

The results of the meeting were soon plain outside the London Tavern. On the following day the Registration Committee passed a resolution in support of the four other candidates; but they only succeeded in carrying it by a small majority. Four days later, Lord John's friends actually ventured on invading a meeting, summoned in his opponent's interests, and succeeded in carrying a show of hands in his favour. Three days later still, Lord John's speech at the nomination was enthusiastically received; and the crowd refused even to listen to the young man from Northampton,

as Mr. Raikes Currie was universally called ; and, on the following day, the 28th of March, his little girl's fourth birthday, Lord John was at the head of the poll from the opening to the last hour ; and, though he ultimately stood in the third place only, polled upwards of 7,000 votes.

This success, due to Lord John's courage, had a great effect on his career. For five years he had undoubtedly occupied a distasteful position. He had been deserted in 1852 by his friends, and he had been since almost constantly misunderstood. Men could not be persuaded to believe that, in breaking up Lord Aberdeen's Administration, he had been actuated by disinterested motives; and they insisted on declaring that he had been ready to conclude an unworthy peace at Vienna, and to argue against it at Westminster. The City election at once changed the opinion both of the electors and the country. Courage always impresses a mob ; Lord John's courage made them think. They could not think at all without reflecting much on Lord John's services and their own ingratitude. A reaction consequently set in ; and reaction, when it once occurs, is apt to be rapid. Wherever Lord John went in 1857, he was received with increasing interest and respect. Paying a visit to South Molton, almost immediately after the election, the people presented him with an address, and enabled him to sound in his reply the keynote of his policy :—

'The opinion of the good,' says Milton, 'is knowledge in the making.' By consulting the opinions of the good and the enlightened the House of Commons recently elected may find means to promote education, to extend political franchises, to enlarge the boundaries of religious freedom by removing some remaining disabilities, and to relieve the people of some of their vexatious burdens. I shall have every reason to be grateful and contented if I am permitted by my votes in Parliament to contribute to such happy results.

Later in the year Lord John attended meetings at Sheffield and Birmingham. At Sheffield he said roundly that the whole truth respecting the negotiations at Vienna had not been made public. At Birmingham he reminded the public of the work still before the House of Commons. The 'Spectator,' in commenting on these meetings, declared

that there was 'a reviving interest' about Lord John personally. 'Perhaps nothing has brought the fact more distinctly home to his own mind than the tone of his reception at Birmingham. He finds himself still recognised and welcomed, and is evidently inspired with new life. The degree of coolness which did exist between Lord John Russell and the public has passed away.'

Lord John, moreover, by his conduct during the session confirmed the favourable impression which he had already made. He might easily have been forgiven if he had shown some animosity towards the Government. No member of it had interfered to prevent the unworthy attempt to oust him from London. One member of it had interfered, so at least Lord John's friends believed, to prevent, in the event of his defeat in the City, his election for Edinburgh. But he retained, throughout the session, the position which he had marked out for himself of an independent supporter of Lord Palmerston; and on one great occasion he rendered the Minister a service such as few have the opportunity of doing. News came, while Parliament was sitting, of the mutiny of the Indian army, the most calamitous event in the history of this country during the present century. Mr. Disraeli, on the 27th of July, under the pretext of moving for papers, made a long and strong attack on Indian administration. Lord John rose late in the debate. He began his speech by declaring that in the presence of what had been truly described as an awful calamity—

I cannot conceive anything less tending to the advantage either of England or of India than such a discussion as the one in which we are now engaged.

He concluded it by a more emphatic declaration :—

Whatever we may do in the future . . . the first matter upon which the House of Commons ought to pronounce any opinion is that the Queen's Government ought to be supported. I have differed from them with respect to several measures not immediately Indian, but connected with the East—their Chinese and Persian wars—but there is no question of these wars at the present time. The question of this evening is the government of India, and I do submit to this House that we ought not to be satisfied with the grant or refusal of

an insignificant paper or despatch; but that, the question having been raised and placed before us, we ought to come to some decision which may give strength to the Government.

And he accordingly moved an address assuring the Crown of the support of the House in its efforts to suppress the disturbance in India.

Mr. Disraeli called Lord John's speech

one of those dry constitutional platitudes which, in a moment of difficulty, the noble Lord the member for the City of London mechanically pulls out of the dusty pigeon-holes of his mind and shakes in the perplexed face of a baffled House of Commons.

But Lord Palmerston, with much truer instinct, said that Lord John had 'struck the keynote of the public feeling;' and the House rejected Mr. Disraeli's proposition and adopted Lord John's address without a division. Lord Fortescue, two days later, expressed the common feeling of all classes in the following letter:—

July 29, 1857.

My dear J. Russell,—I cannot resist telling you the great pleasure with which I have read your speech and the motion which followed it on Monday. Your particular position enabled you to make it with a degree of weight and authority which it could not have derived from any other individual in the House; and you have the merit and the glory of having converted into an aid to the Government and a benefit to the country the most mischievous and unprincipled attempt that I ever recollect to make personal and party capital out of public calamity and disaster. . . .—Yours ever,

FORTESCUE.

Though, however, Lord John concluded that his first duty, in a grave crisis, was to support the Government, he did not regard its treatment of India with unmixed satisfaction. He thought that, if Lord Palmerston had been as active in sending reinforcements to Calcutta as he had proved a year before in despatching troops to China, the mutiny would probably have been confined within narrow limits. The revolt, moreover, taught him, as it taught other people, that the system on which India was governed was obsolete, and that new circumstances required new machinery. But he told Mr. Vernon Smith, the President of the Board of

Control, who applied to him for his opinion on the subject —

I think it would be wrong to ground any change upon an allegation of misconduct on the part of the East India Company. Considering the vast powers entrusted to a set of private gentlemen and merchants, they have conducted their affairs in a wonderful manner, falling into errors that were natural, but displaying merits of a high order. The real ground for change is that the machine is worn out, and, as a manufacturer changes an excellent engine of Watt and Boulton made fifty years ago for a new modern engine with modern improvements, so it becomes us to find a new machine for the government of India.

Lord John went on to say that he hesitated to place the government of our great dependency under a Minister changing with the Administration of the day.

The colonies have been and must continue to be in this position. The consequence has been that the Opposition has made the Government of the colonies a party question, and often on the most unsound and futile pretexts.

And he went on to suggest that India should be placed under a Council whose President, sitting in Parliament, should be removable by the Crown, but not connected with the Executive Government; that the army should be separated into a European or Queen's army and a native army; and that the scheme, instead of being incorporated in a Bill, should be embodied in resolutions, which, after having been discussed and carried in the Commons, could be reported to the Lords.

Lord John mentioned the proposal, which he thus made to Mr. Vernon Smith, to three other persons—Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and Lord Minto. They all thought it impossible that the head of the new Government should not be a member of the Cabinet; and Lord John deferred to their joint opinions.

Parliament, which had sat for a few weeks in December 1857, was adjourned till the 4th of the following February. During the interval a brutal attempt was made on the life of the Emperor of the French by the explosion of bombs, proved to have been manufactured in this country. The outrage led to a violent outbreak of feeling in France. M.

Walewski, on behalf of the French Government, formally asked us to strengthen our laws; the French Ambassador in London spoke in strong terms to a deputation from the City; while the French army sent to the Emperor addresses, which were published in the 'Moniteur,' breathing insult and menace to England. The British Ministry neglected to reply to M. Walewski's despatch; but it determined to comply with the French demand. Sir George Grey communicated the decision privately to Lord John on the 1st of February, and Lord John at once wrote—

Pembroke Lodge: February 2, 1858.

My dear George Grey,—I have read with great pain the letter I have received from you this morning. I was in hopes that the 'Morning Post' and the 'Times' had been misinformed.

It seems to me that the threats against England, published by order of the Emperor in the 'Moniteur,' ought to have made any Minister who had a regard for national dignity decline to enter into any speculative question with a view of altering the law of conspiracy.

I can only say that, if you persist, as I fear you will, I shall oppose you to the utmost of my power.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord John certainly redeemed his promise. He spoke strongly against the introduction of the Bill; closing his speech with an emphatic declaration: 'Let those who will support the Bill of the Government; in that shame and humiliation I am determined not to share.' And, though he took no active part in the debate on Mr. Milner Gibson's amendment, a week later he voted with the majority by which Lord Palmerston's Government was overthrown.

The defeat of Lord Palmerston and the formation of Lord Derby's Government did not, in the first instance, materially affect Lord John's position. There was not much difference, in his eyes, between the new and the old Ministers. Both had been colleagues, both were friends, of his own; and, while Lord Palmerston during his whole continuance of office had showed an increasing inclination to adopt a Conservative policy, Lord Derby had not been many weeks in power before he displayed a desire to conciliate his opponents by Liberal measures. Thus Lord John thought, to use his own expression, that the Tory turned Whig was quite as good

a Minister for England as the Whig turned Tory. 'I am not so eager for office as you suppose'—he wrote to Lord Minto on the 16th of March—

My present position of being able to say what I like is very agreeable. But, while Palmerston was in office, I was exposed to the charge of faction if I did not agree in every measure and almost every word that proceeded from the Ministry. That was a disagreeable position, and it is a pleasure to be relieved from it.

Nor should I be insensible to the honour of again leading the Whig party, who, I think, withdrew their confidence from me in a manner I did not deserve. But I shall not seek this, nor countenance any cabal among the Liberal party. Least of all should I think of leading any party of Radicals and Peelites. I refused last year to be involved in any entangling alliance, and I have repeated my repugnant disclaimer more than once.

Yet Lord John would have been justified at the very outset in waging open war against the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. For Mr. Disraeli had hardly assumed office before he thought it necessary to repeat opinions which he had expressed twenty years before about the great Reform Act. He declared, 'Everybody now considers that there was in the concoction of that Bill a greater number of jobs than was ever perpetrated before;' and that, though its 'nominal object was to improve the representation of the people, [its] great substantial object was the consolidation of Whig power.'

The attack was made at Aylesbury; but the Duke of Bedford told his brother that he could not remain silent under it; and on the 15th of March Lord John referred to it in the House.

Who were the chief Ministers [he asked] concerned in the framing of that Bill? At the head of the Ministry of that day was Lord Grey, a man who for many years of his life had been kept out of power, for which he was eminently qualified, by his perseverance on behalf of an unpopular question. . . . Another chief Minister of that day was Lord Althorp, a man of the purest public virtue. . . . Moreover, all these plans and measures were submitted . . . to a Cabinet of which the Earl of Derby was a distinguished member.

Having thus successfully vindicated his first colleagues

against Mr. Disraeli's reckless imputations, he went on to express his gratification at the correspondence which had just been published between Lord Malmesbury and the French Government.

> I think the noble Lord now at the head of the Foreign Office is likely to carry on the affairs of that department with great regard for the dignity and interests of England.

It is a striking proof of the strained relations between Lord John and Lord Clarendon, that the latter declared that Lord John, in using these harmless words, had gone out of his way to insult him.[1]

Parliament, however, had sterner work before it than this preliminary skirmish. Lord Palmerston, before his defeat, had introduced a Bill for the better government of India. The Conservatives, after the formation of their Ministry, introduced an alternative measure for the purpose. It was soon evident that this scheme—the work of a brilliant but eccentric politician, Lord Ellenborough—had no chance of obtaining favour. Lord John had some intention of moving the rejection of the Bill, and communicated his views on the subject to Lord Granville. He received an assurance, through Mr. George Byng,[2] that, if he took that course, he would be warmly supported both by Lord Palmerston and the late Cabinet. But reflection induced him to think that the government of India was too grave a matter to be sacrificed to the exigencies of a party struggle. Lord Derby, speaking at the Mansion House early in April, threw out a suggestion for compromise; and Lord John, impressed with the good sense of the speech, sat down and wrote the following letter:—

Private] Pembroke Lodge: April 1858.

My dear Lord Derby,—Your speech at the Mansion House induces me to write to you on an important subject. I agree with you in the wish that the India Bill may not be made 'the battlefield of party.' Now there are two Bills before the House of Commons—yours and Lord Palmerston's. You have a full right to have your

[1] Greville, 3rd series, ii. 180. Even Mr. Greville says that this shows the excessive soreness and ill-humour of the outgoing party.

[2] The present Lord Enfield.

Bill moved, and to ask the House of Commons for an opinion on the second reading. But this cannot be done without the consequence you deprecate. Nor could Lord Palmerston's Bill be put in the place of yours without a party struggle and a party victory. It has struck me that it would be possible in a committee of the whole House to pass resolutions which might form the groundwork of a Bill. This was the course pursued by Lord Liverpool in 1813, and he stated the reason for it with his usual candour and fairness. I should be inclined myself to propose this course, and I have prepared resolutions for the purpose. But it would be idle presumption in me to foist my views between the Government and the consideration of their Bill, unless I had their full consent for doing so. If, therefore, without entering into the substance of my resolutions, the form of proceeding appears to you conducive to the public interest, I will ask Mr. Disraeli a question on Monday, and guide myself by his reply. If, on the other hand, the Government think that the second reading of their Bill should be proceeded with on the 19th, I shall take such part as I shall think fit on that occasion without interposing any previous resolutions.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

This letter is important because it shows Lord John's desire to help the new Government out of a present difficulty. But, as a matter of fact, it was never sent; Lord John probably thought that it would be more convenient to communicate the proposal to Lord Derby through some mutual friend, and so thinking kept back his letter. But there is no doubt that the proposal was communicated in some way to the Conservative chieftain. For on the Monday Lord John took the exact course which in his letter he said he would take; Mr. Disraeli at once accepted Lord John's offer; and, in consequence, the Bill which transferred the government of India to the Crown became law in the session of 1858.

There was no doubt that Lord John, by his seasonable suggestion, had rendered a great service both to the Government and to the country. The former it had confirmed in power; the latter it had saved from the reproach that the government of two hundred millions of people had been made a battle-field of party. But, as usual, Lord John's motives were misunderstood, and his conduct abused.

The 'Times' attacked him with the utmost bitterness, and there

is a general clamour against him on the part of the late Government and their friends.[1]

Lord John, conscious that he had done his duty, cared very little for this clamour; and he had the satisfaction of observing that the existence of a Conservative Government promoted the acceptance of one reform for which he had vainly struggled. Ever since the general election of 1847 Lord John had steadily demanded that the oath of abjuration —which no Jew could conscientiously take—should be altered and that his own colleague, Baron Rothschild, should thus be enabled to take his seat for the City, which on three successive occasions had returned him as its representative. But the measure of relief, though regularly passed by the Commons, was as regularly rejected by the Lords. In 1857 Lord John endeavoured to evade the difficulty by a new expedient. He argued that an Act of William IV. empowered the Commons to substitute a new form of declaration for the abjuration oath;[2] but the select committee, to which the suggestion was referred, failed to support its author; and the Jews still remained excluded from sitting in the Legislature. The Conservatives, however, on attaining office, found it inconvenient to continue the struggle. They decided on effecting by fresh legislation very much what Lord John had intended to accomplish with the aid of the Act of William. They consented to authorise either House, by resolution, not to substitute a declaration for the oath of abjuration, but to omit from that oath the words which were offensive to the Jew. Lord John thought it wiser to accept a compromise, which he did not wholly approve, than to continue a tedious struggle; and, the House adopting the same view, Baron Rothschild on the 26th of July at last took his seat. That night, oddly enough, the Baron and Lord John voted in opposite lobbies on the Corrupt Practices Bill. Four days later the Baron thus acknowledged Lord John's services:—

Piccadilly: July 30, 1858.

My dear Lord John,—Although I have endeavoured verbally to express my feelings of gratitude for your great exertions during our

[1] Greville, 3rd series, ii. 185. [2] May's *Const. Hist.* iii. 186.

long struggle, and to offer you my sincere thanks for the kindness you have invariably shown to me, I know that I have done so too feebly and in terms which in no way could have conveyed to you my sentiments for the manner in which you undertook to plead our cause, and brought it to a triumphant issue. During the last eleven years I have taken up much of your valuable time, and I have often hesitated before I interrupted you in your more agreeable occupations; but on every occasion I have been most kindly received by you, and have always found you the true and sincere friend of the oppressed and the warm advocate of just and liberal measures. I remember with the greatest satisfaction the first time on the hustings that you introduced me as your friend; I hope that I have merited the sentiments which you then expressed, and that I shall continue to enjoy the good opinion of one for whom I have the greatest esteem and admiration.—Pray believe me, dear Lord John, your most sincere and devoted,

LIONEL DE ROTHSCHILD.

Though, however, the existence of a Conservative Government was evidently promoting Liberal measures, many of Lord John's friends disliked the state of things which had arisen. They thought it anomalous and inconvenient for Conservatives to be promoting in office measures which they had opposed in opposition; and they considered a Ministry which was surrendering its principles unworthy of support. The managers of the party became consequently anxious for a policy of aggression; and, as a preliminary to action, they desired to heal the differences which kept the various sections of Liberals asunder. They could hardly conceal from themselves that a new combination was impossible which did not satisfy the rival claims of Lord Palmerston and Lord John. It was a proof how greatly Lord John had risen in public estimation since 1855, that the universal consent of his followers placed him again on a level with Lord Palmerston; while a large section of the Liberal party was looking to him and not to Lord Palmerston as its future leader. If, however, the party was anxious for a forward movement, Lord John himself had too much pleasure in his independence to feel any desire for a fresh Ministerial crisis. He was on the best of terms with the Prime Minister; he paid him a visit at Knowsley this very autumn; and, though he was anxious for a new

Reform Bill, he was as ready to accept a good measure from Lord Derby as to introduce it himself. Busy with his literary pursuits, and contented with his own position, he would not—if no new question had arisen—have cared to disturb the Conservative Administration.

In the course of the autumn, however, it became evident that a new crisis was arising in Italy. Lord John, who was in communication with many leading Italians, told Lord Minto on the 29th of October that the Italians, 'relying on the supposed readiness of Louis Napoleon to give his assistance on condition—(1) that he should have Savoy, (2) that the Pope should be secured in the sovereignty of the city of Rome—were preparing for a fresh struggle.' He added that he had himself told his informant in reply, 'that the affairs regarded all Europe, and ought to be settled by a European concert. But [that] there was little chance that Lord Derby would favour such a concert.' He wrote again on the 14th of December :—

I have been told confidentially that an agent of the French Foreign Office is inquiring in London what part the Liberal press will take if the Emperor Napoleon crosses the Alps to help Sardinia, asking only for Savoy as a reward.

This looks serious. I cannot tell Palmerston and Clarendon, as I suspect their advice to the Emperor would be quite against Italy. But you take so great an interest in her fate that I tell you—and you only.

I have advised, as I told you long ago, a general congress. The powers would not be so hostile to Italy as you suppose. Russia would favour France. Prussia will hardly be active in favour of Austria. Malmesbury is, I fear, quite hostile, but not the House of Commons. . . .—Yours affectionately,

J. R.

Lord John's desire for a congress was not destined to be realised. On the contrary, at the beginning of 1859, the speech of Napoleon to the Austrian Ambassador, the projected marriage between Prince Napoleon and the King of Sardinia's daughter, and the language of the King of Sardinia made it evident that the issue would be settled by arms. When Parliament met, on the 3rd of February, the Queen expressed her desire to contribute, as far as her influence could

extend, to the preservation of the general peace; and men of all parties, in the debate on the Address, reciprocated the Queen's language. Lord John himself deprecated an infraction of the peace of Europe as 'one of the very worst examples that could be set.' But he went on that 'we should gain no advantage for the cause of peace, no advantage for the future welfare of Italy or of Europe, by endeavouring to blind our eyes to those serious evils and misfortunes which have from time to time been inflicted on Italy.' Tracing the various acts of interference by Austria and France in the affairs of the peninsula, he declared of the Romagna that Austrian forces and French forces 'impose upon that country about the very worst form of government that any country ever had.' And it was to the withdrawal of these foreign forces that he looked for a remedy.

> I am convinced that the people of Central Italy—a people who for five centuries have been glorious in literature . . . if the foreign forces were withdrawn . . . would soon settle such laws for their own government as would produce contentment and prosperity. .

Thus, at the very commencement of 1859, a question was brought into sudden prominence on which Lord John felt strongly, and on which he had no confidence in the Conservative Administration. The attitude of neutrality, which he had hitherto observed, could not but be affected by the circumstance. And the introduction of a measure of Parliamentary Reform by the Conservative Cabinet almost necessarily drove him into a fresh alliance with Liberals. Sir Theodore Martin, in writing the Life of the Prince Consort, has not hesitated to declare that 'whatever measure Lord Derby's Ministry might propose was sure to be challenged by Lord John Russell and others, who looked upon themselves as having a sort of exclusive right to guide the public mind upon the question.' Such a sentence is only a proof that Sir Theodore failed to appreciate Lord John's conduct and character. Lord John would have welcomed a good measure of Reform from any source, but he was determined to accept Reform from no source which did not proceed on what he thought sound principles.

No one with any acquaintance with Lord John's views on Reform could doubt, moreover, that the particular measure which the Conservative Government adopted would be objectionable to him both from what it did and what it did not. (1) It left the borough franchise unchanged. (2) It reduced the occupation franchise in counties from 50*l.* to 10*l.* (3) It transferred the right of voting, in respect of town freeholds, from the counties to the town in which the freeholds were situated. (4) It did nothing to bring the franchise down to the level of the working classes.

As he himself said immediately after its introduction—

Ever since I departed from that proposition of finality which Earl Grey and Lord Althorp always insisted upon, I have done so upon this ground—which appeared to me to be the only ground for disturbing the settlement of so vast and complicated a subject—namely, that there was a great body of persons, and those persons belonging to the working classes of the country, who were very competent to exercise the franchise. With regard to all these persons the right hon. gentleman does little or nothing.

Holding these views, he gave notice on the 10th of March that he should move a resolution, upon the second reading of the Bill, in conformity with them. That resolution was carried, after a memorable debate, on the morning of the 1st of April, by a majority of 39; and on the following Monday Ministers announced their intention of dissolving Parliament and of appealing to the country.

Two days after this announcement Lord John issued his address to the electors of the City. He naturally placed his conduct on the Reform Bill in the forefront of the battle.

Her Majesty's Ministers, early in the session, introduced a so-called Reform Bill. Among the defects of the Bill, which were numerous, one provision was conspicuous by its presence and another by its absence. . . . It seemed to me that to move an amendment pointing out on the second reading the chief faults of the Bill would be the most clear, manly, and direct course: it was approved by a majority of the whole House of Commons.

But, in the few weeks which elapsed before the dissolution took place, the circumstances which were visibly leading to the Franco-Austrian war raised a new issue of greater

importance even than Reform; and Lord John at once brought the new question before his constituents.

. . . The Earl of Derby has clearly intimated that in the event of war our position must be one of 'armed neutrality, enabling us to take part on that side, whatever it may be, which the honour, the interests, and the dignity of this country may indicate as best deserving our support.'

Unfortunately, the language of Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, for several years past, leaves no room to doubt which is the side which in their opinion will best deserve our support. It is the side of Austria.

It appears to me, on the other hand, that the honour of Great Britain demands that she should not assist in riveting the chains of Italy, and that her interest requires that she should maintain peace with all the powers of Europe.

I am, therefore, in favour of an open, honest, and strict neutrality.

Lord John encountered no difficulty in 1859 in retaining the seat which his own gallantry had saved him in 1857. But the election was not otherwise favourable to the cause of Liberalism. The Conservatives gained largely at the polls; and, though they failed to secure a majority, they formed a compact party of more than 300 members in the new House of Commons. Numerically strong, moreover, they gained fresh strength from the disorganisation of their opponents. The Liberals could not but suffer from the circumstance that they had two ex-Prime Ministers in their camp. The events of the last two years had lowered Lord Palmerston in estimation as much as they had raised Lord John; and the managers of the party thought that it was as impossible to expect Lord John to serve under Lord Palmerston as to place Lord Palmerston under Lord John.

The men who were speculating on a possible solution of this dilemma were disposed, as usual, to throw the blame of it on Lord John. Mr. Greville, writing on the 29th of May, declared that 'everything was thrown into uncertainty because Lord John would not say what he intended to do.' Mr. Greville was, for once, misinformed. Lord John had distinctly stated what he intended to do. Writing privately to one of his most familiar correspondents on the 16th of May, he said, There

is 'no personal difference between Palmerston and me. We should act together cordially if others did not interfere to make mischief;' while on the 17th of May he distinctly indicated his own opinion to Sir James Graham :—

Pembroke Lodge: May 17, 1859.

My dear Graham,— . . . There is a great disposition in the Liberal party to say that the differences between Palmerston and me are the cause why a Liberal Government cannot be made. Now, although this is not true, I feel that I ought if called upon to destroy all reasonable ground for saying that my personal pretensions stand in the way of the public welfare.

On the other hand, I cannot, without sacrificing public objects, accept office without power, and expose myself to be strangled at any moment by the mutes of the party.

There are two situations of influence in the general, as distinguished from the departmental, government of the country: the one that of Prime Minister, the other that of leader of the House of Commons. . . . It seems to me that, if a Liberal Ministry is to be formed, power ought to be divided on fair and equal terms—that is, if he (Palmerston) is Prime Minister, I should lead in the Commons; if I were to be Prime Minister, he ought to lead in the House of Commons. In either case the nomination to Cabinet offices ought to be concerted between us. I have already told you my views on this subject. Of course we should have a full explanation upon Reform and foreign affairs, but I do not anticipate much difference of opinion upon either subject. If, however, on the first point of the leadership we could not agree, there would at once be an end of the negotiation. So likewise if there was a difference which was incurable on any other vital point.—I remain, yours faithfully,

J. RUSSELL.

This letter had the effect, which it was intended to produce, of bringing Lord Palmerston and Lord John into communication; but it did not lead to any immediate arrangement. Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Granville—

94 Piccadilly: May 29, 1859.

My dear Granville,—I have been reflecting upon what you said to me to-day, and I feel, as you do, that it is important that an end should be put to the notion, which has been so inadvertently spread among the Liberals, that there are jealousies and ill-feelings between John Russell and me which would prevent the formation of a Liberal Government in the event of an overthrow of the present Administra-

tion ; and I concur with you that the most effectual way of removing that impression would be that an agreement should be come to between John Russell and me that we would both of us become members of any Government either he or I might be called upon by the Queen to form, and you are at liberty to propose this arrangement to him.

Of course such an arrangement would not apply to the case of any other person being commissioned by the Queen to form an Administration. In such a case John Russell and I would hold ourselves free to take such course as we might each of us think proper.

Yours, &c.,

PALMERSTON.

Lord Granville forwarded this letter to Lord John, who replied—

My dear Granville,—I have considered the letter of which you gave me a copy, and have come to the following conclusions : first, that, however important it is to put an end to the notion that there are jealousies and ill-feelings between Palmerston and me which would prevent the formation of a Liberal Government, it would not be right that either of us should surrender his liberty of action in a way that might lead to public injury or a breach of agreement.

Second, an agreement that we would both of us become members of any Government which, on the overthrow of the present Government, either he or I might be called upon to form, does appear to me to hamper most inconveniently our separate liberty of action.

Though Lord Palmerston's overture led to no direct agreement, the correspondence indirectly led to a removal of differences. During the next few days a meeting of the Liberal party was held which was summoned in the joint names of Lord Palmerston and Lord John ; and, though nothing was definitely settled, the suggestion which Lord Palmerston had made was practically adopted.

The Queen was not ignorant of the negotiations which had taken place between Lord Palmerston and Lord John. She was aware that the somewhat delicate task of awarding the apple of supremacy to one of the two claimants had been referred to her ; and she not unnaturally attempted to evade the difficulty by asking both of them to serve under a neutral peer, Lord Granville. Lord Palmerston at once assented to the suggestion ; Lord John, in assenting to it,

stipulated that he should lead the House of Commons. It then at once became apparent that Lord Palmerston had made in his own mind, though he had not expressed, the same reservation as Lord John. Yet, with the strange inability to appreciate Lord John's motives which characterises his work, Sir Theodore Martin has nothing but praise for Lord Palmerston, and nothing but blame for Lord John. To an ordinary intellect it is difficult to see why Lord John any more than Lord Palmerston could be expected to forgo the lead. If Lord Palmerston had led the Liberal party for the last four years, Lord John had led it for the preceding twenty. The correspondence, however, will tell the story:—

Private] Bruton Street: June 11, 1859.

'My dear Lord John,—I saw Lord Palmerston again after my conversation with you. I informed him that you had in a very kind and friendly manner stated that you had no objection to serve under me, but that you considered that you could not do justice to your political views, if you were not Prime Minister, unless you occupied the same post as that which you held under Lord Melbourne; that you doubted whether you should have any confidence in any other occupier of the Foreign Office, excepting Lord Palmerston. Lord P. told me that if he had been sent for by the Queen he should not have thought it right to alter his position by going to the House of Lords; that, if you had been sent for, he should not have required you to do so as a condition of his serving under you; and that, serving under a third person, he could not consent to abandon the position which he now held. I have seen Milner Gibson, who considers it a *sine qua non* that you and Palmerston should both be in the Government; that either of you below the gangway would be fatal to the Government; that he would prefer you as leader of the House of Commons; but that he is ready to acquiesce in any arrangement with which you are satisfied. Gladstone, Herbert, and Lewis believe your joining to be of the greatest importance, but are of opinion that a Government must be formed or the Liberal party will be disgraced. How this is now to be contrived I do not know. I should be much obliged to you to let me know immediately whether your answer of this evening is final, as it is not fair to the Queen that she should not know as soon as possible whether I continue or give up the attempt. I must thank you again for your great personal kindness towards myself.—Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

Lord John replied—

Pembroke Lodge, Richmond: June 12, 1859.

My dear Granville,—I thought I had made an answer to your proposition which you could submit to the Queen.

I have no difficulty in repeating that, while I feel deeply her Majesty's great personal kindness towards myself, I cannot accept your proposal.

What has passed between you and Palmerston, however, appears to me to free the position from some difficulties.

It is clear that if I were to form a Ministry I should have the assistance of Lord Palmerston. On the other hand, if he is to form a Ministry, I should expect him to propose to me any office I might choose (omitting, of course, his own) with the option of going to the House of Lords or remaining in the House of Commons under him.

That proposition on the grounds of fairness and equality I am prepared to accept. I hope I have made myself clear. With Palmerston I could only have to consider who is to have the first and who the second office in the State. With you I could only occupy the third, and should not feel that I had sufficient security either on foreign affairs or on Reform.

I am afraid her Majesty must encounter the difficulty of making a choice. But I do not think either Lord Palmerston or I should be inclined to do otherwise than submit with respect and loyal duty to her Majesty's decision.

I am glad you feel that I mean no personal unkindness to you. My resolution, however, as to your proposal is final.—I remain, ever yours very truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Granville, on receiving this letter, at once resigned the commission which the Queen had entrusted to him, and the Queen sent for Lord Palmerston.

94 Piccadilly: June 12, 1859.

My dear John Russell,—Granville having given up his commission to form a Government, the Queen sent for me this afternoon and has desired me to undertake the duty. I shall drive down to Pembroke Lodge as soon as I have dined in order to request your assistance, and to ask what office you would like to hold.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

The Queen's decision settled the question. The apple of supremacy had been definitely awarded; and, in the interests both of his party and of his country, Lord John at once

determined to accept office. He simply stipulated that he should receive the seals of Foreign Secretary.[1] Both the Queen and Lord Palmerston would have preferred Lord Clarendon's appointment to that office, and Lord Clarendon's friends were inclined to complain that Lord John should not have given way to him. It is difficult to deal seriously with such a contention. Those indeed must have had a low opinion of Lord John's services and claims who could have imagined that the man who had led the Liberal party for twenty years, and who was waiving his own claims in deference to the public interests, had not a right to insist on any office he thought proper to select. But, as a matter of fact, he had not only the right, but he would have been guilty of extraordinary folly if he had acted otherwise; for the question of the hour was the question of Italy, and on that subject Lord John not merely felt strongly, but he differed from Lord Clarendon. Lord John, therefore, had no course but to take the Foreign Office himself, or to risk the renewal of the dissensions which had weakened and discredited the Aberdeen Administration. He insisted, therefore, on receiving the seals of the Foreign Office, and to this decision may be attributed the fact that modern Italy acknowledges that she owes more to the moral support which she received from this country than to the material support of the third Napoleon.

[1] He told Lord Palmerston on June 16 that 'the importance of European affairs at this moment is my temptation and justification.'

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ITALY FOR THE ITALIANS.

LORD JOHN entered on his second administration of the Foreign Office at a very critical moment. In the week which preceded the final defeat of Lord Derby's Government, the battle of Magenta was fought. In the week which followed the formation of the new Ministry, the Austrians were beaten at Solferino. But the Emperor of the French, horrified at the bloodshed which he had caused, and alarmed at the increasing difficulties of his situation, at once decided on stopping hostilities. He instructed Count Persigny, the French Ambassador in London, to ask the English Government to propose an armistice, and to suggest terms of peace; and, when the Cabinet declined to do more than authorise Lord John to hand the proposal to the Austrian Ambassador without comment, he sent a messenger to the Austrian Emperor proposing an armistice. A few days later, on the 11th of July, the two Emperors met at Villafranca, and arranged between themselves the preliminaries of peace.

Writing confidentially on the 13th of July, Sir James Hudson, the British Minister at Turin, communicated to Lord John the conditions on which it was intended to make peace. They were as follows: Lombardy was to be ceded by Austria, Tuscany and Modena were to be restored to their Dukes, Venice was to remain Austrian, Parma was to be placed at Napoleon's disposal, and the Pope was to become the head of a Confederation of Italian princes. He declared that there was only one universal opinion at Milan and Turin, 'Siamo traditi;' he added, on the 17th, that Napoleon was already styled 'il gran traditore;' that Victor Emanuel had only signed the armistice with the reservation 'en ce qui me concerne;' that he complained that Napoleon had treated

him like a dog; that Count Cavour, rather than be a party to the treaty, had flung up office; and that Italy was lost if she did not throw herself into the arms of England.

Before Lord John received these letters, Count Persigny called upon him, and told him that the Emperor of Austria desired that the terms which had been provisionally arranged at Villafranca should be embodied in a treaty. But that

> The Emperor of the French thought that a European congress should meet in order to settle the remaining Italian questions and convert the convention into a European treaty.

And Lord John, writing to Lord Cowley on the 16th of July, declared that, before the Government could consider the proposal, he must know whether Austria, as owning Venice, was to enter the proposed Confederation; whether the King of Sardinia and the King of the Two Sicilies were to be allowed to exercise their own free will as to entering it or not; whether French, Austrian, or Piedmontese troops were to be employed to restore their old rulers to the Duchies; and whether French and Austrian troops were to be left in occupation of Rome and the Romagna. He added, three days afterwards—

> It seems to me that if Austria is a member of the Confederation, whatever the number of votes may be, she will have the Pope, the two Dukes, and probably the King of Naples in her train, and thus virtually rule the Austrian, not Italian, Confederation. If this point is irrevocably to be decided by the peace between the powers at Zurich, I think a conference can be of no use.

Lord John did not stop at this point. On the day on which he was thus writing to the British Ambassador at Paris, he wrote both privately and publicly to Mr. Corbett, the British Minister at Florence, urging that a representative assembly should be convoked in Tuscany, 'in order that the wishes of the people in favour of the autonomy of that country may be regularly and freely expressed.' He used the same language in the House of Commons, defending the conduct of Victor Emanuel by pleading the example of William III., and declaring that he could be no party to denying the people of Italy the right of

choosing their own sovereign which had been exercised in Belgium, Holland, Sweden, France, and Great Britain. On the 25th of July he sent a despatch to Lord Cowley, pointing out his strong objections to the presence of Austria in the Italian Confederation, and adding 'that the only way of carrying into effect the declared views of Great Britain and France at the Conferences of 1856 is to free Italy as soon as possible from the presence of foreign troops whether French or Austrian;' while, on the 16th of August, he addressed identic despatches both to Paris and Vienna, in which he contended that every people had a right to choose their own Government, and that 'the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena by foreign forces would be to return to that system of foreign interference which for upwards of forty years has been the misfortune of Italy and the danger of Europe.' Thus 'Italy for the Italians' was, from the very outset, the watchword of Lord John's policy.

At Vienna this policy was from the first regarded with extreme irritation: Count Rechberg warmly resented Lord John's dictum that every independent State had a right to regulate its own internal government, and indulged 'in very bitter reproaches' against the British Government. His anger was not unnatural. There could be no doubt that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were openly evincing a desire for Italian independence which was not compatible with the apparent interests of the Emperor of Austria. Even in England, the Queen expressed her dislike of the language which her Ministers were using. 'We did not protest against the war,' she argued; 'we can hardly now protest against the peace.' Believing that Lord John and Lord Palmerston were more liberal than their colleagues, she appealed from them to the Cabinet as a whole; she insisted that the formation of an Italian Confederation and the restoration of the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena to their duchies should be considered as the compensation which Austria was to receive for the loss of Lombardy; and the Prime Minister had to state, in Lord John's name and his own, that, if their advice were not adopted, Ministers might have no alternative but to lay down their offices.

But the irritation of the Austrian Government, the hesitation of the British Court, and even the stipulations on which the two Emperors had agreed at Villafranca, were all powerless to shake Lord John's conviction that 'Italy for the Italians' was the true policy for England and Europe; and it very soon became evident that he was likely to achieve the success which is the usual reward of firmness and decision.[1] Events both in France and in Italy steadily moved in his favour. In France Napoleon could not afford to let England supplant him in the affections of the Italians. Set, moreover, on a congress, he was ready to concede much in order to overcome Lord John's objections to entering into conference; he at last avowed that, if it proved impossible to found an Italian Confederation without giving preponderance to Austria, France would consider the possibility of constituting it without Austria; and he authorised Count Walewski to add that he had never contemplated the employment of force to restore Grand Duke and Duke to their Duchies, and that he was himself anxious to withdraw his troops from every part of Italy.

In Italy events moved still more decisively in favour of Lord John's policy. The Tuscan representatives, assembled in accordance with his suggestion, arrived at a unanimous vote in favour of annexation to Piedmont. Modena and Parma followed the example of Florence; and a deputation was sent from the Duchies to Victor Emanuel to acquaint him with this decision.

The Government of Piedmont was, however, not strong. And, with France on one side and Austria on the other, it hesitated what to do. Instead of grasping the nettle it appealed to Lord John for advice; and Lord John replied that, though

[1] I have passed over this negotiation rapidly. But, in the middle of September, it did not seem likely to end so happily. Lord Cowley wrote on September 9 to say that Prince Metternich had had a long interview with Napoleon, and had arranged a scheme under which Parma and Piacenza were to be annexed to Piedmont, Modena to pass to the Duchess of Parma, and Tuscany to revert to the Grand Duke. Lord John replied privately, 'I could not answer your No. 500 in a despatch, for I should use terms of abhorrence and indignation too strong for eyes and ears diplomatic. The disposal of the Tuscans and Modenese as if they were so many firkins of butter is somewhat too profligate.'

he could not speak officially, he thought Victor Emanuel might say that 'the creation of a large kingdom in the north of Italy was a matter so much affecting the balance of power that he could not undertake the decision of such a question without European consent; but in the meantime he would be prepared to defend Tuscany against the danger of internal disorder.' This opinion was quite enough for the people of Central Italy. From the 1st of October the government of Tuscany was conducted in Victor Emanuel's name; and, on the 9th of November, the Tuscan Assembly appointed Victor Emanuel's cousin, Prince Carignan, Regent of the Duchy.

This movement was too rapid for Napoleon to endure. He bluntly told Victor Emanuel that, if Prince Carignan went to Central Italy, France would abandon him. And on receiving this threat Piedmont again turned to Lord John. If he were only assured of English support against Austria, Victor Emanuel declared that he would persevere in Prince Carignan's appointment. Such an assurance Lord John could not, of course, give; and Prince Carignan accordingly refused the proffered nomination, but substituted a Piedmontese statesman, Signor Buoncompagni, in his room.

While France was showing a steady disposition to concede to England, and Central Italy was displaying a firm resolution to throw in its lot with Piedmont, Austria, though too angry to be silent, was too timid to strike. In July the Grand Duke of Tuscany offered to abdicate in favour of his son. In September Austria admitted that she had no intention of using force; while in November it was shrewdly conjectured that she was pursuing a policy of delay in the hope that events might give her either an excuse or an opportunity for interference.

Delay, however, did not operate in favour of Austria. The long negotiations at Zurich were at last concluded and the invitations to the Congress were issued. As 'the Emperor of the French [had] repeatedly declared himself opposed to the employment of force for the purpose of restoring the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena;' as the preamble of the treaty declared that both Emperors were desirous not only to put an end to the calamities of war, but

also to prevent the renewal of the complications which had given rise to it, by contributing to erect on solid and durable bases the internal and external independence of Italy; as, moreover, 'deliberation on the means by which this end is to be accomplished [formed] the sole object of the proposed congress,' Lord John considered that he was justified in advising the Queen to accept the invitation on the part of England, and named the beginning of January as a suitable time for the meeting of the Congress.

The Congress, however, was never destined to meet. Late in December the famous pamphlet, 'Le Pape et le Congrès,' appeared in Paris. Attributed to the Emperor Napoleon, it produced a feeling of dismay and distrust both at Rome and at Vienna. The Austrian Government required an engagement that France would neither introduce nor support at the Congress the measures which were advocated in the pamphlet, and, failing to obtain the requisite assurance, declined to enter into conference. The French Foreign Minister—Count Walewski—unable to secure an official disavowal of the pamphlet, resigned his office, and was succeeded by M. Thouvenel. The arrangement, which it had taken months to conclude, was abruptly ended; and a definite settlement seemed more remote than ever.

Lord John was not disconcerted by the new dilemma; he was steadily set on ensuring the success of his policy 'Italy for the Italians;' and, as the chances of the Congress receded, was prepared with France and Sardinia to prevent Austrian intervention. The alarm of the Queen, who thought her Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were driving the country into war, and the hesitation of a section of the Cabinet, induced him to modify his proposal in form; and, in the middle of January 1860, he brought forward a fresh project, proposing that—

1. France and Austria should agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy unless called upon to do so by the unanimous consent of the five great powers of Europe.

2. The Emperor of the French should concert with his Holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to be in any way matter of negotiation between the European powers.

4. Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several States and provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny. Should that decision be in favour of annexation to Sardinia, Great Britain and France will no longer require that Sardinian troops should not enter those States and provinces.

Lord John made the first three of these proposals both to Austria and France. The fourth of them he made to France alone; communicating it, however, to Austria, and stating that he did not ask her assent to it. M. Thouvenel, on the part of France, substantially assented to the first three points; he added that the Emperor considered the principle laid down in the fourth point equitable and practical, though he thought himself bound in honour to address himself to Austria before formally adopting it. Count Rechberg, on the contrary, though he received the communication with 'composure and affability,' at once declared that he did not think that the Emperor of Austria would 'consent to enter into any formal or binding agreement not to interfere in Italian affairs. . . . The Imperial Cabinet could not loudly proclaim a policy of non-intervention,' though 'it might have no intention of interfering by force of arms in the Italian States.' To France he used even stronger language: 'I will tell you,' so he said to the French Ambassador, 'we have no intention of interfering in Italy; we are not going to invoke again the dangers from which we have escaped.'

It was clear from these facts that the end was coming very near. Lord John was persistently saying that the future of Italy should be settled by Italians. Napoleon had, over and over again, promised that French force should not be employed in opposition to their decision; and now Austria, though protesting against the doctrine of non-intervention was forced to admit that she did not intend to interfere. While the external aspect of affairs had improved, the internal condition of Italy was stronger; for Count Cavour had again returned to office, and the control of Italian policy had passed into firm hands.

Indirectly the return of Count Cavour to power was due

to Lord John. At his suggestion the Count had been nominated to represent Piedmont at the Congress; and when the idea of a Congress fell through he wrote to Sir James Hudson, 'I hope Cavour will come to Paris and London, congress or no congress.' 'As oaks grow from acorns,' Sir James Hudson replied, 'so even did this curt invitation produce its fruit in the downfall of the Cabinet.'

The process was as follows: Count Cavour declined to leave Italy unless he received a guarantee that the Piedmontese Parliament should be assembled at the earliest possible opportunity, viz. the 20th of March. 'The personal dignity of the King,' who at that time had no love for the Count, 'was offended at the notion of [his] requiring a guarantee;' and Count Cavour thereupon flung up the mission. The friends of both parties were startled at this failure, and came to Sir James Hudson, who had no difficulty in drawing up a form of words which secured the objects of the Count and respected the susceptibilities of the King. But the members of the Rattazzi Cabinet could not close their eyes to the fact that the incident had displayed their own weakness and the Count's strength.[1] They accordingly resigned office, and Victor Emanuel sent for Count Cavour.

Lord John saw at once the full importance of the change. Writing to Sir James Hudson on the last day of January, he said—

> The critical moment has arrived, and I am delighted to have Cavour's sense and ability to conduct matters at Turin instead of the late incapables.

The crisis had indeed come. In the next few weeks events marched at railway speed. Though M. Thouvenel, by the Emperor's desire, brought forward an alternative scheme for constituting Tuscany into a separate principality,[2]

[1] Sir James Hudson added, 'I was not a little astonished to learn that I was accused of having exercised an undue pressure upon the Rattazzi Cabinet (if I had had the power it would have been by the application of hemp to its windpipe, and not by sending a scrap of paper), which had forced its chief to tender his resignation to the King. . . . I cannot say that I was particularly affected by the intelligence but I deemed it advisable to enter a protest against the truth of that assertion.'

[2] On this subject, as well as on the whole Italian policy of France from 1860 to 1863, a good deal of light has been thrown by the publication of the corre-

Lord John declined to recommend any plan but his own, which had been virtually adopted by the Italians. M. Thouvenel's project fell, in consequence, still-born. By the middle of March the new vote, which Lord John had recommended, was taken in Central Italy. The people, by a practically unanimous voice, decided on annexation to Piedmont. With England approving, and France assenting to the scheme, Austria abstained, as she had already said she should abstain, from interference; and the first great step was taken in the advance which was ultimately to lead to a United Italy.

Lord Palmerston had written to Lord John three months before—

> If you should succeed in establishing a respectable State in Northern and Central Italy founded upon the free will and choice of the people, you will erect for [? your] administration of the affairs of Europe, *monumentum ære perennius*, and which I am convinced will not suffer by the *fuga temporum*.

The work which had then seemed almost impossible had been accomplished.

Unhappily, there was one drawback to this success. It will be recollected that, more than a year before, Lord John, writing to Lord Minto, had alluded to a story, which he had heard on competent authority, that Italy had secured the assistance of Napoleon in her forthcoming struggle with Austria by promising the annexation of Savoy to France. After his accession to office Lord John received satisfactory assurance that the project was abandoned; and it is probable that, if the Treaty of Villafranca had been strictly carried out, the arrangement—if there was a formal arrangement—would not have been revived. When Central Italy, however, threw in its lot with Piedmont, the situation was altered. A nation—containing some 10,000,000 persons—was constituted on the flank of France; and Napoleon believed, or affected to believe, that the safety of France required a redistribution

spondence between M. Thouvenel and the Duc de Grammont, the French Ambassador at Rome, under the title of *Le Secret de l'Empereur*. This work, however, only reached the present author while he was passing the proofs of this Memoir through the press.

of territory. From a French point of view there was much in the Emperor's contention. When, indeed, he was embarking on the war, M. Thiers had said of him, 'Ce fou va établir une autre Prusse au-delà des Alpes;' and in the spring of the year 1860 the new Prussia was firmly organised. Napoleon, therefore, again began to talk of the necessity of annexation; or, as he put it on the 1st of March to his Chambers, 'de réclamer les versants Français des montagnes.' Twenty years later he would probably have used another phrase, and dwelt on the need of a 'scientific frontier' for France. The Emperor's intention created a ferment in this country; and Lord John, writing to Sir James Hudson on the last day of January, said—

> What presses at this moment is Savoy. . . . Our position here will be seriously damaged, and Austria will rally all Germany to her side, if such a beginning of natural frontiers is made. I hope Cavour is under no engagement. If Venetia was the condition of any such engagement, that engagement has not been fulfilled on the part of France. If the King sells his inheritance of Savoy to obtain Tuscany, he will be disgraced in the eyes of Europe, and we shall not hesitate to affix to his conduct the fitting epithets.

Sir James Hudson replied—

> With regard to Savoy I thought it best to read your despatches to Cavour. I told him I knew the King had received on the 1st inst. a private letter from Louis Napoleon begging him *not to thwart the Savoyards in their desire for annexation to France in case that desire existed.* I also read to him the passage in your private letter on that matter. Cavour said emphatically, 'I declare to you that at this moment no engagement exists between us and France for the cession of Savoy. If the Savoyards, by a great numerical majority, petition Parliament for separation, the question will be treated parliamentarily. But I tell you frankly that the best way to meet this question is openly and frankly, and in no other way will I ever consent to meet it. I agree with Lord John,' said he, 'that the King would be disgraced were he to *céder, troquer, ou vendre la Savoie.*'

It was not difficult to detect the true meaning of these words. When great Ministers talk of ceding provinces whose inhabitants petition, by numerical majorities, for separation, the cession itself is not distant. On the 1st of March the

Emperor announced the 'revendication d'une territoire' to his Chambers. On the 25th of March the treaty for the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France was signed.

Lord John vigorously protested against this policy When his protest fell unheeded he declared that the districts of Chablais and Faucigny, which had been neutralised by the Treaty of Vienna, should be added to Switzerland. But his protest, from its very nature, was unavailing. For in this matter England stood alone. Count Cavour almost openly defended the annexation, on the ground that it made Napoleon a party to the arrangement by which Piedmont had been raised to the status of an Italian power. Austria declared that she could see no distinction between the cession of Tuscany to Piedmont, and that of Savoy to France. Russia regarded it as an international transaction which did not affect the balance of power; and in which she had therefore no concern. Prussia declined to do anything; and, as the people themselves voted in favour of annexation, Lord John had no alternative but to submit to a redistribution of territory which it was impossible for him to avert. In submitting, however, to the arrangement, Lord John did not attempt to conceal the feelings with which he regarded it. He said publicly in the House of Commons—

> It is obvious that the course he [the Emperor] has taken has already produced a great deal of distrust . . . I believe it will produce great distrust all over Europe. . . . Sir, my opinion, as I declared it in July and January, I have no objection to repeat, that such an act as the annexation of Savoy will lead a nation so warlike as the French to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other acts of aggression; and therefore I do feel that, however we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French Government . . . we ought not to keep ourselves apart from the other nations of Europe, but that . . . we should be ready to act with others and to declare . . . that the powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect each other's limits, and above all restore, and not disturb, that commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately forms the happiness of nations.

Lord John was not unaware of the effect which his lan-

guage was likely to produce. Writing immediately to Lord Cowley, he said—

March 26, 1860.

My dear Cowley,—I have just spoken a speech which may rebound in France. I hope the effect may be to rescue Chablais and Faucigny. We cannot see Swiss independence threatened without emotion.—Yours,

J. RUSSELL.

And the sensation was certainly great. Count Persigny, the French Ambassador, who was in the House at the time, exclaimed, 'Quel langage! Faut-il entendre de pareilles choses contre mon maître?' France, indeed, for the moment consoled itself with reflecting that Lord John had spoken without preparation, and without consulting his colleagues. Lord Palmerston soon made it plain that, if the Foreign Secretary had spoken without authority, the Prime Minister shared his opinions. 'General Flahault, as he was about to start for Paris, asked [him] whether he had any message for the Emperor Napoleon. Lord Palmerston answered, "Repeat to your Emperor Lord John Russell's speech, and tell him it expresses my own opinions." "Mais c'est la guerre!" said the peace-loving General. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders and replied, "Eh bien! si c'est la guerre c'est la guerre. Que voulez-vous? Nous sommes préparés, et nous l'attendons de pied ferme."' Such language was too late to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice; but such language, followed up as it was afterwards, checked the disposition to project further annexations.[1]

One chance, indeed, of obtaining the combined resistance of Europe to the Emperor Napoleon's policy still remained. Late in April Count Rechberg authorised Count Apponyi to assure Lord John confidentially that, though Austria could not support the proposals of England respecting Savoy, she considered the safety of Europe to depend on the faithful observance of treaties; and that she was ready to enter into an arrangement with Great Britain to resist all further encroach-

[1] Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 518; *Reminiscences of Count Vitzthum*, ii. 77. But cf. Lord Palmerston's account in Ashley's *Palmerston*, ii. 392.

ments. But the proposal only brought out the wide difference of opinion between Count Rechberg and Lord John: for Lord John at once assured Count Apponyi that, though they might agree as to the necessity of defending Belgium, or of defending Germany,

in Italy the question of territorial circumscription is mixed up with questions of internal government, . . . and neither the Government, nor the Parliament, nor the people of Great Britain would ever sanction a war to support the authority of the King of the Two Sicilies against the just discontent of his subjects.

This declaration would have been important at any time; it derived additional significance from the condition of Southern Italy. Insurrection had again broken out in Sicily; and, on the 6th of May, General Garibaldi, with a few hundred men, embarked on two vessels at Genoa, and sailed to Sicily to aid the insurgents. Lord John saw the new movement without surprise. Almost from the first moment of entering upon office, he had warned the Neapolitan Government of the consequences of misrule. Thus he wrote on the 1st of July, 1859, to his brother-in-law, Mr. Elliot, the British Minister at Naples—

You will press strongly on the Minister the necessity for abolishing as soon as possible the despotism of the police. Men may differ about the merits of representative institutions, but there can be no difference of opinion among enlightened men about the necessity of a due, impartial, and speedy administration of justice.

And again on the 7th of July, 1859:—

Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinion you express of the importance of the King's deciding at once to adopt a liberal system of internal policy as the only chance of averting a political convulsion and of maintaining himself and his dynasty on the throne. . . . It appears to her Majesty's Government that the King has now to choose between the ruin of his evil counsellors and his own. If he supports and upholds them, and places himself under their guidance, it requires not much foresight to predict that the Bourbon dynasty will cease to reign at Naples, by whatever combination—Royal or Republican—it may be replaced.

But, if Lord John saw the new revolution without surprise,

he viewed it with some regret. He thought that both Italy and Sardinia required rest, and he feared that any fresh addition to the territory of Piedmont would be made an excuse for fresh annexations by France. He consequently urged on Count Cavour a policy of patience, and begged him to sanction no act of aggression on either Naples or Austria. However wise such advice may have been when it was originally given, the progress of events soon made it inapplicable. The mere presence of General Garibaldi in Sicily proved sufficient to effect the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty. Even religion proved incapable of supporting the King.

The other day [so Mr. Odo Russell wrote to his uncle on June 7] the young King of Naples was seized with such a panic that he telegraphed five times in twenty-four hours for the Pope's blessing. Cardinal Antonelli, through whom the application had to be made, telegraphed the three last blessings without reference to his Holiness, saying that he was duly authorised to do so. The convents are awfully scandalised at this proceeding.

And a time had come when the Bourbon dynasty required stronger support than it could derive from an old man's blessings sent by telegraph with or without his knowledge. By the beginning of July, the Sicilians had evidently made up their minds for annexation to Piedmont, and before the end of the month the King had ordered his army to evacuate the whole island. So striking a spectacle filled men's minds with apprehension. It was feared that the work which had begun in Sicily might be extended to Naples; that Southern Italy, freed from the Bourbons, might join with Piedmont in attacking Venetia. Nor was this all. His brother-in-law, Mr. Elliot, forwarded Lord John from Naples a document, purporting to be a treaty between France and Sardinia, under which France agreed to the annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Marches of Umbria to Piedmont, on condition of the cession of Liguria and the island of Sardinia to France. Though Lord John professed to believe that the document was a forgery, the rumour of such an arrangement had reached him from so many quarters that he used it as a pretext for declaring to Lord Cowley

that 'the Government of the Emperor must be aware that such a project would be viewed in the most serious light by Great Britain.' He added that he had no desire to see the crown of the Two Sicilies on the head of the King of Sardinia; that, if the Sicilians had a free Parliament and a voice in the choice of a Viceroy, they need not fear a repetition of the injustice and oppression which they had been made to suffer; that if, however, the Sicilians refused to acknowledge the Bourbon dynasty, revolution might involve the throne of Naples and might even extend to the Roman States; that a dream of an Italian Kingdom might become a reality; and that United Italy might join in an attack on Venetia, which might lead to the armed resistance of the German Powers. France, however, Lord John was firmly persuaded, could prevent such a catastrophe, since Sardinian statesmen, without the expectation of French co-operation, would hesitate to throw themselves against the fortresses of Austria. France and England, therefore, so Lord John concluded, should labour to conciliate (? reconcile) the pretensions of Sardinia and Naples in respect to Sicily; should discourage any aggression on Venetia; and, should they fail to accomplish the first of these two objects, should agree to leave the people of Southern Italy free to manage their own internal affairs.

Events, however, were again marching more rapidly than Lord John had foreseen. General Garibaldi, finding his work in Sicily accomplished, was already preparing to cross the straits to Naples; and M. Thouvenel, on the part of France, suggested that France and England should stop his passage. The Cabinet, on Lord John's recommendation, declined to accede to this view.

The force of Garibaldi was not in itself sufficient to overthrow the Neapolitan Monarchy.

If the navy, army, and people of Naples were attached to the King, Garibaldi would be defeated; if, on the contrary, they were disposed to welcome Garibaldi, our interference would be an intervention in the internal affairs of the Neapolitan kingdom.

Lord John therefore declined to stand between the King and the revolution which was threatening him; and

revolution, thus suffered to run its course, made rapid progress. On the 21st of August General Garibaldi landed in Calabria. The army opposed to him melted away at his approach. Naples, on the 7th of September, welcomed the liberator, who at once announced his intention of marching on Rome; and Count Cavour, pleading as an excuse the necessity for preserving order among an excitable and excited population, occupied the territory of the Pope with a Sardinian army. At the beginning of October he asked the Sardinian Parliament for full power to annex the provinces of Central and Southern Italy. Before the end of October, liberator and king had met near Teano, and General Garibaldi had saluted Victor Emanuel as King of Italy.

Lord John, during these events, had done his utmost to prevent the extension of the quarrel beyond the confines of Italy. A fresh attack on Venice would bring France into the field, and afford Napoleon an excuse for accomplishing those fresh redistributions of territory which rumour insisted on repeating that he was contemplating. To the annoyance of many Liberals Lord John told Piedmont that an attack on Venice would be an infraction of the Treaty of Zurich, which the King of Sardinia had no excuse for violating. But, if he had hitherto promoted a policy of prudence, he threw in his lot with Sardinia in the hour of difficulty. Despotic Europe hastened to express its disapproval of Count Cavour's policy. France and Spain withdrew their Ministers from Turin; Russia and Prussia expressed their indignation and displeasure; Russia also withdrew mission and Minister; and Lord John conceived—

> After these diplomatic acts, it would scarcely be just to Italy, or respectful to the other great powers of Europe, were the Government of her Majesty any longer to withhold the expression of their opinion.

And so Lord John sat down and wrote the famous despatch of the 27th of October, 1860, which a French critic has called 'le monument le plus curieux d'une littérature diplomatique tout à fait nouvelle.'

In this despatch Lord John said—

> There appear to have been two motives which have induced the

people of the Roman and Neapolitan States to have joined willingly in the subversion of their Governments. The first of these was that the Governments of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty, and the general welfare of the people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition.

The second motive was that a conviction had spread, since the year 1848, that the only manner in which the Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong Government for the whole of Italy. . . .

Looking at the question in this view, her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.

That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says, 'The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberations of the States General, but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice ; for, when a people from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.'

Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this : Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their Government for good reasons?

Upon this grave matter her Majesty's Government hold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance to their former Governments. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, cannot pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. . . .

It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of the ties which bind together a sovereign and his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become confused ; the succession of the throne is disputed ; adverse parties threaten the peace of society ; rights and pretensions are opposed to each other, and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. . . .

Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no suffi-

cient grounds for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe.—I am, &c.,

J. RUSSELL.

Baron Brunnow said of this despatch, 'Ce n'est pas de la diplomatie, c'est de la polissonnerie;' while Count Vitzthum declared that it was unique in the 'annals of diplomacy.' On the other hand, it has been lately stated that 'it contradicts most remarkably all its author's earlier verbal and written declarations;' and it has accordingly been suggested that it was composed by Lord Palmerston, or inspired by Lady John. Whatever may be thought of the first of these charges, any one acquainted with Lord John's opinions can only smile at the second of them. Perhaps there is no document which he ever wrote that bears on its face more distinctly the impress of his style or the colour of his opinions. Probably no other statesman but Lord John would have rested the defence of General Garibaldi and Count Cavour on the Revolution of 1688; and, so far from this being new ground, Lord John had distinctly taken it nearly eight weeks before.[1] He wrote to Lord Bloomfield at Berlin—

I wish to put in a caveat against the indiscriminate use of the words 'revolution' and 'revolutionary.'

A revolution may be the greatest of calamities; it may be the highest of blessings. In England the phrases 'the Revolution,' 'from the time of the Revolution,' 'the Government which has prevailed from the period of the Revolution,' are terms which are applied to the change from subserviency to France, and the arbitrary tyranny of our pensioned Stuarts to national independence and the rule of law and liberty, which began to prevail under William III. and the House of Hanover.

In France the term 'Revolution' is generally applied to the democratic anarchy of the Jacobin convention.

[1] *Punch* understood Lord John much more clearly than his later critics.

Well said, Johnny Russell. That latest despatch
You have sent to Turin is exactly the Thing;
And again, my dear John, you come up to the scratch
With a pluck that does credit to you and the Ring, &c.

The servile parties on the Continent are apt to use the term indiscriminately, and the advocates of absolutism speak with as much abhorrence of a change from the worst despotism to the prevalence of the law of order, as of a change from a mild Government to democratic licence. Thus the change from government maintained by torture to a free and regular government is called a 'Revolution;' but such a change, by whatever name it may be called, is a blessing and not a calamity.

It is true that Lord John, on the 31st of August, had placed strong pressure on Count Cavour to abstain from an attack on Venice. But only those who blind themselves to the facts will find anything inconsistent between his advice on this occasion and his approval of revolution in Naples. For an attack upon Venice, Lord John thought, was certain to bring France into the field. The aid of France, so he was assured from all quarters, would inevitably lead to fresh cessions of Italian territory; and the statesman, who wanted Italy for the Italians and not for the French, naturally thought it his duty to counsel moderation.

If other continental powers were alarmed at Lord John's language, in Piedmont and throughout Italy it was read with delight. Count Cavour wrote at once to express his acknowledgments of the 'immense service' which Lord John had rendered to Italy. General Garibaldi 'knocked up Admiral Mundy about five o'clock in the morning, to say good-bye to him, and to thank him, England, her Majesty's Government, and above all Lord John, for their sympathies for Italy; and the Admiral, who knew nothing of Lord John's despatch, could not make out why his name had been brought so much forward.'[1] Mr. Odo Russell wrote—

Private] Rome: December 1, 1860.

My dear Uncle,—Ever since your famous despatch to Sir James of the 27th, you are blessed night and morning by twenty millions of Italians. I could not read it myself without deep emotion; and, the moment it was published in Italian, thousands of people copied it from each other to carry it to their homes and weep over it for joy and gratitude in the bosom of their families, away from brutal mercenaries and greasy priests.

[1] Mr. H. Elliot to Lord John Russell, Nov. 13, 1860.

Difficult as the task is the Italians have now before them, I cannot but think that they will accomplish it better than we any of us hope, for every day convinces me more and more that I am living in the midst of a *great* and *real* national movement, which will at last be crowned with perfect success, notwithstanding the legion of enemies Italy still counts in Europe. . . . —Your affectionate nephew,

ODO RUSSELL.[1]

With the despatch of the 27th of October the chief interest in Lord John's Italian policy terminates. During the ensuing months he used his influence to complete the revolution which he had done so much to support. When France interfered to prevent an attack upon Gaeta, to which the King of the Two Sicilies retired, Lord John wrote despatch after despatch to turn the Emperor Napoleon from his purpose; and when Victor Emanuel assumed the title of King of Italy, England, under Lord John's guidance, at once recognised the new kingdom. Three months elapsed before Napoleon had the resolution or good sense to follow England's example.

Three years later, when General Garibaldi paid his memorable visit to England, he lunched at Pembroke Lodge. And the soldier who had fought with the sword changed walking-sticks with the statesman who had fought as vigorously in the same cause with the pen.

It is now time, however, to recur to other matters with which Lord John had been concerned during the period in which he had been so busily occupied in promoting the union of Italy. In the month which succeeded his acceptance of office his father-in-law, Lord Minto, who had been for some time in failing health, died. Lord Minto was not merely his father-in-law; he was his colleague and counsellor; and on many occasions exercised a great, or, as some statesmen alleged, an excessive influence on Lord John's policy. Ever since his famous mission to Italy, Lord Minto had made the Italian question his own; and, even in the triumvirate which regulated the Italian policy of Lord Palmerston's Administration, Italy had no warmer or more enthusiastic friend. Soon

[1] Eleven months before the Pope told Mr. Odo Russell that Lord John was 'our bitterest enemy.'

after Lord Minto's death, the Russells left Richmond for Scotland, finding change and quiet at Abergeldie. It was a fortunate circumstance that at a moment when the Foreign Office was exceptionally busy, and when the Queen did not entirely agree with the views of the Foreign Minister, Lord John should have been living within an easy drive of Balmoral. But Lord John was not solely occupied with questions of foreign policy. The introduction of a new Reform Bill had been the condition on which he had consented to accept office. During the autumn the Cabinet was engaged in making careful inquiries into the effect of a reduction of the borough franchise; and those members of it who, like the Prime Minister, were opposed to all Reform discovered with some consternation that—

> The returns we have got show an awful increase of voters in all the large towns, whatever standard of franchise we may adopt. Even the eight-pound value would in most cases enormously add to the numbers. . . Then, again, as to our county franchise we seem to be taking a leap in the dark. We have no returns, that I am aware of, that give us the least notion what numbers the ten-pound franchise, as it has been proposed, would add to the present county voters, nor what effect that addition would be likely to produce.

Such were the apprehensions which the Prime Minister expressed to Lord John at the close of the year. Lord John's opinions were very different. The quiet and contentment which had been the direct consequence of the great measure of 1832 confirmed his opinion that organic Reform was the best safeguard against social disturbance. He clung, therefore, to his own view, and on the 1st of March, 1860, brought forward the new Reform Bill. The measure, which was comparatively simple, proposed the reduction of the county franchise to 10*l.*, of the borough franchise to 6*l.*, and the semi-disfranchisement of the twenty-five smallest boroughs returning two members. The Bill, proposed in a moderate speech, was received with indifference rather than hostility; and was read a second time without a division in the beginning of May. But, though no one had hitherto ventured on open hostility to the measure, its fate was already doubtful. It was perishing, not from the attacks of its opponents, but from the neglect of its

friends. One half of the Cabinet did not conceal their dislike of it; the 'Times' discovered that it was pregnant with danger; Mr. Mackinnon, the member for Rye, expressing a universal opinion, met the motion for going into committee on the Bill by a resolution for its postponement; and the Government only succeeded in defeating him by a narrow and reluctant majority. It was evident that the Bill was doomed, and Lord John himself advised the Cabinet to withdraw it. His colleagues readily adopted a suggestion, which was in consonance with their own feelings, and on the 11th of June Lord John withdrew the Bill.

In withdrawing the measure Lord John stated his intention of dealing with the franchise 'at the earliest period which may be in our power.' But it was soon evident that, whatever interpretation this expression might bear, it would not be in the power of the Government to carry a Reform Bill through a reluctant House of Commons, the representatives of an indifferent community.

Pembroke Lodge: November 16, 1860.

My dear Palmerston,—It is obvious that the preparation of business for the next session must depend in a great measure on the question whether or no a Reform Bill is to be introduced by the Government. I think you are entitled to know my opinion on this subject. It is pretty clear that the only measure which would be likely to pass would be one of a very moderate character; say, a Bill reducing the franchise in counties to 20*l.* and in boroughs to 8*l.*, and containing no disfranchisement. For my part, I could willingly agree to such a Bill. But who wants it? Not the Reformers, for they would wish to go much further. Not the Conservatives, for they would argue that a reduction to 8*l.* would be a step, though a short one, to universal suffrage. The apathy of the country is undeniable. Nor is it a transient humour, it seems rather a confirmed habit of mind. Four Reform Bills have been introduced of late years—one by my Government; one by Lord Aberdeen's; one by Lord Derby's; and one by yours. For not one of them has there been the least enthusiasm. I was told by a Lancashire deputation last session that, if we had brought forward a bolder and a larger measure of disfranchisement and enfranchisement, it would have been immensely popular. But Bright's plan, which went much further than ours, only excited more opposition and more general dislike. My conclusion is that, the advisers of the Crown of all parties

having offered to the country various measures of Reform, and the country having shown itself indifferent to them all, the best course which can now be taken is to wait till the country itself shows a manifest desire for an amendment of the representation. Of course the Government and the Liberal party will be liable to great reproach and very unfair charges. But that is better than dragging an imperfect measure through a reluctant Parliament, and enforcing it on an unwilling country. At the same time, if the Cabinet should prefer the introduction of such a measure as I have sketched, I should be quite willing to acquiesce. I cannot conclude without thanking you sincerely for the very handsome manner in which you spoke the other night of my conduct of foreign affairs. Such language from you will dispel many calumnies.—I remain, yours very sincerely,

J. RUSSELL.

The Cabinet was only too ready to adopt Lord John's suggestion, and abandon a measure for which the majority of its members entertained dislike, and for which the country showed no desire; and no new measure of Reform was proposed for more than five years. Lord John's attitude on the subject in 1860 formed a very striking contrast to his conduct in the spring of 1854. In withdrawing the Bill of 1854 he had been unable to suppress his emotion; in postponing Reform in 1860 he hardly attempted to conceal his indifference. But the true explanation of this contradictory behaviour was to be found in the circumstances in which, on each occasion, he was placed. In 1854 he was drifting, under a Minister whom he thought unequal to the situation, into a policy which he disapproved. In 1860 his whole mind was absorbed on the great task on which he was engaged—the regeneration of Italy. Under one set of circumstances he was forced to abandon a measure for the sake of proceedings which he disliked; under the other set of circumstances Reform itself was an encumbrance to a policy which was occupying his whole time. Thus he could not part with it without emotion on one occasion, and he could postpone it without regret on the other.[1]

[1] Those people who think that Lord John was a troublesome colleague to work with will hardly bring themselves to understand the perfect smoothness with which he worked in 1860. Writing to Lady Melgund on January 18—in the week following that in which the Cabinet adopted Lord John's Italian policy

During the discussions on Reform in the Cabinet, Lord John had derived his chief support from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone. Other matters, too, were concurrently indicating that Mr. Gladstone and Lord John were drawing close to each other. No one, not even Lord Palmerston, so thoroughly approved Lord John's Italian policy as Mr. Gladstone; and no one supported Mr. Gladstone's financial measures so loyally as Lord John. 1860 was the year of the Commercial Treaty with France;[1] it was the year of Mr. Gladstone's greatest Budget; it was the year in which the Lords threw out the measure for repealing the duty on paper; and it was the year in which Lord Palmerston persuaded the House of Commons to vote a large sum of money on fortifications. On two of these questions there was no difference of opinion. On the other two Lord John agreed much more nearly with Mr. Gladstone than with Lord Palmerston. Like Mr. Gladstone he did not wholly approve the compromise under which Lord Palmerston submitted to the loss of the Paper Duties Bill; and he disliked the expenditure on fortifications on which Lord Palmerston insisted.[2]

and the new Reform Bill—the Duke of Bedford said, 'John writes, "Last week was the most gratifying week to me in politics which I have had since 1861."' A month afterwards the Duke wrote again to the same correspondent, 'John is in high spirits.' And, after Mr. Gladstone's great Budget speech, the Duke told Lady Melgund that Lord John said, 'My wish and aspiration for many years, which failed under Aberdeen, has apparently succeeded under Palmerston.'

[1] The Emperor wished the meeting of Parliament to be postponed in order that the treaty might be announced simultaneously in England and France. Lord Palmerston, writing on January 6, said of this, 'It is so thoroughly French to want to make a *coup de théâtre* if they do not make a *coup d'état*.'

[2] He wrote to Lord Palmerston—

Pembroke Lodge: May 20, 1860.

My dear Palmerston,—I cannot but think much more seriously of the proposed vote of the Lords than you appear to do. No one can deny the right of the Lords to throw out the Paper Duty Repeal Bill, any more than they can deny the right of the Crown to make a hundred Peers in one day, or of the Commons to reject the Mutiny Bill. But the exercise of a right which has lain dormant since the Revolution must give a great shock to the constitution. Even as a matter of convenience our finances cannot bear two Chancellors of the Exchequer making their Budget in the two Houses. The advantage of having a million added to the revenue of the year I do not deny; but it will be too dearly purchased if the Lords are to put in a claim, which they can never sustain, of imposing taxes directly and indirectly. However, although I cannot agree in your premises, I shall endeavour

From these circumstances, rumours circulated in London of the approaching disruption of the Ministry; and Lord Derby took the unusual course of intimating to Lord Palmerston that, if Lord John and Mr. Gladstone retired from the Government, the Ministry should receive Conservative support. But the disruption of the Government was not so near as Lord Derby had supposed. Lord Palmerston could not afford to dispense with Mr. Gladstone's assistance, and Lord John's resignation was never even dreamed of. Hardly ever a day passed in which he did not receive long and confidential communications from the Prime Minister, and no thoughts of separation can be traced in any of these letters.

During the autumn of 1860 Lord John accompanied the Queen on a visit which she paid to Germany. At Coburg, where the Court stayed for some time, Lord John had a day's wild boar shooting; and, to the Prince Consort's amusement, killed his boar. If it were true that he was the first Prime Minister who had ever been out deer-stalking, it was probably also true that he was the first Foreign Secretary who had ever killed a wild boar. But, attached as he was to the Queen, life in Court was always distasteful to him; and he regretted every little incident of the journey that delayed his return to Lady John and his children. The autumn, after his return home, was spent chiefly at Richmond; till, at the end of January, the family moved up to Chesham Place for Society, Cabinets, and Parliament.

Politically, the year 1861 has little interest. The Conservative policy of Lord Palmerston reflected the mood of the country; and the session hardly produced any changes which are worth recording. One great struggle, indeed, arose at the end of May, on the repeal of the Paper Duty; which was supposed for some weeks to portend a crisis in the

to come to the same conclusion. There is no need of precipitating a quarrel between the two Houses, though the Lords seem to think there is. There would be great mischief in doing so in the present state of affairs both at home and abroad. The House of Commons are much stronger than the Lords, and are sure to win at any time. . . .—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Mr. Gladstone was a little less yielding than Lord John: and Lord John two months afterwards told the Duke of Bedford that 'Gladstone's speech [was] magnificently mad on the Privilege question.'

Ministry, and the defeat of the Government. But, after a somewhat remarkable debate, Ministers—on the last day but one of the month—obtained a sufficient majority, and during the rest of the session no serious attempt was made to disturb them.[1]

But in a personal sense the year was more eventful. In April Lord John's second daughter, Victoria, was married to Mr. Villiers, the eldest son of the then Bishop of Durham. Mr. Villiers, who had recently taken holy orders, is now well known as the incumbent of St. Paul's, Knightsbridge. This was the first marriage among Lord John's own children, and the parting created some natural regrets. Ten days before it Lady John addressed the following verses to her step-daughter :—

On the brae the bonnie primrose, the violet in the wood,
Yet once again have found thee, my lassie fair and good ;
But the bud upon the hawthorn gars a mist come o'er my e'e,
For before the blossom whitens thou'lt be far far frae me.
The mavis and the lav'rock, hark ! how blithe and sad they sing,
Farewell to thee, farewell, lassie, and welcome to the spring ;
But when once more the nightingale from yonder favourite beech
To the gloamin' grey shall pour his lay, thine ear it will not reach.
Oh, sweet and holy is the tie that sae long has bound us twa,
And well I know it ne'er can break tho' thou art far awa';
But a mightier chain is round thee and will not let thee bide,
And thou deemest all too slow the hours that for me too swiftly glide.
So a bonnie blink o' sunshine from our home for ever goes ;
From the garland, round us twining, there drops a bonnie rose.
But thy step is light, thine eye is bright, e'en thro' the starting tear :
God speed thee, and watch o'er thee then ; thy haven is not here !

[1] Lord Malmesbury says that, at a concert at the Palace on June 28, Lord John joined Lord Derby and him. Lord Derby exclaimed, 'How do you do, Lord John? You have got into very bad company.' He looked round on us all with a grim smile and said, 'I see I have ;' when Lord Derby, looking at him attentively, observed that he was incorrectly dressed, having his levée uniform instead of the full dress which he ought to have worn. Lord John said, 'I know I am wrong, and the porter wanted to turn me out.' 'Oh, did he?' excl imed Lord Derby ; 'Thou canst not say *I* did it.' Of course all round laughed at the apt quotation from Shakespeare, and no one more than Lord John himself (*Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 543). Early in 1859 Lady John happened to be placed at dinner at Buckingham Palace between Lord Clarendon and Lord Malmesbury. As she sat down she said, 'I am between the past and the present.' Lord Malmesbury added, 'Yes, and you are the future.'

To meet new joys that beckon thee thy heart is bounding fast,
Yet fold around it lovingly the memories of the past;
They 'll keep it fresh and green beneath the brightness of thy sky,
Like dew in blossoms lingering when the noonday sun is high.
Our help no longer needest thou thy web of life to weave,
And a lonesome spot within our hearts, dear lassie, thou wilt leave.
But to him we yield thee trustfully whose love hath bid thee go,
And to God we pray to be thy stay for aye thro' weal or woe.

Three weeks after his daughter's marriage, Lord John was summoned hastily to Woburn, in consequence of his brother the Duke's serious illness. The Duke died on the 14th of May. Lord John was much overcome with the death of his brother, with whom, throughout his life, he had been on terms of intimate affection, and whose loss snapped the last link between him and his distant childhood. By the Duke's death Lord John at once entered on the Ardsalla estate; and his income, which had so often proved too narrow for the calls upon it, was thereby increased. His improved position justified him in seeking relief from the late hours of the House of Commons in the quiet of the House of Lords. Lord John, indeed, knew well that the bracing air of the former chamber was far preferable to the enervating atmosphere of the latter. But his sixty-nine years of life were steadily reminding him that there were sixty-nine good reasons for the change he was making. In an excellent caricature, 'Punch' made old Lord Brougham receive him at the door of the Peers' chamber with the exclamation, 'Oh, Johnny, ye'll find it mighty dull here;' while, as a matter of fact, Lord Derby greeted him with the opposite dictum: 'Oh, Johnny,' he said as he shook hands with him, 'what fun we shall have here!'

It was at first supposed that Lord John would take the title of Lord Ludlow,[1] the origin of the Ardsalla estate

[1] This title suggested Mr. Punch's lines:—

John Russell, Earl Ludlow, John,
When we were first acquent,
You would have scorned the haven
On which you now are bent.

. . . . . .

The House of Lords, I fear, John,
You'll find uncommon slow,
And for the Commons, gipsy-like,
You'll sigh, when Earl Ludlow, &c.

accounting for the suggestion. But, as a matter of fact, Lord John became Earl Russell of Kingston Russell, and Viscount Amberley of Amberley and Ardsalla.

Mr. Disraeli wrote to him on this occasion—

July 22, 1861.

I congratulate you and your family on the great honours which deservedly await you. But I cannot congratulate the House of Commons or myself; for I feel the House will lose very much of its authority by your retirement from it, and that I shall lose an opponent whom it was yet permitted to respect and regard, and with whom it was a distinction to contend.

D.

Mr. Gladstone wrote—

July 24, 1861.

My dear Lord J. Russell,—I cannot despatch, as I have just done, the Chiltern Hundreds for you without expressing the strong feelings which even that formal act awakens. They are mixed as well as strong; for I hope you will be repaid in repose, health, and the power of long continuing service for the heavy loss we suffer in the House of Commons.

Although you may not hereafter have opportunities of adding to the personal debt I owe you, and of bringing it vividly before my mind by fresh acts of courage and kindness, I assure you the recollection of it is already indelible.—Believe me, most sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

My honourable friend [Sir John Ramsden] alluded the other night to one subject in a tone which I was very sorry to hear used by any one. My honourable friend said that 'the great Republican bubble in America had burst.' Now, sir, I am proud to confess that . . . if a despotic Government fall, and the people who have been subjected to it are likely to obtain better and freer government, I cannot conceal that it gives me satisfaction. . . . But I own I have very different feelings when a great Republic, which has enjoyed for seventy or eighty years institutions under which the people have been free and happy, enters into a conflict in which that freedom and happiness is placed in jeopardy. The joy which I felt at the overthrow of some of the despotisms of Italy is counterbalanced by the pain which I experience at the events which have lately taken place in America. I admit that I have thought, and I still think, that in this country we enjoy more real freedom than the United States have ever done. . . . Yet we cannot be blind to the fact that the Republic has been for many years a great and free State, exhibiting to the world the example of a people in the enjoyment of wealth, happiness, and freedom, and affording bright prospects of the progress and improvement of mankind. When I reflect that the reproaches which are cast by the States of the North upon the States of the South . . . have arisen from that accursed institution of slavery, I cannot but recollect also that, with our great and glorious institutions, we gave them that curse, and that ours were the hands from which they received that fatal gift of the poisoned garment which was flung around them from the first hour of their establishment. Therefore I do not think it just or seemly that there should be among us anything like exultation at their discord, and still less that we should reproach them with an evil for the origin of which we are ourselves to blame.

Such was Lord John's generous language on the eve of the great American civil war.

Those people who have carefully reflected on the remoter

causes which led to the American civil war, will be disposed to trace them to a distant past. The wealth of the Southern States depended on slave labour; and, so long as power remained in their hands, slavery was an institution which no one seriously threatened. But, while the Southern States were thus reposing on the stability of their institutions and on the security of their 'property,' the other States of the Union, where labour was free, were rapidly increasing in wealth and importance. A movement, which is so universal that it seems almost a law of nature, was slowly transferring power from the South and the East to the North and the West; and, at the very moment when this change was occurring, the nation's conscience was awakening to the shame which was inseparable from slavery and its many attendant evils. The efforts of Mr. Garrison, the poetry of Mr. Whittier and of Mr. Longfellow, the writings of Mrs. Beecher Stowe, were, in one sense, only the expression of sentiments which were penetrating into the heart of the nation. But it is the unvarying lot of true prophecy to stimulate the movement by which it is itself inspired; and, if 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' was only the outcome of the higher ideas of the age in which it appeared, its extraordinary success carried the new gospel to every cabin in the land.

While Mrs. Beecher Stowe's romance was being read, the decision in the Dred Scott case, that an escaped slave could be claimed in a free State, increased the agitation. Mr. Lincoln was nominated as candidate for the President's chair. His election, in the autumn of 1860, a little more than a year after the formation of Lord Palmerston's Government, virtually transferred political power to the Northern States. The South saw at once that its institution, its 'property,' was menaced by the election. In the Southern States there was a prodigious ferment; in the Northern States the more remarkable spectacle of what a French writer, M. Gasparin, analysing its causes and its consequences, called 'un grand peuple qui se relève.'

Writing on November 12, 1860, Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, said—

The result of the primary elections has been to ensure to Mr.

Lincoln a larger number of votes in the Electoral College than is necessary to place him in the Presidential chair. He is therefore virtually elected President for the term beginning on the 4th of March next. . . . This transfer of the executive power from the South to the North, from the pro-slavery to the anti-slavery party, has caused an explosion of dissatisfaction in some of the Southern States even more violent than was anticipated. In South Carolina especially the excitement has carried men of all classes beyond the bounds of reason and common sense. . . . The Legislature of the State has passed unanimously a resolution calling a convention of the people to decide the question of secession from the Union. . . If, by the withdrawal of the members for South Carolina and three or four more of the violent little States, the anti-slavery party should be placed in possession of a permanent working majority in the Congress, then the whole South may be brought to consider it necessary in self-defence to secede from the Confederation.

Lord Lyons's anticipations were unfortunately fulfilled. Congress met on the 3rd of December; and the outgoing President, Mr. Buchanan, declared in his message that no State had a right to secede from the Union without the consent of the other States, but that the others had no right to use force against a seceding State. Language of this kind naturally encouraged secession. On the 20th of December—

The convention at Charleston passed unanimously an ordinance declaring that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of the United States of America is dissolved.

The example of South Carolina was rapidly followed. Writing on the 16th of January, Lord Lyons said—

Three more States, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama, have formally seceded. Forts, arsenals, and other Federal property have been seized by the State authorities in States which are still nominally members of the Confederation. A steam vessel (the 'Star of the West'), despatched by the Federal Government with reinforcements to Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, has been fired into by batteries in the hands of the South Carolinians, and has retreated to New York.

In the next few days Louisiana and Georgia seceded from the Union; in the next few weeks Virginia joined the secessionists.

On the news of these secessions arriving in England Lord John directed the British Consul at Charleston to continue his functions; but, if he should be required to recognise the independence of South Carolina, to refer home for instructions. And when, after Mr. Lincoln's accession to power, Mr. Seward, as Secretary of State, addressed a despatch to the American Minister in London, urging the British Government not to recognise the agents of the Southern Confederacy, Lord John replied—

I said that it was not the wish or intention of her Majesty's Government to pronounce any judgment on the causes which had induced some of the United States to secede from the rest. Whether as to the past those States had reason to complain that the terms of the compact of union had not been observed, or whether they had reason to apprehend that, for the future, justice would not be done to them, were questions upon which her Majesty's Government did not pretend to decide. They had seen in the United States a free and prosperous community, with which they had been happy to maintain the most amicable relations. Now that a secession had taken place, they were in no hurry to recognise the separation as complete and final. But, on the other hand, I could not bind her Majesty's Government, nor tell how and when circumstances might arise which would make a decision necessary; that I must therefore decline to enter into any further discussion at the present moment, and could only assure him of our regret at the events which had recently occurred.

Such was Lord John's language to the American Minister on the 8th of April. During the next few weeks news of the greatest importance reached this country. The Southern States, encouraged by the tardiness of the North, openly organised for the struggle. They sent a deputation to Lord John urging that England should recognise their independence. They invited the equipment of privateers to prey on Northern commerce; while the North, under its new President, avowed its intention to maintain the Union, and not merely took steps for collecting an army for the purpose, but proclaimed the blockade of the whole coast line of the Confederacy.

These proceedings necessitated anxious consideration. With the warm approval of his colleagues, Lord John decided, while refusing to acknowledge the independence of the South,

to recognise its belligerent rights; and, on his advice, the Queen issued a proclamation enjoining neutrality in the coming struggle. This decision was not entirely acceptable to either belligerent. The South thought, on the one hand, that the independence of a large and important country, might fairly have been recognised. The North argued, on the contrary, that even belligerent rights should not have been conceded to seceding States. Thus, even in these early stages of the war, the British Government was ascertaining by experience that strict neutrality in a struggle is never acceptable to either combatant.

The neutrality of the British Government was the more creditable because it was daily becoming more apparent that, whatever other consequences might ensue from the war, serious injury must be inflicted on British interests. England was the centre of the cotton industry; millions of her population were dependent on it; and the supplies of cotton were almost entirely drawn from the States whose whole coast line had been declared subject to blockade. The language, too, of the United States Government did not tend to conciliate a great foreign power. On the 1st of May Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State, told Lord Lyons that he had received intelligence that 'the "Peerless," an iron steamer, had been sold to the *de facto* Southern Government, and was on her way out of Lake Ontario to be used as a privateer.' Though it was believed she carried the British flag, and had regular British papers, Mr. Seward sent an order to the naval officers of the United States to seize her 'under any flag, and with any papers;' and he was only induced by Lord Lyons's solemn protest to promise that, if the information on which the seizure was made should prove incorrect, full satisfaction should be promptly given to the Government of her Majesty and the parties aggrieved. But, though Mr. Seward so far gave way, the language which he constantly used, and the articles inserted in newspapers avowedly supporting his policy, were characterised by an unfriendly violence: and Lord Lyons reported that, incredible as it might appear, he believed the American Secretary of State really hoped to 'overawe England and France by threatening language;' he added, on

the 8th of June, that he had thought it his duty to despatch a message to England that the temper of Congress was such that a sudden declaration of war against Great Britain appeared by no means impossible.

The Government of the United States was not content with strong language. In July Congress passed an Act authorising the President to close any ports 'whenever it shall, in the judgment of the President, by reason of unlawful combinations of persons in opposition to the United States, become impracticable to execute the revenue laws and collect the duties on imports by the ordinary means in the ordinary way.' Lord Russell—for he must henceforward appear under his later title—at once expressed his hope that the President would not avail himself of the powers which were thus entrusted to him. With severe logic he pointed out that, when the President was calling for 400,000 men and for 400,000,000 of dollars,

> it seems quite inappropriate to speak of unlawful combinations. . . . The state of things which exists is a state of civil war ; and there is, as regards neutral nations, no difference between civil war and foreign war. Acting on these principles, her Majesty's Government has accordingly recognised the state of civil war as existing, and all the rights which belong to a belligerent her Majesty fully acknowledges to reside in the Government of the United States. But her Majesty cannot acknowledge that ports in the complete possession of the (so-called) Confederate States, and which are not blockaded, shall be interdicted to the commerce of her Majesty's subjects by decree of the President of the United States, or by a law passed by their Congress. This would be in effect to allow the lawfulness of a paper blockade extending over 3,000 miles of coast.

Before this despatch reached its destination, or indeed before it was written, events in America had convinced the Northern States that the war on which they had entered was not the easy parade which had been previously supposed. The raw levies of the North were defeated towards the end of July at Bull's Run, and for the next two months no steps of importance were taken to coerce the South. From an historical standpoint, the difficulties which the Federal States were thus encountering helped to illustrate some of the better

features of the American character; and thenceforward the statesmen of the North were a little more cautious in their language, and a little more vigorous in their actions. But at the moment the evident inability of the North to subjugate the South strengthened the hands of those who thought the European powers might intervene in the contest. Though the interests of France were less immediately concerned than those of England, the French were from the first less ready to play a neutral part than the English. M. Mercier, a man of ability, who represented the French at Washington, from the outset recommended a more decisive policy. In March he advised his Government to recognise the Confederate States; and in May he expressed a strong opinion in favour of raising the blockade.

On the 17th of October Lord Russell wrote to Lord Palmerston—

> There is much good sense in Mercier's observations. But we must wait. I am persuaded that, if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts them and if you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you must expect to see us your enemies. France would be quite ready to hold this language with us.
>
> If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it would be the end of the year, or immediately before the meeting of Parliament.

Lord Palmerston, whose answer to this letter has been printed by his biographer, thought that 'our best and true policy [was] to go on as we have begun and to keep quite clear of the conflict.'

In the meanwhile an event was about to occur in the Atlantic which made the question of intervention merely of secondary importance.

The Confederate States appointed two gentlemen, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to proceed to Europe, accredited to the English and French Governments respectively. These gentlemen embarked at Charleston on the 'Nashville,'[1] succeeded in

[1] The 'Nashville,' on which Messrs. Slidell and Mason had sailed from

running the blockade, and landed in Cuba. It was correctly assumed that they would embark at Havana on the 'Trent,' a West Indian mail steamer, and travel in her to Europe; it was believed that the Government of the United States had issued orders for intercepting the 'Trent' and for capturing the envoys; and it was noticed that a Federal man-of-war had arrived at Falmouth and after coaling had proceeded to Southampton. Lord Russell laid these facts before the law officers; and was advised that a United States man-of-war, falling in with a British mail steamer, would have the right to board her, open her mail bags, examine their contents, and, if the steamer should prove liable to confiscation for carrying despatches from the enemy, put a prize crew on board and carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication. In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion she ought to, disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at some convenient port. But, they added, 'she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage.' A few days before the law officers gave this opinion the 'San Jacinto,' an American war steamer, intercepted the 'Trent,' and did the very thing which the law officers had advised she had no right to do. Without capturing the steamer and carrying her into port for adjudication, she arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell and their two secretaries. The law officers, consulted on these facts, adhered to their

Charleston to Cuba, ran the gauntlet of the Federal navy, captured and burnt at sea a Havre United States packet ship, and, placing the crew of the latter on board, arrived at Southampton for coal. Acting on the clear opinion of the law officers of the Crown, Lord Russell decided that the vessel of a power which had been recognised as a belligerent had a right of shelter in British waters, provided she took on board no munitions of war, or committed any other breach of neutrality. But the incident soon afterwards became more complicated from the arrival of a Federal war steamer—the 'Tuscarora'—at Southampton, with the evident object of watching and capturing the 'Nashville.' Directions were issued to the Admiralty, on the advice of the law officers, to take vigorous steps to prevent any act of war in British waters by stationing a vessel of superior force at Southampton, and by not allowing one vessel to put to sea until a clear twenty-four hours after the sailing of the other. The commander of the 'Tuscarora,' the stronger ship of the two, endeavoured to evade these orders; but, after weeks of anxious watching and correspondence, both vessels sailed at intervals which accorded with the prescribed arrangement.

previous opinion, and pronounced the conduct of the commander of the 'San Jacinto' illegal and unjustifiable by international law.

These grave facts were naturally at once considered by the Cabinet, and it was decided at a meeting on the last day of November to demand immediate reparation. The despatch which was drawn up by Lord Russell for that purpose has a peculiar interest. It was the last official document ever laid before the Prince Consort, and its language was modified in accordance with his suggestions. In its ultimate shape it declared that the British Government 'was willing to believe that the United States officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that, if he considered himself so authorised, he greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had received.'

It added—

The Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honour to pass without due reparation. . . . Her Majesty's Government therefore trust that, when these matters shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may be again placed under British protection; and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

In a second despatch Lord Lyons was told that—

Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her Majesty's Government, your Lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London.

In a private note of the 1st of December Lord Russell told Lord Lyons—

My wish would be that, at your first interview with Mr. Seward,

you should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, and ask him to settle with the President and the Cabinet what course they would propose.

The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully.

If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.

I think the disposition of the Cabinet is to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners, and to be rather easy about the apology. That is to say, if the commissioners are delivered to you, and allowed to embark in a packet for England, and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams, that might be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the commissioners are not liberated no apology will suffice.

These despatches and letters, if they had been sent alone, would have been sufficiently grave. Their gravity was emphasised by the hurried despatch of the Guards and other troops to Canada, and by the fact that instructions, in consonance with them, were sent to Sir A. Milne, who commanded the British fleet in American waters.

In 1862 science had not bound the United States with England by the compelling force of electricity, and forty anxious days passed before Lord Russell received the answer to his ultimatum. The strain of expectation would, under any circumstances, have been extreme. It so happened, however, that, while Court, Cabinet, and country were anxiously waiting the answer to Lord Russell's question, Is it peace? the Prince Consort died at Windsor.

The death of the Prince[1] greatly affected Lord Russell.

[1] Lord Russell wrote after the Prince's death to his daughter Lady V. Villiers, who had recently lost her father-in-law, the Bishop—

December 25, 1861.

My dearest Toza,—You will have guessed why I did not write before; and now I have another letter to thank you for. Amidst all the desolation of the Queen, and the public loss to the nation, I feel for Henry and you in the great loss you have sustained since your marriage.

Every day tells us that neither strength, nor vigour of age, nor ease of position, nor virtuous exertion gives any certainty against the unforeseen summons of God. But we know not what is best for us, nor when it is that the thread of life is complete—at twenty, at fifty, at seventy, or later still. We can only bend [?], and

Though on many questions of foreign policy he differed from his Royal Highness, he had a high opinion of his character, his motives, his conduct, and his abilities. Long tenure of office had thrown him into such constant communication with the Court that the Prince's death was the loss of a friend. Private sorrow was intensified by a sense of public misfortune. For, though the Queen expressed her determination to act in everything as the Prince would have wished, the weight of her grief justified and enforced a temporary seclusion, which could not otherwise but cause inconvenience to the public service. Lord Russell did not see the Queen for seven weeks after the Prince's death. Twelve months more elapsed before Lord and Lady Russell paid a visit to the Queen at Windsor.

And in the meanwhile the progress of civil strife in America, and other matters to be afterwards mentioned, kept the Foreign Office abnormally active. During the summer of 1862 the Federal cause seemed to grow more and more gloomy. To quote Lord Russell's own words—

> Great efforts have been made. An immense army, carefully drilled, and abundantly supplied with stores of ammunition, clothing, and provisions, were advanced by the James River towards Richmond. After a week's severe fighting, this army was driven back to the Potomac, with a diminution of their numbers, it is said, from 140,000 to 60,000 or 70,000 men. Sickness, losses in battle, and captures by the enemy, produced this fearful reduction. General Pope, who endeavoured to make a diversion in front of Richmond, fared no better. His rear was surprised, his baggage cut off, and his whole force, after being defeated in a pitched battle, retired hastily to Washington. The Confederates attempted in their turn an aggression upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. But the invasion likewise failed; and, after the severe and bloody action near Sharpsburg, the Confederate army retired across the Potomac. In these various movements both armies have displayed great courage, and have sustained immense losses. But neither has obtained a decisive superiority, and, as the war is aggressive on the part of the North, and defensive on the part of the South, this result must be considered as favourable to the Southern cause.

endeavour to perform our own part as those who have gone before us have worthily performed theirs. . . .—Yours affectionately,

RUSSELL.

Under these circumstances, M. Mercier, the French representative at Washington, restated the arguments which he had from the first used in favour of intervention; the Emperor Napoleon adopted the views of his representative, and finally Lord Palmerston himself wrote to Lord Russell, who was attending the Queen at Gotha—

94 Piccadilly: September 14, 1862.

My dear Russell,—The detailed accounts given in the 'Observer' to day of the battles of August 29 and 30 between the Confederates and the Federals show that the latter got a very complete smashing; and it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates.

If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation? . . . —Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

Lord Russell replied—

Gotha: September 17, 1862.

My dear Palmerston,—Whether the Federal army is destroyed or not, it is clear that it is driven back to Washington, and has made no progress in subduing the insurgent States. Such being the case, I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting.

We ought then, if we agree on such a step, to propose it first to France, and then, on the part of England and France, to Russia and other powers, as a measure decided upon by us.

We ought to make ourselves safe in Canada, not by sending more troops there, but by concentrating those we have in a few defensible posts before the winter sets in.

I hope to get home on Sunday, but a letter sent to the Foreign Office is sure to reach me.

If Newcastle [1] has not set off, you might as well speak to him before he goes.

[1] The Duke of Newcastle succeeded Lord Russell, as Minister attending on the Queen, pending Lord Granville's arrival.

The Queen is, I think, much the better for the new interest which has opened for her.[1]—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Broadlands: September 23, 1862.

My dear Russell,—Your plan of proceedings about the mediation between the Federals and Confederates seems to be excellent. Of course, the offer would be made to both the contending parties at the same time; for, though the offer would be as sure to be accepted by the Southerns as was the proposal of the Prince of Wales by the Danish Princess, yet, in the one case as in the other, there are certain forms which it is decent and proper to go through.

A question would occur whether, if the two parties were to accept the mediation, the fact of our mediating would not of itself be tantamount to an acknowledgment of the Confederates as an independent State.

Might it not be well to ask Russia to join England and France in the offer of mediation? . . .

We should be better without her in the mediation, because she would be too favourable to the North; but on the other hand her participation in the offer might render the North the more willing to accept it.

The after communication to the other European powers would be quite right, although they would be too many for mediation.

As to the time of making the offer, if France and Russia agree, —and France, we know, is quite ready, and only waiting for our concurrence— events may be taking place which might render it desirable that the offer should be made before the middle of October.

It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow . . .—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

In the meanwhile Lord Russell had reached England, while Lord Granville had joined the Queen at Gotha. On his arrival Lord Granville received a message from Lord Russell announcing the probability of the question being brought before the Cabinet. In a very long letter he expressed his conclusion that—

[1] The Prince of Wales's approaching marriage.

It is premature to depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston ; and which, notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parliament, the press, and the public.

Lord Russell forwarded Lord Granville's letter to Lord Palmerston, who, writing on the 2nd of October, admitted that it contained much for serious consideration.

The condition of things which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be great success of the South against the North. That state of things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has been lately checked ; but we do not yet know the real course of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about to follow ; ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects.

Thus the course of events was already making mediation more difficult. Eleven days afterwards Lord Russell circulated among his colleagues the confidential memorandum, some of whose opening sentences have already been quoted. In this memorandum Lord Russell reviewed the condition of affairs in America 'under three aspects, military, political, and social,' concluding—

It has now become a question for the great powers of Europe whether, in the face of the present condition of America—military forces equally balanced, and battles equally sanguinary and undecisive; political animosities aggravated instead of being softened ; social organisation not improved by a large and benevolent scheme of freedom for four millions of the human race, but embittered by exciting the passions of the slave to aid the destructive progress of armies—it has become a question, in the sight of these afflictions, and the prospect of more and worse, whether it is not a duty for Europe to ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciliatory terms, to agree to a suspension of arms for the purpose of weighing calmly the advantages of peace against the contingent gain of further bloodshed, and the protraction of so calamitous a war.

With this memorandum in their hands the Cabinet assembled from all parts of the country on the 23rd of October. But the set of the tide was making against mediation. When mediation was originally suggested by the Prime Minister,

and accepted by Lord Russell, the continuous success of the Confederate arms made the partisans of the South confident of victory. But the events of September showed that, if the North had hitherto proved incapable of defeating the South, the South was unable to follow up its own successes. Its victories excited admiration, but they decided nothing. It was gradually becoming plain that success must ultimately reward the side which could hold out the longest; and its population as well as its resources enabled the North to endure and suffer longer than the South. Members of the Cabinet, moreover, doubted the policy of moving, or moving at that time. Sir G. Grey, with much good sense, declared that it was inexpedient to offer mediation until we knew that the offer would be accepted; and the Duke of Newcastle thought that the offer itself should be postponed. Considerations such as these prevented the matter being pursued any further. The Cabinet was adjourned. In the following month it refused to join France in the offer to mediate, which the Emperor of the French made alone; the Emperor's unsupported offer was declined, and the war fought out to its bitter end.

In the meanwhile another and a greater embarrassment had arisen out of the war.

Straining every nerve to secure their own success in the struggle, the combatants were seeking in other countries for means to carry on the war. The North, 'having a superiority of force by sea, and having blockaded most of the Confederate ports,' was able 'safely to receive all the warlike supplies which it has induced British manufacturers and merchants to send to United States ports in violation of the Queen's proclamation, and to intercept and capture a great part of the supplies of the same kind which were destined from this country to the Confederate States.'[1] The South, anxious to obtain means of retaliation on Northern commerce, tried to procure armed cruisers from British ship-builders.

Early in the war, a vessel, known originally as the 'Oreto,' equipped at Liverpool, sailed for the Bahamas, was seized at Nassau, released after a full judicial investigation, ran the blockade, was armed at Mobile, and thenceforward became

[1] Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, December 19, 1862.

known as the 'Florida.' Late in June 1862 Mr. Adams drew Lord Russell's attention to a vessel which had been lately launched at Messrs. Laird's yard at Birkenhead, which was fitting out for the especial and manifest object of carrying on hostilities at sea, and which he alleged was about to be 'commanded by one of the insurgent agents, the same who sailed in the "Oreto."' Lord Russell at once forwarded this communication to the commissioners of customs, who, after referring the facts to their collector at Liverpool, and the questions involved in them to their solicitor, reported on the 1st of July that 'at present there is not sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel.' This report was communicated by Lord Russell to Mr. Adams on the 4th of July.

On receiving this report, Mr. Adams instructed the American Consul at Liverpool 'to submit to the collector of customs at that port such evidence as he possessed that the suspicions he entertains of the character of the vessel are well founded.' The Consul complied with these directions: his statement was duly referred to the commissioners of customs, who told their collector on the 15th of July that 'there does not appear to be *prima facie* proof sufficient to justify the seizure of the vessel.'

On July 22 and 24 Mr. Adams, confronted with these successive refusals, forwarded to Lord Russell some additional documents, as well as an opinion of Mr. Collier,[1] in which that eminent counsel not merely declared that the collector of customs would be justified in detaining the vessel, but added—

> If, after the application which has been made to him, supported by the evidence which has been laid before me, he allows the vessel to leave Liverpool, he will incur a heavy responsibility, a responsibility of which the Board of Customs, under whose directions he appears to be acting, must take their share.
>
> It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter.

Mr. Adams's letter of the 22nd of July, and the depositions

[1] The late Lord Monkswell.

which it enclosed, were at once referred to the law officers; his letter of the 24th of July, with the additional depositions and Mr. Collier's opinion, only reached the Foreign Office on the 26th, and was also at once sent to the law officers. It was the habit in those days to send papers of that kind to the Queen's Advocate, who was technically the first law officer. Sir John Harding, who held this position in 1862, was unfortunately incapacitated by a distressing illness, and still more unfortunately the Foreign Office was unacquainted with the circumstance. In consequence the letter which Mr. Adams had written on the 24th, and which, oddly enough, was only received at the Foreign Office on the 26th, did not reach the Attorney and Solicitor General till the evening of the 28th of July.

Writing to Lord Russell on the 20th of August, 1869, Sir Roundell Palmer said—

> The first time that I myself saw or heard of the papers which were the subject of the reference on which Atherton and myself advised that the 'Alabama' might be detained, was about four or five o'clock P.M. on Monday, July 28, when Atherton and myself met to consider them . . . at my room near the House of Lords. I do not know how long they had been in Atherton's hands; but, from my recollection that the matter was then treated as one of great urgency, and from my knowledge of his general habits of business, I think he would have communicated with me on the Sunday (July 27) if they had reached him on or before that day; and my belief has always been, that, as the supplementary depositions sent by Mr. Adams, after those on which Collier had advised, were marked as received at the Foreign Office on the 26th (Saturday), they could not have been delivered at the Attorney-General's chambers till after the usual hours of business on that day (Saturday); and that if they were then delivered they remained there unopened (as would generally happen with papers so left, if no special means were used to prevent it) till the Monday morning.

The delay was very unfortunate. On the evening of the 28th of July, almost while Sir Roundell Palmer and Sir William Atherton were considering the papers which had taken so many hours in travelling to their hands, the suspected vessel, the 'No. 290' as she was then called, left the dock and anchored in the Mersey. On the following morning she proceeded out of the river, ostensibly on a trial trip.

The day afterwards she was joined in Beaumaris Bay by the steam-tug 'Hercules,' which put a crew and some other stores on board of her, and she almost immediately afterwards began her destructive career as the 'Alabama.'[1]

When the horse had escaped elaborate attempts were made to close the stable door. Telegrams were sent to Liverpool, Cork, Beaumaris, and Holyhead, to seize the vessel if she happened to be within those ports. But the 'Alabama' proceeded to a Portuguese port, where she completed her equipment, and her commander received his commission.

Other means, however, still existed by which the vessel might have been seized. If orders had been given to detain her at any port which she entered, her necessities must sooner or later have placed her in the hands of the British authorities. Lord John was ready to take this course; he actually drafted a despatch directing the detention of the vessel. But no member of the Cabinet except the Duke of Argyll approved the proposal. The Chancellor was 'vehement' against it, and it was given up.[2]

One act in this unfortunate drama was closed when the 'Alabama' succeeded in escaping from this country. The second act opened with the long series of depredations which

[1] Mr. (now Sir A. H.) Layard, Lord John's Under-Secretary, sent him a memorandum on the evening of July 29, 1862: 'You will see by the papers I send that the gunboat which has been fitting out for the Confederates at Liverpool left that port this morning. This afternoon we receive the law officers' opinion stating that we should stop her. The papers were sent to the law officers with an instruction that they were of urgent importance.'

[2] I make this statement, which I believe will be entirely new to every one outside a very narrow circle, on the authority of a remarkable letter from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Russell, of December 5, 1872. The Duke said in it, in reply to Lord John's complaints on the Geneva award, 'I must remind you that *our* conduct, when you were Foreign Minister, was not unanimously considered by ourselves so certainly right as you would now hold it to be.

'Let me call to your recollection one circumstance, of which I have a vivid recollection.

'You and I had a conversation one day about the "escape" of the "Alabama" or the "Florida" (I forget which), and I urged on you that, although she had fraudulently escaped when you had meant to seize her, that was no reason why we should not detain her if she touched at any of our ports.

'You agreed with me in this view; and you drew up a despatch directing the Colonial authorities to detain her if she came into their power.

'If this order had gone forth, one great plea of the Americans could never have

she committed on the ocean. Mr. Adams, writing to Lord Russell on November 20, 1862, said—

It now appears from a survey of all the evidence—first, that this vessel was built in a dockyard belonging to a commercial house in Liverpool, of which the chief member, down to October of last year, is a member of the House of Commons ; secondly, that, from the manner of her construction, and her peculiar adaptation to war purposes, there could have been no doubt by those engaged in the work, and familiar with such details, that she was intended for other purposes than those of legitimate trade ; and thirdly, that, during the whole process and outfit in the port of Liverpool, the direction of the details and the engagement of persons to be employed in her, were more or less in hands known to be connected with the insurgents in the United States. It further appears that, since her departure from Liverpool, which she was suffered to leave without any of the customary evidence at the Custom House to designate her ownership, she has been supplied with her armament, with coals, and stores, and men, by vessels known to be fitted out and despatched for the purpose from the same port ; and that, although commanded by Americans in her navigation of the ocean, she is manned almost entirely by English seamen, engaged and forwarded from that port by persons in league with her commander. Furthermore, it is shown that this commander, claiming to be an officer acting under legitimate authority, yet is in the constant practice of raising the flag of Great Britain, in order the better to execute his system of ravage and depredation on the high seas. And lastly, it is made clear that he pays no regard whatever to the recognised law of capture of merchant vessels on the high seas, which requires the action of some judicial tribunal to confirm the rightfulness of the proceeding : but, on the contrary, that he resorts to the piratical system of taking, plundering, and burning private property without regard to consequences, or responsibility to any legitimate authority.

Reciting these facts, and laying stress on the circumstance

been urged against us ; and the American claims would perhaps have never been made at all.

'But what happened? When you brought it before the Cabinet there was a perfect insurrection. Everybody but you and I were against the proposed step. Bethell was vehement against its "*legality*," and you gave it up.

'Well, now I keep to the opinion that you and I were *right*, that the action *ought to have been taken*, and that the Cabinet was wrong.

'The correlative of this opinion is that America *had* reason and right in complaining that the "Alabama" was received in all our ports, and that so far we were in the wrong.'

that her Majesty's Government by endeavouring to detain the vessel had admitted the existence of a case of violation of the laws of neutrality, Mr. Adams concluded by declaring that he was instructed

to solicit redress for the national and private injuries already thus sustained, as well as a more effective prevention of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in her Majesty's ports hereafter.

It naturally took time before Lord Russell was able to reply to so grave a demand, but on the 19th of December he met Mr. Adams's argument with a long and elaborate despatch. After admitting that the Queen's proclamation had been evaded during the civil war both by Federals and Confederates, he argued that the North had derived the chief benefit from such evasions. He quoted high American authorities to show that 'it is not the practice of nations to undertake to prohibit their own subjects, by previous laws, from trafficking in articles contraband of war. Such trade is carried on at the risk of those engaged in it.' He showed that during the Crimean War the statesmen of the United States had been guided by these principles. He pointed out that the Government could only act on evidence and in accordance with the law; he argued that, as soon as it was in a position to act, it had used every effort to stop the 'Alabama' from sailing; and he declared that—

Her Majesty's Government cannot therefore admit that they are under any obligations whatever to make compensation to United States citizens on account of the proceedings of that vessel.

The correspondence which thus commenced was carried on with great ability on both sides during the whole of Lord Russell's occupation of the Foreign Office, and in a very long despatch of August 30, 1865, Lord Russell thus dealt with a proposal to refer the matter to arbitration:—

Her Majesty's Government are the sole guardians of their own honour. They cannot admit that they may have acted with bad faith in maintaining the neutrality they professed. The law officers of the Crown must be held to be better interpreters of a British statute than any foreign Government can be presumed to be. Her Majesty's Government must therefore decline either to make reparation and

compensation for the captures made by the 'Alabama,' or to refer the question to any foreign State.

While on two separate occasions he expressed the same views to his own colleagues. Writing to Lord Palmerston on April 6, 1865, he said—

The Chancellor has said more than once in the Cabinet that, if it could be reduced to a question of law, we might submit to the arbitration of a foreign power. But, barring the difficulty of finding a power really friendly to us—which the United States would accept—a difficulty almost insuperable, I do not see how we can consent to such a mode of decision.

The question really is whether we have *bona fide* put our law in force, and further, whether our law, when put in force, is all that the obligations to a friendly power by the law of nations impose upon us.

Now I do not see how we can submit to any foreign power the question of our own good faith in putting the law in force, or the adequacy of the law for the fulfilment of our international obligations. The one is a question of our own honour and sincerity; the other touches nearly the relations of the Crown to Parliament and our duty as Ministers.

And again to Mr. Gladstone :—

Balmoral: September 17, 1865.

My dear Gladstone,—On looking over your letter on the subject of arbitration, of the 2nd of September, I feel I ought to say something more to you on that head.

The defect—the necessary defect—of the Convention, or Protocol of Paris is that no impartial tribunal is provided.

Buchanan said to Clarendon on one occasion, 'We have no arbitrator to whom we can refer. We always used to refer to the Emperor of Russia because he always decided in our favour. But now you have gone to war with Russia we must refuse arbitration.' This was candid and true.

I had no objection to refer to the Senate of Hamburg and to King Leopold the questions whether Peru owed a small sum of money to an Englishman, or whether English officers were sober and insulted or drunk and insolent. On such trumpery cases nations used to make war, and will, I hope, make war no longer. But, if we were to refer to any such powers the question whether we were to pay five, ten, or twenty millions, I have no doubt the arbiter would say, 'England is the tyrant of the seas. She is very rich. Let her pay twenty millions. It will do her good!'

Then as to the questions to be referred.

1. Was Lord Russell diligent or negligent in the duties of his office?

2. Was Sir Roundell Palmer versed in the laws of England, or was he ignorant or partial in giving his opinion to the Government?

3. Ought the Government and Parliament of England to have provided fresh laws to prevent merchant ships leaving their ports until it was proved they had no belligerent purposes?

I feel that England would be disgraced for ever if such questions were left to the arbitration of a foreign Government. A nation's honour must be as dear to her as a Minister's honour must be dear to him.

The question has been the principal object of my thoughts for the last two years, and I confess I think that paying twenty millions down would be far preferable to submitting the case to arbitration.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.[1]

Thus, then, to the very end of Lord Palmerston's Administration, Lord Russell entertained, and did not scruple to

[1] The experience which Lord Russell gained in 1861 made him exceptionally cautious in 1863. It was reported that two ironclads were being built at Birkenhead, and Lord Russell wrote from Scotland to Lord Palmerston—

Meikleour: September 3, 1863.

My dear Palmerston,—The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the two ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The Solicitor-General has been consulted, and concurs in the measure as one of policy though not of strict law.

We shall thus test the law, and, if we have to pay damages, we have satisfied the opinion which prevails here as well as in America, that that kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it.

If you do not approve, pray appoint a Cabinet for Tuesday or Wednesday next.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

Lord Palmerston, however, on consulting the law officers, found that there was no lawful ground for meddling with the ironclads, and suggested that they should be bought for the British navy. Lord Russell thereupon wrote to the Duke of Somerset—

Meikleour: September 14, 1863.

My dear Duke,—It is of the utmost importance and urgency that the ironclads building at Birkenhead should not go to America to break the blockade.

They belong to Messrs. Bravay of Paris. If you will offer to buy them on the part of the Admiralty, you will get money's worth if he accepts your offer; and, if he does not, it will be presumptive proof that they are already bought by the Confederates.

I should state that we have suggested to the Turkish Government to buy them;

express, both in public and private, his strong objection to referring the 'Alabama' claims to arbitration. But, before the close of the Ministry, opinion in the Cabinet was slowly pointing to the expediency of terminating in some such method an unfortunate dispute between two great and kindred nations. The fall of Lord Russell in 1866 was, under such circumstances, calculated to bring the question somewhat nearer to a solution. Lord Stanley, succeeding to the Foreign Office, concluded an arrangement with Mr. Reverdy Johnson, which was formally signed by Lord Stanley's successor, Lord Clarendon, for the settlement of all claims which the citizens of either nation had on the other. The Senate of the United States, however, refused to ratify the treaty which was thus concluded; and Mr. Sumner, in moving its rejection, indulged in language and put forward claims which evidently made a settlement more difficult.

Lord John did not regret the action of the Senate. He wrote—

> The fault of the convention signed by Lord Stanley, and by which Lord Clarendon was likewise bound, was that under the vague phrases of 'Alabama Claims' and 'Arbitration' it would have been open to the United States to contend that the conduct of the British Government had been throughout wanting in good faith, and that an arbiter chosen by lot (perhaps Mr. Sumner) or a foreign power or State, should decide upon points deeply affecting the honour of the British Government. . . .
>
> It was fortunate, therefore, that the American Senate should have refused to ratify the convention signed by Lord Clarendon and Mr. Reverdy Johnson.
>
> As matters stand at present, the only peaceable alternatives appear to be a reasonable answer to the claims of the United States, or an agreement to drop the whole question on both sides.
>
> What I would esteem a reasonable answer is one suggested by Mr. Forster. I understand him to say that neither the Secretary of State nor the law officers were in fault, but that the official persons employed at Liverpool were wanting in due diligence, and that this country might, in reparation of that neglect, grant compensation for

but you can easily settle that matter with the Turks, if they *bonâ fide* desire to have them and you do not wish to keep them.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

the losses incurred by merchants in consequence of captures made by the 'Alabama.'[1]

In the meanwhile the march of events was convincing a good many people of the folly of leaving such a question permanently unsettled. The prostration of France in 1870 gave Russia an opportunity for declaring herself no longer bound by some of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris; and, even if this country had been disposed to enter single-handed into a contest with the Russian Empire, the attitude of the United States placed her under securities to keep the peace. Mr. Gladstone's Administration would have incurred a heavy responsibility if under such circumstances it had not made a fresh effort to terminate the embarrassment; and Lord Granville, who became Foreign Secretary on Lord Clarendon's death, ultimately agreed to despatch a commission to Washington to confer with an equal number of commissioners appointed by the United States on the various matters of dispute between the two countries.

Lord Russell was, on the whole, disposed to approve the constitution of the commission. He thought that fairer men than the English commissioners, Lord de Grey (now Lord Ripon), Sir Stafford Northcote (afterwards Lord Iddesleigh), Mr. Mountague Bernard, Sir Edward Thornton, and Sir John MacDonald, could not have been chosen. He was, indeed, a little inclined to resent the presence on the commission of Mr. Fish, the American Secretary of State, who, in a despatch to Mr. Motley—which had been read to, and not answered by, Lord Clarendon—had spoken of the negligence of the British Government to detain the 'Alabama,' and had declared that Sir William Jones had taught us to regard extreme negligence as equivalent or approximate to evil intentions.

Yet that was Mr. Fish's charge, which seems to have been so

[1] *Speeches and Despatches*, ii. 260. Three years afterwards Lord Russell used much worthier language: 'I assent entirely to the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice of England that the "Alabama" ought to have been detained during the four days I was waiting for the opinion of the law officers. But I think that the fault was not that of the commissioners of customs; it was my fault as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.' (*Recollections and Suggestions*, p. 407.)

pleasant to the English commissioners that they were delighted to meet him and to swear eternal friendship.

It was not, however, with the composition of the commission that Lord Russell chiefly found fault. It was with their action, and not with their friendships, that he was ultimately at issue. The commissioners were, in the first place, authorised to preface their negotiations by an expression of regret for the escape of the 'Alabama,' and for the depredations which she had committed; and Lord Russell thought that such an intimation, so made, indirectly reflected on his own conduct in office. The commissioners subsequently proceeded to lay down three rules by which neutral Governments were in future to be bound;[1] and to declare that, though these rules were not in force when the claims arose, in any decision upon them the principles thus laid down should be respected; and Lord Russell not unnaturally thought that it was in the last degree unjust that his conduct as Secretary of State should be judged by rules which were not applicable to it at the time.

Strongly holding these opinions, Lord Russell, on June 12, 1871, moved an address to the Crown praying her Majesty 'not to sanction or to ratify any convention for the settlement of the "Alabama" claims by which her Majesty will approve of any conditions, terms, or rules by which the arbitrator or arbitrators will be bound, other than the law of nations and the municipal law of the United Kingdom existing and in force at the period of the late civil war in the United States when the alleged depredations took place.'

In moving this address Lord Russell was careful to point out that he had no objection to offer to the appointment of arbiters, or even to asking the arbitrators whether he was justified in not detaining the 'Alabama' in the interval between the 24th and the 29th.

[1] Under these rules a neutral Government was bound (1) to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out in its territory of any vessel which it had reasonable ground to believe was intended to carry on war against a nation with which the neutral was at peace, and to use like diligence to prevent the departure of any such vessel; (2) not to permit a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a basis of operation against another; (3) to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters to prevent the infraction of these rules.

It is a very fair question whether those five days between the 24th and the 29th were lost by want of due diligence; whether the law officers were entitled to take the time for considering the matter; and whether an order to detain the vessel should have been at once sent down.

On both these points he had evidently altered the opinions which he had held in 1865. But he still objected to the agreement to try these questions by an *ex post facto* law. And his objection was increased by the circumstance that our commissioners had ignored the claims which Canada was making against the States.

Everything has been concession on our side, and assertion, I may say without argument, on the part of the United States. Our commissioners did not trouble the American commissioners to go into any argument; they merely, as I read the protocols, accepted the assertion that they could not entertain the question of compensating the Canadians for the Fenian outrages, on which an order was sent from London that that point should not be insisted upon. So too with regard to the Fisheries.

Lord Granville, in replying to this passage of Lord Russell's speech, said—

The noble Earl said that the United States had made no concessions; but in the very beginning of the protocols Mr. Fish [renewed] the proposition he had made before to much larger national claims [i.e. to the so-called indirect claims]. . . . These were pretensions which might have been carried out under the former arbitration; but they entirely disappear under the limited reference, which includes merely complaints arising out of the escape of the 'Alabama.'

A good many people thought that Lord Russell's position was logically impregnable, and that he was right in contending that it was neither politic nor just that the conduct of public men should be judged by rules not applicable to it at the time. But even many of those, who, in this respect, felt with Lord Russell, were gratified by the prospect of terminating an irritating dispute with a friendly country. It seemed worth while to go a very long way to meet the wishes of a great, a growing, and a kindred nation. Lord Russell's address had consequently no chance of acceptance; and the arbitration to which the Washington commission had agreed went on.

Under the provisions of the Treaty of Washington, the 'Alabama' claims were referred to five arbiters appointed by the Queen, the President of the United States, the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. In accordance with the terms of the reference, the arbiters met at Geneva; and, on the publication of the American case, it suddenly became plain that the indirect claims, which it was supposed were excluded from the treaty, and which Lord Granville had publicly asserted in the House of Lords had disappeared from the limited reference, were again formally put forward. The knowledge of this circumstance produced intense excitement throughout the country; and, in the early part of the session of 1872, Ministers were again and again asked what course they proposed to take, and whether they intended to withdraw from the arbitration. Lord Russell had passed the winter abroad; he only returned to this country in the second week of April. But he was present in the House of Lords on the 12th of that month, when Lord Stanhope again asked for information as to the proceedings of the Government. Lord Granville's answer did not satisfy Lord Russell; and he at once gave notice that on the 22nd of April he would move an address to the Crown praying that all proceedings before the arbitrators might be suspended until the indirect claims were withdrawn. The debate which was thus foreshadowed was from time to time postponed, at Lord Granville's request, in order that official communications with the Government of the United States might be completed. It did not ultimately take place till the 4th of June. On that day Lord Russell stated the whole case with great force:—

We are now in the month of June—the same month in which, last year, the treaty was brought forward here and its ratification was considered—and we are now in the same state of doubt and uncertainty as we were when these questions were originally raised. Two reasons were urged against my persisting with the motion which I then made asking her Majesty not to ratify the treaty. It was said that the negotiations had gone too far, and the commissioners had acted too precisely in pursuance of their powers, to make it right to address her Majesty. . . . The treaty was ratified, and I conceive

that it is your Lordships' duty, and that of every subject of her Majesty, to carry that treaty into effect consistently with the honour of the Crown and the real meaning of the stipulations which it contains. . . . If that is the case—since her Majesty's Government cannot be called on to assist at the arbitration when the case put forward by the other side is not contained in the treaty—I ask what is their course to pursue. I confess it appears to me not to be doubtful. The British authorities —her Majesty herself, her Secretary of State, every person belonging to the Cabinet, and I may say the great majority of the whole nation —have stated that these claims form no part of the treaty. . . . It appears to me that the United States have said—and they are not apt to flinch from any claim they think it right to put forward—they have said they will go to the arbitrators with these indirect claims contained in the document now before the arbitrators. Her Majesty's Government [should] say as firmly and decidedly, 'We shall never attend at Geneva, or before a tribunal to which these indirect claims are presented.'

This speech made a great impression. But the debate was ultimately adjourned; and, before it was resumed, Lord Granville was able to produce a letter from the American Minister in London stating that he was authorised by telegram to declare that the Government of the United States understood a supplemental article, which it was proposed should be added to the treaty, in the same sense as the British Government interpreted it, and that the new rule in the proposed article was 'the consideration for, and to be accepted as, a final settlement of the . . . . indirect claims.' With these assurances Lord Russell expressed himself satisfied, and consented to withdraw or postpone the motion for an address to the Crown.

Feeling at the time was largely with Lord Russell. It was usually agreed that his language had been worthy of a great statesman of a great country. One eminent man wrote to him a few days afterwards—

> I should like so much to have the opportunity of saying to you what I have been saying in these last days to all within my reach, that Lord Russell's speech in the Lords is the only language uttered in the wearisome and repulsive 'Alabama' business that has been in the least degree worthy of the English past.[1]

[1] Mr. John Forster to Lord Russell, June 30, 1872.

At the present day more difference of opinion may possibly exist. Many persons, anxious for the success of arbitration, imagine that it must have been a good thing to refer a vexatious dispute to arbitration; and either have forgotten, or perhaps never knew, the sacrifices which this country made to get the case before the arbiters. Yet the concessions were undoubtedly great. They seemed all the greater because, though the indirect claims were withdrawn, the arbiters proceeded to give a decision that they were inadmissible. They actually, in other words, decided the very point which Queen, Cabinet, Foreign Office, and the great majority of the whole nation had decided should not come before them for decision.

During the whole of this prolonged controversy Lord Russell felt strongly the conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Government. He thought that its members had not sufficiently defended his own action as Secretary of State, or resented with adequate warmth the charges brought against him in official documents. His relations with the members of the Cabinet became, in consequence, strained; and, for the first and only time in his life, he found himself drawn into confidential communications with the leaders of the Conservative party. His 'Recollections and Suggestions,' which he passed through the press two years afterwards, contain ample evidence of his altered feelings. For instance:—

> The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary took for their model apparently the character of Donna Inez in the poem of 'Don Juan':—
>
> Calmly they heard each calumny that rose,
> And saw *his* agonies with such sublimity,
> That all the world exclaimed 'What magnanimity!'

And again:—

> I shall say to Lord Granville, as Sir Peter Teazle said to Mrs. Candour, 'If my character is attacked, I only beg of you not to undertake my defence.'[1]

Even these quotations, however, show that Lord Russell

[1] Lord Russell did not verify these quotations apparently. He purposely altered one word in the quotation from *Don Juan*. But the saying, which he attributes to Sir Peter Teazle, is little more than a paraphrase of the original.

was gradually forgetting the grave annoyance which he had undoubtedly felt. Men do not seek their quotations in 'The School for Scandal' and 'Don Juan' till the first frown of anger is relaxing into something like a smile.

Lord Russell, moreover, derived some satisfaction from knowing that, if the arbiters as a body had decided against the Government of which he was the organ, the English arbitrator, in his elaborate dissent from the finding of the tribunal, had vindicated his conduct; while, a little later still, he had the satisfaction of reading the independent judgment of Mr. Grote in the personal life of the historian:—

I quite agree in the remarks contained in your last note about the unreasonable and insane language of the Americans against England.

The perfect neutrality of England in this destructive war appears to me almost a phenomenon in political history.

No such forbearance has been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. It is the single case in which the English Government and public—generally so meddlesome—have displayed most prudent and commendable forbearance in spite of great temptations to the contrary.

CHAPTER XXX.

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

THE period during which Lord Russell held the seals of Foreign Secretary was one of abnormal activity. The affairs of Italy, and the civil war in America, were only two of the subjects which occupied the attention of the Minister. A new war in China, a war between Spain and Morocco, the occupation of Mexico by France with all its fatal consequences, and the provision of a new King with a new title for the little Kingdom of Greece, were simultaneously demanding anxious attention. Lord Russell's treatment, however, of these and other questions is a subject rather for the historian than for the biographer; and these memoirs must pass on to two other matters which, in the event, were partially linked together—the Polish insurrection of 1862, and the German-Danish War of 1864.

The early history of the Polish insurrection may be given in Lord Russell's own words:—

In 1862 fresh discontent, fresh conspiracies, and fresh preparations for insurrection existed in Poland. The Russian Government took what they considered effectual means to suppress these discontents. The mode was rather a singular one. Not satisfied with arresting the individuals who were supposed to be the leaders of the conspiracy, they made the conscription of January 1863 an engine for seizing upon their supposed enemies. The intelligent acting Consul General at Warsaw, Mr. White, wrote, on January 14, that the list of persons intended to be taken as recruits had been made out, that the utmost pains had been taken to include in these lists all able-bodied men suspected of revolutionary tendencies, and who had been marked out as such by the police during the last two years. Thus the so-called conscription was turned into a proscription. The lists of persons, usually made by lot, were made to comprehend all such persons as Octavius, Mark Antony, and Crassus might have

deemed fit objects of suspicion; and all these persons were to be condemned for life to be soldiers in the Russian army.

This act was naturally the prelude to resistance and civil war.

In Western Europe the cause of the Poles had always attracted sympathy. But the geographical situation of Poland —surrounded by the three great military Empires of Eastern Europe—made it difficult for any country, and impossible for a country whose strength was on the seas, to render them effectual assistance. This circumstance was expressed by Lord Russell himself, on March 25, 1862, in a speech in which he expressed his strong sympathy with a struggling people, but dwelt on the impossibility of affording them active help.

No statesman who has held the office which I have the honour to occupy, no Prime Minister of this country has, at any time, held out the prospect of material assistance to the Poles.

But, though Lord Russell was of opinion that the circumstances of this country made it impossible for it to render material aid to the Poles, he was prepared, in concert with other nations, to afford them moral support. It was originally the wish of the Western powers that a collective note of remonstrance should be presented at Petersburg by the four Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia. But it was ultimately decided that separate despatches on the subject of Poland should be simultaneously addressed to Russia by the Courts of Austria, France, and England. The despatch which was written by Lord Russell in accordance with this arrangement began by expressing the interest with which the British Government regarded, and the sympathy which it felt for, Poland; it went on to vindicate its right, under the Treaties of Vienna, to express its opinions on the subject; it declined to acquiesce in the doctrine that the provisions of those treaties in favour of the Poles had been cancelled by the insurrection of 1830; it argued that the engagements which Russia made in 1815 had not been fulfilled; it pointed out that, whatever might be the final issue of the present contest, it could only be reached after a calamitous effusion of blood; it declared that the disturbances perpetually breaking out in Poland 'necessarily

produce a serious agitation of opinion in other countries of Europe,' and might, under possible circumstances, lead to 'complications of the most serious nature;' and it concluded by urging the Russian Government so to 'arrange these matters that peace may be restored to the Polish people, and established upon lasting foundations.' In conversation —on the day on which the despatch was written—with the Russian Minister in London, Lord Russell declared that 'her Majesty's Government had no intentions that were otherwise than pacific, still less any concert with other powers for any but pacific purposes. But the state of things might change. . . . The insurrections in Poland might continue and might assume larger proportions. . . . If, in such a state of affairs, the Emperor of Russia were to take no steps of a conciliatory nature, dangers and complications might arise not at present in contemplation.' Lord Russell went on to urge that the Emperor should offer an amnesty to those who would lay down their arms, and grant representative institutions both to Poland and Russia.

The Russian Government received this despatch, and the similar despatches from France and Austria, with some consternation. Face to face with these remonstrances, it endeavoured to gain time; and, as one means of doing so, it asked the mediating powers what they had to propose. The three mediating powers were thereupon induced to formulate six points which they asked Russia to concede: (1) a complete amnesty; (2) representative institutions; (3) a national administration; (4) liberty of public worship; (5) the use of the Polish language in the public offices and in the law courts; and (6) a regular system of recruiting. In addition to these six points—on which Austria, France, and Great Britain were agreed—the two latter powers proposed the immediate conclusion of an armistice.

Russia declined to take this remonstrance into consideration till the insurrection was put down. She refused to admit that Europe generally had any right to consider the future of Poland; and she emphasised her argument by specially inviting Austria and Prussia—partners with herself in the original partition of the country—to confer with her upon it.

The reception of this despatch imposed a grave duty on the British Cabinet. In Lord Russell's own language 'the question came to be whether the three powers should together urge their demands by force or relinquish the attempt.' If France could have drawn the answer, force would probably have been used. Her Emperor and her people were equally disposed to intervene. But

> The prospect of a war with Russia for the deliverance of Poland was a very cloudy one. The object to be aimed at must have been, not the fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, but the establishment of Poland as an independent State. The basis for the erection of such a State was almost entirely wanting. The aristocracy of Poland were distrusted: wide in their projects, narrow in their notions of government. . . . The democracy of Poland were hostile to the aristocracy; wild in their desires, bloody in their means. . . . The policy of England, no less than the policy of Austria, would have shrunk from the creation of such a State. Besides these difficulties as to the object, the means of carrying on war against Russia, with Prussia as her probable ally, would have been hazardous and expensive beyond calculation. Moved by considerations of this kind, every proposition of France which tended to pledge the three powers to war was declined by the British and Austrian Cabinets.[1]

And Lord Russell, in a long despatch of August 11, 1863, in which he dealt with and controverted the Russian arguments, simply concluded—

> If Russia does not perform all that depends upon her to further the moderate and conciliatory views of the three powers, if she does not enter upon the path which is open to her by friendly counsels, she makes herself responsible for the serious consequences which the prolongation of the troubles of Poland may produce.[2]

In the meanwhile, the other question which was agitating Central and Northern Europe—the connection of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with one another, with Denmark, and with Germany—was becoming acute.

The two Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein lie to the south of modern Denmark. Holstein, the more southern of the two, is exclusively German in its population. Schleswig, the more northern, contains a mixed population of Danes

[1] *Speeches and Despatches*, ii. 236. [2] *Ibid.* 417.

and Germans. In the course of the fourteenth century Schleswig was conquered by Denmark, but ceded to Count Gerard of Holstein—the Constitution of Waldemar providing that the two Duchies should be under one Lord, but that they should never be united to Denmark. This is the first fact to realise in the complex history of the Schleswig-Holstein question.

The line of Gerard of Holstein expired in 1375. It was succeeded by a branch of the house of Oldenburg. In 1448 a member of this house, the nephew of the reigning Duke, was elected to the throne of Denmark. The reigning Duke procured in that year a confirmation of the compact that Schleswig should never be united with Denmark. Dying without issue in 1459, the Duke was succeeded, by the election of the Estates, by his nephew Christian I. of Denmark. In electing Christian, however, the Estates compelled him in 1460 to renew the compact confirmed in 1448. And, though Duchies and Crown were thenceforward united, the only link between them was the sovereign. Even this link could possibly be severed. For the succession in the Duchy was secured to the male heir in direct contradiction of the law of Denmark.[1]

Thus, while the fourteenth century declared that Schleswig and Holstein should be joined together and separate from Denmark, the fifteenth century placed Duchies and Kingdom, still organically distinct, under one head, uniting them in fact by the link of the Crown. It would complicate this narrative if stress were laid on the various changes in the relations between Kingdom and Duchies which were consequent on the unsettled state of Europe during the three succeeding centuries. It is sufficient to say that, by a treaty made in 1773, the arrangements concluded more than 300 years before were confirmed. Schleswig-Holstein reverted once more to the King of Denmark under exactly the same conditions as in the time of Christian I., who had expressly recognised that

[1] In the whole of this account I have followed, and occasionally copied, the remarkable article on the constitutional question in Schleswig-Holstein which was published in the *Home and Foreign Review* of January 1862. The student, however, will do well to compare this account, written from a German point of view, with *Denmark and Germany since* 1815, by Charles A. Gosch (London, 1862). This book contains the Danish side of the question in a convenient form.

he governed them as Duke, that is, by virtue of their own law of succession.

Such an arrangement was not likely to be respected amidst the convulsions which affected Europe in the commencement of the present century. In 1806 Christian VII. took advantage of the disruption of the German Empire formally to incorporate the Duchies into his Kingdom. No one was in a position to dispute the act of the monarch. In 1815, however, the King of Denmark, by virtue of his rights in Holstein and Lauenberg, joined the Confederation of the Rhine; and the nobility of Holstein, brought in this way into fresh connection with Germany, appealed to the German Diet. But the Diet, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was subject to influences opposed to the rights of nationalities. It declined to interfere, and the union of Duchies and Kingdom was maintained.

Christian VII. was succeeded in 1808 by his son Frederick VI., who was followed in 1839 by his cousin Christian VIII. The latter monarch had only one son, afterwards Frederick VII., who, though twice married, had no children. On his death, if no alteration had been made, the crown of Denmark would have passed to the female line—the present reigning dynasty—while the Duchies, by the old undisputed law, would have reverted to a younger branch, which descended through males to the house of Augustenburg.

With this prospect before them it became very desirable for the Danes to amalgamate the Duchies; and in the year 1844 the Danish Estates almost unanimously adopted a motion that the King should proclaim Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg one indivisible State. In 1846 the King put forth a declaration that there was no doubt that the Danish law of succession prevailed in Schleswig. He admitted that there was more doubt respecting Holstein. But he promised to use his endeavours to obtain the recognition of the integrity of Denmark as a collective State. Powerless alone against the Danes and their sovereign, Holstein appealed to the Diet; and the Diet took up the quarrel, and reserved the right of enforcing its legitimate authority in case of need.

Christian VIII. died in January 1848. His son, Frede-

rick VII., the last of his line, grasped the tiller of the State at a critical moment. Crowns, before a month was over, were tumbling off the heads of half the sovereigns of Europe; and Denmark, shaken by these events, felt the full force of the revolutionary movement. Face to face with revolution at home and Germany across the frontier, the new King tried to cut instead of untying the Gordian knot. He separated Holstein from Schleswig, incorporating the latter in Denmark but allowing the former under its own constitution to form part of the German Confederation. Frederick VII. probably hoped that the German Diet would be content with the half-loaf which he offered it. The Diet, however, replied to the challenge by formally incorporating Schleswig in Germany, and by committing to Prussia the office of mediation. War broke out, but the arms of Prussia were crippled by the revolution which shook her throne. The sword of Denmark, under these circumstances, proved victorious; and the Duchies were ultimately compelled to submit to the decision which force had pronounced.

These events gave rise to the famous protocol which was signed in London, in August 1850, by England, France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. This document settled the question, so far as diplomacy could determine it, in the interests of Denmark. The unity of Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg was secured by a uniform law of succession, and their internal affairs were placed, as far as practicable, under a common administration.[1]

The protocol of 1850 was signed by Lord Palmerston during the Russell Administration. It was succeeded by the treaty of 1852, which was concluded by Lord Malmesbury. This treaty, to which all the great powers were parties, was the logical consequence of the protocol. Under it the succession to Kingdom and Duchies was assigned to Prince Christian of Glücksburg, the present reigning King of

[1] In a remarkable passage in his Diary, Count Vitzthum (St. Petersburg and London, 1852-1864, vol. ii. p. 221) declares that this protocol was the price which Lord Palmerston consented to pay for Russian acquiescence in the Greek policy of 1850. But, from Lord Palmerston's point of view, the integrity of Denmark was quite as much a British as a Russian interest; and the supposed concession, therefore, could not have caused the Minister much compunction.

Denmark. The integrity of the whole Danish Monarchy was declared permanent; but the rights of the German Confederation with respect to Holstein and Schleswig were reserved. The declaration was made in accordance with the views of Russia, England, and France; the reservation was inserted in the interests of the German powers; and in a manifesto, which was communicated to the German Courts, the King of Denmark laid down elaborate rules for the treatment and government of the Duchies.

Thus, while the succession to the Danish throne and the integrity of Denmark had been secured by the protocol of 1850 and the treaty of 1852, the elaborate promises of the Danish King, formally communicated to the German powers, had given the latter a pretext for contending that these pledges were at least as sacred as the treaty. And the next ten years made the pretext much more formidable than it seemed in 1852. For Denmark, aiming at the consolidation of her administration, showed an increasing disposition to ignore her pledges; while the German powers, irritated at the attitude of the Danes, protested against this policy. The Danes endeavoured to extricate themselves from a constantly growing embarrassment by repeating the policy of 1848, by granting, under what was known as the Constitution of 1855, autonomous institutions to Holstein, by consolidating the purely Danish portions of the Monarchy, and by incorporating Schleswig, which was partly Danish and partly German, in Denmark. But the German inhabitants of Schleswig resented this arrangement. They complained of the suppression of their language and the employment of Danish functionaries, and they argued that, under the engagements which had been contracted between 1851 and 1852, Holstein had a voice in constitutional changes of this character. This argument added heat to a dispute already acute. For it was now plain that, while the German Diet claimed the right to interfere in Holstein, Holstein asserted her claim to be heard on the affairs of the entire Kingdom.

Lord Russell, from the first, thought that both parties to this unfortunate dispute were to a great extent to blame; and from the beginning strove to induce both of them partially to

give way. Thus, early in August 1860, he supported a proposal of Denmark for regulating the powers of the Holstein assembly, and for fixing once for all the definite or maximum contributions which should be made by Holstein and the other constituent parts of Denmark to the national expenses. But, at the same time, he pointed out that the proposal failed to satisfy the just claims of Schleswig, whose people, he suggested, might be allowed legislative and administrative independence, and be suffered themselves to determine the language to be used in their churches and schools. No decision, however, was adopted on this suggestion. For the next two years and a half, diplomacy continued to exchange notes and despatches, till at last, in September 1862, Lord Russell, who had enjoyed opportunities of discussing the subject with foreign statesmen while he was in attendance on the Queen at Gotha, made a formal proposal for settling the whole of the differences which had arisen.

Lord Russell commenced this despatch by assuming that there was no longer any doubt (1) that in Holstein and Lauenburg neither taxes could be imposed nor laws enacted without the express consent of the representatives of those Duchies; (2) that the Constitution of 1855, not having been accepted by the Duchies, was inoperative in Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig; and (3) that Denmark can legislate for herself, and impose taxes to be levied on her own people, without the consent of Holstein, Lauenburg, or Schleswig.

Two questions of great importance remain. The first regards the Duchy of Schleswig; the second, the common constitution of the Monarchy.

Schleswig was formerly in a position altogether anomalous. Unconnected with the German Confederation, it was yet connected with Holstein, which formed part of that confederation. Later arrangements have dissolved this inconvenient tie. . . .

There are, however, relations between Germany and Denmark in respect to Schleswig, which have given rise to the present controversy.

The obligations of honour contracted by Denmark towards Schleswig, and imparted to the German Confederation as such by the King of Denmark in 1852, chiefly regard two points. The first

of these is the royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated with Denmark. The second is, in substance, an engagement that the Germans in Schleswig shall be treated on an equal footing with persons of Danish or any other nationality.

After reciting the grievances of which Germany complained under each of these heads, Lord Russell went on—

The best mode of remedying these evils for the present, and of preventing complaints for the future, is to grant a complete autonomy to Schleswig, allow the Diet of Schleswig fairly to treat, and independently to decide upon, questions affecting their university, their churches and schools, the language to be used where the Danish population prevails, where the Germans preponderate, and where the races are mixed.

I come lastly to the question of the constitution, the most entangled and the most embarrassing question of all those in discussion.

Treaties, protocols, and despatches afford us little light upon this subject, and the glimmering rays which they do afford tend rather to lead us astray than to guide us right.

For what could be more destructive of all union, all efficiency, all strength, and, indeed, of all independence, than to lay down as an absolute rule that no law should be passed and no budget sanctioned unless the four States of the Monarchy all concurred? What would Austria say if she were asked to accept a constitution which should paralyse the action of the Reichsrath at Vienna till separate Diets in Hungary, in Galicia, and in Venetia should have adopted the same law or sanctioned the same budget? How would Prussia herself bear an absolute veto on the proceedings of her Parliament given to the Diet of Posen?

To obviate these difficulties Lord Russell suggested that each portion of the constitution might 'have its due independent movement;' that each portion of the Monarchy might bear its allotted share of the national expenses; that the normal budget might be voted for a fixed period of ten years, and confided to a Council of State, composed of two-thirds Danes and one-third Germans; and that extraordinary expenses might be voted by the Kingdom and three Duchies separately. He concluded—

The suggestions I have made may be summed up in a few words:

1. Holstein and Lauenburg to have all that the German Confederation asks for them.

2. Schleswig to have the power of self-government, and not to be represented in the Rigsraad.

3. A normal budget to be agreed upon by Denmark, Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

4. Any extraordinary expenses to be submitted to the Rigsraad, and to the separate Diets of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

The two great German powers, Austria and Prussia, agreed to accept this despatch as the basis of negotiation. Sweden, on the contrary, naturally leaning to the Scandinavian cause, declared the proposal impracticable. Encouraged possibly by the moral support of Sweden, hoping for its active assistance, and not deterred by Lord Russell's advice, the Danish Government proceeded to carry out its policy. During the autumn of 1862 and the winter of 1863 it occupied itself in completing the arrangements for the autonomy of Holstein; and finally, on March 30, 1863, a few days after the marriage of the Prince of Wales brought this country into closer connection with Denmark, Frederick VII. brought the matter to a crisis by declaring that the Diet had interfered in the internal affairs of his Kingdom, and had made demands which were neither justified by the federal laws nor compatible with the rights of those of his dominions which do not belong to the confederation. He declared that Holstein with its army and its finance should be entirely excluded from the rest of the Monarchy; and he announced that 'directions for the settlement of the position of the Duchy would be laid before the Estates for their acceptance.'

The issue of this ordinance made a crisis, already grave, intensely acute. Austria and Prussia lodged strong protests against the ordinance; they brought it before the Diet; the Diet referred it to a committee; and the committee recommended that Denmark should be required to withdraw it, and to prepare a homogeneous constitution for the Duchies and the Kingdom in conformity with the promises of 1852 and with Lord Russell's despatch of the previous September. The Diet adopted these recommendations, and finally, on October 1, 1863, demanded the withdrawal of the ordinance before the 27th of that month. If this demand were not complied with, federal execution in Holstein, or the

military occupation of the Duchy by German troops, would follow.

At this moment Lord Russell again came forward and counselled moderation. Writing to Sir A. Malet, who represented this country at Frankfort, on the 29th of September, he deprecated the contemplated action of the Diet. He argued that it could not be pretended that 'the constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy could be subject to the jurisdiction of the German Confederation.' He declared that her Majesty 'could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy;' and he entreated the German Diet to pause, and to submit the question in dispute between Germany and Denmark to the mediation of other powers unconcerned in the controversy, but deeply concerned in the maintenance of the peace of Europe and the independence of Denmark.

This despatch made an extraordinary sensation among the members of the Diet; and Lord Russell, taking advantage of this circumstance, urged the Danes to withdraw or suspend the ordinance of March. The Danes replied by inquiring whether in that event federal execution would be stopped. Without directly answering this question Lord Russell continued to urge the withdrawal of the ordinance. He communicated to Sir A. Malet, on the 14th of October, the probability of its modification, desiring him to point out to the President of the Diet that federal execution, even if confined to Holstein, would aggravate the difficulty; while, if it extended to Schleswig, 'it must be remembered that Austria and Prussia, as well as Great Britain and France, are bound by the Treaty of 1852 to respect the integrity of Denmark.' And, when the president replied that there was a good deal of jealousy at any interference in German affairs, he directed Sir A. Malet to say that 'her Majesty's Government consider the constitution of the Danish Monarchy . . . as pre-eminently a Danish and not a German affair. It is precisely the attempt to involve Denmark into [? in] the sphere of German affairs . . . which her Majesty's Government feel bound to resist.'

In the midst of this crisis, while Germany was threatening execution, while the Danes were preparing resistance, and Lord Russell was preaching moderation, Frederick VII. died, and Prince Christian of Glücksburg ascended the throne as Christian IX. A change of dynasty had supervened at a moment when the crisis was already so acute that war and only war could apparently terminate it.

If this complicated question of Schleswig-Holstein, whose history has been imperfectly traced, had stood alone, the crisis would have been sufficiently grave to excite anxiety. It was the more grave because it was only the audible and outward expression of an inward movement with which all Germany was seething. German statesmen, German poets, German thinkers, and the German people were sighing for the creation of a strong Germany. Animated by these ideas, which received fresh impulse from the movements of Italy, neither statesmen nor people could tolerate in silence the absorption of provinces, German in their origin and important from their situation, in a neighbouring and Scandinavian Monarchy. And, to quote the words of the well-informed writer whose statements have already been so freely borrowed,[1] 'Instead of waiting, after their ancient custom, for their Governments to take the initiative, and losing the result in disputing about the end and the manner and the means, the Germans resolutely cast aside all secondary interests and concentrated their activity on one distinct object—to reject the Treaty of London and its obligations for Germany, and to obtain the independence of the Duchies under their native sovereign.'

Thus, in 1863, two great questions were arising for settlement in Central Europe. On both of them a profound feeling was excited in this country. The people sympathised with the efforts which the Poles were making, and they thought that the interests of England were identified with the integrity of Denmark. Corresponding views, it so happened, were held by the French Court and the French nation. The cause of

[1] I assume that the article in the *Home and Foreign Review* for April is by the same hand which penned the article in the January number. Both are equally well informed.

Poland had always been dear at Paris, and the French had watched on previous occasions the abortive risings of the Poles with sorrow and shame. They required little encouragement to embark in a campaign with the object of establishing a new nation, allied with France, on the borders of her chief continental rivals. The cause of Denmark was also associated with French interests. For the establishment of a strong Germany would be a menace to France; and the strength of Germany, it was plain, would be increased if the Scandinavian Kingdom on its flank was in any way weakened.

A community of interests was apparently drawing France and England together; but, at the same time, the different circumstances of the two countries modified the policy of each of them. England, as mistress of the seas, saw that it would be comparatively easy to help a maritime nation like Denmark. France, with the most formidable army in Europe at her disposal, thought that a campaign in defence of Polish liberties was not beyond her powers. Each country looked with favour both on the cause of the Poles and on the integrity of Denmark. But France was more ready to employ force in the one case; England was more inclined to proffer help in the other.

At this conjuncture the Emperor Napoleon made a remarkable effort to obtain control of the crisis. Writing on November 4, 1863, to the sovereigns of Europe, he declared that the settlement of Vienna was the foundation on which the political edifice of Europe now rests, and that it is crumbling to pieces on all sides.

> It is impossible not to admit that on almost all points the treaties are destroyed, modified, disregarded, or menaced. Hence there are duties without rule, rights without title, pretensions without restraint.

Under such circumstances it was the duty of the sovereigns of Europe not to delay 'taking a decision until sudden and irresistible events disturb our judgment and draw us in spite of ourselves in opposite directions.'

The Emperor accordingly proposed that the sovereigns of Europe should assemble in congress in Paris to deliberate on the affairs of a perturbed continent.

The letter reached the Queen, by whom it was referred to the Cabinet, early in November 1863. The Cabinet had already assembled in London, and only a week elapsed before Lord Russell was able to reply to the invitation. The answer which he framed, and which the Cabinet approved, was pronounced by an unfriendly critic to be 'unnecessarily explicit.' It certainly made the assembly of a congress impossible. For, after recognising the interest which the Emperor was taking in the welfare of Europe, it went on to dispose of his whole case. The changes which had taken place in Europe since the settlement of 1815 were not, in the writer's judgment, greater than might have been expected from the lapse of time, the progress of opinion, the shifting policy of governments, and the varying exigencies of nations. Many of the modifications which had taken place had 'received the sanction of all the great powers and now form part of the recognised law of Europe.'

Is it proposed to give these changes a more general and solemn sanction? Is such a work necessary? Will it conduce to the peace of Europe?

Other portions of the Treaty of Vienna have been disregarded or set aside, and the changes thus made *de facto* have not been recognised *de jure* by all the powers of Europe.

Is it proposed to obtain from powers which have hitherto not joined in that recognition a sanction to those changes?

Lastly come those parts of the Treaty of Vienna which are menaced, and upon those portions the most important questions of all arise. What is the nature of the proposals to be made on this subject by the Emperor Napoleon? In what direction would they tend? And, above all, are they, if agreed to by a majority of the powers, to be enforced by arms?

When the sovereigns or ministers of Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain met at Verona, in 1823, upon the affairs of Spain, the first four of those powers carried into effect their resolutions by means of armed forces, in spite of the protest of Great Britain. Is this example to be followed at the present congress in case of disagreement? Upon all these points her Majesty's Government must obtain satisfactory explanations before they can come to any decision upon the proposal made by the Emperor.

Her Majesty's Government would be ready to discuss with France and other powers, by diplomatic correspondence, any specified

question upon which a solution might be attained, and European peace thereby more securely established.

But they would feel more apprehension than confidence from the meeting of a congress of sovereigns and ministers without fixed objects, ranging over the map of Europe, and exciting hopes and aspirations which they might find themselves unable either to gratify or to quiet.

Lord Russell's series of awkward questions led to answers and rejoinders; but they made a congress impracticable. They forced the powers of Europe to address themselves to other methods in order to secure the preservation of peace; and they indirectly indisposed France to act in conjunction with England for its preservation.

In the meanwhile Lord Russell was not relaxing the efforts which he was making with this object. Writing on the 28th of October to the British Minister at Copenhagen, he urged Denmark to

declare that she will not apply to the common expenses of the Danish Monarchy any part of the revenues raised in the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, without the consent of the respective Duchies, until some general arrangement in regard to the whole question of finance is settled between Denmark and Germany.

If such declaration should be made, other questions of an international character may be reserved for settlement under the mediation of some disinterested power or powers, and her Majesty's Government would . . . wish to know whether Denmark, in regard to such questions, is prepared to accept mediation, and, if so, whether she will herself make to the Diet a proposal to that effect, or authorise her Majesty's Government to make it on her behalf.

In September Lord Russell had urged Germany to pause and accept the mediation of friendly powers. In October he was giving the same advice to Denmark, and urging her to obtain a breathing space for mediation by making concession. One party to the quarrel showed an increased disposition to take his advice. Count Bismarck had already intimated that 'if Denmark would declare to the Diet that she is ready to give them satisfaction as to the claim of Holstein and Lauenburg to control their own legislation and the expenditure of all moneys raised in the Duchies, and to accept the mediation of Great Britain for the settlement of the international question,

Prussia will endeavour to prevent the execution.' It was certain that Austria and Germany would follow Prussia's example. Denmark, on the contrary, showed little readiness to fall in with Lord Russell's suggestion. She declared, indeed, that she would 'accept with pleasure the mediation of Great Britain.' But she added—

The attitude which the Diet appears inclined to take with regard to the Treaty of London is such that the collective action of all the powers who signed that treaty will perhaps become necessary. Moreover, the King has already accepted the invitation to the congress, in which, according to the opinion of many powers interested, the Danish question will be discussed. The Danish Government must therefore call your Lordship's attention to the advisability in their opinion of reserving this question for the congress, or, if it should not take place, for a special conference of the powers who signed the Treaty of London. But, if there are obstacles to a collective action of these powers, the Danish Government will be happy to accept the mediation of Great Britain.[1]

While, then, Germany, speaking through Count Bismarck, was willing to accept the mediation of Great Britain, Denmark was only prepared to accept Lord Russell's proposal in the event of the failure of other projects. The same motives which had induced her statesmen to refuse the compromise which had been offered in September 1862, restrained them from accepting the proposed terms. As Lord Russell wrote in 1870—

Had this compromise [the arrangement of 1862] been accepted the war might have been prevented, and the integrity of Denmark preserved. Austria and Prussia, in the most conciliatory manner, declared their willingness to accept the terms proposed. Denmark would likewise have accepted them had not a large portion of the English press, including the 'Times' and the 'Morning Post,' two powerful organs of public opinion friendly to the Government, inflamed the passions of the Danes, and induced them to think that they would be defended by the arms of England against even the most moderate demands of Germany, and against the well-founded complaints of the oppressed inhabitants of Schleswig. Thus excited, they refused the proposed terms.[2]

[1] Sir A. Paget to Earl Russell (telegraphic), November 20, 1863.

[2] *Speeches and Despatches*, ii. 239. Lord Russell said the same thing in the interesting, though little known, essay on *The Foreign Policy of England*, 1570–

And, while Danish statesmen were refusing the expedient by which Lord Russell hoped to extricate Denmark from her embarrassment, they were simultaneously aggravating, by their own policy, the intensity of the crisis. Before the death of Frederick VII. the Rigsraad deliberately sanctioned a new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig. Except that it made the representation a little more liberal, the new constitution did nothing to remove the objections which Germany was urging to the separation of Holstein from Schleswig, and to the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark. Yet the new constitution, prepared under Frederick VII., received the assent of Christian IX.; and, though Lord Russell was able to procure the repeal of the ordinance of March, he was unable to obtain the abrogation of the constitution till the German armies, fated to dismember the Danish Kingdom, were actually in motion. Nor was the untimely publication of a new constitution the only circumstance that intensified the crisis. The

1870. 'The British Government tried in various ways to conduct the lightning and carry off harmlessly the storm which they foresaw. An attempt at conciliation between Germany and Denmark had nearly proved successful. Founded on a concession to Schleswig of full autonomy, and a concert of the four parts of the Kingdom in making provision for extraordinary expenses, this plan obtained the assent of Austria and Prussia, and of such men as M. Quaade, the most calm and judicious of Danish statesmen. Denmark would thus have obtained the integrity of her dominions, which five great powers had declared to be desirable. France was ready to give her assent, and the Germans of Schleswig would have had spiritual ministrations for themselves and competent German teachers for their children. It pleased some English advisers of great influence to meddle in this affair; they were successful in thwarting the British Government, and in the end, with the professed view, and perhaps the real intention, of helping Denmark, their friendship tended to deprive her of Holstein and Schleswig altogether' (p. 79). And in a manuscript memorandum headed 'Corrections,' which he left behind him, Lord Russell repeated the same complaint: 'The contest between Germany and Denmark gave occasion to many instances of misconstruction. The Danish Government, or some of its members, imagined that England was bound at all events to defend the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. But, although the powers who signed Lord Malmesbury's treaty declared that the integrity of the territories of Denmark concerned the balance of power in Europe, they nowhere declared that its preservation was essential to the balance of power. . . . No course remained open to the Ministers of Great Britain but an endeavour to preserve the integrity of Denmark by conciliatory means. A plan for this purpose was drawn up which obtained the assent of Austria and Prussia. . . . But some very mischievous advisers inflamed the patriotic hopes of the Danish extreme party, and two self-constituted envoys, said to have been gentlemen of the British press, strongly urged the Danish Government to reject the British proposals.'

Prince of Augustenburg revived his claim to the Duchy of Holstein, which it had been the special object of the Treaty of 1852 to annul; and Count Bismarck, notwithstanding the treaty, declared the claim to be good. The embarrassment of a disputed succession, against which it had been the special object of diplomacy to provide, was thus superadded to the difficulties arising from the pretensions of Germany and the refusal of Denmark.

Such being the state of the case, Lord Russell decided on a new step of much significance. With the approval of the Cabinet, he sent Lord Wodehouse, who had been his Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1859 to 1861, on a special mission to Copenhagen, nominally to congratulate the new King on his accession, but in reality to endeavour, in concert with Sir A. Paget, to arrange the dispute. Lord Wodehouse was instructed—

The Treaty of 1852 is open to no question, and is clearly a part of the public law of Europe.

It has been contended, indeed, in Germany that some anterior arrangements concluded by the exchange of diplomatic notes between Austria and Prussia on the one hand, and Denmark on the other, in 1851-52, must be read in connection with the treaty. . . . The correctness of this last assertion her Majesty's Government cannot admit. They could not consent to make the validity of a positive and plain treaty depend on the execution of arrangements made at some other time by means of diplomatic despatches. . . .

But when, taking a different ground, the Cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna allege that the Government of the late and of the present King of Denmark have not kept faith with the German powers, and that all the engagements of Denmark towards Germany ought to be faithfully executed, her Majesty's Government declare themselves ready to examine that question fairly and impartially. Let Prussia and Austria prove that Denmark has failed, and does still fail, in her obligations towards them, and in such case her Majesty's Government will use all their influence at Copenhagen to induce the King of Denmark to comply faithfully with all the engagements of his crown.

Lord Russell explained the objects of the mission more concisely in a private note to Lord Wodehouse:—

December 2, 1863.

My dear Wodehouse,—I have to propose to you in the name of the Queen a very important special mission. It is in name to con-

gratulate the King of Denmark on his accession; but in fact to endeavour with Russia and with France to reconcile Denmark with Austria and Prussia, and if possible prevent a war.

You must be ready to start in a very few days.

I should like to see you to-morrow if possible at the Foreign Office, and you will have an audience of the Queen before you go.

Your stay at Copenhagen will not, I think, exceed three weeks.—I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Lord Wodehouse, on arriving at Copenhagen, urged, in concert with the representatives of Russia and France, the repeal of the Constitution of November; and suggested, in accordance with Lord Russell's views, that the King might be saved from the unpopularity of its repeal if the Rigsraad could be induced to take the initiative.

But the Danish Ministry would not give way; and Lord Russell thus announced to Sir A. Paget the consequence of its obstinacy:—

P[embroke] L[odge]: December 22, 1863.

My dear Paget,—I don't feel sure that Wodehouse will be at Copenhagen when this letter arrives; but it is to him as well as to you if he is still there.

The refusal of the King to accept our proposition, involving as it did a loss of popularity and a change of Ministry, is not surprising.

But we cannot give active support to a Government which puts itself so manifestly in the wrong.

We must remain with our pockets buttoned and our arms piled till Germany puts herself still more in the wrong than Denmark.

The Germans are so hot in the matter that they may set aside all prudential motives and give up German unity for ever. . . .—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

Thus, till the close of 1863, Lord Russell, labouring for peace, was striving, though unsuccessfully, to induce Denmark to remove every grievance which Germany had against her. In the meanwhile, federal execution was taking place in Holstein; the Danes, to avoid collision with German troops, were retiring from the province; and Prince Frederick of Augustenburg was assuming the dukedom. Thenceforward Lord Russell laboured to separate the Holstein question from

the other questions affecting Schleswig. As he wrote to Lord Wodehouse on the 29th of December—

At present I fear the Germans are going on in their old way, mixing federal right in Holstein, international promises in Schleswig, a common constitution, and the succession to the Crown all in one hash. They must be brought to specify their demands.

Or, as Lord Palmerston wrote to him on the 26th of December—

I quite concur in the views you state, in your letter of yesterday, of the matters to which it relates.

Holstein is part of the German Confederation; and, if the Germans determine to commit therein an act of gross injustice and of diplomatic perfidy, we should content ourselves with a strong and indignant protest. But Schleswig is no part of Germany, and its invasion by German troops would be an act of war against Denmark, which would in my clear opinion entitle Denmark to our active military and naval support. But you and I could not announce such a determination without the concurrence of the Cabinet and the consent of the Queen.[1]

It was, however, the double misfortune of Denmark in 1864 that, while self-appointed envoys undertook to assure her of British support in her extremity, Prussia and Austria had their own reasons for knowing that the armed interference of England was, in the last degree, improbable. Accordingly, on January 16, 1864, they issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Constitution of November within two days. It was in vain that the Danish Foreign Minister replied that, as the Rigsraad was not in session, it was impossible for Denmark to comply with this demand. It was in vain that Lord Russell himself proposed that the representatives of the five great powers in London, as well as those of Sweden and Denmark, should sign a protocol, 'which should declare that the Danish Government should summon the Rigsraad at once,' and that

[1] In this letter Lord Palmerston went on to speculate on the chances of a war, and he added, 'The Prussians are brave and make good soldiers; but all military men who have seen the Prussian army at its annual reviews of late years have unequivocally declared their opinion that the French would walk over it and get without difficulty to Berlin, so old-fashioned is it in organisation and formation and manœuvre.'

How little Lord Palmerston knew of the new forces which were rising in the Europe of his old age!

every endeavour should be made by the Danish Ministry to induce the Rigsraad to repeal the constitution. Austria and Prussia would listen to no argument for delay, and on the 1st of February Marshal Wrangel crossed the frontier, and entered Schleswig.

This action on the part of the great German powers altered the position of affairs. Hitherto Lord Russell, to use his own expression in writing to Sir A. Paget, 'had a twinge or feeling that Germany had much right on her side, and that Denmark was not a little wrong.' Thenceforward he thought Denmark in the right, and Germany utterly in the wrong.

It thus became a grave question for Lord Palmerston's Cabinet whether they should advise the Queen to offer to the King of Denmark naval and military aid for his defence.

The Cabinet, after much deliberation, decided that, in the case supposed, they should offer to assist Denmark by force only in case France would join in an alliance for that purpose.

Although somewhat reluctant at the time to insist upon that condition I am fully persuaded that it was a condition not only wise but absolutely essential. Lord Palmerston was convinced that it would be inexcusable to rush into a war against the whole of Germany inflamed and excited, without the security of a substantial alliance.[1]

With France cold, with Russia indifferent, with this country unwilling to move, Austria and Prussia had no difficulty in working their will. Before the end of February Schleswig was almost entirely occupied by German troops;

[1] That Lord Russell did not exaggerate his own wishes and Lord Palmerston's objections may be seen from the following memorandum which he forwarded to the Prime Minister early in February 1864:—

Proposals to be made to France, February 1864.

1. That France and Great Britain should offer their mediation to Austria, Prussia, and Denmark.

2. That, if Denmark should refuse the mediation, the war should be allowed to go on without interference of France and Great Britain.

3. That, if Austria and Prussia refuse mediation, the measures indicated below should be taken.

4. That the bases of the mediation should be the integrity of the Danish Monarchy and the engagements of 1851–52 as regards the Duchies of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

5. That, if Austria and Prussia refuse mediation, decline to accept the bases proposed, or insist upon terms which are, in the opinion of France and England,

the Danish army had retired before then; and Denmark had appealed in vain to the signatories of the Treaty of 1852.

In the meanwhile Lord Russell was strenuously endeavouring to settle the matter by negotiation, and he at last succeeded in obtaining acceptance to his proposal for a conference at London. But, before the conference met, he sent Lord Clarendon to Paris to see whether he could arrive at some understanding with Napoleon III. Lord Clarendon reached Paris on the 13th of April, and had some conversation both with the Emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Emperor seemed desirous that his policy with respect to Denmark should not be misunderstood by us. He said there was no denying that we had received a *gros soufflet* with respect to Poland from Russia, and that to get another from Germany without resenting it was more than he could stand, as he would have fallen into contempt. He could not therefore join us in strong language to the

inconsistent with the integrity and independence of Denmark, Great Britain will at once despatch a strong squadron to Copenhagen, and France will place a strong corps of troops on the frontiers of the Rhine Provinces of Prussia.

6. Further measures to be the subject of concert between the two Governments of France and Great Britain.

Lord Palmerston wrote of this memorandum—

94 Piccadilly: February 13, 1864.

My dear Russell,— . . . I rather doubt the expediency of taking at the present moment the step you propose. The French Government would probably decline it, unless tempted by the suggestion that they should place an armed force on the Rhenish frontier in the event of a refusal by Austria and Prussia, which refusal we ought to reckon upon as nearly certain.

The objections which might be urged against the measures which you suggest . . . may be stated to be—First, that we could not for many weeks to come send a squadron to the Baltic, and that such a step would not have much effect upon the Germans unless it were understood to be a first step towards something more, and I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference. . . . Secondly, though it is very useful to remind the Austrians and the Prussians privately of the dangers they are running at home—Austria in Italy, Hungary, and Galicia; Prussia in her Rhenish Provinces—yet it might not be advisable, nor for our own interest, to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory. It would serve Prussia right if such an attack were made, and if Prussia remains in the wrong we could not take part with her against France. But the conquest of that territory by France would be an evil for us, and would seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium. On the whole, I should say it would be best for us to wait a while before taking any strong steps in these matters.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

German powers, *not being prepared to go to war with them.* The question did not touch the dignity or the interests of France, and caused no excitement here. The Corps Législatif faithfully represented public opinion here, which was for peace, now that France had had glory enough to save her from the charge brought against Louis Philippe of being servile to the foreigner. He was determined not to go to war for another reason, viz. that France would look for some compensation on the Rhine, and that would set all Europe against him. The universal belief that he wanted to extend the French frontier in this direction made him doubly cautious. The policy of favouring nationalities was popular in France, and it was congenial to his own feelings. He could not, therefore, be party to replacing the Holsteiners under the rule of Denmark which they detested; and, as his great desire was to see Venetia wrested from Austria and restored to Italy, he would not lay himself open to the charge of pursuing one policy on the Eider and a totally different one on the Po.

Such a communication made it tolerably plain that this country could not rely on the co-operation of France in the cause of Denmark. With no force to meet two great military powers single-handed, Britain could only hope to obtain favourable conditions for her in the conference, which opened on the 25th of April. Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell were, however, both in favour of stronger measures than their colleagues. The Prime Minister wrote on the 18th of April—

> If the French and Russians and Swedes would agree with us, we might say to Austria at the meeting of the conference on Wednesday that, unless the German powers agree to an immediate armistice on the basis of present occupation, our fleet is under orders and will go at once to the Baltic to execute such orders as we may think fit to give it. Public opinion in this country would be much shocked if we were to stand by and see the Danish army taken prisoners, and Denmark thus laid prostrate at the feet of Germany.

Lord Russell thoroughly agreed with Lord Palmerston. He had already obtained from the Duke of Somerset full information as to the time which it would take for the Channel squadron to proceed from Portland (where it was held in readiness) to Copenhagen; and on the last Saturday in April he brought forward a formal proposal on the subject in the Cabinet.

The Cabinet, however, did not display the same resolution as its Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary; and Lord Palmerston, to use his own words, annoyed at 'the timidity and weakness'[1] of his colleagues, proceeded to make what he called 'a notch off his own bat,' and told the Austrian Minister that—

If an Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and ports, and go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations against Denmark, I should look upon it as an affront and insult to England. That I could not, and would not stand such a thing; and that, unless in such case a superior British squadron were to follow with such orders for acting as the case might require, I would not continue to hold my present position.

Lord Palmerston's language was naturally communicated to the Cabinet; and Lord Russell proposed to embody it in a despatch to the British Minister at Vienna.

London: May 5, 1864.

My dear Lord Russell,—I remained in attendance at Osborne yesterday after the Council. Last night the Queen sent me your two draft despatches to Vienna with a message. Her Majesty does not like Lord Palmerston's conversation with Apponyi, nor the embodiment of it in a despatch with the Cabinet's adoption and approval. Her Majesty asked whether my understanding was the same as yours of the approval of the Cabinet.

I thought it better, instead of answering the last question, to send word to the Queen that I should be in town early to-day, and that I would talk with you on the subject.

My own impression is that the Cabinet did not adopt the language of Lord Palmerston.

I was not at the Cabinet of Saturday, but I understood that you proposed to send the fleet to the Baltic, with orders to prevent the Austrian fleet entering it. The Cabinet dissented; and at last a draft was agreed upon in which all allusion to the movement of our fleet was omitted.

Lord Palmerston, disagreeing with this decision, which he thought weak and timid, sent for Apponyi, and pressed upon him with force and point his personal views and intentions.

[1] So the letter to Lord Russell of May 1, 1864, originally ran. Two days later Lord Palmerston told Lord Russell that he could, if he liked, scratch out the words 'timidity and weakness' and substitute the word 'decision.' Thus the letter ran (as it is printed by Mr. Ashley, vol. ii. p. 432), 'I feel so little satisfied with the *decision* of the Cabinet,' &c.

Lord Palmerston's conversation was discussed in the Cabinet with the respect and deference due to him, and Clarendon expressed his approbation of what he had said to Apponyi, and his manner of doing it. No one else spoke in the same terms. When it was asked what the Government was to decide, you proposed a draft differing from that agreed upon on Saturday, and again announcing the departure of our fleet under certain contingencies. Many members of the Cabinet, including Clarendon, pressed you to omit all allusion to our fleet, which you consented to do. Now I do not understand why the Cabinet should have done this, if they had been aware that another despatch (not mentioned) was going the same day, officially adopting all that had been said about the fleet in Lord Palmerston's private interview with Apponyi.

A large portion of the Cabinet have all along wished to keep for ourselves perfect liberty of action—to be free to act how and when we like, but to avoid committing ourselves to any threat of definite action, particularly action of an isolated character.

This policy seems particularly advisable at a time when, after infinite pains, you have succeeded in bringing together all the parties interested into a conference.—Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

Lord Russell replied—

Chesham Place: May 6, 1864.

My dear Granville,—If I am wrong in thinking that the Cabinet approved the language of Lord Palmerston to Count Apponyi, I greatly regret it.

But in that case it is necessary for the Cabinet to adopt some other policy, and it will be for Lord Palmerston to consider whether he can be responsible for that policy.

It is necessary for me, who am the organ of Government in regard to foreign affairs, to ascertain what that policy is.

I was no party to the draft agreed upon by the Cabinet, nor could I have signed a despatch in the terms of that draft. I was therefore at liberty to propose another draft, which I did. It is true that I consented to omit all mention of the fleet, as it was thought such a mention would be offensive to Austria.

But that omission was not to prevent my informing our own ambassador at Vienna, in a despatch marked *most confidential*, of the conversation of Lord Palmerston with Count Apponyi, which I conceived was sanctioned by the great majority of the Cabinet.

I think Lord Palmerston's communication must either be confirmed or disavowed by the Cabinet, and then, if the members of the Cabinet wish to 'keep for themselves perfect liberty of action, to be

free to act how and when we like, but to avoid committing themselves to any threat (?) of definite action (or rather to any definite action), particularly action of an isolated character,' Lord Palmerston's language must be distinctly repudiated.

Of course I shall not be a party to such repudiation. But, in the event of the Austrian fleet going into the Baltic, the event must not find the Cabinet unprepared. They must make up their minds one way or another.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

The Cabinet, fortunately for its own comfort, obtained a short breathing space. Four days after Lord Russell's letter, an armistice was concluded, and a respite was thus obtained for deliberation. It was soon evident that the time had passed for talking about the Treaty of London and the integrity of Denmark which it had secured. No European power was ready to risk anything for this object. It was in vain that Lord Russell strove to make the best terms he could for Denmark. The belligerents were unable to arrive at any clear understanding on the future boundary of Germany and Denmark. Germany, as Lord Russell put it in a private note to Lord Cowley, would not stir an inch further; Denmark stuck on the banks of the Schlei. The London conference had visibly failed, and the war was resumed.

When the failure of the conference was evident, Lord Russell again made an effort to ascertain whether the decision of the Emperor to abstain from all active interference was final. But he found that, though the Emperor was ready to watch with favour the armed intervention of England, and would not, as Lord Cowley thought, have disliked the spectacle of this country involved in a formidable war, he was not equally prepared to embark France in a campaign. Towards the end of June, however, his views seemed somewhat shaken. On the 24th of that month Lord Cowley had a conversation with M. Rouher, who he supposed both knew and spoke the Emperor's mind. M. Rouher said, so Lord Cowley wrote—

England need be under no apprehension, whatever may be the line of conduct decided upon in the present phase of the Danish question, that the Emperor will take part against her. Not only would it be in opposition to his sentiments to do so, but equally against his interests, since he is convinced that England is invulner-

able. Neither does Rouher think that the Emperor will stir so long as our operations, should any be undertaken, are confined to naval demonstrations only.... But, if England sends troops and disembarks them, then the Emperor will think that she is really in earnest, and, Rouher is convinced, will himself take the field. It would not, however, be the Danish cause which would occupy the attention of the Emperor. The liberation of Venetia would be his first object, something on the Rhine perhaps his second. On this latter point Rouher said that there was much less eagerness in the Emperor's mind than people were inclined to believe. His Majesty doubted very much whether there was any desire on the part of the Rhenish Provinces for annexation to France; and, although, if the Emperor engaged in war against Germany, it might be necessary for him to ensure some benefit to France, he (Rouher) was convinced that his Majesty's demands would be very moderate (*peu de choses*).

The report of this conversation could not but effect a material change in British policy. Thenceforward Lord Russell believed that the armed intervention of England would bring France into the field; but he had the best reason for fearing that the war, which would then commence, would not be a campaign for the liberation of Denmark, but an operation which would throw the whole Continent into a crucible to be melted down and recast at pleasure. Success in such a war might be even more fatal than defeat; and it became consequently in the highest degree impolitic for this country to move at all.

On the resumption of hostilities, therefore, Denmark found herself alone. Beaten to her knees she had no alternative but submission; and she had to consent to the disruption on which her formidable antagonists insisted as the price of peace.

Lord Russell himself announced the failure of the conference on the 27th June in a speech in which he traced at some length the history of the dispute and of the negotiation. He added—

I conceive that in honour we are in no way engaged to take part in the present war. Although it has been stated to the contrary on the part of Denmark more than once, there has been at no time any pledge given on the part of this country or [of] her Majesty's Government promising material assistance to Denmark in this contest. Three times her Majesty's Government during the period I

have held the seals of the Foreign Office have endeavoured to induce Denmark to accept propositions which we regarded as favourable to her interests . . . My Lords, I do not blame Denmark for the course she has thought fit to pursue. She has a right . . . she has an undoubted right, to refuse our propositions; but we on our side have also a right to take into consideration the duty, honour, and interests of this country, and not to make that duty, that honour, and those interests subordinate to interests of any foreign power whatever.

This explanation did not perhaps satisfy either the Opposition or the public. Resolutions censuring the conduct of the Ministry were proposed in both Houses. The motion in the Lords, which afforded Lord Russell another opportunity of restating his case, was carried against the Government by a majority of nine. The motion in the Commons was rejected by a majority twice as large, or of eighteen. On the day of this division Lord Russell wrote to Lord Cowley, the British Minister at Paris—

Foreign Office: July 9, 1864.

My dear Cowley,—We have done better than could be expected in both Houses, and I trust the Foreign Ministers will now see that they had better keep on good terms with us and not expect the Tories to walk into my room.

I trust the Danes and Germans will now make peace, leaving the Danes free from German interference, and giving the Germans over to German rule. This is the only way to a permanent settlement. If the Germans try to bully the Danes in their own country there will be another revolution hereafter.

I am very glad we have not given in to the temptation of a war between France and Germany. The French, if they get an inch, will certainly take an ell.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

The transaction which has been briefly related in this chapter is one of the most complicated matters recorded in history. The facts are so involved, the merits of the dispute are so confused, that it is difficult to make them intelligible or to pronounce a confident opinion upon them. During the earlier phases of the dispute, Lord Russell, satisfied that neither party to the quarrel was free from blame, had endeavoured to induce each of them partially to give way. Later in 1863 he had urged Denmark to repeal the Ordinance of March

and the Constitution of November; he had desired Germany to separate the question of Holstein from the question of Schleswig; to be satisfied with redressing a German grievance and to cease to intervene in a Scandinavian kingdom. Later still, when armies were moving, and the operations of war were superseding the despatches of diplomacy, he had endeavoured, notwithstanding the reluctance of the Court and the opposition of some of his colleagues, to obtain adequate support. But, while in February 1864 he hesitated to embark single-handed in a contest with the two great powers of Central Europe, in July 1864 he refused the help which he could then have procured at the price at which alone he could have obtained it. Even the partition of Denmark seemed preferable to a war which would have involved the Continent from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and have perhaps shifted every landmark in the map of Europe. The price of success was so high that he preferred to incur the penalty of failure. The absorption of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany was a lesser evil than the incorporation of the Rhenish Provinces in France.

The conduct of this negotiation, however, did not tend to maintain the reputation which Lord Russell had previously secured from the success of his Italian policy. Those who judged by the event, without measuring the difficulties to be overcome, saw that the Minister who had done so much to promote Italian unity had failed to preserve the integrity of Denmark; while, for the second time in his life, Lord Russell was precluded by his duty from stating the real causes of his failure. Just as, after the conference at Vienna, he could not proclaim that he abandoned his own proposal because Napoleon thought that its adoption would cost him his throne, so after the London conference he could not assert that he gave up war for Denmark because he found that it would involve the whole of Europe in a conflagration.

On both occasions men who were imperfectly informed found fault with Lord Russell. A writer, who had no special source of information, but who had watched his struggles for Italy with satisfaction, perhaps more truly appreciated his character. Mr. Hamilton Aïdé wrote—

TO ONE ASPERSED.

Rise, noble heart, and speak !
  Speak to the nation ;
Rise in thy strength, and crush
  Each accusation ;
Rise to thy feet, and face
  All who accuse thee ;
Slay with the sword of truth
  Lies that abuse thee !
Show what the life
  Of a base man can never teach,
How to thee nothing
  Ignoble could ever reach.
If thou hast fallen,
  'Twas striving to fight with them ;
Better to fall with thee
  Than stand upright with them.
. . . . .
God of the fickle crowd,
  One little day—no more ;
Now of thy strength
  And virtue they say no more.
Natures like thine
  Are most quickly ensnared, we know ;
Natures like thine
  Are not easily spared, we know.
Come, as the morning comes,
  Clad in its golden clouds,
Dashing the darkness back :
  Thee no dark fold enshrouds.
Falsehood and mystery
  Never could live with thee ;
Noble heart ! all the rest
  We can forgive with thee.

CHAPTER XXXI.

PRIME MINISTER AGAIN.

IT is now time to retrace our steps and relate the progress of domestic politics during the years in which Lord Russell's attention was so largely occupied with the affairs of Italy, of Denmark, of America, and other countries.

On the conclusion of the session of 1861, Lord Russell took his family down to Abergeldie, where for a second time he became the Queen's tenant. He stayed there for some six weeks, and in October turned southwards, passing a few days at Edinburgh, a few more at Minto and Bishop Wearmouth—where his son-in-law, Mr. Villiers, held a curacy—and at Gibside.[1] During his short visit to Gibside Lord Russell was presented with addresses by the inhabitants of Sunderland and Newcastle, and was entertained at a large banquet in the latter town. In replying to the address he used Conservative language.

> The nature of our institutions and the genius of our people while they sanction and promote the utmost freedom of discussion, are adverse to needless change; and it therefore behoves every friend of progress to wait with patience and to argue with calmness, till public opinion is fully convinced, and the national mind puts its seal on the measures introduced into the Legislature.

In his after-dinner speech he thus defined the characteristics of the legislation in which he had taken so prominent a part:—

> There is one point to which I may perhaps advert, because it respects the principle which I think runs through many of our measures of later times, and shows an improvement in the general principles of government. What I mean is this: a great part of our

[1] The seat of Mr. (afterwards Sir W.) Hutt.

task—for instance, all our measures in favour of religious liberty, relieving first the Protestant Dissenters, then the Roman Catholics, and lastly and recently the Jews—and all our measures with regard to Free Trade, have been measures not introducing new plans, not founded on speculative schemes, but merely unloosing the fetters which statutes and laws had placed on the due liberty of the subject.

Another passage in the same speech had a more personal interest.

Gentlemen, let me say, when I embarked in public life I did so with the view of carrying great measures into effect, having great public objects before me. It appears to me that public life is only honourable when it is directed to such measures. The pedlar who sells his pins and pincushions for sixpence has a better, because an honester, trade than the man who devotes his talents to public life for the sake of his own emolument and advantage.

On the morning which followed address and banquet, Lord Russell and his family left Newcastle, parted at Peterborough with Lord Amberley, who travelled thence to Cambridge, which he was just entering as an undergraduate, and reached Chesham Place. On the next day they settled at Pembroke Lodge for the winter. Some weeks afterwards, while the nation was still mourning the recent death of the Prince Consort, he received the following letter from Lord Palmerston :—

Broadlands: January 22, 1862.

My dear Russell,—The Queen has commanded me to inform you that it is her intention to confer upon you one of the vacant ribands of the Garter as a mark of her high approbation of your long and distinguished services.

She has been informed that it is not necessary for her to hold a Chapter of the Order—to which, at the present moment, she would have felt an insurmountable objection—and that a warrant from her will be sufficient for all purposes.

I should be much obliged to you if for the present you would say nothing about this until I have made some arrangements connected with the matter.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

During the Parliamentary session of 1862 Lord Russell enjoyed the advantages, which a peerage had conferred on him, of lighter labours and greater leisure. His chief speeches

in the House of Lords were concerned with subjects connected with his department, such as the questions which were continually growing out of the civil war in America, and of the conflicts which occasionally arose between the partisans of autocracy and freedom in the new Kingdom of Italy. Home politics gave him little trouble. Lord Palmerston's presence at the head of the Government ensured a virtual truce; while the death of the Prince Consort in the previous December, and the opening of the second great International Exhibition in London in May, were causes indirectly operating for political quiet. Thus the session wore away without friction, and, Lord Russell said, little to occupy posterity's attention. The weight of increasing years, the happiness of his own home, the interest which he was taking in the affairs of other countries, and perhaps the soporific influences of the chamber which he had lately entered, were all affecting him; and he was postponing for another opportunity, or leaving to another generation, the solution of those great questions of organic Reform for which at an earlier period he had so manfully struggled.

Lord Russell was one of the commissioners appointed to deliver the speech at the close of the session on the 7th of August, and was necessarily present for the purpose, dressed in his robes, in the House of Lords. On the following day he left home with his wife and eldest daughter, slept that night in Bangor, crossed the Irish Channel on the following morning, and, after spending ten days at Bray, arrived at Carton, the Duke of Leinster's seat, on his seventieth birthday. From Carton Lord Russell paid a flying visit to his own property at Ardsalla, visiting the cabins of the poor and the houses of his tenantry. But his stay in Ireland was necessarily short, for, a few days after his return to England, on the 1st of September, he set out in attendance on the Queen on a longer journey to Gotha. He took with him his eldest son, whose presence partly reconciled him to his separation from home; but, after three weeks' absence, he returned to Pembroke Lodge, where he remained enjoying such rest and quiet as a Foreign Secretary can secure till the commencement of the session of 1863.

During 1863 Lord Russell took hardly any part in general

debate, and said little or nothing upon domestic politics which is worth recording. The legislative inaction which was coincident with Lord Palmerston's tenure of office, and which had been partly attributable in 1862 to the mourning of a Court and the attractions of an Exhibition, was encouraged in 1863 by the festivities attending the Prince of Wales's marriage. Thus, though the Foreign Office continued exceptionally busy, Parliament had no great measures for consideration; and Liberal statesmen, who, like Lord Russell, were growing old, had to console themselves with reflecting on the triumphs of the past instead of participating in fresh successes. This state of things was visible enough throughout the session; it was emphasised by Lord Russell himself during the recess in words which became famous. Twice during the autumn, which he passed at Meikleour, a beautiful place of Lady Lansdowne's on the banks of the Tay, he made important speeches. At Dundee, where he opened a park presented to the town by Sir David Baxter, he reviewed the legislative successes of the previous thirty years; and, alluding to the predictions, freely hazarded at the time, of injurious consequences, declared that he had never shared these fears.

Thirty years of experience have shown that I have not been mistaken in this hope. Every year has strengthened our political [position, and] confirmed, as you justly observe, our domestic tranquillity.

And then, turning to external politics, he went on :—

As Secretary for Foreign Affairs it has been my object to preserve peace with honour.

Towards the end of September, Lord Russell was entertained at dinner at Blairgowrie, and again made a notable speech.

With regard to domestic policy I think we are all very much agreed, because the feeling of the country, and of those who have conducted great reforms, is very much like that of the man who, having made a road in your own highlands, put a stone on the top of the mountain with an inscription 'Rest and be thankful.'

Strange, indeed, is the fate of epigrams. Almost every well-informed person has laughed at the author of the Reform Act advising the country to rest and be thankful; while per-

haps no one recollects that 'Peace with honour' was claimed by Lord Russell as the result of his foreign policy fifteen years before the same words were borrowed by the Minister who was destined to make them famous.

Lord Russell left Meikleour at the end of September; and, after paying a few visits on his way south, reached Pembroke Lodge and business early in October. To the Foreign Secretary the autumn of 1863 and the session of 1864 was a very busy one. The affairs of America, of Poland, and of Denmark occupied his attention both in his office and in Parliament. But, in a domestic sense, the most important event of the spring of 1864 was the visit of General Garibaldi to England. In other respects it seemed Lord Palmerston's chief object to illustrate the truth of the adage, 'Happy is the country that has no history.'

To Lord Russell's family circle, however, 1864 brought many changes. In September he received a letter at North Berwick, where he was passing the recess, to announce his eldest son's engagement to the fifth daughter of Lord Stanley of Alderley. Lord Stanley had long been Lord Russell's colleague. He had begun his official life, nearly thirty years before, as Under Secretary at the Home Office. He sat in Lord Palmerston's Cabinet as Postmaster General. His father had been raised to the peerage during Lord Melbourne's Administration as Lord Stanley of Alderley; he had been himself summoned, on Lord Russell's recommendation, to the House of Lords during his father's lifetime as Lord Eddisbury. The atmosphere of Alderley was as Liberal as that of Pembroke Lodge; and the long connection between the parents, their community of opinion, as well as the attractions of the bride, made the marriage a very welcome one. It was celebrated at Alderley on the 8th of November; the late Dean of Westminster and the present Dean of Llandaff, cousins to the bride by birth and by marriage, performing the ceremony. And Lord Russell himself, at the breakfast which followed, after professing that, accustomed as he was to making speeches, this was an occasion on which he could not make a speech, succeeded, in a few words, in saying all that was required of him:—

Lady Russell and himself had that day lost a son, but they had gained an excellent and an affectionate daughter; and their son, Lord Amberley, was about to become possessed of the greatest blessing that life can bestow—a wife with all those qualities, virtues, and graces which not only adorn life, but make life worth living. . . . But there was another source of happiness to Lady Russell and himself. They were likely to become more closely associated with their old friends Lord and Lady Stanley, with whom he had had the pleasure of being so long connected through political channels and in other ways, and it would be a source of joy to him to know that that continued connection would be bound up with the future happiness of their son and daughter-in-law.

Lord and Lady Russell left Alderley on the day which succeeded their son's wedding. Lady Russell, after dropping her younger boys at Harrow, returned to Pembroke Lodge. Lord Russell, taking his eldest daughter with him, travelled to Aberdeen, where he had undertaken to deliver an address. In the middle of November the whole family was re-established at Pembroke Lodge; and there, in the following month, they welcomed Lord and Lady Amberley. Lord Russell, however, found time amidst the enjoyment of their society and the occupations of his office to run down to Bowood for the purpose of saying farewell to the widow of his old friend the poet Moore, who was on her death-bed. He found leisure also to re-edit his old work the 'Essay on the Constitution,' and to add to it a new chapter.

Domestic policy had no more interest in 1865 than in 1864. The presence of Lord Palmerston continued to suffuse a conservative calm over the political ocean, and Lord Russell occupied himself with the great questions of foreign policy in which he was absorbed, without attempting to promote the organic reforms which, a few years before, he had so zealously advocated. One other member of the Government, indeed, found ample work to do. Lord Palmerston's Administration will always be as memorable for the fiscal reforms of Mr. Gladstone as for the foreign policy of Lord Russell; and even Radicals tolerated a monotony of inaction when they contemplated the splendid results which the Chancellor of the Exchequer was achieving. For these were the years when the

revenue rose with leaps and with bounds, and when, at each fresh application of the pruning knife, it shot up in luxuriant vigour. In this very year the Chancellor of the Exchequer employed his surplus to reduce the rate of the income tax from sixpence to fourpence and to make concurrently a large reduction in the duties on tea. Lord Russell was in favour of a still more remarkable policy.

Chesham Place: April 6, 1865.

My dear Palmerston,—I think you have decided rightly in the Cabinet about the Budget, saving amendments in detail.

You ask me very fairly what has made me change my opinion about income tax. I will give you my reasons. First, the unexpected surplus of nearly four millions makes me think the operation perfectly practicable if our present prosperity continues. Next, I have become very sanguine of maintaining peace both with France and America.

If these two data are allowed, then I think a strong argument may be drawn from the declarations of 1842 and 1845. The income tax was then imposed in order to make certain commercial experiments, and fill up a void which might for a time be created.

The experiments have now been made, the void has been filled up, and the success is undisputed.

It seems, therefore, to me that the crowning of the edifice, as our neighbour has it, would be the total extinction of the income tax. It is a tax properly imposed on all income, but which no ingenuity could make just or equal.

I have been very slow in coming to the conclusion that it ought to cease; it is a most convenient weapon for a Government in danger of foreign war, but I think its abolition, with a power of revival, would be a proof of power and confidence in our resources which would greatly satisfy our own people and astonish our enemies abroad. . . .—Yours, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Lord Russell's proposal was not, of course, adopted; and Mr. Gladstone retained the tax for the purpose of pursuing still further the remarkable financial policy which had already produced such surprising results in his hands. The session of 1865 was not otherwise memorable, and it was closed at an unusually early period. The Parliament of 1859 had, in fact, completed the sixth year of its existence; and the Ministers were anxious that the dissolution should take place while the

country was fresh from the spectacle of their leader displaying night after night the elasticity of youth beneath the weight of age. Parliament was dissolved in July, and the elections which immediately followed showed that his colleagues had not exaggerated the effect of Lord Palmerston's popularity. For in those days even metropolitan constituencies returned Liberal candidates; Lord Russell had the satisfaction of seeing the City which he had so long represented true to the Liberal cause; and perhaps the only disappointments which he felt in connection with the first general election, since he had attained his full age, in which he had borne no part, were occasioned by the defeat of his son at Leeds, and of his colleague Mr. Gladstone at Oxford. Lord Amberley and he had, however, other causes to compensate for their mortification. On the 12th of August Lord Russell received a telegram from Alderley announcing the birth of a boy, the present Lord Russell. Ten days later, Lady Russell and he stopped at Alderley on their way to Scotland, and had the satisfaction of seeing their little grandchild. Thence they paid a series of visits in Scotland, crossed over towards the end of September to Ireland, and, after seeing many of their friends and some of their tenantry, returned to England on the 3rd, and Pembroke Lodge on the 4th of October.

When Lord Russell returned to Richmond, Lord Palmerston was at Brocket still labouring at his duties. But early in the month a chill, caught while out driving, brought on the illness of which, on the 18th of October, he died. The days had long gone when either rivalry or difference had raised any cloud between Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston; and, throughout the Administration of 1859, the two men had worked together in the closest fellowship and harmony. Lord Russell could not, however, avoid reflecting on his own increasing solitude. The men with whom he had commenced life were mostly joined 'to the great majority.' The solitary survivors of Lord Grey's Cabinet, after Lord Palmerston's death, were Lord Brougham, who had withdrawn from politics; Lord Derby, who had long led the Tories; and Lord Russell, who was resuming the lead of the Liberal party. More than one half even of the original Cabinet of 1846 had

already passed away; while, during the Administration of 1859, death had fallen equally on old friends like Lord Lansdowne, Lord Minto, Lord Campbell, Sir James Graham, and Lord Palmerston, and upon younger friends like Mr. Sidney Herbert, the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Elgin, and Sir George Lewis. The time, however, was one for action and not for mourning. Before Lord Palmerston's death, the Queen, writing from Balmoral, told Lord Russell that she should ask him to carry on the Government; and on the 19th she wrote—

The melancholy news of Lord Palmerston's death reached the Queen last night. This is another link with the past that is broken, and the Queen feels deeply in her desolate and isolated condition how one by one of those tried servants and advisers are taken from her. . . .

The Queen can turn to no other than Lord Russell, an old and tried friend of hers, to undertake the arduous duties of Prime Minister, and to carry on the Government. She has otherwise nothing to add to her letter of yesterday.

Lord Russell at once intimated to the Queen his readiness to obey her commands if his colleagues consented to act under him; and, as a preliminary arrangement, at once invited Lord Clarendon to take his own place at the Foreign Office. Before he communicated his wishes to Lord Clarendon, he received the following letter from a more important colleague:—

Clumber: October 18, 1865.

My dear Lord Russell,—I have received to-night by telegraph the appalling news of Lord Palmerston's decease.

None of us, I suppose, were prepared for this event in the sense of having communicated as to what should follow.

The Queen must take the first step, but I cannot feel uncertain what it will be.

Your former place as her Minister, your powers, experience, services, and renown, do not leave room for doubt that you will be sent for.

Your hands will be entirely free. You are pledged probably to no one, certainly not to me.

But any Government now to be formed cannot be wholly a continuation; it must be in some degree a new commencement.

I am sore with conflicts about the public expenditure, which I feel that other men would either have escaped, or have conducted more gently and less fretfully. I am most willing to retire.

On the other hand, I am bound by conviction, even more than by credit, to the principle of progressive reduction in our military and naval establishments, and in the charges for them, under the favouring circumstances which we appear to enjoy. This is, I think, the moment to say thus much on a subject-matter which greatly appertains to my department.

On the general field of politics, after having known your course in Cabinet for eight and a half years, I am quite willing to take my chance under your banner in the exact capacity I now fill,[1] and I adopt the step, perhaps a little unusual, of saying so, because it may be convenient to you at a juncture when time is precious, while it can hardly, I trust, after what I have said above, be hurtful.—Believe me, sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

I dare say you will now think more fondly still of the gardener's house at Drumlanrig.[2]

Mr. Gladstone was probably right in thinking that a new Government could not be a continuation of Lord Palmerston's Ministry. Few Administrations had, in fact, ever suffered such changes; and, when Lord Russell left the Foreign Office for the Treasury, four out of five of its original Secretaries had ceased to hold the seals of office. And these changes had not only altered the character of the Ministry. They had decreased its strength in the House of Commons. In 1859 the Cabinet had been represented in that House by Lord Palmerston, Lord John, Mr. Gladstone, Sir George Lewis, Sir George Grey, Sir Charles Wood, and Mr. Sidney Herbert. In 1865 it had lost in that House Lord Palmerston, Lord John, Sir George Lewis, and Mr. Sidney Herbert; it had gained, as its solitary recruit, Mr. Cardwell. The great spending departments, the War Office and the Admiralty, moreover, were both held by peers. Various proposals were made by Lord Russell's colleagues for remedying this state of things. The Duke of Somerset and Lord de Grey (Lord Ripon) very

[1] *i.e.* as Chancellor of the Exchequer without the lead of the House of Commons, which was, however, immediately conferred on him.

[2] In the preceding month Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone had met Lord and Lady Russell at the Duke of Buccleuch's (Drumlanrig).

handsomely offered to facilitate matters by their own retirement, while Sir Charles Wood and Lord Granville wished to conciliate the 'Times' by bringing Mr. Lowe into the Cabinet.

Thus, at the very first commencement of his task, Lord Russell found that personal questions were likely to increase his difficulties. Lord Stanley, to whom he offered office, refused, though in the friendliest manner, to leave his party and join the Cabinet. Objections were raised in higher quarters to a change of men at the War Office; and, during the autumn of 1865, Lord Russell was able to do little more than to replace Sir R. Peel in the Irish Secretaryship with Mr. Chichester Fortescue, and to introduce Mr. Forster to subordinate office. In the beginning of 1866 he was able to effect slightly greater changes. Notwithstanding the objections of his colleagues, and the jealous complaints of some of the younger members of his Administration, he insisted on appointing Mr. Goschen to the Duchy of Lancaster and to the Cabinet; while the retirement of Sir C. Wood, who became Lord Halifax, enabled him to move Lord de Grey from the War Office to India, and to promote Lord Hartington to the first place in the War Department.

These changes slightly strengthened the Cabinet, and increased, to some extent, its influence in the Commons. But the embarrassments which had arisen from these slight personal changes were accentuated by the difficulties which occurred in agreeing upon measures. Every one out of the Cabinet felt that the accession of Lord Russell to the first place in the Ministry must inevitably lead to the introduction of a fresh Reform Bill. But almost every one in the Cabinet was anxious either to postpone the remedy or to make the dose as mild as possible. Lord Russell did not share these opinions. As he told the Queen a few weeks later—

> Lord Russell's opinion is that a Ministry to have a chance of stability must be either frankly Liberal or frankly Conservative; he does not think that a mixed, colourless, characterless Ministry would have any chance of stability.

Acting on this principle, he laboured in Cabinet to frame a moderate but real measure of Reform; but, warned by

the experiences of 1854 and 1860, he strove to limit its scope. With the first object he succeeded, with Mr. Gladstone's help, in prevailing over the reluctance of his colleagues, and in basing the franchise on rental instead of on rating; with the second object he decided on dealing with the franchise only, and on postponing the question of redistribution to some future time.

The Bill which was thus proposed, and which contemplated the reduction of the county franchise from 50*l.* to 14*l.*, and of the borough franchise from 10*l.* to 7*l.*, and the enfranchisement of lodgers, would have added, if it had passed, a considerable number of voters to the electorate. It was introduced by Mr. Gladstone on the 12th of March. Some people thought that Mr. Gladstone hardly spoke on this occasion with his accustomed fire; he had, at any rate, to suffer the chilling influence of an irresponsive audience. But the first reading was carried after two nights' debate; and the second reading was fixed for the 12th of April. It was, however, already evident that, while the Conservative party were organised and active, the Liberals on their side were divided and callous. They argued, with some force, that the Government had only brought one half of its scheme before Parliament, and that it was unstatesmanlike and impolitic to accept one portion of the scheme without being acquainted with the whole. Lord Grosvenor, though he sat on the Liberal benches, declared that he would meet the second reading with a resolution that it was 'inexpedient to discuss a Bill for the reduction of the franchise until the House has before it the entire scheme contemplated by the Government;' while Mr. Kinglake, the author of 'Eothen,' aiming at the same end, but anxious to save the existence of the Ministry, announced that he should ask the House to declare that 'it is not expedient to go into committee on the said Bill until this House shall have before it the expected Bill for the redistribution of seats.'

The difference between these rival motions was not one of principle, but of time. Mr. Kinglake and Lord Grosvenor were equally anxious for a complete scheme. But, while Lord Grosvenor wished to affirm the necessity for completeness before the House pronounced an opinion on the principle

of the measure, Mr. Kinglake was ready to postpone this expression of opinion until the principle had been accepted by the passage of the second reading. Mr. Kinglake, in other words, was the more friendly, Lord Grosvenor the more logical objector; and, as friendliness is a more important factor than logic in politics, the Government felt itself able to accept the compromise which Mr. Kinglake offered to it.

Thus, when the second reading of the Bill came on, the real question for decision was whether the House would accept Mr. Kinglake's compromise, to which the Ministry was willing to assent, or insist on Lord Grosvenor's amendment, to which it declined to agree. It answered the question, on the morning of the 28th of April, by passing the second reading of the Bill, but passing it by a majority so small that it made the continuance of the Ministry in power difficult. The Liberal majority, in fact, sank to that fatal number of five which Lord Russell must have recollected had produced, nearly thirty years before, the crisis of 1839. Nor was the narrowness of the division the most serious symptom. The minority was swelled by the names of Liberals whom Mr. Bright had already likened to the discontented occupiers of the Cave of Adullam, and who, Lord Russell said years afterwards, were 'divided into three columns or gangs, the first consisting of the selfish, the second of the timid, and the third of those who were both selfish and timid.' The presence of these malcontents made the passage of the Bill, and even the future of the Government, uncertain; and the Ministry seriously considered whether it would abandon its task. It decided to persevere; and, on the last day of April, Mr. Gladstone announced its decision. A week later it carried out its pledge by introducing three additional measures—a Redistribution Bill for England and Wales, and Reform Bills for Scotland and Ireland.

The members of the Cabinet, in so far assenting to the wishes of its critics, did not conceal from themselves the difficulties which were still before them. But they felt that every effort consistent with principle should be made to conciliate opposition. Accordingly, on the second reading of the Redistribution Bill, Mr. Gladstone assented to an instruction to the committee to fuse Franchise Bill and Redistribution

Bill into one; while Lord Russell himself made a strong appeal to Lord Grosvenor:—

37 Chesham Place: May 15, 1866.

Dear Lord Grosvenor,—I wish to submit for your consideration some reflections on the Reform question as it now stands.

When the Franchise Bill and the Seats Bill stand for committee, the Government will be ready either to fuse the two Bills into one Bill, or to carry them on *pari passu* as it may seem to the House of Commons and the Government most expedient.

This is not a point of much importance.

What is really important is that the question should be settled for a considerable time, say to the end of the century or longer.

There was fair ground for maintaining that the franchise and the distribution of seats, as settled by the Reform Act, should not be altered, and that ground I myself maintained till the votes of the House of Commons and the advance of public opinion rendered it no longer tenable.

But, now that the Government and the Opposition have alike pledged themselves to consider the question of Reform with a view to its settlement, it would be most unwise to pass a Bill which would be a signal for fresh and increasing agitation.

If sixty or seventy thousand of those who would be entitled to the borough franchise by the present Bill were to have the door shut upon them by a vote of the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone and I could no longer be responsible for the Bill as a settlement; and proposals for scot and lot, or perhaps for manhood suffrage, would be put forward by those who are now content with the Bills of the Government.

The new Ministry would probably meet such proposals as the agitations for the removal of Catholic disabilities and the repeal of the Corn Laws were met, namely, by stout resistance ending in unqualified concession.

I beg you to consider these matters maturely before the question comes on for ultimate decision. . . .—I remain, in spite of the case, yours very truly,

RUSSELL.

P.S.—Since I wrote this letter I find that Gladstone has accepted Bouverie's instruction to the committee on the Bills. I shall be very glad to see you if you like to call here any morning.

This appeal had not the effect of lessening the difficulties. Long debates ensued before the House resolved itself into

committee on the Bill; still longer discussions took place in committee on the County and Borough Franchise. The Government found itself supported by varying and uncertain majorities. At last, on the 18th of June, Lord Dunkellin, the eldest son of Lord Clanricarde, carried a motion against the Government, substituting rating for rental as the basis of the borough franchise. In one sense, the amendment which was thus carried was not of much importance. It was still open to the House to fix any sum as the basis of the franchise, and a 5*l.* rateable value would probably have admitted as many persons to the electorate as a 7*l.* rental. But in another sense the division had a significance which it was impossible to ignore. As Lord Russell himself said in the House of Lords, 'Coming after so many attempts to obstruct, delay, and defeat, the Bill, we could not but consider that it was hopeless for us to proceed further with it.' The Cabinet accordingly met, and decided on tendering its resignation.

The Queen received the news of her Minister's decision with regret. She would, under any circumstances, have desired to avoid parting with men who had served her so long; and she felt additional apprehension in 1866 because Prussia and Austria were visibly preparing for the struggle which a few days later was to lead to the Seven Weeks' War. In her letters to her Minister she urged continually the necessity for compromise and conciliation; and she probably thought that, when the peace of the world was on one side of the scale and a 7*l.* franchise on the other side, the relative importance of the two things did not require any nice measuring. Lord Russell did not conceal from himself that, in the critical state of the Continent,

> persons who had been for some time in communication with foreign powers, whose policy was known to those foreign powers, who had maintained an intimate alliance with both France and Russia, the neutral powers in the present war, might have an advantage over any others who, newly entered upon office, must necessarily be strangers to the correspondence that had been carried on.

But he saw perhaps more distinctly than the Queen that the influence of the country depended on the character of its public men. He wrote to her on the 3rd of May—

While your Majesty's Ministers are bound to listen to every proposal of a moderate and conciliatory character, they would be only injuring the country and themselves if they were to assent to any amendment of an insidious character which would deprive them of the support of the Liberal Reformers throughout the country.

He wrote in strong terms, on the 12th of May, to General Grey, the Queen's Private Secretary, suggesting that the Queen should postpone her projected visit to Scotland on the double ground that 'war appears imminent in Germany,' and that 'certain questions of the Reform Bill, vital to the existence of the present Government, will be discussed.'

He wrote to the Queen on the 2nd of June—

Your Majesty's confidential servants are very sensible of the difficulty of the present crisis, and of the inconvenience of a change of Government. They will therefore anxiously consider their position before offering to your Majesty their resignation in case of a defeat in the House of Commons.

The course of obstruction so openly followed by the Opposition makes it, however, very difficult to yield to them on any point without incurring just reproach on the part of the public as having abandoned their principles and forsaken their measures on light and insufficient grounds.

A week later he wrote—

Downing Street: June 9, 1866.

Lord Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty. He is fully alive to the importance of averting a Ministerial crisis; but Lord Russell would ill serve your Majesty's interests and those of the country if, by any premature concession, he were to expose his own character, and that of Mr. Gladstone, to the loss of public confidence, and those who would most taunt and reproach them with such a concession would be their implacable and insidious enemies.

And, after the division on Lord Dunkellin's motion, he wrote—

Downing Street: June 19, 1866.

Lord Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty. Your Majesty's Ministers have fully considered the purport of your Majesty's gracious message in connection with the vote of last night in the House of Commons.

The proceedings of the last few weeks have convinced them that they will gain nothing by protracted discussions on the Bill.

The reasons against a dissolution founded on the general apathy of the South of England on the subject of Reform appeared to them valid.

There remains only one course; and, as they are not convinced until it has been tried that the experiment of forming a Government under Lord Derby may not succeed, your Majesty's Ministers feel themselves compelled by their duty to your Majesty and the country humbly to tender to your Majesty their resignation of the offices they hold.

Here is the Queen's answer:—

The Queen has received Lord Russell's letter with the greatest concern. The adverse vote in the House of Commons, and the step which the Ministers have thought it right to take in consequence, have taken her completely by surprise, having understood from Lord Russell and others of the Government, whom she saw before going to Scotland, that there was no fear of a crisis.

In the present state of Europe, and the apathy which Lord Russell himself admits to exist in the country on the subject of Reform, the Queen cannot think it consistent with the duty which the Ministers owe to herself and the country that they should abandon their posts in consequence of their defeat on a matter of detail (not of principle) in a question which can never be settled unless all sides are prepared to make concessions; and she must therefore ask them to reconsider their decision. . . .

Lord Russell replied—

Downing Street: June 22, 1866.

Lord Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he has considered carefully your Majesty's communication, and proceeds to state the reflections which occur to him before laying that letter before his colleagues.

The serious view which your Majesty's Ministers took of the majority on Lord Dunkellin's amendment was not founded on any point of detail. The difference between rating and rental might have been adjusted by provisions adapting the rating value to the amount of rental proposed by the Government.

It was the general hostility shown by the House of Commons to the proposals brought forward by your Majesty's Ministers which induced them to think that the vote on Lord Dunkellin's amendment showed, on the part of the House of Commons, a want of that confidence which is necessary to the existence of any Ministry.

Further, in regard to a dissolution of Parliament, Lord Russell

mentioned apathy in the South of England, not general apathy in the country.

It seems to Lord Russell that, if the Reform Bill is postponed, your Majesty's Ministers must declare their adherence to the principles of that measure, and must be at liberty to submit the same measure, unaltered in regard to the franchise to be bestowed, but reconsidered in its details, and amended in regard to the distribution of seats, either to the present or to a new Parliament.

Should they be of opinion that a dissolution is necessary for that purpose, either now or in the autumn, your Majesty would be entirely free either to accept that advice, or to adopt the alternative, namely the resignation of your Majesty's Ministers.

Lord Russell is well aware that the critical state of the Continent, now engaged in war, makes it advisable, if possible, to avoid a change of Government. At the same time your Majesty will recollect that, when Lord Russell informed your Majesty that your advisers would probably think it necessary to introduce a Reform Bill, your Majesty expressed strongly and decidedly an opinion that, if any measure on this subject were introduced, it ought to be carried forward to a final result, and not trifled with or dropped without any serious intention of abiding by the measure proposed with the sanction of the Crown. This opinion of your Majesty is shared by Lord Russell. He considers that vacillation on such a question weakens the authority of the Crown, promotes distrust of public men, and inflames the animosity of parties.

Later in the day the Cabinet met, and Lord Russell wrote again :—

Lord Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to submit the view taken by the Cabinet of their present situation.

That, on an expression by the House of Commons of confidence in the present Government, coupled with an opinion that the House wishes for the introduction at an early period of a measure founded on the principles and leading provisions of the measure proposed by her Majesty's Ministers in the present session, her Majesty's Ministers would retain their offices in compliance with her Majesty's request.

The Queen, on her part, would have assented to the proposed expedient if it could have been adopted by a unanimous Cabinet with a fair prospect of acceptance by the House of Commons. But, as day after day passed, it was evident that there was a smaller and slighter chance of the

fulfilment of these conditions; the Cabinet consequently concluded that it was useless to go on; and the Queen reluctantly consented to accept the resignation of her Ministers.

The resignation of Lord Russell in the summer of 1866 not merely ended the short-lived Administration of which he was the chief; it proved in the result the termination of an official career which had commenced more than a generation before in the Government of Lord Grey. In one sense Lord Russell was amply vindicated. The breeze of popular opinion, for which he had vainly waited since 1849, freshened after his fall into a gale. The apathy of Southern England ceased with his resignation. Before a month was over, the railings of Hyde Park had given way to the pressure of a mob; men of all parties were aroused to the conviction that Reform was a subject to be treated and not to be trifled with; and in 1867 a Conservative Administration brought forward a larger and more comprehensive measure of Reform than any which Lord Russell had ever contemplated. Thus, though it was not given to Lord Russell to be the author of a second Reform Act, the passage of the second Reform Act vindicated his prescience and proved the truth of his principles.

In other respects, Lord Russell's second Administration will not attract much notice from the historian. It will be chiefly recollected for its failures and not for its accomplishments. It failed to avert the Prusso-Austrian war, just as it failed to carry its own great measure. It could not claim in its short existence that it had secured peace on the Continent, or that it had made any notable addition to the Statute Book.

Those then who judge by results will pass rapidly over the short months during which Lord Russell's second Administration lasted, and dwell rather on the other periods of his career during which he rendered great and important services to his country.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CLOSING YEARS.

THE fall of the Russell Administration in the summer of 1866 terminated—so it proved—the official career of the subject of this memoir. Within a few weeks of completing the seventy-fourth year of his age, he had long passed the period at which men usually look for retirement. Thenceforward his life was to be free from the cares of office. But, though his career as a Minister was at an end, his activity as a statesman had not ceased. At intervals, which were to become gradually less frequent with the advance of years, he emerged from his retirement to support the cause of civil and religious liberty, whether at home or abroad, to which his life had been consecrated. Like the well-bred hunter in his secluded paddock, he was stirred by the whimper of the hound and the music of the horn; and, with pen and with voice, came forward again and again to promote the cause of progress, to encourage the oppressed, to denounce the oppressor.

The twelve years, however, which Lord Russell was still to live can be briefly described. Biography should occupy itself with the growth of youth and with the achievements of maturity, and should dwell lightly on the decline of age; and, though the lamp still burned clearly, though the brain was still active, one chapter may contain all that it is necessary still to relate of Lord Russell's career.

As Lord Russell withdrew more and more from political pursuits, he addressed himself more actively to his literary studies. In 1866 he completed the 'Life of Mr. Fox,' which had been interrupted by his accession to office. In 1868 he printed three letters to Mr. Chichester Fortescue on 'The State of Ireland.' In the same year he consulted Messrs. Longman on the propriety of publishing anonymously some imaginary

colloquies between Bishop Burnet and Archbishop Tillotson on the Athanasian Creed. Messrs. Longman referred the manuscript, without revealing the secret of the authorship, to a clergyman of broad views and literary distinction who is still alive, and the opinion of this gentleman on the book—

> It is a work which I should like to see both published and popular; but I do not anticipate for it any marked success, although I do not suppose it can be a failure—

is still preserved with the original manuscript.

Lord Russell did not publish the colloquies. Influenced perhaps by the opinion of Messrs. Longman's reader, he abandoned his intention. But he incorporated what he had to say on dogmatic Christianity in the remarkable volume of Essays on 'The Rise and Progress of the Christian Religion in the West of Europe from the Reign of Tiberius to the Council of Trent.'[1] An anonymous reviewer said of this book on its publication, that

> Many are the points of view from which minds, weighted with the complex results of an age eminently inquiring and resolutely scientific, have contemplated the mysterious import of Christianity; but no previous writer has been led to look at it through the prism of concrete Constitutionalism, and to reduce the history of its world-wide evolutions into a handy manual of Whig principles.

The sneer, if it were applicable at all, can only apply to the two concluding essays in the volume, in which Lord Russell made the mistake of the child who is ignorant of perspective and attached an undue importance to objects which looked large because they happened to be near. The remaining essays are not susceptible to the same reproach. No doubt, like all Lord Russell's historical works, they are founded not on original research, but on other men's researches. No doubt, too, occasional repetitions offend the taste, and perhaps reveal the weight which advancing age was imposing on the octogenarian author. But nevertheless they form an admirable account of the 'transformation' which Christianity had undergone.

Christ had told His Apostles to preach a religion of love; it had been perverted into a religion of logic. St. John, St. Paul, and Christ

[1] This is the title of the first edition.

Himself had called for sympathy; St. Athanasius and St. Thomas Aquinas relied on a syllogism.

The preparation of this work did not exhaust Lord Russell's literary labours. In 1870 he published selections from his speeches between 1817 and 1841, and from his despatches between 1859 and 1865. To the speeches he prefixed a long introduction of 170 octavo pages; to the despatches a shorter preface of 58 pages. In the following year he printed privately a short essay of 96 pages on the foreign policy of England from 1570 to 1870. Four years later he published two pamphlets on education in which he advocated the institution of free schools; and he brought his long literary labours to a conclusion with the best known of his later works, his 'Recollections and Suggestions.' In the preface to this book, however, he acknowledged that he found his memory was beginning to fail, and that he had therefore copied the account of his earlier recollections from the details which he had given five years before in the introduction to his speeches.

Whatever may be thought of the 'Recollections and Suggestions' as a literary work, it breathes from the first page to the last the same spirit of liberty which had actuated its author throughout his long life. 'There is nothing so conservative as Progress:' such—so he said in his old age—was the first advice which he gave as Prime Minister to the Queen. 'There is nothing so conservative as Progress:' such is the last sentiment which his pen records.

But perhaps, in an autobiographical sense, the most interesting part of the 'Recollections and Suggestions' is the motto which Lord Russell placed on his title-page:—

> Not heaven itself upon the past has power:
> But what has been has been, and I have had my hour.

For the interest which attaches to the quotation arises from the circumstance that thirty-eight years before Lord John had applied the same lines to himself in his speech at Bristol. There, while expatiating on the reforms which the Whig Ministries of Lord Grey and Lord Melbourne had accomplished, he had quoted from memory, for he gave them imperfectly Dryden's

couplet. But if in 1835 he had already cause to be satisfied with the hour which he had lived, the career with which this book has been occupied had hardly begun. For twenty consecutive years after the Bristol speech Lord John was to lead the Liberal party in the House of Commons. For twenty years he was to fill the highest offices in the State. For thirty years, in the language of the ode which Dryden has thus translated for us, he was to be by turns the favourite and the victim of fortune; and if in his old age he could look back with calm satisfaction at the second hour he had lived, his friends could claim for him that he could shroud himself in his own manly integrity.

A narrative of Lord Russell's literary pursuits during the closing years of his life must not distract attention from more personal matters. On his leaving office in the summer of 1866 his wife wrote in her diary—

> John so well and happy that my joy at his release becomes greater every hour. There is a sense of repose that can hardly be described: abounding happiness at his honourable downfall that cannot be uttered.

A few weeks after the resignation of the Government, Lord Russell turned his back on London, and took his wife down with him to Endsleigh. They had gone there first together after the fall of Lord Melbourne; they were returning after his own final retirement. During the few days in which they were the guests of the Duke of Bedford, Lord Russell found leisure to compose, and read, an address at the Town Hall of Tavistock, the town which more than half a century before had first chosen him as its representative.

Lord Russell was, however, already contemplating a much longer journey. The Seven Weeks' War was over. Austria had surrendered Venetia to France, who had in turn transferred it to Italy. Thus, at last, Italy was free from the Alps to the Adriatic; and her King, it was rumoured, would inaugurate his new rule by publicly entering Venice. Lord John determined to witness a spectacle associated with so many of his aspirations; and on the 18th of October, with his wife and five unmarried children, set out for Italy. They travelled leisurely, making halts of more or less duration at Paris, Strasburg,

Stuttgart, Munich, and Innspruck, on the last day of October crossed the Brenner—the pass swarming with soldiers—and on the 3rd of November reached Verona, arriving on the 5th at Venice. Two days later Victor Emanuel entered the city by water; and Lord Russell saw the pageant from the windows of the Palazzo Corner, the house of an old friend, Count Pasolini, the Commissary of the city.

Mia madre [so runs the narrative of Count Pasolini's son] andò incontro al vecchio amico . . . e vedendolo comparire con una gran coccarda tricolore sul petto, dissegli festevolmente, 'Ah! ah! fort bien, Mi Lord! Nos couleurs italiennes sur votre cœur!' 'Pour moi,' rispos' egli, stringendole la mano, 'je les ai toujours portées. Comtesse! Je suis bien content de vous trouver ici aujourd'hui. C'est un des plus beaux jours de notre siècle.'

E lamentando taluno che il sole, il sole d' Italia, mancasse a far più bella la storica solennità, Lord Russell rispose scherzando che l' Inghilterra, in segno di simpatia, avea mandato al Canal Grande la cara nebbia del suo Tamigi.

After Lord Russell's death the 'Fanfulla' thus recorded its recollections of the incident:—

L' ultima volta che lo vidi fu a Venezia. Re Vittorio Emanuele era entrato nella sospirata città, e salutava, commosso, da uno dei balconi in piazza S. Marco, le mille e mille persone che lo acclamavano con delirio.

Un vecchietto, a pochi passi dal Re, contemplava quello spettacolo attraverso un velo di lagrime. Il conte Russell, venuto apposta a Venezia per assistere all' ingresso del Re d' Italia, si asciugava gli occhi e dava strette di mano a destra e a sinistra, come che egli pure fosse stato un cittadino di quella fantastica città, quasi che egli pure provasse il debito della riconoscenza per il Re Galantuomo. E la sera, quando le belle signore di Venezia acclamavano Vittorio Emanuele alla *Fenice*, il conte Russell fu visto agitare il fazzoletto, e la voce robusta del Ministro liberale unì il suo 'hurrah!' agli evviva dei Veneziani.

The Russells remained at Venice for a week after this famous spectacle. They left it on the 13th of November; and, after spending two days at Milan, and three at Bologna, where they placed themselves under the guidance of Signor Minghetti, one of the most capable statesmen whom modern Italy has produced, they arrived on the 19th at Florence. Sir Henry Elliot, Lord Russell's brother-in-law, was at that time British

Minister at Florence, still the capital of the new Kingdom; and the society which Lady Elliot and he gathered round them at the Embassy naturally added to the attractions which the City of Flowers would, in any case, have possessed for Lord Russell and his family.[1]

[1] Sir H. Elliot, Lady Russell's second brother, had been made by Lord John Russell British Minister at the Court of Naples. In 1860 the conquest of the Two Sicilies by Garibaldi, and the annexation of the Kingdom to Piedmont, terminated the appointment, and Lord Russell, writing to him on the 12th of November, said, 'The triumph of Italy is death to your mission,' and added, 'I think you may as well stay in England for a time when you come home, without looking for a fresh appointment.' The day after that letter was written, the *Times* published a leading article warning the public that a gross job was being perpetrated by Lord John Russell for the benefit of Mr. Elliot, and at the expense of Sir James Hudson, who was to be removed to St. Petersburg in order that Mr. Elliot might take his place at Turin. Sir James, on seeing the report, wrote a letter to Lord John expressing his surprise and annoyance at the article; and Lord John replied on the 26th of November, 'You will readily believe that I never thought of moving you from Italy, where you have done so much, and are so justly esteemed. . . . We are going to send Bloomfield ambassador to Vienna, but he will not be there for five or six weeks. Later an ambassador will be named to Petersburg. Lord Napier (secret at present) will be the man.' The appointment of Lord Napier to Petersburg (which was at that time raised to an embassy) necessitated some other diplomatic changes. Sir Andrew Buchanan was removed from Madrid to the Hague in Lord Napier's room, and Sir John Crampton was transferred from Petersburg to Madrid in the place of Sir A. Buchanan. The first half of this arrangement was known on the 8th of December, and the *Times*, returning to its old charge, declared that, the former intrigue having failed, Sir A. Buchanan is to be shifted to make room for Mr. Elliot. By Lord John's desire a formal contradiction of the new charge, and of the intention of removing Sir James Hudson from Turin, was sent to that paper, and the *Times* in publishing it wrote, 'As to the intention of removing Sir James Hudson from Turin, if it was an invention, it was sufficiently plausible to impose upon Sir James Hudson.' Lord John thereupon wrote to Sir James Hudson, and ascertained that Sir James had heard, both from the secretary to his legation and from Count Cavour, of his intended promotion; and that, though he had received the report with surprise, he had believed it. It seems, therefore, plain that in November 1860 some busybodies had circulated a rumour (1) that Sir James Hudson was to be promoted to Madrid to make room for Mr. Elliot; (2) that the rumour took such circumstantial shape that it was actually believed by Sir James Hudson; and (3), as Lord John's letters of the 12th of November to Mr. Elliot, and of the 26th of November to Sir James Hudson prove, there was not any foundation for it.

The development of the Italian Kingdom naturally increased the expenses of the British Minister at Turin. Soon after Lord John acceded to the Foreign Office, he raised the salary of the post from 3,600*l.* to 4,000*l.* a year; and in 1861, after the annexation of Naples—in consequence of an appeal from Sir James—he further increased it to 5,000*l.* In addition to this the Minister continued to receive an allowance of 500*l.* a year for house rent, which he had always enjoyed.

While Lord Russell was at Florence he wrote to his daughter, Lady V. Villiers—

On politics I am more interested at present about the departure of the Pope from Rome and its consequences than about Reform,

The emoluments of the post, therefore, were practically raised by Lord John from 4,100*l.* to 5,500*l.* a year—a sum, however, which Sir James subsequently declared was insufficient to cover the expenses of the mission.

In the beginning of 1862 circumstances occurred which made Lord Russell think it might be necessary to remove Sir H. Bulwer from Constantinople. And he wrote to Sir James Hudson, in strict confidence, asking him whether he would be inclined to accept the post. Sir James, in reply, expressed himself ready to place himself at Lord Russell's disposal, but pleaded his own growing infirmities as a reason for the preference which he felt for remaining at Turin, where continued service would entitle him to a first-class pension; and Lord Russell, on the 5th of March, told him that he could accordingly remain at Turin and thus secure his object. This correspondence has not been preserved. The first letter was, indeed, destroyed at Lord Russell's own suggestion, who did not probably wish to leave on record the possible necessity of removing Sir H. Bulwer. But I have authority for saying that copies of this correspondence were retained by Sir James Hudson, and that the account of it which I have given in this paragraph is correct.

In the spring of 1863, Mr. H. Elliot, on his way home from a special mission in Greece, passed through Turin and saw Sir James Hudson, who told him that he was due for his pension on the 15th of July, that he had determined to ask for it, and that he wanted to be succeeded by Mr. Elliot. Sir James did more. He sent the following letter to Lord Russell by Mr. Elliot :—

Private and confidential] Turin : April 16, 1863.

My dear Lord,—You were so kind as to say you would allow me to work out my time for a pension at this Mission, and as I find . . . that I shall acquire a title to my pension on or about the end of next July, I hope you will graciously accede to my request to be placed on the Pension List.

Henry Elliot, who I sincerely hope will succeed me here, will tell you what a charming home I have prepared for him.

I would only beg to add that I entered the service of the Crown thirty-three years ago, and during all that time I do not think that I have enjoyed twelve months' repose.—Yours, &c.,

JAMES HUDSON.

Lord Russell replied—

House of Lords : April 27, 1863.

My dear Hudson,—It is a pang to me that we should be parted in that labour we have carried on together, and in which you have had so great a share of the work and the credit. But it is a great comfort that you should wish Henry Elliot to succeed you. I find your time will be completed in June, and I will prepare the Queen for the event.—Yours, &c.,

RUSSELL.

These diplomatic changes led to the renewal of the charges against Lord Russell. The *Times*, on the 13th of August, wrote, 'The public will be astonished to hear that it is intended to supersede Sir James Hudson as British Minister at Turin ;'

which has a million of stout nurses to take care of it. The Italian Government and the Pope are fencing at each other very skilfully;

and other newspapers at once copied and re-stated the charge. Lord Russell wrote at once to Sir James—

Meikleour, Perth: August 16, 1863.

My dear Hudson,—You will have seen the articles in the *Times* and *Morning Post*. I rely upon you for my vindication.—Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

Sir James Hudson happened to be absent in what he called the 'Cimmerian political darkness of the paternal Government of Austria.' Some time elapsed before he received his chief's letter, and, as the attacks still continued in the newspapers, Lord Russell wrote again :—

Meikleour: August 30, 1863.

My dear Hudson,—Circumstances, of which you will be aware, make it necessary that you should present your letters of recall in person.

It is necessary also that you should see your real friends at Turin and disabuse them with respect to the misrepresentations of the causes of your retirement. They are explained in your private letters, but you have never written a despatch formally requesting leave to retire.

I am sorry to trouble you about this, but the indiscreet advocacy of pretended friends has made it necessary.—I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

The day after this second letter was written, and long before it reached Sir James Hudson, Sir James, who had now returned from Cimmerian darkness to his letters and Piedmont, wrote from Desenzano: 'What has happened which requires that *I* should "vindicate" *you*? It sounds uncommonly like a joke, and therefore I presume our old friend the press is mixed up in it somehow.'

Seven days later he wrote from Brescia—

I am quite ready to obey your summons to present my letters of recall in person, and I shall hasten to do so the moment I receive them from you.

I have already explained to all those who had a right to inquire the reason for my retirement, and I have told them that you have left me at Turin nearly a year and three-quarters more than need have been the case, and this you did out of sheer kindness and deference to my wish to be permitted to decline the promotion you offered me in Feb.-March 1862, and to work out my time for a pension (July '63) instead of removing me as you might have done.

But, indeed, I am not aware that anybody in Italy questions your act or has expressed other than good will to Elliot. I confess myself unable to hit upon any form of words which will satisfy the English papers; and, as the storm has now blown over, I imagine it would be very impolitic to raise it again by public letters.

As the question of my pension has been formally settled by the Treasury, I presume no further public act respecting it is now necessary on my part. . . . —Believe me, &c.,

JAMES HUDSON.

But by the same post Sir James wrote to Mr. H. Elliot—

My reason for resigning was my notion that I was bound in honour to fulfil

and no one can say whether right or wrong will win: by right I mean Ricasoli, and by wrong Pio Nono, of course.

my engagement to Lord Russell, who proposed by a confidential letter in Feb.-March 1862, to send me to Constantinople.

It was then settled that I should decline the Embassy, and should work out my time (to July '63) for a pension at Turin.

I could do no less than carry out that engagement.

Lord Russell replied—

Balmoral: September 19, 1863.

My dear Hudson,—I hope that nothing may ever arise to disturb our confidence in each other, but it is evident you have misunderstood me, and have made a sacrifice when I wished you only to consult your own convenience.

If you had continued Minister at Turin as long as I held the seals of the Foreign Office, and ten years longer, I should have been better pleased with that arrangement than any other.

But you seem to have thought that there was an engagement between us that you should retire as soon as you became entitled to your pension.

I never imagined any such engagement to exist, and was surprised when I heard you had mentioned it to Henry Elliot. I consider the resignation to have been entirely voluntary on your part.

If from any supposition that I wished you to leave Turin you hastened your resignation, I am very sorry for the mistake: for, though Henry Elliot may do well, he can never enjoy to the same extent the confidence of the Italians.—I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Four months afterwards Lord Russell wrote to his Under-Secretary, Mr. (now Sir A. H.) Layard—

Pembroke Lodge: January 20, 1864.

My dear Layard,—You told me one day that you thought you might be questioned on the subject of Sir James Hudson's retirement from his post at Turin. So far as I am concerned the story is a very plain tale.

Considering Sir James Hudson one of the ablest of our diplomatists, I held out to him a prospect of promotion to an embassy.

Finding that he preferred to work out his time for a pension at the Italian Mission, I was happy to consent to a request which I thought beneficial and conducive to the success of our policy in Italy.

When, however, in April of last year he wrote to me that he hoped I would accede to his request to be placed on the Pension List, and added that he entered the service of the Crown thirty-three years before, and during all that time had not enjoyed twelve months' repose, I recommended him to the Treasury for a pension, and asked the Queen's permission to announce to him a fresh distinction upon his retirement.

I do not know that I could have exhibited more strongly the high esteem in which I held Sir James Hudson.

You are aware that it was reported in 1861 that he was to be removed to another post, and that in 1863 I had so annoyed him with repeated offers of other missions that I had forced him to retire.

These are fictions which malignity delights to invent and to propagate.

What purpose was to be served by endeavouring to impair the confidence

The Russells remained in Florence till the 19th of December, when they turned homewards, travelling leisurely by the route, which they had followed ten years before, through

which always subsisted between Sir James Hudson and me, I know not. I am sure they were not well-wishers of Sir James Hudson, or of the cause of Italy, who imagined and spread those rumours. They were probably stimulated by some petty spite against me, and careless of truth or of consequences.—I remain yours truly,

RUSSELL.

Strong as these letters are, if they had stood alone, it would no doubt be possible to argue that Sir James had misunderstood his chief's offer of February 1862, and had formed a notion that Lord Russell wanted his place, and that he was consequently bound to vacate it so soon as he was entitled to his full pension. But it so happens that these letters do not stand alone. Mr. (now Sir A. H.) Layard was Lord Russell's Under Secretary at the Foreign Office: and Sir James thus communicated to him his approaching retirement:—

Privatissime] Turin: May 23, 1863.

I have asked Lord R. to let me take my pension when my time is up, and he has consented. Now don't be savage, my dear friend. I can give an excellent reason for what I do. God bless you.—Your ever affectionate,

J. HUDSON.

Mr. Layard remonstrated, and Sir James replied—

Turin: June 1, 1863.

You have no right to apply the term 'desert' to my retirement—say rather driven out by the economists of your office.

I told Earl Russell two years ago that it would be impossible to live at the Mission unless it was raised to 6,000*l.* a year. . . . His Lordship did grant something . . . and brought the pay up to 5,200*l.*, or 800*l.* short of what is required to meet the ordinary expenses of representation, charities, &c. . . .

I soon found that my calculations were correct. I was about 4,000*l.* out of pocket by the Mission. . . .

This can only end one way: to go on at the present rate is simply to end in Whitecross Street, and that you would not wish.

This is the personal part: now take the political.

If your Liberal Cabinet breaks up, we go back to the Tories. What would be the first step of these short-sighted politicians in Italy? To remove me. They tried it before, and I successfully resisted.

But I could no longer resist if they now returned to office, because I have now worked out my time for my pension . . . and if Malmesbury were to come back, the first Mission he would lay his hand on would be this—in order to commence the rebuilding of that tottering old edifice, the foreign policy of the Tories.

My *duty*, therefore, to my friends, to our principles, and to Italy, was to shape such a course as would, whilst it placed a good man and true here, utterly bar the attempt of the Tories to put one of their own hacks at this Mission.

I therefore proposed to Lord John to put his brother-in-law, Henry Elliot, here, and let me retire on my pension. I said nothing about the dirty salary; but I explained the political part to him, and said it would be necessary to put

Pisa and Spezzia to Genoa, and thence by the Corniche to Marseilles. They spent the last week of 1866 at San Remo, and the first week of 1867 at Cannes, where a small English society was collected. They were subsequently detained by the illness of one of their children for a fortnight at Nimes, and did not consequently reach Paris till the end of January, or their London house till February 3, 1867. Lord Russell's arrival was anxiously expected, Mr. Gladstone, writing to Paris, urged him, if possible, to hasten his return. For, on the 5th of February, Parliament assembled; and a session which was destined to leave a permanent mark on English history began.

The Reform Act of 1867 no doubt impressed on many people the force of Mr. Canning's adage which Lord Russell was fond of quoting, 'Those, who oppose improvement because it is innovation, may one day have to submit to innovation which is not improvement.' Timid Liberals, who had

some man here who could not be *snuffed out*, as I should be by the Tories if they came back to power. . . .—Yours affectionately,

J. HUDSON.

If this letter, and the statements which it contains, are carefully compared with the facts and correspondence which have already been set out in this note, it will be seen that Sir James Hudson's memory was already misleading him both upon questions of pay and upon the reasons for his retirement which he fancied that he had communicated to his chief, and that he was stating entirely new grounds for his resignation.

Is not the true explanation something like this?—that Sir James found his income insufficient for his position; that he feared that he would not improve his pecuniary affairs by a costly move to an expensive embassy; that, in failing health and with some fears of a Tory Ministry, he thought it most prudent to retire; and that the reasons, which he knew had influenced himself, he thought were known and understood by his chief?

If, indeed, Sir James Hudson had been succeeded by Mr. Robinson and not by Mr. Elliot, would any sane being have doubted this explanation? Does not, in fact, the whole allegation of a job depend on the circumstance that Sir James was succeeded by Lord Russell's brother-in-law? I am not concerned in considering whether Lord Russell was wise or not in appointing his brother-in-law to the post. A more timid man might, perhaps, have hesitated to do so. But it should, at least, be recollected that there is no allegation that Mr. Elliot was not fit for the office; and there is the distinct opinion of Sir James Hudson that he was the best man for the place. I have felt myself obliged to tell in detail a story which I dislike the telling of, for I have no desire to reflect on a most distinguished diplomatist who is no longer alive. I have only to add that my narrative is largely founded on Mr. G. Elliot's pamphlet, *Sir James Hudson and Earl Russell* (London, 1886).

disliked the moderate measures of Reform which Lord Russell had pressed on them in 1852, in 1854, in 1860, and in 1866, must have reflected that their conduct in those years had paved the way for a measure which, for good or evil, had laid the foundations of that democracy whose upper stories were completed in 1885, and which is still awaiting its coronal. It is not necessary, however, to relate in detail the well-known history of a remarkable measure. It is sufficient to say that the securities on which the Government relied were, one after another, abandoned; and that the Bill in its final shape extended the suffrage to all householders in boroughs. Reform, for which Lord Russell had worked so long, had come at last in a more comprehensive shape than he had contemplated.

Encouraged by the passage of a democratic measure, and startled by the fact that Ireland, agitated by fresh rebellion, was subjected to fresh coercion, Lord Russell decided on again drawing attention to the chief grievance of the Irish people, and on moving for a commission to inquire into the management of the revenues of the Irish Church. But, before the motion came on, he extended its terms, and asked that the committee should be instructed to inquire into the amount of the revenues of the Church with a view to their more productive management, and to their more equitable application for the benefit of the Irish people. Writing privately to him on the 16th of June, Lord Derby deprecated the addition to the motion, which he rightly declared was equivalent to the old Appropriation Clause. But it was, of course, precisely because Lord Russell adhered to his old opinion of the value of an Appropriation Clause that he had inserted, and now adhered to, his words. The House of Lords had thus an opportunity afforded to it—while it was actually nearing the precipice which it could not see—of preserving a Church by sacrificing a portion of its revenues. And they again refused, by a triumphant majority, the suggested compromise. They failed to see that only two years later they would in consequence have to accept a far more drastic remedy.

The session had other interests for Lord Russell than the passage of a Reform Bill or the defeat of an Appropriation Clause. In the beginning of it he had the satisfaction of

seeing his eldest son commence his Parliamentary career; and a week before it concluded he had the still greater pleasure of giving his eldest daughter to Mr. Archibald Peel, the nephew of the Minister and the third son of Lord John's friend, neighbour, and political opponent, General Peel.

The marriage was fixed for the 15th of August, in order that Lord and Lady Amberley—who were on the eve of setting out for America—might be present at it. They sailed from England on the following day, leaving their eldest son—a baby just two years old—in its grandparents' charge at Pembroke Lodge. In the following month the child was transferred to its other grandparents; and Lord Russell, with his wife and youngest daughter, set out for Ireland. They slept on the 7th at Penmaenmawr, where they were joined by their youngest son, and on the 9th crossed from Holyhead to Kingstown. They stayed in Ireland for the best part of a month, visiting Killarney in the South, and their own property at Ardsalla in the North. From the moment of his landing to the moment of his departure Lord Russell was almost everywhere received with the gratitude which the Irish can show to their benefactors. At Belfast alone the author of the new Appropriation Clause received a threatening letter; and the authorities thought it necessary to place him under police protection. But as he was in the company of the Viceroy, the Duke of Abercorn—who was his brother-in-law—even his wife felt that the risk was small: and the pleasure of their tour was not destroyed by this untoward incident.

On the 9th of October the party turned their backs on Belfast, crossed to Stranraer, and, after stopping at Newton Stewart, at Carlisle, and with the Duke and Duchess of Cleveland at Raby, picked up their little grandson at Alderley, and, on the 14th of October, reached Pembroke Lodge. News was at this time arriving of the fresh, and as it proved unsuccessful, attempt which General Garibaldi was meditating on Rome; and Lord Russell amused himself by teaching the child to say 'Viva Garibaldi.'

Lord Russell, however, had other and more important work before him than teaching his grandson a popular Italian cry. The decision at which the Ministers arrived, to send an

expedition to Abyssinia, necessitated the summoning of Parliament in November; and Lord Russell a short fortnight afterwards proposed a series of resolutions which affirmed the necessity of improving the education of the lower, middle, and upper classes. Nothing came of the proposition. Lord Russell's elaborate statement was answered by the Duke of Marlborough, and the Peers went home to dinner. Yet, if the motion did nothing else, it served to mark Lord Russell's position in the van of another great movement, in which he was also destined to witness, before three years were over, such success as he could hardly have ventured on anticipating in 1867.

Lord Russell, however, had already made up his mind that, whether the future were pregnant with triumph or reverse, the time had come for laying down the helm which he had held so long. His age already exceeded by nearly two years that which Lord Palmerston had attained when he had formed his last Administration; and, though age had brought Lord Russell the health which he had rarely enjoyed in youth, he had reached a time when few men are capable of exhausting labour. At Christmas he communicated to Mr. Gladstone his decision to abstain from taking office; who replied—

Hawarden: December 26, 1867.

My dear Lord Russell,—. . . And now as to the intention you have formed. My political relations with you began late in life. I moved to you, not you to me; and ever since we have been in contact, that is to say during the last fifteen years, my co-operation with you has been associated all along with feelings of warm attachment and regard. Every incident that moves me farther from your side is painful to me. Nor am I sanguine as to what is to take place in the Liberal party when your decision is known. . . .

Your title, however, to repose cannot be questioned. I have often pointed [? out] to those who (justly) made much of Lord Palmerston's prolonged activity that your real and responsible political life began earlier as it has also continued later. Sir Robert Peel, in July 1846, thought he had earned his dismissal at an age (58) which if spared I shall touch in three days' time. Your fame is not a question of to-day's or to-morrow's popularity, but of the future at large. If you do not stand without a rival, I, for one, undoubtedly know not where to look for your superior in the annals of British legislation. None of those we see, perhaps none of those we remember, will take so high

a place. So long as you have been ready to lead, I have been ready and glad to follow. But there are laws we must all acknowledge, and I cannot ask you to persist against them. I earnestly hope that the Almighty will crown with the continued possession of every blessing the years He may allot you. I am relieved to think that the conclusion you seem to have reached involves no visible severance; and I trust the remainder of my own political life, which I neither expect nor desire to be very long, may be passed in efforts which may have your countenance and approval.—Sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

Having communicated his resolution to Mr. Gladstone, Lord Russell thus told it to the man who was already marked out as his successor in the Lords:—

Pembroke Lodge: January 2, 1868.

My dear Granville,—On a deliberate view of my past labours, my present age, and the future anxieties of the State, I have made up my mind not again to take office, if it is now offered to me.

I have communicated this decision to Gladstone, who acquiesces in the most friendly manner.

I have only further to say that I shall be glad, while Derby is the head of the Ministry, to help the party in any way that can be most useful.—Yours affectionately,

RUSSELL.

P.S.—This last sentence seems ambiguous. What I mean is, that if a new Government is formed, my assistance, though always willing, would hardly be required.

Lord Granville answered—

16 Bruton Street, London, W.

My dear Lord Russell,—Your letter took me by surprise. There is no one in England who has so clear a right to rest as you if you wish for it or think it necessary for your health. There seems, however, no chance at present of a change of Government, and it is impossible to say what may be the state of the country and of parties when this Administration comes to an end.

All younger politicians must envy you, who, through storm and sunshine, have built up a great political reputation. But that fact imposes on you great responsibility. I am glad to learn that, in any case, you do not intend to make any change in your present position. —Yours affectionately and gratefully,

GRANVILLE.

If, however, Lord Russell had made up his mind that

more than half a century of Parliamentary service had entitled him to exemption from the labours of office, he was in no mood to lay down his armour while the battle of civil and religious liberty was still undecided. While, in fact, he was writing to Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, he was composing the first of the three pamphlets on Ireland which, under the title of 'A Letter to the Right Honourable Chichester Fortescue, M.P.,' was immediately published. In it, after considering the historical and political aspect of the Irish problem, he frankly discarded his own original proposal.

I believe the Appropriation Clause would, if adopted at the time, have given satisfaction to the Irish people, and have afforded a breathing time for the consideration of later and larger measures. But this proposal was rejected by Parliament, and I am the first to say that what would have been healing in 1835 would be futile in 1868.

Lord Russell went on to argue that the time had come for establishing religious equality by the disestablishment of the Church, by the appropriation of three-fourths of its revenue to the endowment of the Church of Rome, and by the division of the remaining fourth between the Protestant Episcopal and the Presbyterian Churches.

Lord Russell, when he published this pamphlet in February, could hardly have foreseen the triumph that was approaching. Yet within six weeks of its publication Mr. Gladstone brought forward the motion which sounded the knell of the Tory Government, and of the Established Church in Ireland. Two weeks later still Lord Russell was himself presiding at an enthusiastic meeting at St. James's Hall, summoned to support Mr. Gladstone's policy; while immediately afterwards, under the guise of a second letter to Mr. Fortescue, he published a second pamphlet on the Irish question.

The year, as it ebbed away, brought many changes to the Russell family. In May Lord Russell went down to The Grove to be present at the wedding of his nephew Odo (the late Lord Ampthill) with Lady Emily Villiers. In June Lady Georgiana Peel, who came to Pembroke Lodge for the event, presented her husband with their first child. In July Lord Dunfermline's death, to Lady Palmerston's intense regret, prevented Lord Russell from fulfilling the task

which he had undertaken of unveiling the statue and window which were dedicated to Lord Palmerston's memory in the town and abbey of Romsey;[1] and, early in August, Lord Russell, with his three unmarried children and two of his grandchildren, left Richmond for Scotland, where they spent a month at St. Fillans, occupying a second month in visits at Inverary, Minto, Woburn, Adisham, and Walmer, and finally reaching home on the 5th of October.

Lord Russell during the holiday was in excellent health and spirits. His sister-in-law Lady William wrote to him—

Letters from the Abbey, and Lacaita *viva voce*, proclaim that you never were so brilliant, so agreeable, or so charming as September 1868. I said you really could be divine. I did not say you were occasionally a mere mortal—which is when you disagree with me—because these are family matters.

A little more than a month after Lord Russell's return to Richmond, the Parliament of 1865 was dissolved, and the general election of 1868 occurred.[2] The Conservatives, though the counties remained faithful to them, were routed hip and thigh in the boroughs; and the Ministers, without waiting to face the Parliament which they had convened, placed their resignations in the Queen's hands. The Queen at once sent for Mr. Gladstone, who wrote to Lord Russell—

11 Carlton House Terrace, S.W.: December 3, 1868.

My dear Lord Russell,—I have this morning undertaken by her Majesty's command to attempt the formation of a new Administration.

In proceeding to this task, I cannot, without much misgiving, compare myself with you and with others, so much more competent than I am, in whose steps I am thus endeavouring to tread.

Neither can I forget the generous declarations of confidence, and the unequivocal support, which I have received from you in the hour of difficulty, and which have helped to bring me onwards to responsibilities, I fear, beyond my strength.

Looking to the formation of a Government, I have before me the

[1] Lady Palmerston earnestly urged him to make the effort as Palmerston's *oldest and best friend*. The italics are hers.

[2] On private grounds the results of the election were not satisfactory to Lord John. His son, Lord Amberley, was defeated in Devonshire; and his brother-in-law, Mr. George Elliot, was beaten by Mr. (now Sir George) Trevelyan in the Border Burghs.

declarations in which you have claimed an exemption, without doubt nobly and amply earned, from the heavy burdens of the great offices you have so often borne as a Minister and as a leader in both Houses of Parliament.

Under all circumstances, I should look with hope and confidence to full and frequent communications with you, and to the benefit of your friendship and advice.

There remains, however, a question. You have an experience and knowledge to which no living statesman can pretend. Of the benefit to be derived from it I am sure that all with whom I can be likely to act would be deeply sensible. Would it be too great an invasion of your independence to ask you to consider whether you could afford it [*sic*] as a member of the Cabinet without the weight of other responsibility?

I send this letter instead of disturbing you by a telegram at night; but, if it be convenient to you to come up to-morrow forenoon, I should be most happy to explain to you the precise point I have reached in the first stage of my arduous proceedings.—Believe me, my dear Lord Russell, very sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

Lord Russell, though he felt deep regret that the weight of advancing years should have prevented his accepting Mr. Gladstone's offer, at once made up his mind to refuse it; and Mr. Gladstone replied—

The snapping of ties is never pleasant, but your resolution is probably a wise one, and I rejoice to think there are ties between you and us which cannot be snapped. Perhaps it is selfish of me to think of and mention them, rather than to dwell upon those ties which inseparably associate your name with so many great and noble passages in the history of your country.

But Lord Russell, though he refused the responsibility of power, had no intention of being idle. On the 18th of January he published a third pamphlet on Ireland in the shape of a third letter to Mr. Chichester Fortescue. In this pamphlet he not merely dealt with the Irish Church; but, taking Mr. Trench's 'Realities of Irish Life' as his text, strenuously advocated the reform of the Irish Land Laws. So far as the Irish Church was concerned he declared himself in favour both of its disestablishment and disendowment, though he desired that an interval of about a year should be allowed in which it should

be enabled to frame a scheme for its future organisation. He proposed too that the Church should be allowed to retain certain portions of its property to which it might have an equitable title; endowments of equal amounts being handed over both to Presbyterians and Roman Catholics. So far as the land was concerned he desired to give the tenant some security against ejectment and some compensation for improvements. He concluded—

> When the great work of conciliation has been, in spite of unjust aspersions and unfounded calumnies, gloriously accomplished, Mr. Gladstone may take to himself the consolation of Dante, that his life travels into the future, far beyond the mark to which the arrows of his enemies can reach, and he may say proudly—
>
> If I'm traduced by tongues which neither know
> My faculties nor person, yet will be
> The chronicles of my doing, let me say
> 'Tis but the fate of place, and the rough brake
> That virtue must go through.

Holding these opinions Lord Russell warmly supported the Bill which Mr. Gladstone introduced, expressing his satisfaction that

> This question has been taken up in a befitting manner by a great Minister who, by his able, his honest, and his courageous policy . . . has been fortunate enough to awaken in the people of the United Kingdom a sentiment of justice and sympathy towards the people of Ireland which they have never hitherto had the good fortune to see prevail.

But, at the same time, he voted in the majority against the Government on a proposal of Lord Salisbury's for giving the clergy of the Establishment the continued possession of their glebe houses; he supported on the third reading a fresh clause, introduced by Lord Stanhope but really framed by himself, for providing glebe houses for the clergy of all denominations. When the Bill was returned from the Commons he again voted with the Conservative party, declaring, however, that he would rather assent to the harsh provisions sent up from the House of Commons than lose the measure altogether; and, on the final stage of all, when the two

Houses had practically compromised their differences, he again expressed a hope that

> Parliament will be at liberty to see whether there are any objects likely to be of advantage to Ireland which have superior claims to those of 'unavoidable calamity or suffering.'

Thus from the first to the last Lord Russell had maintained the same opinion. He preferred the disendowment of the Irish Church to the maintenance of its monopoly. But he would have liked still better to have used the funds of which the Church was deprived for the endowment of other branches of the Christian religion.

Though, however, he had been unable to shape the details of the measure to suit his own views, he thoroughly rejoiced at the conclusion of a great controversy, writing to Mr. Gladstone to congratulate him on his success. Mr. Gladstone replied—

Chislehurst: July 27, 1869.

My dear Lord Russell,—Thank you very much for your kind note, and I can well believe in the satisfaction you are entitled to feel upon the passing of the Irish Church Act. It is really founded on principles of which you were the expositor long ago; and, although you may consistently regret that it does not embody all your views, you are not the man to desire that a secondary purpose should be preferred to one that is primary.—Sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

The Irish Church Bill necessarily formed the chief legislative measure of 1869. But in the same session Lord Russell made a serious effort to deal with another evil by empowering the House to add a limited number of life peers drawn from men distinguished in arms, in law, in the public service, and in letters or science, to the House of Lords. The proposal was no new one for Lord Russell to make. Nearly twenty years before, during his own Administration, he had brought the matter before the Queen, and had received her sanction of the offer of a life peerage to a distinguished lawyer, Dr. Lushington. Dr. Lushington, however, declined the offer. Lord Palmerston's action in 1856 in conferring a life peerage on Lord Wensleydale was defeated by the refusal of the Lords to allow a life peer to sit. And the subject was not

renewed till it was brought forward by Lord Russell in 1869. The Bill, which Lord Russell introduced for this purpose, reached, though it did not pass, its third reading, when it was rejected on the motion of Lord Malmesbury, who was so proud of his effort that he has published his speeches both on the second and the third reading in his 'Memoirs.' It does not seem necessary to publish in this memoir the speeches which Lord Russell made on the same occasions. Yet the time may possibly come when, in this matter too, Conservatives may regret that, from resisting improvement because it was innovation, they should have to submit to innovation which they may not consider improvement.

In the course of the session Lord Russell paid short visits to Oxford, which his youngest son had now joined, and to his daughter Lady Georgiana Peel at Wrexham. Towards the close of it he was the Queen's guest at Windsor, where he was invested with the Grand Cross of the order of St. Michael and St. George; and he subsequently visited Lord and Lady Amberley at Rodborough, thence proceeding, through one of the most beautiful valleys in England, to Ross, Tintern, and Chepstow. Three months later, on the 26th of October, he left home on a longer journey, travelling through France, in deep snow, to Cannes and San Remo, which he and his family reached on the 3rd of November, and where they remained for some months in the Villa Garbarino.

Our landlord, the Marchese Garbarino, was an ardent Liberal and Italian patriot; and to our surprise and delight we found painted on the ceiling of our pretty little drawing room, a portrait of John. There was one in each angle, the three others being Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour.

The five months were among the very happiest of our lives, and we reckon it among the three earthly paradises to which our wanderings have taken us—La Roche, St. Fillans, and San Remo. It was a very quiet life, but with a pleasant amount of society, many people we much liked passing through, or staying awhile, or, like ourselves, all the winter. Our Cambridge and Oxford boys spent a delightful Christmas vacation with us. We had a little party of English and Italians every Wednesday.

Of the doings of San Remo; of a visit of the Crown

Princess of Germany with her sister, the late Princess Alice ; of the theatres, where Lord Russell was received with applause, and where his entrance was greeted with the English national anthem ; of a dance which the Russells gave at their own villa ; and of a ball in which Lady Agatha was first introduced to society—'a little country town ball, partners of all conditions, but merrier far than most of the grander balls, to which she may go, are likely to be'—of these and other matters which occupied their time it is not necessary to speak in detail. At last, on the 7th of April, they bade adieu to the villa—'servants all in tears ; and all, high and low, showering blessings on us, and praying for our welfare in their lovely language.' A few days later they reached Paris, where they were lodged at the Embassy. There the Russells stayed another ten days, dining with the Emperor—Lord Russell being seated next the Empress, Lady Russell next the Emperor—breakfasting with the Mohls ; and meeting at Lord Lyons' own table, and in the houses of other friends, many of the most distinguished men in France. On the 25th of April they left Paris, crossed the Channel, slept that night at the rectory at Adisham ; and on the following day, 'after exactly six months' absence, arrived safe and happy in dear lovely Pembroke Lodge.' This or some other visit to Adisham suggested to Lord Russell the following lines :—

A priest and his wife dwelt somewhere in Kent,
Their minds on church ornaments piously bent :
They carved the church roof to reclaim every sinner,
But had nothing to carve for their children at dinner ;
The table of Credence was polish'd and burnish'd,
The table for supper but scantily furnish'd.
'How full is our church,' was the Minister's boast ;
'How empty our stomachs, pray give us some roast,'
Replied the poor bairns of Adisham nursery :
'There are stores in the chancel but none from the bursary.
Oh, better a fast day in monkish refectory
Than a feast day for us in Adisham rectory.'

Before the Russells reached England, the session of 1870 had already run half its course. Its chief measure, the Irish

Land Act, had already made great progress. Mr. Gladstone wrote to Lord Russell at Paris—

We have had a most anxious time in regard to the Irish Land Bill. Often do I think of a saying of yours more than thirty years back which struck me ineffaceably at the time. You said, 'The true key to our Irish debates was this: that it was not properly borne in mind that as England is inhabited by Englishmen, and Scotland by Scotchmen, so Ireland is inhabited by Irishmen.'[1] The fear that our Land Bill may cross the waters creates a sensitive state of mind among all Tories, many Whigs, and a few Radicals.

The Irish Land Bill reached the Lords at the end of May; and on the 14th of June Lord Russell made a great speech upon it. After stating his determination to resist all the amendments which it was understood that the Duke of Richmond, on behalf of the Conservative party, intended to propose, he concluded—

Happy is the sovereign who can achieve that which Elizabeth with all her power, and William III. with all his capacity, were unable to accomplish. Happy is the Minister who is able to do what Burleigh and Somers could not carry into operation; and happy is the Parliament which, instead of heaping up penalty after penalty against the Roman Catholics of Ireland, finds itself bound together in promoting the good of that country, ready to listen to all her just claims, and as I hope likely to establish peace and harmony throughout the land.[2]

Lord Russell took almost as much interest in the passage of the Education Act as in that of the Land Act. But, as the principles on which it was framed by Mr. Forster met his warm concurrence, he took little part in the debate upon

[1] The passage to which Mr. Gladstone apparently refers will be found in Lord John's great speech of April 15, 1839. It is well worth quoting: 'Sir, I know not why, if we conduct the government of England according to the wishes of the people of England, and if we conduct the government of Scotland according to the wishes of the people of Scotland, I know not why, in Ireland, the opinions and wishes of a small minority only should be consulted, and the great majority should be totally omitted in the list of the supporters of Government. I say, on the contrary, that we can have nothing firm, that we can have nothing stable, that we can have no permanent improvement, unless we act on such principles as shall carry with them the good will and the confidence of the Irish people.'

[2] I have slightly abbreviated this fine passage. Lord Granville, writing on June 17, said, 'You cannot imagine the pleasure your admirable speech gave us all.'

it.[1] And in fact the stirring events which were agitating the Continent distracted his attention, at the close of the session, from domestic topics. War was declared by France against Germany ;[2] and, with the outbreak of war, fear soon arose that the interests of this country might be affected. On the 1st of August Lord Russell introduced a Bill empowering the Crown to embody the militia ; and on the 2nd he pressed the Lords to read it a second time. He only withdrew his motion on the promise of the Government to introduce a Bill of its own. His speech, however, on the second reading of the Bill derived its chief interest from his outspoken denunciation of the negotiations which, it had been just ascertained, had taken place between Prussia and France respecting Belgium.

Let me again remind your Lordships of the obligations of the most sacred kind into which we have entered to guarantee the independence and neutrality of Belgium. . . . We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. . . . I deny that any great danger would exist if the country manfully declared her intention to stand by her treaties and not to shrink from the performance of all her engagements. . . . When the choice is between honour and infamy I cannot doubt that her Majesty's Government will pursue the course of honour, the only one worthy of the British people. . . . The main thing is how we can best assure Belgium, assure Europe, and assure the world that . . . the great name which we have acquired by the constant observation of truth and justice will not be departed from, and that we shall be in the future what we have been in the past.

The King of the Belgians thus acknowledged this 'spirit-stirring speech'[3] :—

[1] He moved an amendment, which was rejected, for the appointment of a Minister of Education. Mr. Forster, it may be added, was always ready to ascribe to his old leader full credit for what he had done. Writing to Lord Russell on May 23, 1872, he said—

'As regards universal compulsory education, I believe we shall soon complete the building. I trust your Lordship will live to see it completed ; but it is hard to see how there would have been a building to complete if you had not, with great labour and in great difficulty, dug the foundations in 1839.'

[2] Lord Clarendon died on June 27. On the 25th Lord Russell received a note from him which he endorsed, 'July 1 : On the 25th I received this letter at Pembroke Lodge. Lord Clarendon died on the 27th at six o'clock in the morning.' On July 1 Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville both confidentially communicated to Lord Russell that Lord Granville was to be Lord Clarendon's successor.

[3] The expression is taken from Lady Russell's diary.

Bruxelles : le 14 Août, 1870.

Mon cher Lord Russell,—Les paroles généreuses que vous avez prononcées sur la Belgique au sein du Parlement d'Angleterre ont été droit au cœur de tous les Belges et au mien : et je ne suis que l'organe de tous mes compatriotes en venant vous offrir ici l'expression de notre vive reconnaissance . . . pour le ferme appui que vous nous avez prêté dans ce moment plein de péril pour nous.

Il appartenait au vaillant champion des idées libérales en Angleterre de protéger de son talent et de sa grande autorité le petit pays qui s'honore de pratiquer le mieux les traditions constitutionnelles sur le continent. En le faisant, cher Lord Russell, vous avez rendu un service signal à la plus juste des causes, et je ne saurais vous dire assez le sentiment de gratitude que nous en avons conçu en Belgique.

Il y a longtemps du reste que nous étions habitués à compter sur vous. Les Belges n'oublient pas que toujours vous avez été pour eux un ami sincère : et je n'oublierai jamais toutes les marques de sympathie que vous nous avez données à mon regretté père et à moi.

Croyez toujours, cher Lord Russell, aux sentiments de sincère amitié de votre tout dévoué

LÉOPOLD.

Lord Russell throughout the autumn watched with painful and increasing interest the terrible struggle between France and Germany. His sympathies were strongly roused in favour of the Germans, and after Sedan he communicated to Count Bernstorff, who forwarded them to the King of Prussia, his warm congratulations, on the victory. There is still among his papers a copy of the reply in which Count Bismarck, by the King's command, directed Count Bernstorff to communicate to him his Majesty's thanks for his outspoken language. But, as the autumn wore on, circumstances of more immediate interest than even the progress of the war aroused Lord Russell's attention. In November Russia, taking advantage of the crisis, abruptly declared her intention of tearing up the article in the Treaty of 1856 which limited her naval force in the Black Sea. Lord Russell, if he had been so inclined, might have seized the opportunity of showing the worthlessness of the provision, which he had himself proposed to surrender for a different arrangement in 1855. He saw nothing, however, but the danger to England : and

adopted the expedient, customary to his fellow-countrymen but new to himself, of writing to the 'Times' on the defence of the country.[1]

However much Lord Russell may have disliked the conduct of Russia at this particular conjuncture, he was ready to bear his emphatic testimony to the policy of Lord Granville. In that 'Review of the Foreign Policy of England,' which has already been noticed, and which was printed in 1871, he declared that throughout the Franco-German War Lord Granville 'had preserved the even tenour of his way:' and, repeating the phrase which he had used at Blairgowrie, he declared afterwards that he had raised his reputation 'by the maintenance of peace with dignity and honour.' On another point, however, he did not equally approve the policy which the Foreign Minister was pursuing. In 1871 Lord Granville concluded the treaty with the United States under which it was determined to refer the Alabama claims to arbitration: and this was not the only occasion during the session of 1871 in which Lord Russell found himself in sharp conflict with Mr. Gladstone's Government. He showed his consistency by forming one of the majority by which the Ballot Act was defeated for the last time. He warmly opposed the measure for the Abolition of Purchase in the army, entering, for the first time in his life, into familiar correspondence with the leader of the Opposition for the purpose of making his opposition more effective; and he warmly resented the

[1] In later years Lord Russell's letters to the *Times* were not infrequent. The most important of them was perhaps one in 1872 on the business of the House. In this letter, among other remedies for the block of Parliamentary business, Lord Russell proposed to constitute four representative Assemblies for each of the four Irish provinces, and two for the Lowlands and Highlands of Scotland. 'The Imperial Parliament might still retain its hold over their legislation, and refuse, if it so chose, to give a third reading to any Bill assented to on its first and second readings and on the report by the local Assembly.' The proposal was condemned, at the time, as crude and hasty; and no doubt it was not thoroughly elaborated by the writer. Yet possibly a good many people who were prepared to condemn the suggestion then, may now be sorry that they did not avail themselves of this compromise also.

I shall not think it necessary to refer to Lord Russell's later letters to the *Times*. Biography, it seems to me, as I have already said, should occupy itself with the growth of a man's mind, or the achievements of its vigour, and not dwell too minutely on the minor activities of age.

manner in which that measure was ultimately carried by the use, or, as he thought, the abuse, of the Prerogative of the Crown. His confidence in Mr. Gladstone's Government was, in fact, shaken: and the familiar correspondence which he had hitherto conducted with Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues was largely interrupted.

Though Lord Russell was displaying considerable activity in his opposition to the Government, he was only an occasional attendant at the House of Lords. At the close of the session he let his house in Chesham Place, which he never afterwards occupied, to the late Mr. Samuel Morley. He spent his seventy-ninth birthday at Richmond. Lady Russell wrote—

> My dear dear husband's birthday, his 79th year come to a close. His serene and cheerful mind a greater blessing year by year as enjoyments one by one drop away. He looks back with gratitude; he accepts the present with contentment; he looks forward, I think, without dread. Our school did honour to the day by a grand tea here.

During the next three weeks Lord and Lady Russell paid visits both at Woburn and Laverstoke. On the 9th of September they crossed the Channel, slept that night at Boulogne, and, arriving the following day at Paris, occupied themselves in looking at the marks which war and uprising had made on the city. From Paris they proceeded to Switzerland, stopping on their way at Dijon, which was still full of German soldiery, and arrived at Lausanne on the 14th of September.[1] They stayed there till the beginning of November, when the colder weather warned them that the time had come for more southern skies, and they proceeded to Cannes, where they remained for four months; subsequently crossing France by Montpellier, Toulouse, and Pau to Biarritz; making thence a short excursion to St. Sebastian—where Lord Russell found

[1] Mr. and Mrs. Lecky—for whom the Russells entertained a warm friendship—arrived unexpectedly at Lausanne, and at once called on them. It so happened that the English clergyman, who did not know Mr. Lecky, called at the same time, and launched at once into an attack on the new systems of philosophy, and the taint of rationalism in many English Protestants, declaring that the greatest triumph of Christianity was the submission of the intellect to faith. Mr. Lecky, in the meanwhile, seated on Lady Russell's other side, was recommending in his quiet voice *Les Martyres de la libre Pensée.*

he was able, after an absence of more than fifty-seven years, to keep up a conversation in Spanish—and returning by Argelès, Pau, Bordeaux, Tours, Orleans, and Paris. At Orleans Lady Russell and her daughter took an early drive to see the town.

> Marks of shot in many places. Asked coachman how German army had behaved there. 'Mais, pas trop mal.' How French army had behaved. 'Mais, pas trop bien.'

Four days later the Russells were back in England, and Lord Russell was giving notice of a motion in the House of Lords.

So far as Lord Russell was concerned, the session of 1872 was chiefly memorable for the very prominent part which he took in resisting the claims of the United States. While Parliament was still sitting, however, he delivered an address to the Historical Society, of which he had just been elected President. But, though he was thus displaying his old intellectual activity, those who were nearest and dearest to him saw constant evidence of the increasing weight of age. His wife wrote on April 18, 1872—

> Cold. John did not venture out. Still looks tired: and not as he did when we arrived [i.e. from abroad]: but no cold. Sad, most sad to me, that when I take a brisk turn in the garden it is no longer with him; that his enjoyments, his active powers, yearly dwindle away; that it is scarcely possible that he should not at times feel the hours too long, from the difficulty of finding variety of occupation. Writing, walking, even reading very long, or talking very much with friends and visitors all tire him. He never complains: and I thank God for his patience; and, oh! so heartily that he has no pain, no chronic ailment. But alas for the days of his vigour when he was out and in twenty times a day—when life had a zest which nothing can restore.

Perhaps it was this evidence of growing infirmity which induced the Russells to pass the summer and autumn of 1872 almost entirely at Pembroke Lodge; and perhaps the same reason, when Parliament met, induced them to take a house in London, and so avoid the fatigue of journeys to and from Richmond. But the choice was in every sense unfortunate. The drains of their hired house were out of order; and Lord and Lady Russell and their daughter all felt the depressing influence, and suffered from the illness, which results from sewage poison. Weakened and depressed by circum-

stances, which were still undiscovered, Lord Russell had no strength to bear up against the annoyance with which he saw that the American Government was attacking his own conduct of the 'Alabama' case, and that his old colleagues, instead of resenting the attack, were passing it over in silence. But his spirits visibly recovered when he escaped from the bad influences of his hired house in London to the healthy atmosphere of Richmond; and, before the session closed, Lord Russell gave proofs of vigour, and of attachment to his old principles, by personally introducing a measure for the better government of Ireland.

Early in August the Russells crossed to Boulogne, and travelled thence to Dieppe, where they stayed for some five or six weeks. During the whole of their stay Lord Russell was singularly well, and able to enjoy the society of Lord and Lady Salisbury—who were at the Villa Cecil—and the long drives and expeditions which they made in the neighbourhood. Later in the autumn, after his return to England, he was roused into his old enthusiasm for religious liberty by the struggle which broke out between the Emperor of Germany and the Pope. Friends of religious liberty, and enemies of Roman Catholicism, decided on holding a great public meeting to support the Emperor; and they persuaded Lord Russell to promise that he would preside at it. Sir G. Bowyer, whom many persons will recollect as a prominent Roman Catholic, remonstrated with him; and Lord Russell replied—

I am very sorry to differ from you in the step which I have taken of consenting to preside at a meeting at which it will be proposed to express our sympathy with the Emperor of Germany in the declaration he has made in his letter to the Pope. I conceive that the time has come, foreseen by Sir R. Peel, when the Roman Catholic Church disclaims equality, and will be satisfied with nothing but ascendency. To this ascendency, openly asserted to extend to all baptized persons and therefore including our Queen, the Prince of Wales, our bishops and clergy, I decline to submit.

Whatever feelings Lord Russell's letter may have roused in devout Roman Catholics, it was read with natural satisfaction in Germany. Lord Odo Russell wrote—

British Embassy, Berlin: December 20, 1873.

My dear Uncle,—Prince Bismarck called on me to tell me how deeply gratified he felt on reading your letter to Sir George Bowyer; and how grateful for the powerful moral support you are giving him in his struggle against the infallible Papacy. He wondered whether you remembered the visit he paid you at Pembroke Lodge during the Exhibition.

Since he called here, the newspaper he is, rightly or wrongly, supposed to inspire, published a translation of your letter, and two little articles, herewith enclosed, which may amuse you.

I must add that your letter has produced an outburst of enthusiasm in the Liberal press of Germany. . . .—Your affectionate and grateful nephew,

ODO RUSSELL.

Lord Russell, however, was in his eighty-second year; and his medical advisers declared that he was not strong enough to attend the meeting. In announcing their opinion to Sir John Murray (of Philiphaugh), who ultimately presided in his room, Lord Russell said—

The very same principles which bound me to ask for equal freedom for the Roman Catholic, the Protestant Dissenter, and the Jew, bind me to protest against a conspiracy which aims at confining the German Empire in chains, never, it is hoped, to be shaken off. I hasten to declare, with all lovers of freedom in this country, and, I trust, with the great majority of the English nation, that I could no longer call myself a lover of civil and religious liberty all over the world if I did not proclaim my adherence to the Emperor of Germany in the noble struggle in which he is engaged. We have nothing to do with the details of the German laws: they may be necessary; they may be too harsh: we can only leave it to the German people to decide for themselves as we have decided for ourselves.

At all events we are able to see that the cause of the Emperor of Germany is the cause of liberty, and the cause of the Pope is the cause of slavery.

Mr. Punch made this letter, and the meeting, which Lord Russell did not attend, the subject of one of his most amusing cartoons.[1] But Prince Bismarck was too much in earnest to be amused. Lord Odo Russell wrote—

[1] In the picture, a very diminutive Lord Russell, with his handkerchief in his hand, is standing by a colossal Prince Bismarck, who is wielding the sword of No Popery, and saying, 'Go it, Bismarck, pitch into him! I'd ha' done it myself, only I have such an AWFULLY BAD COLD.'

British Embassy, Berlin: February 9, 1874.

My dear Uncle,—Thanks for your letter. Bismarck confided to me, as a *secret*, that he and the Emperor were preparing a letter of thanks to you which they hoped would show you how very grateful they are to you for rousing the sympathies of the people of England for the cause of Germany. . . .—Ever your grateful nephew,

ODO RUSSELL.

Here is the Emperor's reply :—

Berlin: February 18, 1874.

Dear Lord Russell,—I have received your letter of January 28, with the resolutions of the great meeting in London, and with my Ambassador's report of the proceedings.

I thank you sincerely for this communication, and for the accompanying expression of your personal sympathy.

It is incumbent upon me to be the leader of my people in a struggle already maintained through centuries past by German Emperors of earlier days, against a power the domination of which has in no country in the world been found compatible with the freedom and welfare of nations—a power which, if victorious in our days, would imperil, not in Germany alone, the blessings of the Reformation, liberty of conscience, and the authority of law.

I accept the battle thus imposed upon me in fulfilment of my kingly duties, and in firm reliance on God, to whose help we look for victory: but also in that spirit of regard for the creed of others and of evangelical forbearance which has been stamped by my forefathers on the laws and administration of my States.

The latest measures of my Government do not infringe upon the Romish Church or the free exercise of their religion by her votaries; they only give to the independence and the legislation of the country some of the guarantees long possessed by other countries, and formerly possessed by Prussia, without being held by the Romish Church incompatible with the free exercise of her religion.

I was sure, and I rejoice at the proofs afforded me by your letter, that the sympathies of the people of England would not fail me in this struggle—the people of England, to whom my people and my royal house are bound by the remembrance of many a hard and honourable struggle maintained in common since the days of William of Orange.

I beg you to communicate this letter, with my hearty thanks, to the gentlemen who signed the resolutions, and remain yours sincerely,

WILHELM.

A little later Lord Odo Russell sent his uncle the following copy of a letter from Prince Bismarck :—

Berlin : February 24, 1874.

My dear Lord,—I return with many thanks the letter of Earl Russell, bearing the memorable date of the 27th of January, and need hardly say how much I am gratified by the active interest the Nestor of European statesmen is taking in our defensive warfare against the priesthood of Rome.

I quite agree with the idea which seems to underlie his letter : that in clerical government there is always a seed of international conflicts, and that a great deal less of that seed will be thrown out, if England and Germany are agreed to stand up for religious liberty.

I shall thank you for remembering me kindly to Earl Russell and telling him that time never has impaired with me the impression of our personal acquaintance made in 1862, in his Lordship's seat in Richmond Park.—Believe me, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

V. BISMARCK.

His Excellency Lord Odo Russell.

The year in which Lord Russell was thus displaying his old enthusiasm for religious liberty, or, as some persons would prefer to say, his old zeal against the Church of Rome, opened very happily on Pembroke Lodge ; and Lady Russell commenced her new journal by recording her deep sense of thankfulness and hope. Yet the first day of 1874 was the last New Year's Day on which she could ever have written such a sentiment ; and those who have followed Lord Russell's career up to this point, and who are acquainted with the many sorrows which were to fall on him during the few years in which he was still to live, will recall the memorable saying of Solon to Crœsus, 'Call no man happy before he dies.' In April 1874 Lady Russell's elder sister, Lady Dunfermline, the Lady Mary Abercromby of a former page, died at Rome. In May Lord and Lady Amberley, who had passed the winter with their eldest son in Italy, arrived in Chesham Place, the boy ill with diphtheria. Leaving their son behind them, they picked up the two younger children at Pembroke Lodge and carried them to Ravenscroft, their country home. But they had not long reached their own house when their daughter sickened of the same complaint. Lady Amberley nursed her child through the illness, contracted the infection, and died at the end

of June. Five days later she was joined in death by her child.

On the day of his daughter's death, Lord Amberley sent his younger son to Pembroke Lodge, which has since been his home; and a short time later, Lord and Lady Russell moved with their own family and their little grandchild to Aldworth, which was placed at their disposal by Mr. Tennyson. There Lord Russell occupied himself with the concluding pages of 'Recollections and Suggestions,' appropriately ending the book with a quotation from the great poet in whose house he was residing. And his work, and the favour with which it was received, helped to divert his thoughts from the loss which he had sustained, and from the anxiety which the illness, the irremediable illness as it proved, of another of his children, was concurrently occasioning him. And thus, with a cloud of sorrow settling down on his household, Lord Russell concluded his eighty-second and entered his eighty-third year. During 1875 he spoke on one or two occasions in the House of Lords; and, in the autumn, threw himself with ardour into the cause of the insurgents who were rising against Turkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lady Russell thinks that her husband showed all his old courage and vigour in the promptness with which he attacked, and the skill with which he defended, the cause of liberty in Eastern Europe.[1] A more independent testimony of the value of his services reached him from Caprera.

Caprera: Septembre 17, 1875.

Mon illustre ami,—En associant votre grand nom aux bienfaiteurs des Chrétiens opprimés par le Gouvernement Turc, vous avez ajouté un bien précieux bijou à la couronne humanitaire qui ceint votre noble front.

En 1860, votre parole sublime sonna en faveur des Rayahs Italiens, et l'Italie n'est plus une expression géographique. Aujourd'hui vous plaidez la cause des Rayahs Turcs, plus malheureux encore. C'est une cause qui vaincra comme la première, et Dieu bénira vos vieux ans.

[1] Lord Russell had, for some years, become weary of Turkish misrule. Writing to Lady William Russell in 1874, he said, 'I cannot stand the Turk any longer. It is fit he should keep the Dardanelles. But from Adrianople to Belgrade all government should be in the hands of Christians. . . . I tried myself, with Palmerston's aid and sanction, to improve the Turks. They are unimprovable, and I give them up, but for the benefit of Europe and not for the monopoly of Russia.'

Je me chargerai de ce que vous voudrez. Je baise la main à votre précieuse épouse, et suis pour la vie votre dévoué

G. GARIBALDI.

À Lord John Russell, Londres.

General Garibaldi's praise was not undeserved. Lord Russell had been the first prominent man in England to realise the great issues which were inseparably connected with the insurrection; and, throughout 1876, he watched with never-failing interest and horror the progress of the movement and the atrocities with which it was met. Yet his own declining health made it impossible for him to emerge from his retirement and take part in the fray. For, if the sorrows of 1874 had left a deep mark on his frame, the events of 1876 were still further to try him. At the beginning of the year, his eldest son, whose opening promise he had watched with such satisfaction, died at Ravenscroft, the home in Wales where his wife and his daughter had been taken from him two years before. In August his step-son, Lord Ribblesdale, died abroad; while Lord Russell himself, after his son's death, was seized with illness which kept him two months in his room, and from which he never thoroughly recovered. He was, indeed, well enough in 1877 to receive a party of 600 working men, their wives and their children, at Pembroke Lodge, and to spend three months in the summer in the invigorating air of the Isle of Thanet. But the end was coming very near. Early in 1878 Lord Russell had a feverish attack, which lasted several days, and further weakened his debilitated frame. In the middle of March he was again attacked by illness, and was never afterwards allowed to leave his bedroom. On Good Friday, April 19, his wife wrote—

I have just been sitting with my dearest husband. He has said precious words such as I did not expect ever to hear from him, for his mind is seldom, very seldom, clear, and I put them down at once as well as I can.

We were holding one another's hands. 'I hope I haven't given you much trouble.' 'How, dearest?' 'In watching over me.' Then by-and-by he said, 'I have made mistakes, but in all I did my object was the public good.' Again, 'I have sometimes seemed cold to my friends, but it was not in my heart.' He said he had enjoyed his

life . . . At another moment he said, 'I am quite ready to go now.' He so often talked of travelling that I thought he might be planning a journey, although he looked different from usual—grown more like himself—and asked him where to? 'To my grave, to my death.'

The following day Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone called at Pembroke Lodge, and Lord Russell was well enough to see them for a few minutes; and, during the rest of April, he continued to maintain his strength. But on the 1st of May a change for the worse set in. Lord Russell, on the 9th, was far too ill to see even the leading members of a great deputation of Nonconformists which came to Pembroke Lodge to congratulate him on the fiftieth anniversary of his first great achievement, the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. Two days later still he became visibly worse, and, though he lingered another seventeen days, on the evening of the 28th, holding his wife's hand, he passed calmly and peacefully away.

Letters and tokens of sympathy poured in on his widow from all quarters. The Queen wrote at once to express her sorrow. And the Prime Minister thus conveyed to Lady Russell the feelings of the nation:—

10 Downing Street: May 29, 1878.

Dear Madam,—The Queen and her Majesty's Ministers share the public feeling that some national mark of respect should be shown, by an admiring nation, to the illustrious departed.

A public funeral in that Abbey beneath whose shadow his youth was educated, and which subsequently witnessed his great career, appears to be not an unbecoming consummation; but her Majesty has been graciously pleased to remark that nothing should be done without the entire concurrence of yourself and your family, and with complete deference to the known wishes of him whom we have lost.

I have the honour to remain, dear madam, with great consideration and sympathy, yours faithfully,

BEACONSFIELD.

The wishes which Lord Russell had expressed in his lifetime did not, however, permit his family to avail themselves of the Prime Minister's offer, and Lord Russell was buried on the Tuesday which succeeded his death in the family vault at Chenies. He lies there amidst the ancestors of the Russells,

with his first wife, his son, his daughter-in-law, and their child. But, among all that long array of departed great, though the names of William Lord Russell and Rachel his wife are included in the category, there is none who rendered such services to his country, or conferred such distinction on his family, as the bold, honest, and able statesman, whose career has been imperfectly sketched in the preceding pages.

Three weeks after Lord Russell's death, the Fox Club met for one of their annual dinners. Up to that time only three toasts had been allowed at the club: 'The memory of Charles James Fox;' 'Earl Grey and the late Reform Bill;' 'the memory of the late Lord Holland.' At the meeting in June 1878 Lord Stair, who was in the chair, got up and said, 'Since the last meeting of this club the great leader of the Whig and Liberal party has been taken away, and I believe it is the wish of the club to drink to the memory of Lord Russell.' The toast was drunk in silence, and Lord Stair again rose and said he believed it to be the desire of the club that Lord Russell's memory should be added to the toasts. Mr. Charles Fitzwilliam, who was present, then expressed a hope that he might propose a slight alteration: that all the great measures carried had been carried by Lord John Russell, the name by which all good Whigs liked to call him, and he suggested that the toast should be to the memory of Lord John Russell. This was at once agreed to.

To this, the tribute of a club, it is only necessary to add one or two further extracts from hundreds of letters in the possession of the family.

On the day which preceded Lord Russell's death General Garibaldi wrote—

Caprera: 27 Maggio, 1878.

Illustre e caro Lord Russell,—Sono spaventato ancora per una notizia sfavorevole sulla vostra salute. Oggi sono assai confortato, e con me Italia tutta che tanto vi deve.

Vogliate darmi vostre notizie, e salutarmi caramente l' amabile vostra famiglia.—Per la vita, vostro

G. GARIBALDI.

Two days after his death, Mr. Bright wrote to Lady Russell—

What I particularly observed in the public life of Lord John you once told me you liked his former name and title—was a moral tone, a conscientious feeling, something higher and better than is often found in the guiding principles of our most active statesmen; and for this I always admired and reverenced him.

On the same day Lord Houghton wrote—

Lord Russell has ever been to me the highest and most complete statesman of my generation. He is the only one whom I have known in whom the worth and dignity of the man never lost by public life and the conduct of national affairs.

EPILOGUE.

IF the preceding chapters of this book have failed to describe the character and career of the statesman with whom they have been concerned, it is hopeless for their author to attempt, in the few pages which are still left to him, to give life and distinctness to the portrait. The narrative might at once be closed if it were not necessary to gather up a few dropped or missing threads, and weave them into the story; and if it were not right to offer, in doing so, a few general observations on Lord John Russell's private life and public career.

On public grounds Lord John stands before posterity in a double capacity. He was not merely a distinguished statesman; he was a voluminous author. If, indeed, he had deserted, as he once thought of abandoning, politics for literature, it is not likely that he would have acquired fame. His best works would, no doubt, have brought credit to any writer. But their warmest admirers will hardly number them among the classics. Those of Lord John Russell's books which still survive are read because they were written by Lord John Russell; and the light which the author sheds is lustre borrowed from the eminence of the statesman. It is as a man of action, and not as a man of letters, that Lord John will descend to posterity; and it is by his achievements in Parliament, and not by the productions of his pen, that he must ultimately be judged.

The first reflection on his Parliamentary career which will occur to most people is the time over which it extended. He was a member of the Legislature for sixty-five years. No previous statesman of equal eminence had served his country for anything like the same period; and no period of equal importance had ever before occurred in the history of the

world. When Lord John Russell entered Parliament, the power of the first Napoleon was unbroken. When he died the Second Empire was a thing of history. At the beginning of his career Europe was the appanage of sovereigns; at the close of it the fairest parts of it were the heritage of peoples. The modern doctrine of nationality had asserted itself against the principles of the Holy Alliance; and Emperors and armies had given way before the impulse of populations.

In the changes which had thus been accomplished, not merely on the map of Europe but in the Governments of Europe, Lord John had almost uniformly been on the side of liberty. At the beginning of his career he had devoted some of his first literary earnings to the relief of a people whom he had thought oppressed. In the closing years of his official life he had laboured for the cause of Italy with a zeal and with a success which have few parallels in British history. Yet, though the part which he played in foreign affairs was large and notable, his fame must ultimately rest on domestic legislation. During the course of his Parliamentary career a revolution was effected in domestic policy; and in this revolution there can be no doubt that Lord John Russell was the chief actor.

In 1813, when Lord John Russell entered Parliament, the government of the empire was virtually in the hands of a few hundred persons who had seats in the House of Lords or who nominated the majority of the members who sat in the House of Commons. The chief prizes in State and Church were reserved for the relatives, the friends, or the acquaintances of the ruling class. The narrowest religious prejudices influenced legislation. A Roman Catholic was ineligible both for office and Parliament. A Nonconformist could only hold office because the Legislature was in the habit of annually indemnifying him for breaking the law. A Jew was disabled from acquiring real estate. There seemed no prospect of remedying these disabilities. Public meetings, except those authoritatively constituted, were held to be illegal; their organisers were frequently subjected to prosecution for high treason. Lord John Russell's first effective speech in Parliament was in opposition to the suspension of the Habeas

Corpus Act. He returned to the House in 1819 to oppose the measures by which Lord Liverpool's Administration endeavoured to curb the press and restrict public meetings. The punishments imposed by law were brutal. The criminal code was written in characters of blood, and proved inefficacious to repress crime. Women could still be flogged at the cart-tail; men could still be placed in the pillory; no reasonable secondary punishment had been invented. The modern policeman had not replaced the old Dogberry. My Lord Tom Noddy went to see the last forger publicly executed. Her Ladyship probably attended the service in Newgate on the Sunday which preceded his execution. Debtors languished in prison; real estate was not liable for debt. The bull ring, the prize ring, and the cock pit were favourite places of resort among rich and poor. There was no provision for the education of the people. There were no free libraries, no public galleries, no rational amusements for the masses. The commercial legislation of the country was founded on a policy of restriction. Dear corn and low wages were the chief objects of the Legislature. The dwellings of the people were undrained, ill ventilated, and perhaps abutted on a graveyard in which every fresh interment exposed the remains of those who had gone before to the noisome and overcrowded plot which was called God's acre. The Poor Law, instead of promoting thrift, was used to encourage extravagance. The men who had the largest families, the women who had most illegitimate children, were the favourites of the rates. In many parts of England rates were commonly paid in aid of wages.

Such was the England which Lord John Russell found. The introduction of a 'not' into most of the preceding sentences will portray the England which he left. People are apt to dwell on the material progress of the sixty-five years which were covered by his Parliamentary career, and to remind one another that, while at the beginning of it men could not travel faster than the Pharaohs, before the close of it electricity and steam had almost annihilated space and time; but they too frequently forget that the legislative and moral advance was as remarkable as the national progress,

and that most of the reforms which were accomplished in this period owe their inception or their completion, more or less directly, to Lord John Russell.

In organic Reform Lord John accomplished almost all that he desired; and, in his old age, lived to see younger men push his principles to extremes which he had not contemplated, and which he did not wholly relish. He undoubtedly shared Lord Grey's desire to make the Reform Act a final measure; and he risked popularity and office—while Lord Melbourne's Administration lasted—for the sake of maintaining a settlement to which he considered himself pledged. In later years, when he again reverted to the subject, all his various proposals were framed on the model of the Act of 1832; and he seemed more anxious to amend any casual defects in that measure, or to extend its operation a little further, than to devise a large and comprehensive scheme of representative Reform. Hence, on organic questions, he displayed, in his later years, an almost Conservative dislike of extensive changes; and he subjected himself to the reproach, or, as some people will think, to the praise, that he retained at eighty the opinions which he had successfully asserted at forty years of age. But on other matters his views enlarged with the increase of years. He displayed an unusual capacity, for an old man, to adapt himself to the conclusions of a younger generation; and, on questions connected with the Church, with education, with the treatment of crime, with the management of finance, and with the freedom of commerce, he could act at eighty, as he acted at forty, with those who were in the van of the Liberal party.

It is neither the wish nor the object of the present writer to prove that in what he thus did and thought Lord John was always right. He wrote himself in 1869, 'I have committed many errors, some of them very gross blunders;' and there are undoubtedly passages in his biography which show that he had no better claim than other men to infallibility. But even in those instances on which most people will think he was mistaken—the publication of the Durham letter in 1850, the junction with Lord Aberdeen in 1852, and the unfortunate, and even disastrous, change of opinion in 1853

—he acted on what he genuinely thought at the moment was the interest of the Church, the Crown, and the country. His head may have been in error, but his heart was sound.

Administrative ability unfortunately attracts less attention than Parliamentary eloquence, and the capacity which a man displays in his office is forgotten when the generation of those who work under him passes away. It would otherwise be remembered to Lord John's credit that no man in the present century has acquired greater reputation as a Minister. He was one of the best Secretaries of State that ever entered the Home Office; and, in his short career at the Colonial Office, he displayed a breadth of view and a sobriety of judgment which promised to make him the greatest of Colonial Ministers. He was never satisfied with discharging the mere details of his office. His great speech on colonial policy in 1850, which is in reality an elaborate treatise on the rise, progress, and future of the colonies, is an eternal proof of the thoroughness with which he had thought out every portion of the subject; while the continuous efforts which he made at the Home Office for the more rational treatment of crime by the construction of better prisons, by the introduction of improved prison discipline, by the gradual abolition of transportation, and by the establishment of a rural police, again afford a decisive proof that his desire was not merely to administer, but to improve, what he found. Perhaps modern England owes as much to the improvements which he thus introduced as to the passage of the Reform Act.

As Foreign Minister Lord John displayed equally great qualities. No man ever fell on more critical times, and no man ever achieved a more brilliant success than Lord John's Italian policy secured. His despatches on this question, and on other subjects, are, in many ways, remarkable. They frequently read like political essays rather than official documents, and they commonly contain the doctrines, or, as hostile critics would say, the platitudes, of the Whig creed. Some of them are unusually long. But their length is always attributable to the matter which they contain, and not to mere diffuseness of style. Few men of his generation could express so much by voice or pen in so few words as Lord John;

and, on those occasions on which he was lengthy, it will almost invariably be found that he was so because he had a good deal to say, and not because he took a long time in saying it.

The characteristics which are visible in his despatches may be traced in his speeches. Many of them read like careful essays, pregnant with thought and matter. Occasionally, indeed, they teem with platitudes, which sound like extracts from a political commonplace book. But it is due to their author to remember that sentences which sound like platitudes now were far from being platitudes when they were first uttered. The doctrines which are accepted as truisms today have been made truisms by Lord John Russell's insistence.

It was, however, rather in debate than in exposition that Lord John showed to most advantage. His full mind, his mature knowledge, and his long practice made him a most capable debater. He rarely missed the strong point of his own case, or the weak point of his adversary's; and both in public discussion and in private conversation he had the knack of grappling with the centre of a subject which is as serviceable as it is unusual. He was, too, quick, as well as dexterous, in reply. Mr. Gladstone quoted his retort to Sir F. Burdett—'The honourable member talks of the cant of patriotism; but there is something worse than the cant of patriotism, and that is the recant of patriotism'[1]—as an example of readiness in debate; while Sir Robert Peel said that, though bludgeons were not in Lord John's way, he can draw a rapier of the finest temper and polish, and run you through.[2]

There is one other characteristic in Lord John's speeches which deserves to be noticed. In the words of the late Sir William Heathcote, he never mingled in debate without raising its tone. His reasoning may be true or false; it may command or fail to secure consent. But the reader instinctively feels that the arguments come from a true man, who is expressing, not concealing, his real opinions, and who is labouring to the best of his judgment in the service of his country

[1] The story is told in Mr. Frith's *Memoirs*, ii. 258. But the repartee had been given before in *Fraser's Magazine* for June 1845.

[2] I owe this saying and the succeeding one to Lord Coleridge.

and mankind. His language is as transparent as his thoughts are clear. There is no false colour in his sentences, no base metal in his composition. Ring him where you will, he rings true.

It was somewhere said of Lord John's speeches that, whatever effect they might have on the audience, they read better than those of other people; and, in fact, Lord John had physical defects which prevented him from taking the highest rank as an orator. His physique was weak. Mr. Sydney Smith told a Devonshire elector in the thirties who expressed surprise at Lord John's small stature that 'he was wasted in the service of his country;' while one of his own colleagues declared that it was strange to see 'so great a man so little.' Nor was his weak physique his only drawback; his voice was thin, his manner was awkward. It was humorously stated that, when he placed his left elbow on the palm of his right hand, the House awaited a sentiment in favour of civil and religious liberty.

In a very careful and on the whole appreciative article in 'Fraser's Magazine,' in June 1845, the writer says—

Notwithstanding the many points of excellence in his speeches, Lord John Russell's exterior and style of speaking are most disappointing. Remembering the pleasure he has given you on paper, and the prominent position he holds in the House of Commons, your first sensation on seeing and hearing him is that you must have been misinformed. Can that little, quiet, fragile, modest, almost insignificant-looking man—so neat, plain, and formal, in his black coat and snow-white neckcloth, who sits with his legs crossed anyhow, and his hat overshading his small, sharp features till they are scarcely seen—can that be Lord John Russell? . . .

In a few moments he takes off his hat and rises from his seat, advancing to the table to speak. Now, for the first time, there is something that prepossesses. His head, though small, is finely shaped; it is a highly intellectual head, and the brow is wide and deep. . . . A moment more and you are struck with the proportions, though small, of his frame—his erect attitude, his chest expanded. You begin to perceive that a little man need not, of necessity, be insignificant. . . . He speaks for a time, and your disappointment returns. His voice is feeble in quality, and monotonous. It is thin, and there is a twang upon it which smacks of aristocratic affectation;

but it is distinct. . . . He goes on in that strain, uttering a few of the most obvious commonplaces of apology or of deprecation, till the idea of mediocrity grows insensibly upon your mind. Wait a little. A cheer comes from the Opposition benches. . . . Nay, even on the Ministerial side the 'point' has not been without its effect, as many a suppressed titter testifies. All the level commonplace, it seems, was but the stringing of the bow; at the moment when least expected, the cool prepared marksman has shot his arrow of keen and polished sarcasm at Sir Robert Peel, whom it has fleshed, if not transfixed. . . . And then he proceeds during a speech of perhaps an hour and a half . . . now rousing his own side to cheers against their opponents, and now stimulating those opponents to laugh at or suspect their own leaders; but always exhibiting power, self-possession, tact, skill, Parliamentary and political knowledge, command of language, and felicity of diction, surpassed but by few of the distinguished men of the day.

This description, written nearly half a century ago by a writer presumably opposed to Lord John's political opinions, admirably illustrates both Lord John's excellences and defects as an orator. Defects in the present day have a constant tendency to survive. For the history of the nineteenth century is largely written in its caricatures; and the caricaturist naturally exaggerates the peculiarities at which men laugh, and not the qualities which they applaud.

No man fills a larger place in caricature than Lord John Russell. The small stature, which testified to the frail body, and the large head, which indicated the capacious intellect, equally assisted the caricaturist. It became gradually customary to portray Lord John as a boy, or as a child. Lord John's striking personal characteristics were not, however, seized by the caricaturist at the first. In his earlier pictures of him, Mr. Doyle has concealed, instead of exaggerating, the Minister's peculiarities. In the earliest of them in which Lord John appears,[1] a scene from the 'Beggars' Opera,' Lord John is the functionary waiting to lead Sir C. Wetherell off to execution. Two numbers later he is the tailor—a tall tailor—who has fitted John Bull with a pair of 'bra' new grey breeks.' And it was only in 1835 that Mr. Doyle thoroughly seized his

[1] The first caricature of Mr. Doyle's with which Lord John is associated—'The New Lamps for Old'—does not contain his portrait.

characteristics and made himself master of his appearance. Mr O'Connell's influence with the new Ministers was a tempting subject for the artist: Lord John's commanding position in the Cabinet brought him into the first place in almost every composition; while the Minister's slight frame contrasted with Mr. O'Connell's burly features gave zest to the caricature. Thus Lord John is Little Red Riding Hood to Mr. O'Connell's wolf; he is the very small sheep, while Mr. O'Connell is the wolf in sheep's clothing; he is Hop o' My Thumb in 'The Faggot Cutter and his Seven Sons;' he is a sleek and small pug in the admirable caricature of Sir E. Landseer's 'Jack in Office;' he sits on Lord Melbourne's lap in the sedan to Vauxhall, and finally he marches in front in 'The Age of Leetle Men.'

It will be probably clear from this short paragraph that Mr. Doyle had thoroughly realised how much Lord John's diminutive stature could be made to assist his pencil. The later caricaturists of the reign naturally availed themselves of the same peculiarity. But they engrafted on Lord John's slight physique some characteristics which were rather amusing than true. Represented almost always as a boy, or occasionally as a girl, it required only one step to connect him with the mischievous tendencies and the weakness which is inseparable from youth. Thus he is the boy who has written 'No Popery' on the wall and run away;[1] he is the page who is not strong enough for the place; or the nursemaid unable to wheel the perambulator with the baby Reform Bill up the steps of the House of Lords. Probably even Lord John's intimate friends are hardly aware how their own impression of his character and career has been moulded by these amusing pictures.

If Lord John's career was rendered more difficult by the smallness of his frame, he was at a still greater disadvantage from the physical weakness from which he suffered throughout his life. There is an Oriental proverb that stomach is everything and everything is stomach. But stomach was the one

[1] Lord Russell admitted to Mr. William Rogers that this caricature was very severe, and did his Government a great deal of harm. He repaid it years afterwards by giving Mr. Leech's son a nomination for the Charter House.

qualification which Lord John had not. His digestion was possibly weakened by the drastic remedies which our grandparents were in the habit of applying to organs which require a milder treatment. In reading Lord John's boyish diaries, it occurred to the present author that the first day of the week, when no playhouses were open, was reserved by Lord John either for travelling or for medicine. But from the first day of his life to the last days of his Prime Ministership his physical weakness undoubtedly militated against his chances. In the long rivalry between Lord Palmerston and himself, Lord Palmerston owed as much to his admirable organisation as Lord John did to his intellectual power. It has been said of a great modern statesman that the most extraordinary thing about him is not his mind but his body. And perhaps Lord John is the only instance of a man rising to the very highest rank in politics with a physical organisation so defective that it suggested doubt as to his strength for the work allotted to him at almost every stage of his career.

Lord John was able to triumph over these defects of the body, and to survive to an unusual age, because he regulated his life on sensible principles. He was moderate in his diet, regular in his habits, and careful to obtain a sufficiency of exercise. But, though by these expedients he succeeded in partially overcoming a physical deficiency to which other men would have succumbed, the means which he adopted for doing so placed him under a disadvantage. Instead of consolidating his party by hospitality in Chesham Place, he was seeking rest and health in the seclusion of Pembroke Lodge. It is no doubt a somewhat humiliating circumstance that political success should so frequently be promoted by social pleasures. But those who recollect the careers of Lord John and Lord Palmerston will agree that the one Minister derived no mean advantage from the care with which his wife cultivated the society which the wife of the other Minister was forced to neglect.

It was the common criticism applied to Lord John in January 1855, that he resigned office without justification. History perhaps will pass an exactly opposite verdict on him, and say that both in 1838 and in 1848 he remained in office

without justification. For the reasons which induced him to leave office in 1855—viz. his disapproval of the conduct of the war, and his refusal to resist an inquiry which he thought necessary—are at any rate adequate; while it is much more doubtful whether the withdrawal of the Appropriation Clause in 1838 should not have led to the resignation of the Ministry which was founded on it; and whether the rejection by the Cabinet of Lord John's Irish policy in 1848 should not have logically involved the retirement of the Minister who proposed it.

This book, however, has not been concerned with Lord John's public career alone; it has endeavoured to deal with the man as well as with the Minister; and the author's objects would not be fulfilled if a few words were not added on what Lord John was, in the seclusion of his own home, to his wife, his children, his servants, and his friends.

What Lord John was to his friends may perhaps be inferred from several passages in this Memoir. In the society of those whom he liked, there was no better or brighter companion. The cold climate, which played the deuce with votes, was dispelled by the sunshine of Pembroke Lodge.

The popular idea of Johnny [wrote Mr. Motley] is of a cold, cynical, reserved personage. But, in his own home, I never saw a more agreeable manner.[1]

In fact, his wide reading, his long experience, his hearty appreciation of all that was good, made him a delightful companion. In conversation, he had the capacity which stood him in such good stead in debate; and Sir James Mackintosh used to cite as an example of a witty saying the definition of a proverb which Lord John gave one morning at breakfast—'One man's wit, and all men's wisdom.'[2]

[1] Motley's *Correspondence*, i. 300.

[2] *Life of Mackintosh*, ii. 473.

In his later life Lord Russell was rather jealous of the fact that his claim to be the author of this famous saying was questioned, and, as the controversy respecting its parentage has lately been revived, it is well to show how the error of ascribing it to another arose.

Deanery, Westminster: March 3, 1873.

My dear Lord Russell,—I heard the other day from Mr. Lecky of a perplexity occasioned to you by an expression in Dean Milman's *Essays* which I believe I can solve.

In one of these essays there occurs the definition of a proverb as 'One man's

With such qualities as these it was no wonder that Lord John's society was sought and valued. Young and old found an equal welcome at Pembroke Lodge; Lord John's nature, indeed, like good wine, mellowed with advancing age, and 'as he grew old, he took more and more pleasure in the society of all who came to him.'

A great authoress has told her readers that it is better sometimes *not* to follow great reformers of abuses beyond the threshold of their homes. But, if this be true of other men, it is emphatically untrue of Lord John. It is precisely to Lord John's home that every biographer of Lord John who understands his business must desire to take his readers. No doubt it is well to show him—

When the steam is on,
And languid Johnny glows to glorious John.

But it is still better to see him by his own fireside, or with his wife, his children, and his servants.

What Lord John was to his servants two little incidents may show. (1) Travelling in Switzerland in his old age, he was seized with illness, and his valet explained his anxiety to his medical attendant by saying, 'I love every hair of his head.' (2) In the autumn of 1888, his youngest daughter took her old nurse to a local lecture on Mr. Carlyle. The lecturer excused his hero's domestic troubles by declaring that it was natural that great men, whose minds were absorbed

wit, and many men's wisdom,' which is quoted as 'erroneously ascribed to an eminent living statesman.'

It so happens that many years ago, when I was at Canterbury, Sir Robert Inglis, speaking of this definition, said (as I understood him) that he had been in the House—wherever it was—when you brought down the definition (if I remember right) to breakfast. Having always had this in my recollection, I asked Dean Milman why he had said 'erroneously.' 'I said no such thing,' he replied, 'I said "ascribed to an eminent living statesman;" and "erroneously" was put in by the Editor of the *Quarterly*.' The Editor, at this time, was Mr. Elwin, and the next time I met him I asked him why he had inserted it. I forget exactly his answer; but it was to the effect that he had a strong impression of having seen the definition in some French writer, I think Montaigne. There the subject dropped. I have thought since that it could never have been in a French writer, because, as I remember Guizot once remarking to me, there is no French word for what we in modern English mean by 'wit.'

But my object in writing was to clear our dear old friend at St. Paul's of any doubt or disregard of the tradition which ascribes the definition to you.

Yours sincerely,

A. P. STANLEY.

by public anxieties, should be sometimes irritable and impatient at home. And the old nurse, who had only known one great man, expressed her indignation that any one should suppose that great men were not great in their home life.

What Lord John was to his wife and his children only they can tell; but the perfect confidence which wife and husband had in one another, the constant happiness which they derived from one another's society, may be, at any rate, inferred by one who has had the privilege of access to their private correspondence, and her private journals. As for Lord John's children, they brought him all their childish troubles, and confided to him all their childish thoughts. He was never, in his busiest days, so busy that he had not time to devote to them. In 1846, when he was charged with the formation of a Ministry, he stopped at Wimbledon on his way from Osborne to London, and had a game of ball with his boy. And in the spring of 1865, when most men thought that the Foreign Minister was engrossed with the affairs of his office, his youngest daughter, who was laid up with illness, had more pressing work for him, sending him from her bed the following note :—

I am very sorry to say that the canary you gave me is dead. Mammy said I [had] better write to tell you. I should like very much if you would come up to talk about it.

Lord John's intense love for wife and children may be said to have occasionally interfered with his efficiency as a public man. When domestic trouble was heavy on him, he was always disposed to look with despondency on public affairs; and it was not perhaps an altogether accidental circumstance that crises in the Cabinet had a tendency to synchronise with anxiety at home. Writing to his wife from Windsor in April 1847, he said—

Baron Stockmar came in and asked me what had made me so low yesterday evening. I was obliged to say that it was your not being so well. He could not imagine so simple a cause, and thought that there must be something wrong in the state of Europe.

While, in the following year, writing from Balmoral, he said to Lady John—

I do not envy the Queen anything she has, except the rosy cheeks of Prince Alfred. Our poor boy is so different, and gets so depressed and unstrung.

When trouble came upon him, he was frequently prostrated by the blow. 'Jesus wept,' so ran his consolatory note to his son-in-law Mr. Villiers after the Bishop of Durham's death—

Jesus wept; and these natural sorrows must be indulged before they can be checked.

In periods of sorrow and in joy he sought in religion consolation and encouragement. His views on the highest subjects with which man's mind can occupy itself were not perhaps thought out with the accuracy of a metaphysician. He probably was not sorry to leave a great deal unsettled and vague. He never seriously addressed himself to the questions which have agitated Christianity in our own times. He accepted Jesus Christ as the Divine Founder of a religion of love; he regarded the Bible as the word of God. To the last hour of his life he looked back with satisfaction to the share which he had himself had in terminating the monopoly of printing it in Scotland. A visitor at Pembroke Lodge noticed that the only book on his library table was an old Bible Society's Bible bound in sheepskin. He could not understand the complicated dogmas of other Christians. He detested the doctrines of Rome, and the pretensions of the High Church party in the English Church. He frequently spoke of them in language which could not fail to give offence. Lady Russell wrote—

His religion was as simple and true as everything else about him. He deplored the earthly and sectarian trappings by which man has disfigured Christianity—the multiplication of creeds, dogmas, ceremonies in the Church of England; her assumption of sanctity as the special depositary of truth; the narrowness of spirit which has made her through all history the enemy of free thought and progress. He was very severe on the wearisome and irreverent repetitions in her services . . . he disliked the reading of the Commandments, one of which—the fourth—not one of those who prayed to obey it meant to obey. . . . There was, I need hardly say, much that he heartily loved and admired in the liturgy. The thanksgiving prayer was especially dear to him . . . Baptism he, of course, considered merely as an outward sign. He had himself never been confirmed, but did not trouble his

mind about the petty superstition which would have made this an obstacle to his joining in the Lord's Supper. This rite was to him nothing but a simple remembrance of Christ's last supper and death.[1] He thought the English Catechism wholly unfit for children, and vehemently disliked the dogmatic parts of it. His thoughts and opinions were not to be bounded or cramped by the regulations of any one sect built up by man. He looked forward to a day when there would be no priests, or rather when every man would be a priest, and all superstitious notions—such as is implied in the notion that only a clergyman ought to perform certain offices of religion—should be cast aside by Christian men for ever.

In practice, however, Lord John showed a greater tolerance than might be inferred from some of his opinions or writings. When he was in London he usually attended the services at St. Paul's, Knightsbridge, or at Belgrave Chapel. It would have been difficult to select two churches, within a reasonable distance of Chesham Place, representing more opposite poles of thought. But he did not confine himself to places of worship within the pale of the Church. Lady John and he went sometimes to hear the great Nonconformist preachers; while occasionally, like most men of deep religious feeling, he recognised that public worship does not constitute the highest form of devotion. Sitting one Sunday among his trees and his flowers, with his daughter and his grandchildren around him, he said to Lady Russell, 'It conduces much to piety not to go to church sometimes.'

Such is a rough sketch of Lord Russell's religious views. But his opinions on the highest subjects were modified by his political judgment. Few Tories—who had resisted the emancipation of the Roman Catholics which he had done so much to secure—had so genuine a dread of the political consequences of the spread of Roman Catholicism. Through the greater part of his life he hoped to find an adequate barrier to Rome in the Church; and for this reason, even if

[1] Writing to Lady Victoria Villiers in 1866, Lord Russell said, 'About his and your views on the Eucharist, every one must judge for himself how far he believes in the spiritual presence of Christ in the Holy Communion. Without questioning your belief, I am inclined to think that every act of kindness and love and charity to our fellow creatures obtains the special blessing of God and Christ —that the merciful shall obtain mercy; and those who forgive trespasses of others may hope forgiveness of their own.'

it had stood alone, he would have desired to maintain the Establishment. But he was also throughout his early and middle life impressed with the notion that the clergy of an endowed Church were more likely to profess liberal views than the ministers of voluntary sects, who were dependent for their livelihood on the subscriptions of their congregations. The experience of a long life perhaps convinced him that a State-endowed clergy would not extricate itself from the trammels of Creeds and Articles; and so, as years rolled on, he became less earnest in defence of the cause, and would often laugh as he brought out the well-known arguments. Writing early in 1870, the year of Mr. Forster's Education Act, from San Remo, he said—

> The prospect of obtaining a national unsectarian education, founded on the exclusion of all catechisms and formularies, is, in the present temper of the nation, so fair a one that I think the country may well wait a year for the accomplishment of so great a blessing.
>
> My wish and hope is [so he wrote a year afterwards], the rising generation may be taught to adopt, not the Church of Rome, or the Church of England, but the Church of Christ.

These few remarks may possibly help the reader to supply the lights and shadows of an imperfect portrait, and to gather some idea of the nature and character of the man whom the author has endeavoured, however vainly, to draw. It is a pleasure to recollect that his long life was, on the whole, a very happy one. His childhood was, indeed, clouded by the death of his mother, his middle years by the loss of his first wife, his old age by the deaths of his eldest son, his daughter-in-law, and their child; as well as by the afflicting illness of another son.

Yet, in the children who were still left to him, in the children's children who were brought to his home, in the memory of the part which he had played in the past, in the interest which he was taking in the present, in the hope which he felt for the future, in the consciousness of his own integrity, in the respect of his fellow-countrymen, in faith in his God, Lord Russell may have found some consolation for his trials, and have reflected that, if his old age was clouded with sorrow, his grey hairs were descending with honour to the grave.

INDEX

ABERCORN, Duchess of (half-sister to Lord John), i. 58 *n*
Abercorn, Duke of, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, ii. 430
Abercromby, Lady Mary, i. 432; ii. 164, 276
Abercromby, Mr. (Master of the Mint), i. 206, 207; declines the Speakership, 215; becomes Speaker, 216; O'Connell's support of, 220; resignation of the Speakership, 322; made Lord Dunfermline, 322; death of, ii. 433
Abercromby, Sir R. (afterwards 2nd Lord Dunfermline), British minister at the Hague, ii. 236
Aberdeen, Lady, letter to Lord John, i. 152
Aberdeen, Lord, brings the dispute with America in 1846 to a peaceful issue, i. 422; disapproves of Prince Leopold's selection as husband for the Queen of Spain, ii. 1; memorandum from M. Guizot on the Spanish marriages, 5 *n*; his conciliatory policy towards France, 13; letter from Lord John on the Austro-Italian conflict, 50; enjoined by the Queen to submit all important drafts to her before the despatches leave the office, 54 *n*; arranges with Lord John a ministry based on unity between the Whigs and the followers of Sir Robert Peel, 124; reply to Lord John's memorandum, 124; Lord John's answer, 126; declines further negotiation, 127; asked to form a Ministry and declines, 128; letter from Lord John, with an offer, 156; his reply, 157; sent for by the Queen to form a Ministry, 160; accepts office, 160; proposes ultimately to retire from the Premiership in Lord John's favour, 163; correspondence with the Duke of Bedford thereon, 163; completes his ministry, 164; difficulties because of the jealousies of Whigs and Peelites, 165; misunderstanding with Lord John, 165; letters to and from Lord John on the latter's tenure of office, 166–169; letters from and to Lord John on the latter's speech on the Irish Church, 173; letter to Mr. Monsell assuring him that Lord John's opinions on the Irish Church are not shared by many members of the Government, 174; on the necessity of circumspect instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on his mission to Constantinople, 178; does not credit the Czar's alleged hostile intentions towards Turkey, 180; conflict of views with Lord John on the Russian difficulty, 180, 181, 182; labours for peace, 183; hopes that Russia will accept the Porte's modifications of the Vienna Note, 185; Lord John's memorandum on the Eastern question laid before him, 186; letter to Lord John on the situation, 188; desires to draw up a new Note to be submitted to the Porte by the four Powers, 194; objections to his handing over the Premiership to Lord John, 194; agreement with Lord John on Reform and the Eastern question, 198, 199; explains and defends Prince Albert's action in public affairs, 203; against the postponement of Lord John's Reform Bill, 204; uneasy at the prospects of war, 204 *n*; on the further postponement of the Reform Bill, 206; asks Lord John to postpone same, 207; congratulates Lord John on his speech on the postponement of his Reform Bill, 210; 'Punch's' cartoon of him and Lord John, 211 *n*; divergence of policy between him and Lord John in the Crimean War, 212; his treatment of the offer of an Austrian alliance, 213; his dilatoriness in the execution of the plan for the

ACH

division of the War and Colonial departments, 217; against subsidising Sweden, 217; prefers to subsidise Austria, 217, 218; letters to and from Lord John on changes in the ministry, 219; concurs in Lord John's acceptance of the Presidency of the Council, 220; reasons for avoiding the introduction of Sir George Grey into the Cabinet, 221; agrees generally to Lord John's proposed ministerial changes, 222; letter to Lord John in reply to the latter's proposed resignation, 225; declines to advise the Queen to appoint Palmerston as War Minister, 230; disclaims any want of confidence in Lord John as leader of the House of Commons, 232; declines to concert with the French a new plan of campaign, 236; letter in answer to Lord John's resignation, 237; interview with Lord John respecting the latter being asked to form a government, 287

Acheson, Lord, i. 458

Acland, Sir Thomas, i. 4 *n*, 169, 299, 305 *n*

Adair, Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert), i. 50

Adam, Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir C.), i. 71

Adam, Rt. Hon. William (Duke of Bedford's agent), i. 20, 27

Adams, Mr. (astronomer), pension to, ii. 146

Adams, Mr. (American minister to England, his correspondence with Lord John regarding the 'Alabama,' ii. 353; asks redress for the injuries inflicted by that vessel, 356

Adams, President, i. 421

Adams, Serjeant, i. 282

Adrianople, Treaty of, ii. 192

Alye, Captain, i. 74

Aide, Hamilton, his poetical tribute to the character of Lord John, ii. 397

'Alabama' case, the, ii. 353

Albemarle, Lord, his doggerel Latin lines on the Masters of Westminster School, i. 6 *n*

Albert, Prince, 'on vastly good terms with Lord John,' i. 434; interest in the Cracow matter, ii. 8; distrust of Lord Palmerston, 8; on the action of the King of Piedmont in the Italian revolt against Austria, 39; attitude in the Austro-Italian conflict, 46; objects to the wording of a despatch to the Porte on the Hungarian refugees, 54; letter to Lord John on Palmerston's conduct in the Greek

APP

dispute, 59; criticism of Lord John's scheme of Reform, 129; differs with Lord Palmerston on the Schleswig-Holstein question, 132; charged with interfering unconstitutionally in foreign and domestic affairs, 202, 346; death of, 347

Ali Pacha, Turkish Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conference, ii. 257

Alice, Princess, visits the Russells, ii. 439

Alien Acts, the, i. 73

Allen, Mr., i. 42, 43, 112, 113; letter to Lord John, 116

Althorp, Lord, undertakes conduct of Lord John's Bribery Bill, i. 129, 131; proposals for suppression of bribery, 133, 134; his rumoured 'falling off,' 137; discourages Lord John's project of a Central Association, 147; becomes leader of the Whig party, 153; letter to Lord John, 153 *n*; wishes to settle the new civil list, 154; offers office to Lord John, 159; not on the Reform committee, 165; aids Lord John in passing a Reform Bill, 170; coincides in coercive Irish legislation, 186; introduces Bill for Irish Church reform, 188, 192; hoped, on Lord Grey's resignation, that the King would send for Sir Robert Peel, 204; succeeds to the peerage, 207; letter to Lord John, 209; his principle in respect to Church rates, 278 *n*; ii. 196

Amberley, Lady, death of, ii. 449

Amberley, Lord (eldest son of Lord John), i. 387, 402; Landseer's sketch of, ii. 113; in private theatricals at Woburn, 114; writes to his father as to his future education, 279; his marriage, 403; defeated at Leeds in the general election, 406; birth of a son, 406; begins his Parliamentary career, 430; death of, 451

American Civil War, causes of, ii. 338, 339

Ampthill, Lord; see Russell, Lord Odo

Anglesey, Lord (Viceroy of Ireland), i. 183, 184, 197

Anti-Corn Law League, the, i. 366, 318; ii. 196

Antonelli, Cardinal, sends the Pope's blessing to the young King of Naples, ii. 323

Antwerp, bombardment of, ii. 189

Apponyi, Count (Austrian minister to England), ii. 321, 392, 393

Appropriation Clause, i. 246, 276, 297, 299, 301, 433

ARG

Arguelles, Señor, ii. 48
Argyll, Duke of, i. 35; ii. 174, 200; quoted, 243; letter to Lord John respecting the detention of the 'Alabama,' 355 *n*
Armagh, Archbishop of, consulted by Lord John on reforms in the Irish Church, i. 299
Arms Bill, the, i. 388, 431, 467–469
Arnould, Sir J., quoted, i. 479
Arrouca, convent of, i. 60
'Arrow' question, the, ii. 286
Ashley, Lord (afterwards Shaftesbury, Earl of), his diary quoted, i. 399; letter to Lord John, 455
Ashley, Mr. E., his publication of Lord Palmerston's letters, ii. 158
Atherton, Sir William, his advice solicited on the 'Alabama' question, ii. 354
Atkin, Mr., i. 5
Attwood, Mr., i. 173 *n*
Auckland, Lord, i. 411; ii. 16; his measures of national defence, 21; letter from Lord John on the naval estimates, 28; death of, 80, 97
Augustenburg, Prince, his claim to the duchy of Holstein, ii. 386
Australia, i. 338; French plan for invading and holding, ii. 176
Austria, loses Milan, ii. 38–40; suggested transfer of Ionian Islands to, 41; seeks a compromise with the Italians, 45; refuses a conference on Italian affairs, 49; suppresses the Hungarian rebellion and demands the extradition of Hungarian refugees from Turkey, 54; action in the Montenegrin difficulty, 177; proposition to subsidise, in the Russian war, 217, 219
Austria, Emperor of, his abdication, ii. 25; a fugitive, 49
Austrian alliance with England, proposals of an, in the Russian war, ii. 213, 218
Aylmer, Lord, i. 268 *n*, 269
Azeglio, Signor, ii. 277

BALACLAVA, ii. 228
Ball, John, quoted, i. 233, 234 *n*
Ballot, the, i. 286, 295, 325
Bandon Bridge, borough of, i. 132
Bank of England charter revised, i. 193; in the crisis of 1847, 459
Bank Restriction Act of 1797, i. 82
Bannister (actor), i. 7
Barillon, M., despatches of, i. 103, 113

BED

Baring, Sir Francis, i. 178; in the Cabinet, 335; at the Exchequer, 365; Budget proposals of, 368, 369; asks for a committee on the sugar duties, 374; succeeds Lord Auckland in the Cabinet, ii. 80; relationship to Sir Charles Wood and the Greys, 80; a stern economist, 80; accepts the Admiralty, 98; votes for the Militia Bill, 150 *n*; protests against Lord John's supersession in the leadership, 159; quoted, 210; consulted by Lord John on a ministerial crisis, 287
Barker, Russell, quoted, i. 10
Barnes, Mr. (editor of the 'Times'), i. 236
Barnstaple, writ suspended, i. 119
Barrymore (actor), i. 8
Bath, Lady, i. 27
Bath, Lord (uncle by marriage of Lord John), i. 27
Bathurst, Lord, i. 133
Baxter, Sir David, ii. 402
Baynes, Sir Christopher, i. 30
Beaumont, M. de (French minister in London), ii. 46
Beauvale, Lord, i. 425
Bedford, Duchess of (Georgiana, mother of Lord John), letters of, i. 2, 4; chronic ill health, 2, 3; death of, 4
Bedford, Duchess of (Georgiana, stepmother of Lord John), i. 5, 10, 113; ii. 113; death of, 174
Bedford, Duchess of (Lord Tavistock's wife); see under Stanhope, Lady
Bedford, fourth Duke of, i. 2
Bedford, Francis, fifth Duke of, i. 2, 3
Bedford, Francis, seventh Duke of; see under Tavistock, Lord
Bedford, John, sixth Duke of, i. 2; death of his wife (a daughter of Lord Torrington), 4; second marriage to a daughter of the Duke of Gordon, 5; made Viceroy of Ireland, 18; his part in the fall of the Talents Administration, 28; retirement from the Viceroyalty, 28; on tour in England, 30; visits Sir Walter Scott in Selkirkshire, 31; opinion of English universities, 44; pleasure at Lord John's début at the Speculative Society, 47; encourages him to continue the 'Whig Register,' 49; suggests to Lord John a tour through the English manufacturing towns, 54; discourages Lord John's going to Cambridge University, 57; on the riots and discontent in 1816, 88; continen-

BED

tal trips of, 113; opposes the Canning Ministry of 1827, 134; renounces a political career, 134, 135; illness of, 163 *n*; on Triennial Parliaments, 194; deprecates Lord John's assumption of the Opposition leadership, 214; approves of Lord John's marriage to Lady Ribblesdale, 231; paralytic seizure, 251; death of, 340
Bedford citizens' contribution to Lord John's expenses at the Devonshire election, i. 234
Belcher, Young (pugilist), i. 10
Belgium, fears of its incorporation in the French Empire, ii. 42; revolt of, from Holland, 48; letter of the King of, to Lord John, 441
Bennet, Mr., i. 5
Bennett, Mr., ii. 119
Bentinck, Lord Frederick, i. 71
Bentinck, Lord George, i. 371, 423, 440; scheme for Irish railways, 443, 444; ii. 12; proposal on the income-tax, 27; 79; obtains a committee on the sugar colonies, 94
Beresford, Marshal, i. 61
Berkeley, ii. 29
Berlin, on the eve of a revolution, ii. 49
Bernal Osborne, Mr., ridicules the idea of Lord John 'waiting for a breeze,' ii. 103
Bernstorff, Count (German minister to England, thanks Lord John for his sympathies in the Franco-German War, ii. 442
Berry, Miss, her introduction to Lord John, i. 55; quoted, 95 *n*
Bessborough, Lord (Irish Viceroy), i. 422, 430; on the employment of Irish poor in the potato famine, 435; 438, 440, 447; dying advice to Lord John, 451, 452; death of, 453
Betty, Master (actor), i. 18
Bexley, Lord, i. 133
Bickersteth, Mr. (afterwards Lord Langdale; Master of the Rolls), i. 253
Birmingham, i. 136; great Reform meeting at, 172; Political Union, 172, 173; Chartist riots in the Bullring, 332; constabulary for, 333
Bismarck, Count, willing to accept the mediation of Great Britain in the Danish question, ii. 383; supports the claim of the Prince of Augustenburg to the duchy of Holstein, 386; instructs the German Emperor's thanks to be given to Lord John for his sympathies in the Franco-German war, 442

BRO

Blackburne (Attorney-General), i. 206
Blackfeet and Whitefeet, i. 185
Blake, General, i. 39
Blake, Mr. (Remembrancer), i. 220 *n*
Blakeney, Sir E., i. 332 *n*, 333, 460, 468
Blandford, Lord, scheme for disfranchisement of rotten boroughs, i. 154
Blennerhasset, Sir R., on Orangeism, i. 264 *n*
Blomfield, Dr. (Bishop of London), i. 330
Bolingbroke, Lord, i. 127 *n*
Bonaparte, Joseph, made king of Spain, i. 37
Bourbon dynasty expelled from Sicily, ii. 323
Bourqueney, M., French ambassador at Vienna, ii. 213; proposes the neutralisation of the Black Sea, 253, 254
Bowring, Sir John (British consul at Canton), ii. 286
Bowyer, Sir J., remonstrates with Lord John on his action in the religious struggle between the Pope and the German Emperor, ii. 446, 447
Boyne, battle of the, anniversary of, in 1849, and its results, ii. 84
Bradford, Lord (uncle by marriage to Lord John), i. 23, 27, 36
Brand, Mr., i. 85
Breadalbane, Lord, ii. 112
Brent (Westminster scholar), i. 7
Bribery Bill, i. 119, 124, 128, 144
Bridgeman, George (afterwards Earl of Bradford), i. 4 *n*, 27, 58, 59 *n*, 60, 65, 66, 68, 69 *n*, 71
Bridgeman, Lady Lucy, i. 74
Bright, Rt. Hon. J., i. 410; condemns Lord John's speech on the Iris Church, ii. 173; the Cave of Adullam, 411; his letter to Lady Russell on the death of her husband, 453
Bristol, riots in, on the Lords' rejection of the Reform Bill, i. 172; testimonial of the Reformers of, to Lord John, 250
British and Foreign School Society, i. 328
British North America, i. 338
Broome, Mr., i. 35
Brougham, Lord, views on Parliamentary Reform, i. 116; his sneer at Lord John's phrase, 'New lamps for old,' 119 *n*; one of 'a little faction at Brooks's,' 135; motion for Parliamentary Reform, 158; 'stands between Lord Grey and rest,' 160; excluded from the Melbourne Cabi-

BRO

net, 233; made chairman of the Commission on educational endowments, 252; on the ballot, 286; attacks Lord Melbourne for not giving him the Chancellorship, 290; defends Lord John's attitude towards Reform, 291; his measure of indemnification to Lord Durham, 306; procures a grant for the National and British and Foreign School Societies, 328; urges Lord John to write on the constitution of England, 386; opposes the Bill for repealing the Navigation Acts, ii. 99
Brown, Dr. Thomas, i. 45
Brown, Mrs., i. 40
Browning, J. F., i. 223
Bruce, John (Professor of Logic), i. 25, 46
Brunnow, Baron, i. 355; recalled, ii. 203; his description of Lord John's famous despatch on Italian affairs, 327
Brunswick Clubs, i. 146
Buccleuch, Duchess of, i. 344, 379 *n*
Buchanan, Mr. (President of the United States), his declaration on the question of secession, ii. 340
Buchanan, Sir A., ii. 423 *n*
Buller, Charles, i. 285, 289, 387, 395; death of, ii. 97
Buller, Sir John (afterwards Lord Churston), i. 213, 216, 341
Bulteel, John Croker (Lord Grey's son-in-law), i. 183 *n*, 213
Bulwer, Mr. (afterwards Sir H.), British minister at the court of Madrid, connives at the selection of Prince Leopold for the hand of the Queen of Spain, ii. 1–3; despatches from Lord Palmerston, 6, 7 *n*; instructions in the Portuguese rebellion, 9; his procedure in Spanish affairs, 42–44; requested to quit Spain, 43; sent to Washington, 45; 424 *n*
Bulwer, Sir E. Lytton, his motion that Lord John's conduct at Vienna has shaken the confidence of the House in the Ministry, ii. 266
Buol, Count, interviewed by Lord John in Vienna, ii. 249; declares the Black Sea neutralisation beyond the scope of the Vienna Conference, 254; his scheme regarding the Black Sea, 258; his version of interviews with English and French ministers regarding the termination of the war, 265
Burdett, Sir Francis, on Lord John's speech against the suspension of the

CAP

Habeas Corpus Act, i. 90; motion on Parliamentary Reform, 109, 110; one of 'a little faction at Brooks's,' 135; motion for the relief of Roman Catholics, 139; ii. 460
Burge, Mr. (agent for Jamaica), i. 338
Burgoyne, Sir John, letter to, from the Duke of Wellington, on invasion, ii. 18
Burke, Mr., 160; ii. 196
Butler, Lady Mary, i. 5 *n*
Butler, Richard (afterwards Lord Cahir), i. 13, 35, 37
Byng, George (afterwards Lord Strafford) and his five wishes, i. 364; ii. 268, 297
Byron, Lord, i. 13, 92, 114, 136, 394

CAMELFORD, writ suspended, i. 119
Camp, Miss de (actress), i. 8
Campbell, Sir J. (afterwards Lord; Attorney-General), i. 252, 253; his analysis of Lord John's character, 433; proposal for dealing with disturbances in Ireland, 472, 473; ii. 67, 73
Canada, origin of the rebellion in, i. 293; Lord Durham's mission and line of action, 306, 307; proposed loan to, for railway building, ii. 78; proposed removal of the differential duties on timber in, 79
Canning, Lord, ii. 221, 222
Canning, Rt. Hon. G., speech against Lord John's proposals on Parliamentary Reform, i. 127; forms a Ministry, 133; death of, 134; 135, 136; references to, ii. 135; quoted, 428
Canning, Sir Stratford (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, minister at the Porte), urges the Porte not to give up the Hungarian refugees, ii. 54; further action therein, 135; returns to Constantinople, 178; settles the Holy Places dispute, 179; 189; on the exclusion of Russia from the Principalities, 192; warning to the Porte of Mussulman outrages, 193; authorised to make use of the British fleet in any defensive operations in the Euxine, 195; not in favour of Austria acting against the Greek insurgents, 218; his perverse action at the opening of the Vienna Conference, 251
Canrobert, General, ii. 235
Canterbury, Archbishop of, letter from Lord John to, on the Gorham case, ii. 118
Capponi, Marquis Gino, ii. 277, 278

CAR

Cardwell, Rt. Hon. E., ii. 221, 222; enters the Cabinet, 408
Carey, Dr. (head-master of Westminster School, made bishop of Exeter, i. 6 *n*, 7
Carignan, Prince, and Central Italy, ii. 314
Carleton, Mr. (Irish novelist), pension to, ii. 146
Carlisle, Lord, ii. 166
Carlist insurrection in Spain, ii. 9
Carlos, Don, ii. 9
Caroline, Queen, i. 121
Cartwright, Dr., tutor to Lord John, i. 10; inventor of the power loom, &c., 11; his volume of letters and sonnets, 11; on the Bedford county election in 1807, 29
Cartwright, Major (the reformer), i. 10
Cartwright, Mr., i. 16
Castlereagh, Lord, i. 110; agrees to the disfranchisement of Grampound, 119; accepts Lord John's proposals of Reform, 119, 120; death of, 127; references to, ii. 10, 12
Catholic Association, the, ii. 196
Cato Street conspiracy, i. 119
Cator Westminster scholar), i. 7
Cavaignac, General, at the head of affairs in France, ii. 46, 49
Cavour, Count, meets Lord John, ii. 277, 278, and *n*; returns to office, 316; his interview with Sir James Hudson regarding Savoy, 319; defends the annexation of Savoy and Nice, 320; thanks Lord John for the 'immense service' rendered to Italy, 328, 423 *n*, 438
Cayley, Mr., on Lord John's leadership of the House, ii. 170
Census of 1831, i. 34, 32
Chalmers, Mrs., pension to, ii. 146
Chandos Clause, the, i. 165 *n*; ii. 155
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, ii. 41, 48, 50; defeat at Novara, 50 *n*
Charles X. of France, i. 155, 156
Chartists, riots of, i. 88, 332; monster procession of, ii. 68
Chatham, Lord, i. 160
Christian I. of Denmark and the Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 372
Christian VII. of Denmark formally incorporates the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into his kingdom, ii. 373
Christian VIII. of Denmark and the Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 373
Christian IX. of Denmark (Prince of Glücksburg) and the Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 374; succeeds Frederick VII., 380

CLA

Church of England, legislative reform for the, i. 201; Temporalities Bill, 246; Rate Bill, 273, 277, 278; excitement in, over the Gorham case, ii. 117–119; indignation with the Pope's division of England into twelve sees, 119; discontent with the Durham Letter, 121
Churchill (at Dr. Moore's school), i. 4 *n*
Cintra, convention of, i. 38
Clanricarde, Lord, i. 422
Clare, Lord, i. 13, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43
Clarendon, Lord, made Privy Seal, i. 337; opposes the treaty of the four Great Powers in the Turko-Egyptian war, 346; at Holland House, 348; letter to Lord John, 358; on Irish reforms, 396; on the formation of a Ministry, 411; letter to Lord John, with enclosure from Mr. C. P. Villiers, 440; on loans to Irish railways, 444; made Viceroy of Ireland, 453; propositions for dealing with Irish discontent, 460; advises the suspension of Habeas Corpus, 464; his Arms Bill, 467–469; proclaims disturbed districts in Ireland, 469; on Palmerston's action in the Foreign Office, ii. 5; declares civil war in Ireland to be imminent, 64; again proposes the suspension of Habeas Corpus in Ireland, 66; thanks Lord John for his 'stout declaration,' 67; threatening nature of his position in Ireland, 70 *n*; process against John Mitchel, 71; proceedings against editors of Irish journals, 72; favours Irish emigration, 76; devises a measure for such emigration, 78; believes in martial law for Ireland, 81; and prefers machinery for preserving order to remedial legislation, 81; asks for the renewal of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 81; delighted with Lord John's speech on his Irish policy, 84; promise of support from Lord John, in his action towards Lord Roden, 85; inquires into the Orange-Riband screed at Dolly's Brae, and dismisses Lord Roden from the commission of the peace, 85; is of opinion that the Lord-Lieutenancy cannot be permanently retained, 86; agrees with the proposal to substitute a fourth Secretary of State for the Lord-Lieutenant, 87; congratulates Lord John on his approaching fall, 94 *n*; desires to subsidise a newspaper in his party's interests, 97; 98; disapproves of Lord John's policy in the

CLA

slave trade, 107; willingness to relinquish the Irish Viceroyship, 139; his policy defended by Lord John, 143, 144; suggested as Prime Minister, 152; letter to Lord John on the statement that there was an intrigue against the latter's leadership, 152; 157; on Lord John's leadership of the House, 170; his comment on Colonel Rose's summons of the British fleet, 179; opinion of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 179 *n*; 185; agrees with Lord John's estimate of the situation before the Crimean war, 182; Lord John's memorandum on the Eastern question laid before him, 186; 200; quoted, 210; approves of the subsidising of Sweden in the war with Russia, 218; letter to Lord John on the latter's contemplated resignation, 227; Lord John's letter to him on the Vienna Conference, 242; letters to Lord John as to the latter taking office, 246; 247; on the action of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 251; explains the new neutralisation project to the Vienna Conference, 257; appeals to Lord John not to resign, 262; strained relations between him and Lord John 297; invited to take the Foreign Office by Lord John, 407; his death, 441 *n*

Clarke, Mary Anne (trafficker in commissions), ii. 108

Clive, Mr. (son of Earl Powis), i. 5, 8, 66, 68

Cobden, Mr., national testimonial to, i. 425; declines Lord John's offer of office, 426; his pamphlet 'The Three Panics,' ii. 18, 30; on the ministry of 1851, 129 *n*; quoted, 144; 152–154; introduces the motion which secured Lord Palmerston's defeat, 286

Cockburn, Lord, i. 44

Coercion Bills, i. 202, 204, 422, 465

Collier, Mr. (afterwards Sir J.), and the question of the 'Alabama,' ii. 353

Collier, Sir G., i. 72

Colonies, the, autonomy for, ii. 104

Colquhoun, Mr. (member for Newcastle-under-Lyme), i. 338

Conservative party in 1852, ii. 151

Convict classes of Great Britain, i.

Cooke (actor), i. 7

Copleston, Dr. (Bishop of Llandaff), i. 478 *n*

DEN

Corbett, Mr. (British minister at Florence), ii. 311

Corn Laws, the, i. 407, 417

Corporation Bill, i. 140, 243–245, 266

Cottenham, Lord (Chancellor), i. 290

Coup d'état, the, ii. 138

Courvoisier, murderer of Lord William Russell, i. 2

Cowley, Lord, despatch to, from Lord John, on the Holy Places dispute, ii. 177; 236; writes to Lord John on the Italian question, 313 *n*; 324, 394, 396

Cowper, Lady (afterwards Lady Palmerston), i. 155; see under

Crabbe, i. 131 *n*

Cracow, suppression of the republic of, ii. 8, 37

Cradock's (Mrs. Grove) 'Calendar of Nature,' ii. 272

Crampton, Judge, i. 206, 207, 452

Crampton, Sir John, ii. 423 *n*

Cranworth, Lord, ii. 165

Crawford, Mr., ii. 150 *n*

Creed, William (bookseller), i. 46

Cremorne, Lord, created a peer, i. 457, 458

Crimean War, causes of the, ii. 176; protocol defining its object, 248

Croft, Mr., i. 61; illegally imprisoned at Lisbon, ii. 11 *n*

Croker, Rt. Hon. J. W., i. 166, 167; his article in the 'Quarterly' on Lord John's speech at Stroud, 289; attack on Sir J. Stephen, 337 *n*; references to, in Moore's diaries, ii. 149 *n*

Crown and Government Security Bill, ii. 67, 70

Cumberland, Duke of, sanctions the promotion of Orange lodges in the army, i. 262, 264

Currie, Mr. Raikes, and Lord John's seat in the City, ii. 289

Curwen, Mr., i. 30

Customs tariff, i. 365

DALHOUSIE, Lord, i. 424

Dalling, Lord, quoted, i. 216

Darlington, Lord, i. 374

Davy, Sir H., his disbelief in lighting London with gas, i. 35 *n*

De Grey, Lord (afterwards Lord Ripon), ii. 408, 409

Demont, Louise (Queen Caroline's Swiss maid), i. 124

Denison, Dr. (Bishop of Salisbury), i. 478 *n*

Denmark, in the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, ii. 132

DER

Derby, Lord, ii. 154; asked by the Queen to form a ministry, 241; at the head of government, 295; proposes a compromise regarding the Bill for the better government of India, 297; his intimation to Palmerston as to Conservative support, 334; meets Lord John at a Palace concert, 335; communicates with him as to action in Ireland, 429
Dessin, M., i. 122 *n*
Devon Commission, the, *i.* 400
Devonshire, Duke of, i. 123; offers the borough of Bandon Bridge to Lord John, 132; appointment as Lord Chamberlain, 141 *n*
Dickens, Charles, ii. 145; characteristic letters to Lord John of request for aid and thanks on behalf of a Mr. P., 146, 147
Dietrichsen, Count, ii. 34
Dillon, Mr., ii. 289
Disraeli, Right Hon. B., attacks Lord John in the 'Runnymede Letters,' i. 254; later opinion of him, 255, 385; his obituary notice of the session of 1848, ii. 96; on agricultural distress, 105; defeated thereon, 122; offers to accept a colourless declaration in favour of free trade, 159; his Budget torn to shreds by Mr. Gladstone, 160; on Lord John's postponement of a Reform Bill, 205; his attack on the Aberdeen Ministry and Lord John's reply, 223, 224; brings forward a resolution condemning the language and conduct of the government, 264; defeated, 265; attacks the Indian administration of government, 292; his description of Lord John's speech in answer to him, 293; becomes Chancellor of the Exchequer, 296; his attack on the great Reform Act, 296; accepts an offer of Lord John regarding Bill for the better government of India, 298; congratulates Lord John on going to the House of Lords, 337; his letter to Lady Russell on the death of her husband, 452
Dissenters, legislation for, i. 256–261
Divisions of Counties and Boundaries of Boroughs Bill, i. 179
Dodd, Mr. Westminster master), i. 6
Dodsworth, Mr., ii. 119
Doherty, Mr. (Chief Justice of Common Pleas), i. 183
Dolly's Brae, battle of, ii. 84, 85
Dost Mahomed, i. 364
Dowling, Mr., i. 382

DUR

Doyle ('H. B.'), his caricature of Lord John, i. 50 *n*; ii. 462
Dred Scott case, the, ii. 339
Drouot, Count, i. 74
Drouyn de Lhuys (French Foreign Minister), proposes a compromise between Greece and England, ii. 59; recalled by his government, 60; interviews with Lord John regarding Vienna Conference, 245; joins the Plenipotentiaries from Paris at Vienna, 257; his scheme regarding the Black Sea, 257; his letters to Lord John on the same, 259, 260 *n*; tenders his resignation to the Emperor, 261
Drummond, Charles, i. 434
Drummond, Lieutenant, report on the census of 1831, i. 175; (Under-Secretary for Ireland), marries Miss Kinnaird, 263 *n*; proposes that rent-charge should go to Irish railways, 298
Drummond, Maurice (married to Lord John's eldest step-daughter), i. 434
Drummond, Mrs. Maurice (Lord John's step-daughter Adelaide), quoted, i. 247; her sketch of Lord John's home life, 270; illness of, 390; marriage, 434; new year congratulations to Lord John, ii. 143; 280
Du Cane, Sir E., quoted, i. 333
Dudley, Lord (Foreign Secretary), on Doulocracy at Cassiobury, i. 111 *n*; resignation of, 145
Duff, General, ii. 113, 114
Duke, Mr., 150 *n*
Duncannon, Lord, one of 'a little faction at Brooks's,' i. 135; on a committee on Parliamentary Reform, 165; O'Connell's action towards, 182; is Moore's host, 195; his letter on Lord John's circular to Reformers, 222; in communication with O'Connell, 223 *n*; 'not an orator,' 250; on the evictions in County Carlow, 263; assures Lord John of the good feeling of the House, 317; suggests a peerage for Lord Howick, 336
Duncombe, Thomas, his resolution for opening Westminster theatres in Lent, i. 316
Dundas, Admiral, ii. 29
Dunfermline, Lady, death of, ii. 449
Dunfermline, Lord; see Abercromby, Mr.
Dunkellin, Lord, his amendment on the Reform Bill of 1865, ii. 413
Dunning, Mr., quoted, i. 48
Durazzo, Madame, sonnet to her by Lord John, i. 114; at Genoa, 131;

DUR

letter to Lord John on his rumoured marriage, 150; on the Durham Letter, ii. 122
Durham Letter, the, ii. 119-122, 172
Durham, Lord (Privy Seal), proposal for extension of suffrage, disfranchisement of rotten boroughs, and triennial parliaments, i. 125; forms a committee for Parliamentary Reform, 165; engaged on Irish Church Reform, 188; objected to by Lord Melbourne as a Cabinet minister, 285; mission to Canada, 295; 306, 307; returns home, 308; death of, 382

EAST INDIA COMPANY, its monopoly terminated, i. 193
Ebrington, Lord (afterwards Lord Fortescue), elected for Devonshire, i. 158; 169; motion on the rejection of the Reform Bill, 174; address to William IV., 177; in Ireland with Lord John, 195, 196; assures Lord John of the 'golden opinions' he has won, 247; petitions for the commutation of tithes, 257; is for a change in the personnel of the Melbourne Cabinet, 308; made Viceroy of Ireland, 314; a warm and consistent Liberal, 321; on the treatment of the education question by the House, 330*n*; action in the Chartist riots, 332*n*; on the corn duties, 367; ii. 224
Ecclestiastical Titles Bill, ii. 124-128, 151
Eden, Dr. (afterwards Lord Auckland), i. 475*n*; ii. 116
Edinburgh, i. 33; intellectual society of, in 1809, 44-46
Edinburgh Letter, the, i. 403, 406
Education, condition of, at the Queen's accession, i. 328; State, 455
Educational endowments, commission of inquiry into, i. 252
Egerton, Sir Philip, his account of Grillion's Club, i. 73*n*, 305*n*
Egmont, Lord, i. 136*n*
Elba, Napoleon at, i. 74
Eldon, Lord, is of opinion that 'it is impossible to muzzle a fool,' i. 34; action on the Bribery Bill, 119; as an equity judge, 253*n*
Election petitions, i. 292
Eliot, Lord (Secretary for Ireland), i. 389
Ellenborough, Lord, i. 34; diary quoted, 155; boast regarding the Corporation

FER

Bill, 244; 'a very able speaker,' 427; his scheme for the better government of India, ii. 297
Ellice, Mr., i. 308; quoted, 320*n*; on colonial administration, 338; on war with France, 347
Elliot, Admiral, i. 364
Elliot, George (brother-in-law of Lord John), 353*n*
Elliot, Gilbert (Dean of Bristol), ii. 226
Elliot, Lady Fanny (daughter of Lord Minto), i. 345; marriage to Lord John, 378; see Russell, Lady John
Elliot, Lady Harriet (sister-in-law of Lord John), illness of, ii. 236; death of, 244
Elliot, Mr. (afterwards Sir H.; British minister at Naples, and brother-in-law of Lord John), is advised by Lord John as to his action with the Neapolitan Government, ii. 322; on the effect in Italy of Lord John's Italian sympathies, 328; his diplomatic career in Italy, 423*n*; his relationship with Lord John gives rise to a charge of jobbery on the part of the latter, 423*n*; correspondence on the same, 424-428
Elwin, Mr., ii. 466*n*
Emmet, Mr., i. 249
Encumbered Estates Act, i. 473
Enfield, Lord, testifies to the devotion of Lord John's supporters, ii. 268; 297
Episcopate, proposal to increase, in 1846, i. 474, 475
Erroll, Lord, i. 449
Erskine, Lord, i. 35
Essex, Lord, i. 111*n*, 312
Euston, Lord, i. 29
Everett, Mr. (American minister in London), i. 421
Evictions in Ireland for religious belief, i. 263
Evora, convention of, ii. 10
Exeter, Bishop of, i. 479; declines to institute Mr. Gorham, ii. 117, 118

FACTORY ACT, the, i. 193
Fagging at Westminster School, i. 9
Famine, potato, in Ireland, i. 406, 431, 435, 437; ii. 76
Farini, Signor, ii. 277
Fellowes, Mr., i. 129
Fergusson, Cutlar, i. 236*n*
Fergusson, Dr., ii. 26
Ferretti, Cardinal, elected to the pontifical chair, ii. 38; liberal opinions of, 38; hesitation between progress and reaction, 39

FIE

Fielding, quoted, i. 12
Finlay, Mr. (historian), his complaint against the Greek Government, ii. 56
Fish, Mr. (American Secretary of State), ii. 361
Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, i. 249
Fitzgerald, Lord William, i. 13
Fitzgerald, Mr., condemns Lord John's speech on the Irish Church, ii. 173
Fitzgerald, Vesey (President of the Board of Trade), i. 145
Fitzgibbon, Richard, i. 13
Fitzpatrick, General, i. 26, 29, 69
Fitzroy at Dr. Moore's school), i. 4
Fitzwilliam, Charles, ii. 453
Fitzwilliam, Lord, i. 399
Flahault, Count, ii. 321
Fleetwood, Sir H., his motion for reducing the county franchise, i. 324
Fletcher, Mrs., ii. 226
Follett, Sir W., i. 309
Fordwich, Lord, i. 164 *n*
Foreign Enlistment Bill, i. 111 *n*
Forster, John editor of the 'Examiner'), ii. 147; on the 'Alabama' claims, 360, 365
Forster, Mr., Lord John introduces him to a subordinate government office, ii. 409; his conduct in the Education Act of 1870, 440; letter to Lord John on the Act, 441 *n*
Fortescue, Lord, i. 195, 196, 404; his letter to Lord John on Indian administration, ii. 293
Fortescue, Rt. Hon. Chichester, obtains the Irish Secretaryship, ii. 409
Foscolo, Ugo, i. 109 *n*
Fox, Colonel, retires from Stroud in favour of Lord John, i. 235
Fox, Miss (Lord Holland's sister), letter of, i. 277
Fox, Mrs., 22
Fox, Rt. Hon. C. J., i. 17, 22, 24, 26, 70, 405; letter on Horace's Odes, ii. 108
Fox Maule, Mr. (afterwards Lord Panmure; Secretary-at-War), would postpone the organisation of the Militia till the outbreak of war, ii. 17; 112, 150 *n*, 196; letter to Lord John on the differences regarding the Vienna Conference, 255
France, position of, after the peace of Tilsit, i. 36; Russia's ally, 36; treaty with Spain for the partition of Portugal, 37; revolution of 1830, 155; warlike attitude towards England in 1840, 346; feeling towards England in 1846, ii. 13; flight of

GIL

Louis Philippe from, 25; 31; formally occupies Roman territory, 53; action in the Greek dispute, 59; the *coup d'état*, 138; in the Crimean war, 177 *et seq.*
Francis, Don, ii. 1
Fraser, Professor, i. 45 *n*
Frederick VI. of Denmark and the Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 373
Frederick VII. of Denmark, his rules for the better government of Schleswig and Holstein, ii. 375
Free Trade, i. 408, 420
French, Fitzstephen, i. 440
Frost, Mr. (magistrate at Monmouth), i. 341
Fuad Pasha, Turkish Foreign Minister, ii. 179
Fuller, Major, i. 19
Fuller, Mr., i. 30

GALLOIS, M., i. 122
Garbarino, Marchese, his admiration for Lord John, ii. 438
Garibaldi, General, sails for Sicily, ii. 322; effects expulsion of Bourbon dynasty, 323, 324; lands in Calabria, enters Naples, and announces his intention of marching on Rome, 325; salutes Victor Emanuel as King of Italy, 325; visits Lord John Russell, 329; letter on the death of Lord John, 453
Garrard, Mr., A.R.A., his picture of sheep-shearing at Woburn, i. 22 *n*
Garvey, Mr., i. 468
Gas-lighting of London, i. 35 *n*
Gascoigne, General, i. 168
Gasparin, M., quoted, ii. 339
General Association of Ireland, i. 272, 274, 275
George III., insanity of, i. 49
George IV., institutes proceedings against Queen Caroline, i. 121; an Anti-Catholic, 136; death of, 154
Gerard, Count, of Holstein, ii. 372
Germany, revolution in, ii. 40; and the Schleswig-Holstein question, 41, 132; war with France, 441
Germany, Crown Prince of, visits Lord John, ii. 439
Germany, Emperor of, his letter to Lord John on the struggle for religious liberty, ii. 448
Gibbs, Sir Vicary, i. 29
Gibson, Rt. Hon. G. Milner, attacks Lord John for his conduct at Vienna, ii. 266
Gilbert, Davies, i. 120

GIL

Gilpin, Mr., i. 5
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. 155; for free trade, 157; wrecks Mr. Disraeli's Budget, 160; his first and greatest Budget, 170; 201; resigns office in Palmerston's Cabinet, 245; thoroughly approves of Lord John's Italian policy, 333; loyally supported by Lord John in his financial measures, 333, and *n*; his Budget, 333; 334 *n*; letter to Lord John on the latter going to the House of Lords, 337; splendid results of his fiscal reforms, 404; defeated at Oxford, 406; his letter to Lord John on the successorship to Lord Palmerston, 407; does not think a new government could be a continuation of Lord Palmerston's administration, 408; meets Lord John at the Duke of Buccleuch's, 408 *n*; introduces the Reform Bill of 1866, 410; his additional measures to complete the scheme, 411; his letter to Lord John on the latter's decision not to take office, 431; his motion regarding the Established Church in Ireland, 433; sent for by the Queen to form an administration, 434; invites Lord John to a seat in the Cabinet without other responsibility, 434; passes the Irish Land Bill, 437; his letter to Lord John on the same, 440
Glenelg, Lord (Colonial Secretary), abused by William IV., i. 240 *n*; the King's antipa hy to him, 268; at Bowood, 287; motion of want of confidence in him as Colonial Minister, 296; Sydney Smith's satirical allusion to him, 303; Lord John's proposals with regard to his retirement, 308, 312; action in the West Indian crisis, 313; his colonial policy, 336
Gloucester, Duchess of, i. 275 *n*
Gloucester, Duke of, i. 34
Goderich, Lord, formation of his ministry, i. 134-136; resignation of, 137; *see* Ripon, Lord
Goito, Piedmontese victory at, ii. 45
Gordon, Lord Alexander (son of fourth Duke of Gordon), i. 22
Gordon, Lord William, i. 31
Gordon, Sir A., his correspondence with Lord John, ii. 186 *n*
Gordon, Sir Robert, i. 152
Gore, Charles, i. 323
Gorham case, the, ii. 117-119
Gortchakoff, Prince (Russian Plenipotentiary at Vienna Conference), refuses to consent to limitation of Russian force in the Black Sea, ii. 252

GRA

Goschen, Rt. Hon. G., appointed to the Cabinet by Lord John, ii. 409
Gosford, Lord (Governor of Canada), i. 294, 457
Gosset, Sir W. (Serjeant-at-Arms), i. 263
Goujon, M., i. 36 *n*
Goulburn, Rt. Hon. W., i. 176
Graham, Dr., made bishop of Chester, i. 480
Graham, Sir James, engaged in Parliamentary Reform, i. 165; retires from office, 200, 204; on the Conservative benches, 243 *n*; impresses on Sir Robert Peel the necessity for moderation, 315; charges Lord John with encouraging Chartism, 341; motion on Chinese policy, 342; introduces Factory Bill, 388; on the Arms Act, 389; reintroduces the Factory Bill, omitting education clauses, 399; 'a bitter opponent, excellent tactician,' 427; on the Irish poor-law, 447; offered the Governor-Generalship of India, ii. 98; declines the Admiralty, 98; on Lord John going to the Lords, 100; favours Lord John's Reform proposals, 102; arranges with Lord John a ministry of Whigs and Peelites, 124; reply to Lord John's memorandum, 124; the latter's answer, 126; declines further negotiations, 127; endeavour of Lord John to induce him to enter the Cabinet, 129, 130; 143, 152; bears testimony to Lord John's endeavour to check corrupt election practices, 153; indecision in the Russo-Turkish question, 182; advises Lord John to concert with Lord Aberdeen on Reform, and the Eastern question, 198; against the postponement of the Reform Bill, 204; resignation of office in the Palmerston ministry, 245
Graham, Sir Thomas (afterwards Lord Lynedoch), i. 51; 58 *n*
Grammont, Duc de (French ambassador at Rome), ii. 318 *n*
Grampound, bribery at, i. 117, 118; writ suspended, 119; 124, 125
Grant, Mr., i. 145; see Glenelg, Lord
Granville, Lord, enters the Cabinet, ii. 134 *n*; President of the Council, 220 *n*, 221; thanks Lord John for

his conduct at the Vienna Conference, 269; letters from Palmerston and Lord John regarding dissensions in the Liberal camp, 205, 306; letter to Lord John on the question of leadership, 307; Lord John's reply, 308; resigns the commission which the Queen had entrusted to him, 308; his reply to Lord John's address relative to the 'Alabama' awards, 363; on putting the fleet in motion, 392; on Lord John's decision not to take office, 432; quoted, 440 *n*; appointed successor to Lord Clarendon, 441 *n*
Grattan, James, returned for Dublin, i. 30; 220 *n*
Greece, her struggle with Turkey, i. 151; English interference in behalf of Mr. Finlay's and Don Pacifico's claims, ii. 56; yields to the English demands, 59
Greek Church, the, in Turkey, ii. 177–180, 187, 191, 192
Gregory XVI., death of, ii. 38
Grenville Committees, the, i. 292
Grenville, Lord, i. 88, 147
Greville, Charles, quoted and instanced, i. 47 *n*, 213, 218, 224, 230, 241, 265, 268, 276, 289, 294, 316, 319, 320, 348, 357, 362, 370, 374, 377, 387, 397, 400, 429, 432, 444, 447, 455, 470, 471, 472; ii. 2 *n*, 5 *n*, 7 *n*, 8 *n*, 14, 27, 43 *n*, 72, 74 *n*, 100, 102, 107, 122, 130 *n*, 143, 203, 282 *n*, 287, 290, 297 *n*, 299 *n*, 304
Grey, Lady, her report of an Irish rising, ii. 73
Grey, Lord (2nd Earl), policy towards Spain, i. 42; his proposed mission to Mr. Adair, 50; at Holland House, 53; declines to act with Lord Lansdowne, 134; opposes the formation of a Central Association, 147; offers Lord John the Paymaster-Generalship, 158; troubles in the formation of a ministry, 160; plan of Parliamentary Reform, 165; advises the King to dissolve Parliament, 168; admits Lord John to the Cabinet, 169; resignation of, 177; returns to office with power to create peers, 178; conduct of Irish affairs, 183; accepts coercive legislation for Ireland, 186; schemes of Irish Church Reform, 187; dealings with the tithe question, 197; resignation of, 204; letter to Lord John, 209; 'horror of the Radicals,' 219 *n*; declines concert with the Radicals and Irish party, 224, 225; declines to reform the admini-tration, 231; Lord Melbourne's memorandum to him offering the Foreign Secretaryship, 232; on O'Connell, 234; death of, 403
Grey, Lord (3rd Earl); see under Howick, Lord
Grey, Sir Charles, William IV.'s violent language to him at a council, i. 240 *n*; observation on members of the Grey ministry, 304
Grey, Sir George, made Judge-Advocate, i. 314; on the Arms Act, 465, 467; ii. 16; his Crown and Government Security Bill, 67, 70; on the Chartist processions, 69; sponsor to Lord John's second son, 73; opposed to spending more money on Ireland, 78; account of the Queen's visit to Ireland, 85; weak health of, 88; small influence in debate, 90; action on the Pope's Bull concerning English sees, 119; 150*n*, 151; exclusion from the Cabinet, 166 *n*; sent to the Home Office, 199; 201; suggests to Lord John the Presidency of the Council, 220; offered the Colonial Office, 219, 220; becomes Secretary for the Colonies, 222; 295, 352, 408
Grillion's Club, i. 73; Lord John at, 305
Gros, Baron, mediates between England and Greece, ii. 57
Grosvenor, Lord, ii. 410
Grosvenor, Sir Richard, i. 458
Grote, Mr., motions on the ballot, i. 295, 324; ii. 367
Guizot, M., i. 348, 349, 356, 357, 358; his policy in the Spanish marriages, ii. 5–7; quarrels with Lord Normanby, 8; on the violation of the Treaty of Vienna, 37, 466 *n*
Gunning, Mr., i. 5
Gurney, Mr., on the Chartist processions, ii. 69

HABEAS CORPUS ACT, suspension of, in Ireland, ii. 64–66, 72, 81
Hailes, Solomon, his tribute to Lord John's character, ii. 269
Hallam, Mr., resigns the pension which he no longer needs, ii. 146 *n*
Hallowell, Admiral, i. 71
Hamilton, Duke of, i. 31
Hampden, Dr., appointed Dean of Hereford, i. 475; action of the bishops on his appointment, 478; consecration of, 480; ii. 116

HAR

Hardinge, Sir Henry, accuses Lord John of supporting the Birmingham Political Union, i. 173; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 227
Hardwick, Mr. (police magistrate), ii. 147
Hardy, Lady, i. 164 *n*, 176 *n*
Harewood, Lord, i. 338
Harrington, Lord, commander of the forces in Ireland, i. 26
Hartington, Lord (afterwards Duke of Devonshire), at school at Woodnesboro', i. 13; his dog 'Chance,' 19, 27
Hartington, Lord, appointed by Lord John to first place in the War Department, ii. 409
Harvey, Whittle (member for Colchester), i. 140
Hatherton, Lord. ii. 109
Hawes, Sir B., i. 382 *n*, 395
Hawkesbury, Lord (afterwards Lord Liverpool), proposed as Pitt's successor, i. 17
Hawtrey, Dr. (Provost of Eton), ii. 281
Herbert (confidential servant), i. 6, 7
Herbert, Rt. Hon. Sidney, i. 424; ii. 155; urges Lord John not to resign, 209; would subsidise Sweden, 218; 229, 230, 236; resignation of office in Palmerston Cabinet, 245, 287, 407, 408
Herschel, Sir John, made Master of the Mint, ii. 145
Heywood, Lady, ii. 111
Heywood, Sir Benjamin, ii. 111
Higgins, Mr., i. 1
Hill, General, i. 53
Hind, Mr., grant to, ii. 146
Hinds, Professor, ii. 26 *n*, 116
Hoare, Mr., i. 23
Hobhouse, Sir J., on Abercromby as Speaker, i. 215; letter to Lord John, 220 *n*; ii. 90, 196
Holland, Lady, at Woburn, i. 35, 36; delicate state of her health, 40; letters to Lord John, 135, 338; on the Catholic question, 136; death of, 404; legacy to Lord John, 404
Holland, Lord (the first), i. 160
Holland, Lord, author of 'Lope de Vega,' i. 25; at Woburn, 35, 36; tour in Spain, 38, 39; advises Lord John to study at Edinburgh, 43; 'the only remaining Whig in England,' 49, 50 *n*; opinion of Lord John's translation of the Odyssey, 98; 'made of sterner stuff' than

HOW

Lord Lansdowne, 137; in Opposition in the Wellington administration, 139; in favour of a Central Association, 147; letter on England's Russian policy, 152; letter on the Prince de Polignac, 156; urges Lord John to attack the strongest of the Tory strongholds in the election of 1831, 169; comment on Lord John's speech at Totness, 213; letter on the death of the Duke of Bedford, 340; opposes the treaty of European Powers in 1840, 346; death of, 358; inscription composed by Lord John for his monument, 359 *n*
Holy Places, struggle for the possession of, by the Greek and Latin Churches, ii. 177; settlement of the dispute, 179, 192
Hood, Tom, pension to his children, ii. 146
Hope, Professor, i. 45
Horner, Mr., i. 108
Horsman, Mr., i. 425; proposal to exempt professional and precarious incomes from the full weight of the income-tax, ii. 26
Houghton, Lord, his estimate of Lord John, ii. 454
Howick, Lord (3rd Earl Grey), at the meeting on the question of the Speakership, i. 224, 244; opposes the suspension of the Canadian constitution, 294; calibre as a Minister, 303; dissatisfied with the conduct of Colonial affairs, 312, 313; attitude towards the franchise, 324, 325; proposition to promote him to the Post Office, and call him to the House of Lords, 336; resigns office, 336; refuses to take office if Lord Palmerston becomes Foreign Secretary, 411, 415, 416; letter to Lord John on the latter's formation of a Ministry, 412; reasons for including him in the Ministry, 427; his remonstrance at Lord Palmerston's conduct of foreign affairs, ii. 44; reduces the colonial garrisons, 50; dissatisfaction with Palmerston, 52; letter to Lord John on the Hungarian refugees, 54; views on Irish legislation, 65, 69; proposes a loan to Canada, 78; against further expenditure on Ireland, 78; his Canadian proposal before the Cabinet, 80; accused of suppressing an important despatch, 94; one of the best Colonial Secretaries, and the most unpopular of

HOW

Ministers, 104; hostility to his colonial policy, 105; 137, 166 *n*
Howley, Dr. (Archbishop of Canterbury), correspondence with Lord John on the Hampden appointment, i. 474–478, 480; death of, 480
Hubner, M., ii. 50
Hudson, Sir James (British Minister at Turin), and the charge of jobbery brought by the 'Times' against Lord John, ii. 423 *n*; his correspondence on the same, 424–428 *n*
Hume, the historian, i. 102
Hume, Mr., motions on the Civil List, i. 121; and on the Irish Church, 198 *n*; in communication with Lord John on the Speakership, 224; proposition to curb Ministerial powers by limiting the supplies, 225; draws attention to Orange Lodges in the army, 264; acts as a stimulant to Lord John, 330 *n*; his appeal to Lord John against war with France, 351; attacked by Lord John and called a 'chartered libertine,' 455 *n*; motion censuring the Government for its action in the Portuguese revolt, ii. 12; motion on the income-tax, 27; measure of Radical Reform, 102
Hummelauer, Baron, i. 356; ii. 45
Hungary, insurrection in, ii. 54, 134
Hunt, Dr., i. 30, 31
Hunt, Leigh, pension to, ii. 146
Huskisson, Mr., i. 145, 146
Hutt, Mr., opposition to the maintenance of war ships on the slave coast, ii. 106; 399 *n*

IBRAHIM Pacha, defeats the Turks, i. 346; defeated by them, 362
Income-tax, abolition of, in 1816, i. 86; increase of, ii. 24
India, government of, transferred to the Crown, ii. 298
Indian Mutiny, outbreak of, ii. 292
Infantado, Duc d', i. 64
Inglis, Sir Robert, at the Hundreds Farm, Woburn, i. 163 *n*; at Grillion's, 395 *n*; opinion of Lord John, 343; commendation of Lord John's speech on Irish affairs, 439
Inkerman, battle of, ii. 228
Ionian Islands, suggested transfer of, to Austria, ii. 41
Ireland: Arms Bill, i. 431; Church Reform Bill, 187–193; Coercion Bill, 204, 422; Municipal Bill, 266, 272, 273, 277, 279, 293, 299, 327; Poor

KNO

Law Bill, 272, 277, 297, 438; Registration Bill, 365, 370; Tithe Bill, 198, 202
Isturitz, Señor (Spanish minister in London), ii. 3, 9, 45
Italy, revolution in, against the Austrians, ii. 38, 39; the party of Young Italy and the Old Catholic party, 38; appeal to France, 46; considerations for peace with Austria, 50; events in the south of, 50

JACKSON, Dr., ii. 116
Jacobson, Dr. (Bishop of Chester), i. 477
Jamaica, proposed suspension of its constitution, i. 319
Jameson, Mrs., pension to, ii. 146
Jarnac, Count, French chargé d'affaires in London, ii. 2, 5
Jebb, Colonel (Sir Joshua), i. 332
Jeffrey, Lord, i. 44; anecdote of, 177 *n*
Jellachich, General, bombards Vienna, ii. 49
Jews, Parliamentary disabilities of, i. 142; Bill for removing those disabilities, ii. 93
Jocelyn, Lord, speech on Irish discontent, ii. 66, 204
Johnson, Mr. Reverdy, ii. 360
Johnston, Mrs. (actress), i. 6
Joinville, Prince de, appointed to the command of a French fleet, ii. 13; his scheme for attacking England, 20
Jones, Ernest (Chartist leader), ii. 69
Jones, Gale (secretary to the Corresponding Society), imprisonment for libel, i. 47
Jones, Sir William, ii. 361
Junot, Marshal, i. 37

KAINARDJI, Treaty of, ii. 192
Keck, Legh (member for Leicestershire), i. 144
Kemble (actor), i. 7, 8, 24, 25
Killeen, Lord (eldest son of Lord Fingall), i. 46
King, Ben. at Cassiobury, i. 137
King, Locke, his motion for the equalisation of county and borough franchise, ii. 122; and for the reduction of county franchise, 285
Kinglake, Mr., his opinion of the writing of Lord John, ii. 273; 410
Kinnaird, Lord, i. 33
Kinnaird, Miss (afterwards Mrs. Drummond), i. 229, 230; ii. 230
Knowles, Sheridan, pension to, ii. 146

KOL

Koller, Baron (Austrian ambassador), Palmerston's unauthorised despatch to him, ii. 132
Kossuth, victories of, ii. 49; Lord Palmerston's proposed reception of him, 133, 135; his speeches against Russia and Austria, 135, 136

LABOUCHERE, Mr., at the Colonial Office, i. 314; in the Cabinet, 335; ii. 90, 137, 150*n*, 166
Lafayette, General, i. 157
Laird, Messrs., and the 'Alabama,' ii. 353
La Marmora, General, ii. 277
Lamartine, M. de, complains of an article in 'La Presse,' ii. 33; his circular issued to foreign courts after the flight of Louis Philippe, 31; correspondence with the Duke of Wellington, 32, 34-37; declares the treaties of 1815 at an end, 40; receives a deputation from Irish agitators begging for aid, 64; his answer to them, 68
Lamb, Mr., i. 145; see Melbourne, Lord
Lambert, Henry, i. 6
Lambton, Mr.; see Durham, Lord
Langdale, Lord, i. 253*n*
Lansdowne, Lord, in the Goderich Ministry, i. 134; 'victim and dupe of two of the greatest rogues (politically speaking) in the kingdom,' 135; negotiation with Canning, 135; 'honest as the purest virgin,' 136; vouches for the staunchness of Lord John, 137; in opposition in the Wellington Administration, 139; in favour of a Central Association, 147; views on the Catholic question, 147; declines the Foreign Office, 160; discourages concert with O'Connell, 223*n*; share in memorandum to Lord Grey, 233; warmly supports a pension to Moore, 238; before the Queen on the formation of the Russell Ministry, 411; on the risk of asking Mr. Cobden to take office, 425; communications with Lord John on the office of Lord Lieutenant, 452-453; on school grants, 454; letter from Lord John on Irish affairs, 466; ii. 26; interferes to check Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, 43; 60, 61; his views on Irish legislation, 65; on the poor rate in Ireland, 82; on the rating clause in the Irish Poor Law Bill,

LES

83; 86, 98; attitude on Reform, 102; his objections to Lord John's Reform Bill, 130; offers his resignation, 130; 137; suggested as Prime Minister, 152; letter from Lord Palmerston, 158; writes to Palmerston on Lord John's willingness to take office, 158, 159; declines to form a Ministry, 160; Lord John requests his counsel on his accepting the leadership of the Commons in the Aberdeen Ministry, 161; his mode of dealing with Russian aggression on Turkey, 182; against Lord John's scheme of Reform, 197, 198; insists on its modification, 200; compromise with Lord John on the matter, 201; threatens resignation if the Reform Bill is proceeded with, 207; communications with Lord John on the remodelling of the War Department, 232; sent for by the Queen to form a Government, 241; communicates to Lord John the objections of the Government to Austrian proposals regarding the Black Sea, 253*n*; proposes Lord John as a member for 'the Club,' 281
Landseer, Sir Edwin, his sketches of Lord Amberley and Lady Victoria Villiers, ii. 113
Larpent, i. 457*n*
Lauderdale, Lord, i. 33, 43
Layard, Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.), contrasts the policy of Lord John with that of Lord Aberdeen in the conduct of the Crimean War, ii. 214; memorandum to Lord John on the 'Alabama,' 355*n*
Leach, Sir John, i. 253*n*
Lecky, Mr., quoted, i. 1
Lee, Dr. Prince, made Bishop of Manchester, i. 476; ii. 116
Leech, Mr., cartoons by, in 'Punch,' ii. 203, 463
Leeds, Duchess of, ii. 113
Leeds, Duke of, ii. 101, 113
Lefevre, Rt. Hon. C. S., Speaker, i. 323, 381
Lehzen, Baroness, i. 311
Leinster, Duke of, i. 13, 439*n*, 452
Le Marchant, Sir Denis, i. 166, 170; quoted, 174
Leopold, King, sympathetic letter to Lord John on the death of his first wife, i. 311
Leopold, Prince, of Saxe Coburg, offered the hand of the Queen of Spain, ii. 1, 2, 3, 6
Leslie, Mr., anecdote of, i. 177*n*

LEV

Leveson, Lord Francis, i. 277
Lewis (Monk), i. 26
Lewis, Sir G. C., i. 34 *n*; ii. 151; his letter to Lord John on the latter's defence of his conduct, 268; advises Lord John as to his literary work, 272; his 1857 Budget, 285
Ley, Mr. (Clerk of the House of Commons), i. 343
Lichfield House Compact, the, i. 223
Lieven, Madame de, i. 152
Lincoln, Lord, i. 424; see Newcastle, Duke of
Lincoln, Mr., nominated as candidate for the Presidency, ii. 339; his accession to power, 341
Lindsay, W. S. (shipowner), letter to Lord John on the repeal of the Navigation Laws, ii. 100 *n*
Lister, Lady Theresa, i. 229
Lister, Miss Harriet, in attendance on the Queen, quoted, i. 313; in charge of Lord John's children, 340; 343 *n*, 344; eulogises Lord John's fulfilment of his fatherly duties, 345; congratulatory letter to Lord John on his second marriage, 379; see Cradock, Mrs. Grove
Lister, Mr. (author of 'Granby'), i. 229
Littleton, Mr. (afterwards Lord Hatherton), his Tithe Bills, i. 197, 198; 202, 204
Liverpool, Lord, formation of a Tory Ministry, i. 28; under age when first elected to the House of Commons, 70; dealing with the Luddites and Chartists, 88; condones the action of the yeomanry at Peterloo, 115; introduces the Six Acts, 117; persuaded to take proceedings against Queen Caroline, 121, 122; attacked with paralysis and apoplexy, 133
Lloyd, Mr., murder of, i. 471 *n*
Locker, Mr. (Public Secretary to the Mediterranean fleet), i. 71, 72
Lockhart, Mr., i. 180
Lombardy, affairs in, ii. 41, 48; refusal of Austria to abandon, 49
London, Bishop of, his dissatisfaction with the reversal by the Privy Council of the Bishop of Exeter's decision in the Gorham case, ii. 117; fears a secession from the Church, 118; answer to the London clergy respecting the Pope's Bull dividing England into sees, 119
London University, i. 260
Londonderry, Lord, attacked by the mob on the Lords' rejection of the Reform Bill, i. 172; incident connected with his appointment as ambassador at St. Petersburg, 236; references to, in Moore's diaries, ii. 149
Longfellow, poetry of, ii. 339
Longman, Messrs. i. 112; ii. 148; consulted by Lord John respecting the publication of a religious work, 418
Lopes, Sir Manasseh, conviction for bribery, i. 109, 118
Lords, House of, its constitution, i. 171; rejects Lord John's second Reform Bill, 172; first instance of the Commons enabling an administration to escape an adverse vote of the, 174; conflict with the Commons on the Appropriation clause, 246
Louis Philippe, i. 157; action on finding Prince Leopold among the candidates for the hand of the Queen of Spain, ii. 2, 3; flight of, from Paris, 215
Lowndes, Mr., i. 94
Lucan, Lord, i. 438
Lucas, Mr. (member for Meath), seconds a motion for a committee on the ecclesiastical revenues of Ireland, ii. 171, 172
Luddites, riots of the, i. 88
Ludlow, General Sir George, i. 23, 25, 34, 35
Ludlow, Lord, bequeaths his property at Ardsalla, Meath, to the Duke of Bedford, ii. 74
Lushington, Dr., offered and declines a life peerage, ii. 437
Luttrell, Mr., i. 131 *n*, 137, 176 *n*
Lyndhurst, Lord, motion in the Lords on the disfranchising clauses in the third Reform Bill, i. 177; leads the majority in the Lords against the Melbourne Ministry, 241; obstructive tactics in the Lords, 266, 267; his opinion of the Irish people, 272 *n*
Lyons, Lord (British Minister at Washington, his anticipations of the result of the Presidential election, ii. 339; his relations with Mr. Seward, 342; the host of the Russells in Paris, 439
Lyttelton, Lord, i. 117; verses on John's share in the Reform Act, 179
Lytton, Lord (first), lines on Lord John, i. 304

MAC

Macaulay, Rt. Hon. T. B., i. 312; succeeds Mr. Abercromby at Edinburgh, 323; Secretary-at-War, 337; asks Lord John to write for the

MAC

'Edinburgh Review,' 386; loses his seat at the general election of 1847, ii. 90; retains office nine months thereafter, 91; reasons for declining the offer of the borough of Richmond, 91; aids in securing Lord John's leadership of the Commons in the Aberdeen Ministry, 161, 162; declares that no man has led the House after sixty years of age, 163
McCullagh, Professor, pension to his sister, ii. 146
McDonald, Lieut.-Colonel (Adjutant-General), i. 55
MacDonald, Sir John (English Commissioner on 'Alabama' claims), ii. 361
McGregor, Colonel, i. 460, 461, 463, 468, 469
Mackenzie, Henry, i. 44
Mackinnon, Mr. (member for Rye), his amendment on Lord John's Reform Bill of 1860, ii. 331
Mackintosh, Sir James, quoted, on Edinburgh University, i. 45; 92 *n*; guarantees Moore against arrest at Holyrood, 112 *n*; letter to Moore, 113; letter to Lord John, 116; keeps back the 'Edinburgh' for an article on Reform, 123; work of purging the criminal code of capital offences, 331
Magenta, battle of, ii. 310
Mahon, Major, murder of, i. 461, 463, 468
Maitland, Sir Thomas, governor of the Ionian Islands, i. 109 *n*
Malet, Sir A. (British minister at Frankfort), ii. 379
Malmesbury, Lord (Foreign Minister in Lord Derby's government), ii. 297; his story of Lord John at a Palace concert, 335 *n*; opposes his Life Peerage Bill, 438
Malthy, Dr. (bishop of Durham), i. 476; letter to and from Lord John on the Pope's Bull dividing England into Roman Catholic sees, ii. 119–121
Mamiani (Italian patriot), ii. 277
Manchester, Duchess of, i. 15
Manchester, Duke of, i. 5
Mandeville, Lord, i. 129
Manin, Signor, drives the Austrians out of Venice, ii. 38
Manteuffel, Baron, his interviews with Lord John respecting the Vienna Conference, ii. 247
Marriage Bill, i. 259, 260
Marsden, J., i. 19

MEL

Martin, Captain, i. 69
Martin, Sir Theodore, quoted, i. 471; ii. 59, 302; blames Lord John for not yielding to Palmerston in the leadership, 307
Massari, Signor, ii. 277
Masterman, Conservative candidate for London, i. 457 *n*; ii. 150 *n*
Mathew, Father, pension to, ii. 146
Mazzini, Signor, at the head of the Young Italy party, ii. 38
Meadowbank, Lord, i. 46
Meagher, Mr., ii. 72
Mehemet Ali, his war with the Porte, i. 346, 348; his conditions of peace, 351
Melbourne, Lord, letter to, from Lord John, on Pitt, i. 12; succeeds Lord Grey, 204; letters from Abercromby and O'Connell on the appointment of Irish judges, 207; dismissal of his Ministry by the King, 208; chooses a Speaker, 215; forms a Ministry, 231; memorandum to Lord Grey on the formation of a Government, 231; writes to Lord John thereon, 232; opinion of Lord Brougham, 233 *n*; sanctions a pension to Moore, 238; views on O'Connell's tour in Scotland, 248; places the Great Seal in commission, 251; approval of Lord John's speech on Irish policy, 276; opposed to resignation in 1837, 280 *n*; acts as the Queen's private secretary, 284; disapproves of the ballot, 286; compromise with the Lords on Irish legislation, 292; opposed to dissolution on the Canadian question, 294; indifferent on the subject of the Tithes Bill and Municipal Bill, 300; apprehensions of Lord Durham's mission to Canada, 306; checks Lord John's enthusiasm in behalf of education, 329; anxiety in the crisis with France, 348; declines to accept Lord John's propositions, 349; characteristic anecdote of, 369; opposed to dissolution on the Corn Law question, 373; illness of, 387; makes Dr. Hampden Regius Professor of Divinity, 475; 480
Melgund, Lord (present Lord Minto), sponsor to Lord John's second son, ii. 73
Melville, Lady, in Italy, ii. 131
Melville, Lord, Lord John's juvenile satire on him, i. 14; acquitted by the Lords of malversation of public funds, 22; retires from the Cabinet, 133

MEN

Mentschikoff, Prince, his mission to the Porte, ii. 179; leaves Constantinople, 179, 181
Mercier, M. (French minister at Washington), in favour of intervention in the American civil war, ii. 344, 349
Metcalfe, Lord, i. 458
Metternich, M., flight of, from Vienna, ii. 38; his scheme for settling the Italian question, 313 *n*
Miguel, Dom, ii. 9, 10
Milan, the Austrians driven from, ii. 38, 39; recovered by them, 45
Mildmay (at Dr. Moore's school), i. 4 *n*
Miles, Mr. (member for Bristol), proposals on sugar, i. 398, 399
Military departments, confused state of, in 1854, ii. 215
Militia, concerning the, ii. 15–17, 22, 23, 28, 150
Milman, Dr., made Dean of St. Paul's, ii. 117
Milne, Sir A., ii. 29; receives instructions as to the movements of the British fleet in American waters, 347
Milton, Lord, i. 137, 155
Minghetti, Signor, visited by the Russells, ii. 422
Minto, Lady, i. 380; death of, ii. 174
Minto, Lord, i. 335, 344, 347, 380, 416; his mission to Italy, ii. 39; wishes to assist the Sicilians against the King of Naples, 50; letter from Lord John on the Hungarian refugee question, 55; writes to Lord John on the latter's defeat on Mr. Locke King's franchise motion, 123; tells Lord John of an intrigue to oust him from the leadership, 152; letter from Lord John, 158 *n*; his favourable opinion of the Porte's behaviour, 184; letter to Lord John on the bad conduct of the Crimean war, 228; 236; death of, 329; his influence on Lord John's policy, 329
Mitchel, John, i. 440; his schemes to foment rebellion in Ireland, ii. 71; conviction and transportation, 71
Mohl, M. and Mme., ii. 439
Moira, Lord, i. 92
Molesworth, Sir William, his motion of want of confidence in Lord Glenelg, i. 296; ii. 165 *n*
Moncorvo, Senhor (Portuguese Minister in London), ii. 9
Monsell, Mr. (Clerk of the Ordnance), his message from the Roman Catholic members of the Government, ii. 173; letter from Lord Aberdeen, 174

MOR

Montagu, Lord F., resigns his seat for Huntingdonshire, i. 120
Monteagle, Lord, i. 411
Montenegro, revolt of, against the Turks, ii. 177; settlement of dispute, 178
Montpensier, Duc de (son of Louis Philippe), the destined husband of the Infanta of Spain, ii. 1–3, 5 *n*, 6, 7 *n*
Montrose, Duke of, i. 32
Moore, Dr., i. 4
Moore, General Sir John, i. 38, 39; death of, 40
Moore, John Russell, i. 113 *n*
Moore, Mrs., i. 4, 5; ii. 148
Moore, Mr. (member for County Mayo), his motion for a committee on the ecclesiastical revenues of Ireland, ii. 171
Moore, Thomas, quoted, i. 13; his 'Remonstrance' on Lord John's withdrawal from Parliamentary activity in 1816, 91; on Lord John's translation of the Odyssey, 98; in debt, 112; offers of help from Lord Tavistock and Lord John, 112; declines a residence at Holyrood, 113; on a foreign tour with Lord John, 113; his 'Rhymes on the Road,' 114; quoted, 131 *n*; dedicates his 'Epicurean' to Lord John, 133; engaged on a Life of Byron, 136 *n*; letters to Lord John, 137, 142, 161; views of the Reform Bill, 181; invited to stand for Limerick, 182; poem on coercive Irish legislation, 186; letter to Lord John on his attitude towards Ireland, 203; on the dismissal of the Grey Ministry, 210; receives a pension, 235; visit to Lord John at Tonbridge, 270, 271; at Bowood, 287, 288, 358, 383; last letter to Lord John, 448; declining health and intellect, ii. 102; death of, 148; his will, 148, publication of his diaries, journals, and letters, 149
Morea, the, French occupation of, ii. 189
Morell, Mr. (of Wymondley College), deprecates the action of the London dissenters, i. 141 *n*
Morley, Lord, i. 205 *n*
Morley, Rt. Hon. John, his opinion on the 'Arrow' affair, ii. 287
Morley, Samuel, rents Lord John's house in Chesham Place, ii. 444
Morpeth, Lord, i. 117; his amendment to the address to William IV., 218; proposed for the Cabinet by Lord

John, 308; in the Melbourne Cabinet, 315; at Naworth, 344; conducts Irish Registration, 365 *n*; ii. 90; diary quoted, 145 *n*
Morris, Mr., i. 5
Mosbourg, Count, i. 76 *n*
Mostyn, Lord, ii. 131
Mount-Edgcumbe, Lord, his correspondence with Lord John on the alleged French preparations for war, ii. 177
'Mrs. Witty' (Lord John's dog), i. 19, 20
Mulgrave, Lord, on the Copenhagen affair, and Lord Eldon's comment, i. 34; difficulties with the King on the appointment of Major Stanhope, 240, 241 *n*; explanation of O'Connell's invitation to the Castle, 249; made Viceroy of Ireland, 262; his Irish policy denounced, 275, 276; sounds Dr. Murray on the tithe question, 298; supports Mr. Drummond's views on the tithe-rent charge, 298; on the weakness of the Ministry, 303; (now Lord Normanby) made Colonial Secretary, 314; inefficiency in the Colonial Office, 335
Munro, Captain, i. 21, 22
Muntz, Mr. appointed magistrate at Birmingham, i. 341
Murat, Joachim, i. 77
Murdoch, Mr., inventor of gas, i. 35 *n*
Mure, Miss, her marriage with Lord Ribblesdale, ii. 174
Murray, Dr., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, i. 298
Musgrave, Dr., made Archbishop of York, i. 476; ii. 116
Mussulman outrages in Roumelia, ii. 193
Musurus Pacha, ii. 185

NAPIER, General, i. 468
Napier, Lord, appointed to embassy at St. Petersburg, ii. 423 *n*
Napier, Mr. (editor of 'Edinburgh Review'), i. 386, 404
Naples, revolution in, ii. 45; 48; Sicilian revolt from, 50; 52
Napoleon I., endeavours to exclude British commerce from the Continent, i. 37; forces on Spain the partition of Portugal, 37; places his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne, 37; at Elba, 74, 75; motive for his return to France, 76

Napoleon, Louis, President, at war with the Chamber, ii. 132; his assumption of the imperial title, 176; his marriage, 177; acquiesces in Turkey's concessions to Russia, 192; views relating to Sweden, 218; refuses to accept the Austrian propositions regarding the Black Sea, 261; motives which may have swayed him, 263; attempt on his life, 294; irritated at the precipitation of events in Italy, 314; offers to mediate between the Northern and Southern States, 352; proposes a congress of the sovereigns of Europe, 381; his communication relative to French action in favour of Denmark, 390, 391
Narvaez, Señor, ii. 42
'Nashville,' the, ii. 344
National Society, i. 328
Navarino, battle of, i. 151
Navigation Acts, suspension of the, i. 441; Bill for repealing, ii. 93, 99, 100
Nesselrode, Count, on the occupation of the Principalities, ii. 188
Newcastle, Duke of, offered the Irish Viceroyalty, ii. 130 *n*; 143, 155; suggests that the term Whig should be dropped, 156; favours Lord Aberdeen for Prime Minister, 157; mediates with Mr. Monsell after Lord John's speech on the Irish Church, 173; 201; at the War Office, 219, 220; 229, 230, 231, 233, 236; succeeds Lord John as Minister in attendance on the Queen, 349 *n*; thinks the offer premature of English mediation between the Northern and Southern States, 352
Newgate, i. 331
Newman, Mr., i. 218; secession to the Church of Rome, 475, 477; Cardinal, ii. 116
Newport, Sir John, i. 308, 312, 335
Nicholas, Emperor of Russia, i. 152, 153; demands from Turkey protection for the Greek Church, ii 179; contemplates the partition of the Turkish Empire, 180; pretence for interference with Turkey, 187; unconditional acceptance of the Vienna Note, 188; refuses to accept the Turkish modification of the Note, 188; wishes to evacuate the Principalities, 188; attaches a different meaning to the Vienna Note from that of the allies who drew it up, 189; death of, 247

NIC

Nicholls, Mr. (Poor Law Commissioner), i. 272
Norbury, Lord, murder of, i. 315
Norfolk, Duke of, i. 434
Normanby, Lord, i. 133, 314, 335, 336; communication from M. Guizot on Spanish marriages, ii. 6; his quarrel with M. Guizot, 8; conversation with Lamartine, 37; his Italian sympathies, 47; on the inadequacy of the legislative machinery to deal with the business of the country and remedial proposals, 96; 132; instructions on the Coup d'état, 138; receives despatch from Palmerston approving of the Coup d'état, 139; 142; see Mulgrave, Lord
Northbrook, Lord, i. 3*n*
Northcote, Sir Stafford (afterwards Lord Iddesleigh), ii. 361
Nottingham Castle, burnt by rioters, i. 172
Novara, defeat of the Piedmontese at, ii. 45, 50*n*

Oaths, Parliamentary, Bill for altering, ii. 99
O'Brien, Smith, motion for a redress of Irish grievances, i. 389*n*; ii. 72, 73; subpœnas Lord John, 75
O Brien, Stafford, i. 447; his extravaganza on the Babes in the Wood, ii. 102
O'Connell, Daniel, agitating on Roman Catholic Emancipation in Ireland, i. 139; elected for Clare in place of Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald, 145, 146; urges the adoption of triennial Parliaments, universal suffrage, and vote by ballot, 154; repudiates smooth words, 182; refused office by the Whigs, 183; has no patience with the 'base, brutal, and bloody' Whigs, and demands an Irish Legislature, 185, 186; on Mr. Stanley's measure of Irish Church Reform, 193; denounces Mr. Littleton's tithe proposals, 198; on the surplus revenues of the Irish Church, 202; reveals the arrangement between himself and Mr. Littleton on the Irish Coercion Bill, 204, 205; letter on the judicial appointments, 206, 207; in concert with Lord John on the vote of the Irish party, 219–224; claims on the Melbourne Ministry, 233. 234; on tour in Scotland, demands the abolition of the House of Lords, 248; invited to the Castle

PAL

by the Viceroy, 248; the King's alarm thereat, 248, 249; scheme for 'reforming' the Lords, 251; on the introduction of tithes to Ireland, 257; his political progress viewed with alarm, 262; letter to Mr. Warburton on Irish matters, 273; desires to thrust the Municipal Bill in the forefront, 295; letter from Lord John thanking him for aid in his Irish policy, 321; arrest of, 394; estimate of the price at which Irish friendship might have been purchased, 396; his opinion of Lord John, 395; gratitude to Lord John for his speech on Irish affairs, 397; 457, 464
O'Ferrall, More, i. 452, 463
Ollivant, Dr., ii. 116
O'Loghlen, Serjeant, i. 206
Oporto, revolt in, ii. 8–12
Orangeism, i. 220; official, 262; Orange lodges in the United Kingdom and Canada, 263, 264; Mr. Hume's motion against, and Lord John's amendment, 264; Orangemen of Down attacked by Ribandmen at Dolly's Brae, ii. 84
Oranmore, Lord, quoted, ii. 210
'Oreto,' the (afterwards the 'Florida'), ii. 352
O'Rourke, Father, i. 440
Osborne, Mr., i. 29
Owen, Professor, on Lord John as a lecturer, ii. 275
Oxford, Bishop of (1847), i. 479

Pacifico, Don, his claims on the Greek Government, ii. 56–58
Page, Mr. (Westminster Master), i. 6
Palmer (actor), i. 7
Palmer, Mr. (of Luckley), marriage to Lady M. Sinclair, i, 15, 16
Palmer, Sir Roundell, on the 'Alabama' case, ii. 354
Palmerston, Lady, i. 155; thinks her husband's dismissal from the Foreign Office the result of a conspiracy, ii. 141; 201, 433, 434*n*
Palmerston, Lord, i. 29; votes for the disfranchisement of East Retford, 145; made Foreign Secretary in the Grey Ministry, 160; defeated in the Hampshire election, 211; Foreign Secretary in the Melbourne Ministry, 233; vote on the Irish Municipal Bill, 327*n*; supported by Lord John in urging the acceptance of the Treaty of July 1840, 346; strengthens the Mediterranean fleet, 347; in-

fluence as Lord Melbourne's brother-in-law, 349; policy towards France and the Four Powers in the Egypto-Turkish war, 351-353; attacks Lord John in the 'Chronicle,' 354; does not believe in the French threats of war, 356; is considered a dangerous man at the Foreign Office, 357; urges the reinstatement of the Pacha of Egypt, 358; rejects a conference of the Four Powers, 359; letter to Lord John defending Lord Ponsonby's action at the Porte, 361; triumph of his foreign policy, 362, 363; consequences of his high-handed method, 365; supports the Ten Hours clause in the Factories Bill, 399; objections to his return to the Foreign Office, 414-417; 420; approves of admitting Cobden to the Cabinet, 425; offers Mr. Charles Villiers a post at Rio, 426*n*; despatch to Mr. Bulwer on the Spanish marriages, &c., ii. 2; effects of that despatch at the French and Spanish Courts, 2, 3; note to the Spanish Government on its decision to hasten the marriages, 3; Mr. Wood's letter on his irritating foreign policy, 4; complaints from the French Government thereon, 5; protest to the Spanish Government against the Montpensier marriage, 7; action in the quarrel between Lord Normanby and M. Guizot, 8; distrusted by the Court, 8; letter from Lord John on the Oporto revolt, 9; Sir H. Seymour refuses to forward his claim to the Portuguese Government on behalf of Mr. Croft, 11*n*; threatens resignation thereon, 11; his epigrammatic phrase, that steamers have bridged the Channel, 15; urges the formation of the Militia, 15, 17; protests against delay in the scheme of national defence, 16; his objections to Mr. Fox Maule's scheme thereon, 18; private communication from the Russian Minister on the Schleswig-Holstein question, 43; unauthorised despatch on Spanish affairs, 43; his proposed measures against Spain rejected by the Cabinet, 45; his irritating despatch to Portugal, 45; amicable relations with the French ambassador, M. de Beaumont, 46; letter of remonstrance from Lord John, 46; complains of the Queen giving too ready credence to persons hostile to her Government, 47; permits an English contractor to furnish the Sicilian insurgents with arms, 51; apologises to the Neapolitan Government for this 'inadvertence,' 52; on ill terms with Lord Ponsonby, 53; assents to the passing through Lord John of all despatches submitted to the Queen, 53; letter to Lord John on the refugee Hungarians in Turkey, 54; 'squaring at Russia,' 56; instructs Admiral Parker to enforce claims on the Greek Government, 56; his unaltered despatch to Mr. Wyse, 57; letter from Lord John and his reply in the matter, 57, 58; assents to a compromise on the Greek imbroglio with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 59; is informed by Lord John of an intended change in the Foreign Department, 60; speech in the House in defence of his foreign policy, 62; receives a memorandum from the Queen on the relations of a Foreign Minister to his sovereign, 63; agrees with Lord John in the abolition of the Irish Viceroyalty, 88; mainly concerns himself with the business of his department, 90; secures support for his policy by subsidising a newspaper, 97; thinks Lord John's new Reform Bill premature, 102; congratulates Lord John on his speech on the slave trade, 107; on Lord John's Reform Bill, 130; advises him to postpone his visit to Paris, 132; sends an unauthorised despatch to Baron Koller, and is forced to withdraw it, 132; letter from Lord John urging him not to receive Kossuth, and his reply, 133; abandons his intention of seeing Kossuth, 136; receives addresses vilifying the Emperors of Austria and Russia, 136; correspondence with Lord John on this subject, 136, 137; justifies his approval of the Coup d'état, 138, 139; dismissal from the Foreign Office, 139; declines an offer of the Lord-Lieutenancy, 140; the true grounds of his dismissal from office, 141, 142; his 'tit for tat with John Russell,' on the Militia scheme, 144; declares he will never again serve under Lord John, 152; 157; his account of his conversation with the Duke of Bedford, 158; advice on the Russo-Turkish difficulty, 182; Lord John's memorandum laid before him, 186; pun on Reshid

PAL

Pacha, 187 *n*; against Lord John's scheme of Parliamentary Reform, 195; communicates his objections to Lord Aberdeen, 197; is informed by Lord Aberdeen that no material alterations can be made in the Bill, 198; resignation, 199; withdraws his resignation, 201; public opinion of the causes of his resignation, 202; tries to postpone the introduction of Lord John's Reform Bill, 204; will resign if it is proceeded with, 207; letter to Lord John on the subject, 208; his *beau idéal* of the results of the Crimean war, 214; approves of the subsidising of Sweden in the war with Russia, 218; bent on sending an expedition to the Crimea, 223; proposed by Lord John as the head of the War Department, 229; doubts the expediency of abolishing the office of Secretary-at-War, 231; sent for by the Queen to form a Government, 241; succeeds in reconstructing the old Administration, 241; his letters to Lord John relative to the Vienna Conference, 243; invites him to take office on reconstruction of Cabinet, 245; his pleasure on the acceptance of office by Lord John, 247; personally entreats Lord John to remain in the Government, 263; his letter on the latter's resignation of office, 267; defeats a motion for the reduction of county franchise, 285; defeated on Mr. Cobden's resolution on the conduct of his Government in the 'Arrow' affair, 288; announces the intention of dissolving Parliament, 288; his opinion of Lord John's speech in answer to Mr. Disraeli, 293; is defeated on the Bill for the alteration of the Conspiracy Laws, 295; his letter to Lord Granville on the Liberal leadership, 305; assents to the Queen's suggestion to serve under Lord Granville, 306; sent for again by the Queen to form a Government, 308; seeks the assistance of Lord John, and gives the latter the Foreign Office, 309; agrees with Lord John's policy of 'Italy for the Italians,' 312; informs the Queen that the non-adoption of his Italian policy may lead to resignation, 312; his apprehensions regarding Reform, 330; his remark on the Emperor Napoleon's desire for a simultaneous declaration in England and France

PEE

of the Commercial Treaty, 333 *n*; receives a communication from Lord Derby relative to Conservative support, 334; thinks that in the civil war in America 'our best and true policy is to go on as we have begun and keep clear of the conflict,' 344; letters to and from Lord Russell on the state of affairs in America, 349, 350; his action in the Schleswig-Holstein affair in 1850, 374, and *n*; letter to Lord Russell on the separation of the two questions, 388; his opinion of the Prussians as soldiers, 388 *n*; not prepared to go to war in favour of Denmark without a substantial alliance, 389; his answer to Lord John's memorandum relative to the united action of France and Great Britain, 390 *n*; he and Lord Russell in favour of stronger measures than their colleagues, 391; his death, 406

Panizzi, Signor, on Lord John as a lecturer, ii. 274

Parga, ceded to the Turks, i. 109 *n*

Paris, coup d'état in, ii. 138

Parker, Admiral Sir W., ii. 55, 56

Parker, Mr., defeats Lord John in the election for Devonshire, i. 234

Parkes, Joseph, ii. 157

Parr, Dr., i. 55

Pasolini, Count, ii. 422

Patten, Rt. Hon. J. Wilson (Lord Winmarleigh), i. 168, 169

Pattison, Mr., elected for London, i. 457 *n*

Peel, Archibald (third son of General Peel), marries Lord John's eldest daughter, ii. 430

Peel, General, i. 270; ii. 174 *n*

Peel, Lady, declines a public funeral for her husband and a peerage for herself, ii. 110

Peel, Lady Georgiana (Lord John's eldest daughter), ii. 276, 433

Peel, Sir Robert, his abilities contrasted with those of Lord John, i. 104; opposed to Reform, 128; retires from the Canning Ministry, 133; in the Wellington administration, 138; defeated by Lord John on the Religious Disabilities question, 142; annoyance at the vote of his colleagues on East Retford, 145; anger of the extreme Tories against him for his part in Roman Catholic emancipation, 148; 153; action on Lord John's first Reform Bill, 166; opposition to the third Reform Bill,

177; compliment from Lord John, 178 *n*; on the Church in Ireland, 202; his Ministry in 1834, 211; issue of the Tamworth Manifesto, 211; cannot command a majority in the Commons, 214; responsible, by accepting office, for the policy of his sovereign, 217; defeated on Lord Morpeth's amendment to the Address, 218; Liberals prepared to give his Ministry a fair trial, 225; resignation, 228; breadth of his policy and skill in administration, 228; moderation on the Municipal Corporations Bill, 245; proposal to deal with the tithe system, 257; thinks that marriage with Dissenters should be a civil contract, 259; action in the Canadian difficulty, 296; Lord John seeks a compromise with him on the Tithes Bill, 299; his ministerial policy paralleled by Lord John, 301; takes no pains to win the goodwill of his followers, 304; urged to moderation in opposition in the debate on Irish affairs, 315; sent for by the Queen to form a Ministry, insists on the removal of the ladies of the household, 320; communication from Mr. Abercromby on his resignation of the Speakership, 322; reforms in the Criminal Code, 331; supports Lord John on the question of Privilege, 343; moves a vote of want of confidence in the Melbourne Ministry, 374; decides on Mr. Lefevre's re-election as Speaker, 381; measures introduced by him in 1842, 385; accused of coquetting with Free Trade, 388; introduces an Arms Act, 388; dealing with the sugar question, 398; his Budget of 1845, 400; his Irish measures, 400; action on the failure of the potato crop, 406; 409; resignation, 411; resuscitates his old Ministry, 420; proposition for arbitration in the American dispute, 421; defeated on Coercion, and resigns, 422; 430; his practice of conferring peerages for merit only, 457, 458; gives support to the Whig Ministry, 459; basis of his Coercion Act, 465; contrast between his and Lord John's coercive measures, 471, 472; his policy towards France, ii. 13; Duke of Wellington's memorandum to, on England's relations with France and the United States, 14; influenced by the Duke to adopt a scheme of national defence, 14–16; his draft Bill for reviving the Militia, 16; his last debate in the House, 62; weakening of his distrust of Lord John, 98; interchange of views with Lord John on Horace's Odes, 108; death of, 109; his monument in Westminster Abbey, 110; 124, 144, 146, 163; Lord Shaftesbury's opinion of him, 275

Peirce, Mr., i. 5

Pelham, Mr., i. 160

Pellico, Silvio, ii. 48

Pembroke, Lady, i. 449

Pennefather, Mr., i. 184

Penryn, bribery at, i. 119, 143, 144

Pepys, Sir C. (Master of the Rolls), made Chancellor, i. 252, 253

Perceval, Spencer, i. 28, 30; attempts to 'conquer France by depriving it of bark,' 35 *n*; satirised by Lord John, 48 *n*; confers a restricted Regency on the Prince of Wales, 49; his Ministry's return to power celebrated by Lord John in a parody, 50 *n*; murder of, 57

Perrin, Judge, i. 463

Perry, Mr. (editor of the 'Morning Chronicle'), i. 123

Persigny, Count (French ambassador in London), ii 310, 311, 321

Peterloo, the affair at, i. 115

Petty, Lord H. (afterwards Lord Lansdowne), Chancellor of the Exchequer, i. 17, 18, 26; defeated in the contest for Cambridge University, 29, 30; see Lansdowne, Lord

Peyton (Westminster scholar), i. 7

Philipps, Sir R. B., made a peer, i. 457, 458

Piedmont, her part in the Italian revolt against Austria, ii. 39

Pitt, Rt. Hon. William, i. 12, 17, 84, 458

Playfair, Professor, i. 43–45, 54–57, 60, 78; ii. 111, 279

Plunket, Lord, i. 117, 463

Pocklington, Mr., i. 31

Polhill, Mr., i. 155 *n*

Polignac, Prince de, i. 156, 157

Ponsonby, Captain, i. 24

Ponsonby, Colonel, i. 30

Ponsonby, Frederick, i. 132

Ponsonby, Lady Emily, quoted, i. 451 *n*

Ponsonby, Lady Fanny, i. 5

Ponsonby, Lord, bet with Lord John, i. 54 *n*; advises the Sultan to reject Mehemet Ali's propositions, 352;

proposes the deposition of Mehemet Ali, 355; extends the blockade of Alexandria, 359; conduct defended by Lord Palmerston, 360, 361; tension between him and Palmerston, ii. 53
Ponsonby, Mr., i. 5, 108
Pope (actor), i. 8
Pope, General, ii. 348
Pope, the, forced to quit Rome, ii. 25, 78; issues a Bull dividing England into twelve sees, 119; quoted, 329 *n*
Porchester, Lord, motion for an inquiry into the Walcheren expedition, i. 48 *n*
Porte, the, and the Montenegrin insurrection, ii. 177; the Russian demands from, for protection of the Greek Church, 179; urged by Sir Stratford de Redcliffe to reject them, 179; alterations in the Vienna Note, 185; advised to make concessions to Russia, 192; outrages by its Mussulman on its Christian subjects, 193; destruction of fleet at Sinope, 199
Portland, Duke of, i. 28
Portugal, 'England's hereditary ally,' i. 37; partition of, by Napoleon, 37; the convention of Cintra, 38; again occupied by the French, 40; insurrection in, ii. 8–12; affairs in, 42
Portugal, Maria, Queen of, her relations with the English Court, ii. 8; unpopularity of her husband, 8; appeals for intervention by the Powers on the rebellion of her subjects, 9; arbitrary measures of her advisers, 10, 11
Potato famine in Ireland, i. 406, 431, 435, 437; ii. 76
Poyntz, Mr., i. 136 *n*
Presbyterians, the, in Ulster, ii 76
Preston, Lord, i. 5, 8; see Ludlow, Lord
Prince Regent, birthday of, i. 23; restrictions on his appointment, 49; see George IV.
Privy Council, judgment in the Gorham case, ii. 117, 118
Prudhoe, Lord, i. 458
Prussia, King of, ii. 247
Prussia, Prince of Emperor William), ii. 247
Pusey, Mr., ii. 216
Pym, Mr., i. 29

Quaade, M., his opinion on the Danish question, ii. 385 *n*
Quadruple Treaty, the, ii. 9–11

Radetzky, Marshal, ii. 38; defeats the Piedmontese at Novara, 45, 46
Radical party, action of the, in Parliament, i. 116, 122, 266; nickname Lord John 'Finality Jack,' 290
Raglan, Lord, i. 35; ii. 235
Railways in Ireland, i. 443
Rancliffe, Lord, i. 156
Rattazzi, Signor, visited by Lord John, ii. 277; his Cabinet, 317
Rawdon, Colonel, i. 92
Rawdon, Miss, marriage to Lord William Russell, i. 92; Byron's encomium on her beauty, 92; see Russell, Lady William
Rawdon, Mrs., i. 230 *n*
Rechberg, Count (Austrian Foreign Minister), ii. 312, 316, 321
Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de; see Canning, Sir Stratford
Redington, Sir T., 451 *n*; illness of, ii. 70; consulted by Lord John on the endowment of the Roman Catholic clergy, 76; his scheme for bringing this about, 77
Reeve, Mr. H., i. 461; quoted, ii. 8
Reform Bill, the first, rejected in the Commons, i. 166; the second, carried in the Commons, 169; thrown out by the Lords, 172; the third, passed in the Commons, 175; defeated in the Lords, 177; passed and receives the royal assent, 178, 179; pamphlet on the principles of the, 318; ii. 102, 130, 143, 204, 205, 296, 410
Registration of births, marriages, and deaths, established, i. 259
Reshid Pacha (Prime Minister to the Sultan), ii. 187; Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's warning to, 193
Retford, East, bribery at, i. 143, 144, 145
Rianzares, Señor, ii. 3
Ribblesdale, Lady, her children by her first husband, i. 229; married to Lord John, 231; death of, 310
Ribblesdale, Thomas, (third Lord), i. 229, 386, 402; ii. 121; reply to Lord John's remonstrance on his purchase of General Peel's race-horses, 174 *n*; marriage with Miss Mure, 174; hires Lord John's estate of Rodborough manor, 266; death of, 451
Rich, Mrs., ii. 217
Richmond, Duke of, i. 165, 177, 200, 201, 204
Ripon, Lord, i. 200, 204
Roden, Lord, moves for a committee

on Irish affairs, i. 315; visit from Orangemen on the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne, and its results, ii. 84; his name struck out of the commission of the peace, 85
Roe, Mr., i. 463
Roebuck, Mr., i. 439; his motion approving Palmerston's policy in the Greek dispute, ii. 62; his criticism of the Irish policy of the Whig administration in 1849, 84; motion approving Palmerston's foreign policy, 107; motion on the conduct of the Crimean war, 237; motion in opposition to Government carried, 241; gives notice of motion based on report of the Sebastopol committee, 268
Rogers, Rev. William, ii. 463 *n*
Rogers, Samuel, i. 131 *n*; anecdote of, 137 *n*; 176 *n*, 287, 288
Roman Catholics, disabilities of, i. 129, 394; emancipation of, 139, 146, 183; endowment of their clergy, in Ireland, proposed, ii. 65, 77
Rome, occupied by the French, ii. 53
Romilly, Lady G. (Lord John's half-sister), i. 58
Romilly, Sir Samuel, i. 108, 463
Roscoe, Mr., i. 30
Rose, Colonel (chargé d'affaires at the Porte), summons the British fleet, ii. 179
Rose, Right Hon. George, i. 48 *n*, 123
Ross, Mr., ii. 101 *n*
Rossi, M., ii. 38
Rothschild, Baron, i. 456, 457; ii. 93, 150 *n*; acknowledges Lord John's services on behalf of the Jews, 299
Rouher, M., ii. 394
Roumelia, Mussulman outrages in, ii. 193
Rowan, Colonel (Commissioner of Police), ii. 68
Royal Society, the, ii. 145
Russell, Agatha (Lord John's daughter), ii. 174
Russell, Francis Albert Rollo (Lord John's youngest son), ii. 101, 276
Russell, Francis (Lord John's uncle William's eldest son), i. 36
Russell, Georgiana Adelaide (daughter of Lord John), i. 270; see Peel
Russell, Gertrude (Lord John's uncle William's eldest daughter), i. 36, 57, 156
Russell, Lady John (Lord John's first wife); see Ribblesdale, Lady
Russell, Lady John (Lady Fanny Elliot), second wife of Lord John, i. 378; birth of a son (John), 387; attacked by fever, 390; lines on her husband's fifty-first birthday, 391; verses to Lord John and his reply, 401, 402; illness at Edinburgh, 403; urges him to accept the Premiership, 410; reminiscences of him, 433, 434; recovery from serious illness, 448; account of her life at Pembroke Lodge, Richmond, 449; her diary quoted, 461; quoted on Irish affairs, 472; reading to her husband at St. Leonard's, ii. 26; on Lord Palmerston, 46; quoted, 69; birth of her second son, 70; on a tour in Ireland with her husband, 74; her husband's dog-Latin letter to her, 93 *n*; on the interview between Lord John and Sir James Graham touching the offer of the Admiralty, 98; birth of a third son, 101; 106; lines on her husband, 112; on the Scotch tour, 113; account of her husband's home life and social gifts, 111; description of a tour with him in Wales, 131; illness of, 155; on the effect of office on her husband's health, 162; on his acceptance of office in the Aberdeen Ministry, 164; note on his tenure of the Foreign Office, 167; 169; birth of her only daughter, 174; story of Palmerston, 187 *n*; quoted, 211; visits her sick sister Harriet at Paris, 236; opinion of her husband's mode of resignation, 237; her lines on the marriage of her step-daughter, 335; joy at the termination of her husband's official career, 421; on his failing health, 445; letters of condolence from the Queen and Lord Beaconsfield on the death of her husband, 452
Russell, Lady Rachel, letters of, i. 103
Russell, Lady Victoria (daughter of Lord John), i. 310, 343 *n*, 410 *n*; her marriage to Mr. Villiers, ii. 335; her mother's lines on the event, 335
Russell, Lady William (daughter of the fourth Earl of Jersey), death of, i. 36
Russell, Lady William (Lord John's sister-in-law), her marriage, i. 92; illness of, 150; letter to Lord John in answer to an offer of his official residence at Whitehall, 164
Russell, Lord Arthur, i. 2
Russell, Lord Charles (Serjeant-at-arms), ii. 203
Russell, Lord Edward, private secretary to Lord John, i. 323

Russell, Lord John, at the age of eleven, 1; inherited bad health, 3; early days at Stratton Park, 3; at school at Sunbury, 4; his mother's letter 'to the best of all good boys,' 4; death of his mother, 4; his father becomes Duke of Bedford, 4; extracts from his journal, 5; accident when out shooting, 5; at Westminster School, 6; first school flogging, 6; plays Tom Thumb at Westminster, 7; record of a week's holiday from school, 8; 'fagged' by his brother, Lord Tavistock, 9; his views on 'public school' life, 9–10; at a prize fight in Tothill Fields, 10; leaves Westminster, and has for private tutor Dr. Cartwright, 11; his tutor's method of instruction, 11; early essays at dramatic composition, 11, 12; starts a commonplace book, 11; his first volume of poetry dedicated to Rt. Hon. W. Pitt, 12; his later opinion of Pitt's policy, 12 *n*; with Mr. Smith, vicar of Woodnesboro', 13; friendships formed at Woodnesboro', 13; starts a diary, 13; order of life at the new school, 13; dinners as a boy of twelve, 14; at the theatre at Sandwich, 14; betting at school, 14; juvenile satire on Lord Melville, 15; physical characteristics at the age of thirteen, 15 *n*; recess at Woburn, 15; in private theatricals at Kimbolton, 15; poem on the marriage of Lady Madalina Sinclair, 15; letter from his father, inclosing money, with instructions for its disbursement, 16; account book entry of said disbursement, 16; playing in private theatricals at Woburn, 16; a prologue written at thirteen, 17; parody on the dagger scene in 'Macbeth,' based on Lord Hawkesbury's proposed successorship to Pitt, 17; epigram on Lord H. Petty, 18; poem on the fall of the Tories, 18; five nights out of eight at theatre in London, 18; shooting and horsemanship, 19; history of 'Mrs. Witty' (his dog), 19; cost of her keep, 20; suspicious death of 'Mrs. W.,' 20; backward in his studies, 21; translations of Virgil and Horace, 21; holiday-making, 21; hard on Lord Melville, 22; at the sheep-shearing at Woburn, 22; in Ireland at the Viceregal Lodge, 23; costume at a fancy ball, 23; physical characteristics at fourteen, 24; his new journal and account book, 24; at Woodnesboro', 24; journal entry on Fox's death, 24; remarks on Jones's 'Letters from a Tutor,' 25; on Yeates's 'Conversations on Chemistry' and Lord Holland's 'Lope de Vega,' 25; too bad a shot to keep a game book, 25 *n*; references to the general election and to Napoleon, 25; attractions of the playhouse, 26; at Holland House, considers Sydney Smith 'very amusing,' Charles Fox 'a very clever boy,' 26; again in Ireland, 26; writes a prologue for theatricals, and appears as an old woman at the ball at the Royal Hospital, 27; back at Woodnesboro', 27; keen interest in the general election of 1807, 29; letter on the Bedfordshire election from Dr. Cartwright, 29; on tour in England and Scotland with his parents, 30; in the Lake Country, 30; his criticism of Dr. Watson, 30; encounters a Yorkshire utilitarian on the banks of Derwentwater, 31; meets Sir Walter Scott, 31; cost of his journey from Ayton to Woodnesboro', 33; his political opinion of the Duke of Gloucester, 34; on the Copenhagen expedition, 34; rook-shooting, 35, and *n*; at Woburn, 35; at Lord Tavistock's wedding, 36; course of his studies at Woodnesboro', 36; Lord and Lady Holland's proposition of a tour in Spain, 36; his sympathy with Spain and hatred of Napoleon, 38; at Coruña, 39; abandonment of the line of tour in consequence of the French advance, 39; arrives at Lisbon, 39; description of the cavalcade *en route*, 40; at Seville, 40; detained by fever at Badajoz, 41; return to England, 41; dissatisfaction with Whig Opposition on the subject of Spain, 42; course of his studies while on the Spanish tour, 42; acquisition of languages, 43; at Edinburgh with Professor Playfair, 44; his estimate of the Professor, 44; course of study at Edinburgh, 45; elected a member of the Speculative Society, 46; interference with his studies through sickliness of constitution, 46; debates and work in the Speculative Society, 47; his article in the 'Whig Register' (?) on Parliamentary Reform, 48; parody of 'Lochiel's Warning,' 48 *n*; con-

trast of his early and later views on the conduct of reform, 49; political parody on the Witches' Chorus in 'Macbeth,' 50 *n*; second visit to the Peninsula, 51; at Gibraltar, 51; disapproves of proclamations offering rewards for deserters from the French, 51; at Cadiz, his letter to his father on Spanish affairs, and his brother William's postscript, 52 and *n*; interview with Sir Arthur Wellesley at head-quarters in the lines of Torres Vedras, 53; reads a paper on the proceedings of the Spanish Cortes at the Speculative Society, 54; on tour through the manufacturing towns of England with Professor Playfair, 55; opinion of Dr. Parr, 55; views on English manufactures and manufacturers, 56; his return to Edinburgh University, 57; lines on Dugald Stewart, 57; drilling with Militia in Bedfordshire, 57; another foreign tour, 58; unexpectedly meets his brother William at Portsmouth, 58 *n*; his twentieth birthday at sea, 59; a new diary of his fifth tour, 59; in Portugal, 60; on the battle-field of Salamanca, 62; mixed up with the retreating British army, 63; on the battle-field of Barrosa, 64; an evening adventure, 64; 67; reaches his brother at headquarters, 67; illness *en route*, 67, 68; engages a servant, 68; their travelling aspect, 68; the priest's Latin syllogism at Plasencia, 68 *n*; member for Tavistock, 70; at Saragossa, 71; at Wellington's head-quarters at Vera, 72; his song on Spanish women, 72 *n*; return to England, 72; opposes in Parliament the forced union of Norway and Sweden, and the renewal of the Alien Acts, 73; becomes a member of Grillion's Club, 73; tour in Italy, 74; interview with Napoleon at Elba, 74; views on Italian art, 76 *n*; reports the popular feeling in Italy to be in favour of Napoleon, 77; at Bologna and Modena, where fighting prevails, 77; notes the sharp contrast between the German and Italian races, 78; protests in Parliament against a new war, 78; summary of his career from boyhood to manhood, 78-80; lines from an essay on Vanity, 80; denounces the bloated national expenditure, 85; opposes income-tax

successfully, 85, 86, and army estimates unsuccessfully, 86; infrequent appearance in the House, 87; speech against suspension of Habeas Corpus Act, 89; withdrawal from Parliamentary life, 91; Mr. Moore's 'Remonstrance,' 91; attractions of society on the Continent, 92; meditates abandoning politics for travel and letters, 92; works published by him from 1819 to 1829, 93; rarity of his 'Letters written for the Post and not for the Press,' 94; 'The Nun of Arrouca,' 94, 123; success of his 'Essays and Sketches,' 95; illustration of his literary style, 95; rank as an essayist and as a poet, 96; his tragedy 'Don Carlos,' 97, 98; translation of Fifth Book of the Odyssey, 98-100; historical works, 100:—'English Government and Constitution,' 100; 'Life of William, Lord Russell,' 101, 102; 'Causes of the French Revolution,' 102; his standing as an historian, 102; 'Affairs of Europe,' 103; 'Turks in Europe,' 103; qualified appreciation of his historical works by the public, 104; appreciation by his friends, 105; poem suggested by the early reviews of his works, 105-107; again elected for Tavistock, 108; parliamentary speeches in 1819, 109; on the cession of Parga, 109; on Parliamentary Reform, 109; letter to Lord Holland on foreign politics, 110; political advice from his father, 111; letter from Lord Dudley on 'Doulocracy' at Cassiobury, 111; another foreign tour, 111; offer of pecuniary help to Moore, 112; accompanied by Moore to the continent, 113; sonnet to Madame Durazzo on leaving Genoa, 114 *n*; recall by his party to Parliament, 116; his resolutions for the disfranchisement of Grampound, 117, 118; is for moderate against radical Reform, 118 *n*; his Bill for suspending the issue of writs to Penryn, Camelford, Grampound, and Barnstaple, 119, 120; sits for Huntingdonshire in the Parliament of 1820, 120; petition to the King on the introduction of the Bill of Pains and Penalties, 121; independence of Court favour, 121 *n*; taciturnity in society, 122; parody on William Spencer's 'The Year 1806,' 123-124; reintroduces

the Grampound Bill, 124; met by Stuart Wortley's amendment, 125; resolutions on bribery and the direct representation of populous places, 126; his Bill for the suppression of bribery, 128; defeated in his canvass of Huntingdonshire, 129; commits his Bribery Bill to the charge of Lord Althorp, 129; letter to Lord Althorp on bribery, 130; another continental tour, 131; translates Fifth Book of Odyssey at Geneva, 131; offered the Irish borough of Bandon Bridge by the Duke of Devonshire and elected, 132; Moore dedicates his 'Epicurean' to him, 133; writes a 'smart' prologue for private theatricals in Florence, 133 *n*; supports the Canning Ministry of 1827, 134; letter to Moore on Canning's death, 136; his anecdote of Rogers, 137 *n*; the champion of religious liberty, 139; motion supporting the demands of Dissenters and Roman Catholics, 140-142; passage in the Commons of his Bill for disfranchising Penryn and enfranchising Manchester, 144; the same rejected by the Lords, 145; addresses the King for the settlement of the Roman Catholic emancipation question, 146; proposal of a Central Association for organising the country and for petitioning Parliament in favour of religious liberty, 147; letter to Lord Lansdowne on the Catholic question, 148; asked by an extreme Tory to reintroduce his Reform Bill, 148; writes 'The Captive of Alhama,' 149; extract from his 'The Bee and the Fly,' 149 *n*; letter from Madame Durazzo on his rumoured intended marriage, 150; letters from his brother William on the same subject, 150; at Geneva, 150; his opinion of the battle of Navarino, 151; letter from Lord Holland on Russian ascendency, 152; his motion on behalf of Greece, 153; rejection of his Bill to allow Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham to return members, 154; fails in general election of 1830, 155; in Paris, 155; efforts on behalf of the Prince de Polignac, 156-157; offered the Paymaster-generalship by Lord Grey, 158; address to the electors of Tavistock, 160; his only official act of importance in the four years of the Paymaster-generalship, 162;

salary attached thereto, 162; his London and country residences, 163; time spent on the Continent, 163 *n*; his first dinner-party and the guests thereat, 164 and *n*; letter from Lady William Russell declining the offer of his official residence, 164; invited by Lord Durham to frame a plan of Parliamentary Reform, 165; his plan of Reform, 165; his speech and its reception on the introduction of the first Reform Bill, 166; sanguine letter to Moore on its chances of passing, 167; elected for Devon, 169; introduces his second Reform Bill, which is carried through the Commons, 169-170; admitted to the Cabinet, 169; demonstration of Liberals on his handing the Bill to the Lord Chancellor, 171; banquet at the Thatched House Tavern, 171; the Bill is thrown out by the Lords, 172; letter to the Birmingham meeting, 172; letter to William IV. apologising for calling the majority of the House of Lords a faction, and the King's reply, 173; introduces and carries the third Reform Bill, 174; criticism of House of Lords on their treatment of his Reform Bill, 178; Lord Lyttelton's verses to him, 179; offer to Sir Walter Scott, 180; again elected for Devonshire on the dissolution of the Grey administration, 181; on carrying Reform, 181; letter to Moore on liberal measures to the Irish, 182; publication of 'Causes of the French Revolution,' 182 *n*; views on Irish policy, 183, 185; favours coercive legislation in Ireland, 186; letter to Moore in answer to his 'Paddy's Metamorphosis,' 187; letters to Lord Grey on the insufficiency of the proposed Bill for Irish Church Reform, and offering to resign, 188, 189; letter from Lord Grey submitting the matter to Lord Holland, 190; Lord Holland's letter of advice on his proposed resignation, 191; opposes triennial Parliaments, 193, 194; letter from his father on that subject, 194; visits Ireland, 195; letters to Moore from Ireland, 195; entertained at a public dinner at Belfast, 196; conclusions formed on his Irish tour, 197 *n*; opinions on the Church in Ireland, 198 *n*, 199; 'upsets the coach,' 199, 200; declares Irish Church Reform to be the principle of the Government's existence, 201; on

RUS

coercion, 202; speech on his own position towards the policy of the Government, 203: Moore's letter on the subject and his reply, 203; letter to Lord Melbourne on the assembling of Parliament, on Lord Grey's resignation, and the policy of the Government, 205; his appointment as leader of the House opposed by the King, 208; letter from Lord Tavistock, 208; letter from the King and from the Chelsea College establishment on his leaving office, 209; letter to Moore, 210; re-elected for the southern division of Devonshire, 211; his speech at Totnes, 212, 213; leader of the Opposition in the Peel ministry, 214; difficulties of his new position, 214; speech on the Speakership, 215, 216; his speech on the amendment to the Address, 217,218; letter in reply to his circular from O'Connell promising the co-operation of the Irish party, 220; draft reply to O'Connell, 221; Lord Duncannon's letter on the same subject, 222; letter from Lord Grey on the concert of the Whigs with the Irish party and the Radicals, 224; refuses Hume's proposition to limit supplies, and desires to give the Peel ministry a fair trial, 225; raises the question of the Irish Church as an *experimentum crucis*, 225-227; forces Sir Robert Peel to resign, 225; marriage to Lady Ribblesdale, 229, 231; letter from Lord Melbourne, 232; made Home Secretary, 233; proposes that O'Connell should take office, 233; defeated in his canvass for Devonshire, 234; elected for Stroud, 235; letter to Moore offering a pension to his sons, 235; his part in the Londonderry ambassadorship incident, 236; letter from Moore, 237; procures a pension for Moore, 238; disliked by William IV., 239; communication from the King on the proposed reduction of the Militia staff, 241 *n*; refuses to undertake the question of Church rates, 242; introduces the Corporation Bill, 243; affection for Lord Stanley, 244 *n*; the Lords' amendments to his Corporation Bill, 244; the Bill passed, 245; failure of his health, 247; goes to Endsleigh, 247; his explanation to the King of O'Connell's invitation to the Castle, 249; speech at Plymouth

RUS

on the conduct of the Lords, 250; testimonial from the Reformers of Bristol, 250; approval by the King of his Plymouth and Bristol addresses, 251; advocates the appointment of a permanent judge in equity, poor opinion of equity lawyers, 253; attacked with fever, 253; Disraeli's attacks upon him in the 'Runnymede Letters,' 254; Disraeli's opinion later on, 255; on committees to 'consider the whole case of the Dissenters' and the English tithe system, 257; carries the Tithes Commutation Bill, 257, 258; carries the Registration Bill, 260; his Marriage Bill, 260; letter from Lord Melbourne on his proposal for the admission of Dissenters to the Universities, 260 *n*; legislation on behalf of the Church, 261; on the assistance of military and police in tithe-collecting in Ireland, 263; his amendment to Mr. Hume's motion against Orangeism, 264; paper on the attitude of the Peers, 266; proposes the creation of Liberal peers, 267, 268; death of his wife's mother, 269; birth of a daughter, Georgiana Adelaide, 270; sketch of his life at home, 270; education of his children, 271; introduces the Irish Municipal Bill, 275; speech on Irish policy, 275, 276; agreement with Lord Melbourne on abandoning the Appropriation Clause, 276; introduces a measure on Irish Poor Law, 277; his Irish Municipal Bill, 277; views on the Church Rate Bill, 278; illness, 279; vacillation on the Municipal Bill, 280; returned for Stroud, 282; speech on Reform, 282-284; Lord Melbourne's letter on the Queen's private secretary, 284 *n*; letters to Lord Melbourne on the ministerial position, 285, 286; advocates the ballot, 286; letter from Sydney Smith, 287, 288 *n*; dines with the Queen at Brighton, 288; speeches advocating moderate action in Reform, 289, 290; named 'Finality Jack' by the Radicals, 290; his attitude on Reform defended by Lord Brougham, 291; memorandum to the Cabinet on election petitions, 292; letter from Lord Melbourne on Irish legislation, 293; introduces the Poor Law and Municipal Bills, 293; resolutions on the Canadian griev-

RUS

ances, 294; at Windsor with the Queen, 295; announces the suspension of the Canadian constitution, 295; opposes the ballot, 295; letter from Lord Spencer on the division on Mr. Grote's motion for the Ballot, 296; rumour of his resignation, 296; propositions on the tithe question, 298; consults the Primate of Ireland, 298; compromise with the Opposition on the Tithe Bill and Municipal Reform, 299, 300; parallel lines of his policy with that of Sir Robert Peel, 301; high opinion of contemporaries of his paramount ability in the Melbourne Ministry, 303; behaviour to his followers in question, 304, 305; letter from his father, 304; Lord Lytton's lines on him, 305; at Grillion's, 305; warm friendship with Lord Stanley, 305 *n*; speech on the Durham Bill of Indemnity, 307; letter to Lord Melbourne on the reconstruction of the Cabinet, 308; letter to Lord Melbourne on the situation in Canada, 309, 310; birth of a second daughter, Lady Victoria Villiers; death of his first wife, 310; sympathy and condolence on his loss, 311; letter from King Leopold, 311 *n*; urges the retirement of Lord Glenelg from the Colonial Office, 313; assists in making changes in the personnel of the administration, 314; his conduct of the debate on Irish government, 316; his loss of popularity, 317, 318; pamphlet on the principles of the Reform Act, 318; letter from and interview with the Queen on the resignation of the Melbourne ministry, 319; espouses the Queen's view on the removal of the ladies of the Royal household, 320 *n*; letter to O'Connell thanking him for his parliamentary support, 321; resumption of office, 322; action in county franchise and the ballot, 324-326; memorandum on the Irish Municipal Bill, 327 *n*; speech on education, 327; connection with educational societies, 329 *n*; proposals on behalf of educational progress and their reception, 329, 330; his prison reforms, 330; purges the criminal code of many capital offences, 331; on transportation, 332; on penitentiaries and reformatories, 332; police reforms, 332, 333; constitution of constabulary in Manchester and Birmingham, 333; on the government

RUS

of Ireland, 333 *n*; on the loquacity of magistrates, 334 *n*; vexed at the resignation of Lord Howick, 337; at the Colonial Office, 337; letter from Sir J. Stephen on an attack in the 'Quarterly,' 337 *n*; contemporary compliments on his management of the Colonial Office, 338, 339; speech on the colonial empire, 339; death of his father, 340; at Buckhurst with his children, 340, 342; accused of having encouraged Chartism, 341; supports Sir E. Wilmot's motion regarding juvenile offenders, 342; on privilege, 343; his 'Bellman Rhymes,' 344; on a visit to Lord Minto, 344; thoughts of Lady Fanny Elliot, 345; confers with the Duke of Wellington on the military force in the Mediterranean, 346; letters sent to him on the French war crisis, 347; his memorandum to Lord Melbourne with propositions on the situation, 348; Lord Spencer's letters deprecating his resignation, 350; appeal from Mr. Hume against a war, 351; urges the acceptance of Mehemet Ali's proposition by the Sultan, 352; appeal from Lord Melbourne not to bring on a ministerial crisis, 352; interview with the Queen and adoption of a compromise with Lord Melbourne, 354; letter of remonstrance to Lord Melbourne, 354-356; letter from and to Lord Palmerston on the subject, 356, 357; urges conciliation and open dealing with France, 357; his sorrow at the death of Lord Holland, 358; letters to Lord Melbourne on Lord Palmerston's high-handed proceedings, 359; defence of Lord Holland's memory, 359; advocates the removal of Lord Ponsonby from the Porte, 360; letter from Lord Palmerston, defending Lord Ponsonby, 360-362; on the late delivery of despatches, 363; deals with the customs tariff, 365-367; memorandum for his colleagues on the Corn Laws, 368; moves for a committee on the Corn Laws, 369; letters of approval of his speech, 370-372; letter from Lord Spencer foretelling defeat, 372; urged to proceed with the Sugar Bill, 373; advises dissolution, 374; invitation from the Liberals of London to contest the City, 375; returned for London, 376; address on his past and future policy, 376; marriage to Lady Fanny Elliot,

RUS

378; receipt of a 'Border Ballad' from his wife's mother, 379; presented with the freedom of the borough at Selkirk, 380; letter from the Queen on his resignation, 381; Lord Sydenham's dying words and legacy to him, 382; difficulties in Opposition, 384, 385; literary work at Endsleigh, 386; birth of his eldest son, John, 387; opposes an Arms Act, 388; lines from his wife on his fifty-first birthday, 391; translation of Dante's Inferno, 391–394; O'Connell's opinion of his Irish policy, 396; motion on Irish Reform, 396; proposal to endow the Irish Roman Catholic clergy, 397; thanked by O'Connell for his speech, 397; action on the sugar question, 398; supports the Maynooth Bill, 400; illness of his wife, 401; nonsense verses from his wife, 401; his rhymed reply, 402; illness of his wife at Edinburgh, 403; receives freedom of the city of Edinburgh, 403; writes an article for the 'Edinburgh Review' on Lord Spencer and Lord Grey, 404; grief at the death of Lady Holland, 404; Lady Holland's legacy to him, 404; address to his constituents of the City, 406; summoned by the Queen, 409; encouragement from his wife to undertake the post of Prime Minister, 410; letters from Lord Grey on the subject, 412–416; his opinion of Palmerston's fitness for the Foreign Office, 416; letter to her Majesty on his failure to form an administration, 417; indignation with Lord Grey, 417, 418; supports Sir Robert Peel on Free Trade, 420; letter to Mr. Everett on the American controversy, 421; opposes the Coercion Bill, 422; becomes Prime Minister, 422; declines alliance with the Protectionists, 423; offers office to late members of Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet, 424; endeavour to secure Mr. Cobden's services, 425; Mr. Cobden's answer declining office, 426; offers Lord Grey office, 427; letters from Mr. Charles Wood, on the subject of Lord Grey, 427; address to his London constituency, 428; deals with the sugar question, 429; introduces an Arms Bill (Ireland), 431; relief of distress in Ireland, 431; death of his brother William, 432; his character and abilities sketched by Lord Campbell, 433; his second

RUS

wife's reminiscences of him, 433; at Chorley Wood, 434; his wife's illness, 435; organisation of public works in Irish potato famine, 435, 436; speech on the Government's obligation to supply the Irish with food, 436; accusations of his failure to meet the famine by adequate measures, 440, 441; proposes the suspension of the Navigation Acts, 441; blamed for not employing the Irish on productive works, 442, 443; opposes Lord George Bentinck's Irish railway scheme, 443, 444; defends the Irish relief works, 445, 446; makes land support the poor, 446 *n*; last letter from Moore and his answer, 448; presented by the Queen with Pembroke Lodge, Richmond, 449; letters from Lord Bessborough on Irish affairs, 451, 452; on the Lord-Lieutenancy, 452; efforts in the improvement of State education, 454; his attack on Hume, 455; supports the Ten Hours clause, 455; letter from Lord Ashley, 455; amendment of the Poor Law Commission, 456; is again returned for the City on the dissolution of Parliament, 456; letter from the Duke of Westminster on the creation of peers and his reply, 457, 458; letters from Lord Clarendon with proposition for dealing with disorder in Ireland, 460, 461; letter to Lord Clarendon on the causes of social disorder in Ireland, 463, 464; discourages Lord Clarendon's proposal for an Arms Bill, 465; suggests a Landlord and Tenant Bill, 466; reluctantly assents to mild coercive measures, 469–473; passes the Encumbered Estates Act, 473; introduces a measure for compensating tenants for improvements, 473; proposal for increasing the episcopate, 474; appoints Dr. Hampden Bishop of Hereford, 475; his other ecclesiastical appointments, 476; letter from and to the Primate, on the Hampden appointment, 476, 477; receives a memorial from the bishops on that subject, 478; his reply thereto, 479; appoints Dr. Sumner Archbishop of Canterbury, 483; receipt of Lord Palmerston's despatch on the Spanish marriages, &c., ii. 2; note to the Spanish Government on the marriages, 3; letter from Mr. Wood on Palmerston's irritating foreign policy, 4; his supervision of all Government departments, 5 *n*; his reply to the

RUS

French Government's complaints of Lord Palmerston and his policy, 5–7; objection to a passage in Lord Palmerston's protest to the Spanish Government, 7; growing difficulties with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office, 8; memorandum on the demand for the fulfilment of the Quadruple Treaty against the Oporto Junta, 9; agreement with France for forcibly terminating the Portuguese insurrection, 12; his policy in this condemned by Conservatives and Radicals alike, 12; on friendly terms with the Duke of Wellington, 14; receives memoranda from the Duke on the national defence, 14, 15; urged by Lord Palmerston to embody the militia, 15; his memorandum on a militia force, 16; letter from the Duke of Wellington on an indiscreet publication of his letter to Sir John Burgoyne, 18; his elaborate memorandum on national defence, 19–23; his speech on the Budget of the year, including a large increase in the income-tax, 24; illness of, 24, 26; resists Mr. Horsman's proposal of exemptions from the full weight of the income tax, 26; with Lady John at St. Leonard's, 26; speech on Mr. Hume's motion on the income-tax, 27; letter to Lord Auckland on a reduction of the naval estimates, 28; letters to the Duke of Wellington on a reduction in the army, 29, 30; declaration of neutrality in the French crisis, after the flight of Louis Philippe, 31; letter from the Duke of Wellington on his correspondence with Lamartine, 31, 32; approves of the Duke's reply to Lamartine, 34; further letters from the Duke on his correspondence with Lamartine, 35–37; criticism of Lamartine's policy and views, 37; his devotion to the cause of Italian freedom, 38; sends Lord Minto on a mission to Italy, 39; his memorandum on affairs in Europe, with recommendations, 40–42; checks Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, 43; sent for by the Queen on the subject of foreign affairs, 43; letter from Lord Grey on Lord Palmerston's conduct of the Foreign Office, 44; and from Sir Charles Wood on the same subject, 44; letter of remonstrance to Lord Palmerston, 46; another memorandum on foreign affairs, 47–49; at

RUS

Windsor in consultation with the Queen, 49; letter to Palmerston on the Austro-Italian conflict, 49; letter to Lord Aberdeen on a compromise between Austria and Italy, 50*n*; letter from and to Palmerston on the supply of arms to the Sicilian insurgents by an English contractor, 51; project of removing Palmerston to Ireland, 52; persuades Palmerston to offer Naples an apology, 52; mediates in the Ponsonby-Palmerston fracas, 53; all despatches submitted to the Queen to pass through his hands, 53; letter from Lord Palmerston on the Hungarian refugees in Turkey, 54; letter to Lord Minto, 55; repudiates interference with the Greek Government, 56; letters to and from Lord Palmerston on the unaltered despatch to Mr. Wyse, 57, 58; letter from Prince Albert on the termination of the Greek dispute, 59; letter to Palmerston notifying an intended change in the Foreign Department, 60; speech in the House in defence of Palmerston's foreign policy, 62; his position between the Court and the Foreign Office, 62; memorandum on the state of Ireland, 64; reply to Lord Jocelyn's speech on Irish rebellion, 66; letter from the Duke of Wellington on the Chartist procession, 68; and from Sir George Grey on the same subject, 69; letter from his brother, the Duke of Bedford, on the safe issue from the Chartist procession, 69; birth of his second son, 70; suspends the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, 72; alarm at false news of the Irish rebellion, 73; visits Ireland, 74; reception at Dublin, 74; his brother, the Duke of Bedford, makes over Lord Ludlow's bequest to him, 74; served with a subpœna by Smith O'Brien, 75; travelling in Scotland, 75; proposes to endow the Roman Catholic clergy and promote emigration from Ireland, 76; his memorandum for submission to the Pope on the matter, 77; his scheme of Irish emigration, 78–80; his emigration scheme rejected by the Cabinet, 81; threatens to throw up the government, 81; passes a poor-rate for Ireland, 82; and the Irish Poor Law Bill, 83; its rating clause struck out in the Lords, 83; induces the House to acquiesce in the amendment, 84; Mr. Roebuck's at-

tack, 84; justifies his Irish policy, 84; passes an Irish Loan Bill, 86; extends Irish franchise, 86; endeavours to obtain the abolition of the Viceroyalty and the institution of a fourth Secretary of State, 86, 87; fluctuates in his view of the substitute for a Viceroy, 87*n*; withdraws his proposals on the Lord-Lieutenancy, 88; weak health in 1848, 90; his feeble support in the House of Commons, 90; offers Macaulay Lord Zetland's borough of Richmond, 91; letter in dog-Latin to his wife, 93*n*; his Bills for promoting the health of towns and removing Jewish disabilities, 93; abandonment of Bill for repealing the Navigation Acts, 93; compromise on the sugar question, 94, 95; indiscreet attack on Lord George Bentinck, 94; points out the reason for the failure of the Ministerial measures, 95; letter from Lord Normanby on the failure of the legislative machinery to compete with the country's business, and remedial proposal, 96; his answer to Mr. Disraeli's obituary notice of the session, 96; declines to buy the press in his interest, 97; enlarges the basis of his administration, 97; offers Sir James Graham the Admiralty, 98; on his refusal gives it to Sir Francis Baring, 98; lessening of the distrust between him and Sir Robert Peel, 98; stakes the existence of the Ministry on the passing of the Bill for repealing the Navigation Acts, 99; his remarks on Lord Brougham's opposition to this Bill, 99; letter from a shipowner on the Bill, 100*n*; entertains the idea of a peerage, 100; birth of a third son, 101; at Balmoral with the Queen, 101; kills the first deer ever shot by a prime minister in office, 101; verse to his wife, 101; last interview with Moore, 102; brings the proposal of a new Reform Bill before the Cabinet, 102; his proposal discountenanced, 102; answer to Mr. Hume's Reform measure, 103; his colonial measures, 104; speech on the suppression of the slave traffic, 106; interchange of views with Sir Robert Peel on Horace's Odes, 108, 109; speech on the death of Sir Robert Peel, 110; offers Lady Peel a public funeral for her husband and a peerage for herself, 110; carries a motion for the erection of a monument to Sir Robert in Westminster Abbey, 110; holiday-making at Manchester, 111; at home at Pembroke Lodge, 111; on a holiday tour in Scotland, 112; reception in Invernessshire, 113; 'the biggest man in the kingdom,' 113; love of sport, 113; the Highland gillie's estimate of his sporting capacity, 114; at Woburn seeing the old year out and the new year in, 114; interest in the Church of England, 116; his clerical appointments, 116, 117; letter to the Bishop of London on the Privy Council's judgment in the Gorham case, 117; letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury on the subject, 118; letter to the Bishop of London on the Pope's Bull dividing England into sees, 119; the notorious Durham Letter, 119–122; introduces a Bill to resist the Pope's action, 122; undertakes to deal with the equalisation of county and borough franchise, 122; defeated on Mr. Locke King's motion on the franchise, 123; letter to the Queen, 123; Lord Minto's letter on the matter, 123; resignation, 123; advises the Queen to send for Lord Stanley, 124; memorandum of reconstruction of ministry based on a combination of the Whigs and the followers of Sir Robert Peel, 124; Lord Aberdeen's and Sir James Graham's answer thereto, 124; his reply thereon, 126; they decline further negotiations, 128; letter to his colleagues on his failure, 128; is reluctantly induced to resume office, 128; endeavours to get Sir James Graham in the Cabinet, 129, 130; memorandum on Reform, 129; offers the Duke of Newcastle the Irish Viceroyalty, 130*n*; threatens to retire if Lord Lansdowne resigns, 130*n*; departure of his first wife's children for Italy, 131; tour in Wales, 131; projected visit to Paris postponed, 132; urges Palmerston not to receive Kossuth, 133; Palmerston's reply, 133; further letter to Palmerston and consultation with the Cabinet on the matter, 134; letters to and from Palmerston on the latter's reception of addresses disrespectful to the Emperors of Russia and Austria, 136, 137; letter from the Queen on the Coup d'état, 138; letter to Lord Palmerston dismissing him from the Foreign Office for his action on the Coup d'état, 139; offers him the

Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, 139; letter of explanation to Lady Palmerston, 141; a defence of his action in, and his own later judgment on, the dismissal of Palmerston, 142; denies that he himself expressed approval of the Coup d'état to Count Walewski, 142*n*; answer to Mrs. Maurice Drummond's new-year congratulations, 143; speech in the House on his difference with Palmerston, 143; in Lord Clarendon's defence, 143, 144; defeat on the Militia scheme and resignation, 144; review of his five years and eight months' administration, 144; never in debt till he became First Lord of the Treasury, 145*n*; encouragement of letters, science, and art, 145; makes Tennyson Poet Laureate, 145; declines Lord Rectorship of Glasgow in favour of Wordsworth, 145; discrimination in conferring pensions, 145, 146; letters of application and thanks from Charles Dickens in behalf of a Mr. P., 146, 147; redeems an old promise and edits Moore's letters and papers, 148; simultaneously prepares the Fox correspondence for publication, 149; re-election for the City of London, 150; conflicting forces in opposition to him, 150; 'Punch's' satire on him, 151; at 'The Gart,' near Callander, 152; letter from Lord Clarendon on the suggestion of an intrigue against his leadership, 152; Sir James Graham's testimony to his endeavour to check corrupt election practices, 153; sympathetic letter from Sir James, 154; letters to and from Lord Aberdeen, 154–156; letter to Lord Lansdowne on his correspondence with Lord Aberdeen, 157; Duke of Bedford's letter on his conversation with Palmerston, 157; presented with the freedom of the boroughs of Stirling and Perth, 158; speech on the memory of the Duke of Wellington, 158; is willing to serve under Lord Lansdowne, 158; protest from Sir F. Baring against this course, 159; at Woburn with Lords Lansdowne and Aberdeen, 160; letter from the Queen asking his aid in the Aberdeen Ministry, 161; Mr. Macaulay's advocacy in that behalf, 161, 162; offers to lead in the House and sit in the Cabinet without office, 162; takes the Foreign Office with an understanding to resign it shortly to Lord Clarendon, 163; Lord Aberdeen's proposal to retire from the premiership in favour of him, and that he should meanwhile superintend generally all departments, 163; misunderstandings in office with Lord Aberdeen, 165; letters to and from Lord Aberdeen on his relief from the Foreign Office and position in the Government, 166-169; resigns the Foreign Office, 169; introduces a measure to enable municipalities to rate themselves for the support of voluntary schools, 170; his opinion of Mr. Gladstone's Budget speech, 170*n*; testimony to his qualities as a leader, 170; speech on the Irish Church and its effects, 171, 172; offers to resign rather than that Lord Aberdeen should lose the services of the Roman Catholic members of the Government, 173; letter from Lord Aberdeen on the subject, 173; birth of his only daughter by his second wife, 174; in Scotland, 174; paper in his possession containing questions issued by Napoleon III. on the possibility of invading and holding Australia, 176; correspondence with Lord Mount-Edgcumbe on French aggressive preparations, 177; despatches on the Montenegrin and Holy Places questions, 177; persuades Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to return to Constantinople, 178; privately informed by Sir George Seymour that the Czar does not seriously meditate an attack on the Porte, 180; conflict between his and Lord Aberdeen's views on treating Russian pretensions, 180, 181; memorandum on the political outlook in 1853 with regard to Russia, 181; letter from Palmerston on the subject, 182; is of opinion that the Turks should be forced to sign the Vienna Note, 183; letters to Lord Clarendon, 183, 184; at Roseneath with his family, 184; letters from and to Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon, 185, 186; on the entanglements of the Eastern question, 186; correspondence with Sir A. Gordon, 186*n*; is 'for the Turk against the Russian,' 186; memorandum on the Eastern question, 187, 188; letter from Lord Aberdeen on the situation, 188; letters to Lords Clarendon and Aberdeen, 189, 190; speech at Greenock on the crisis,

RUS

190; letter to Lord Clarendon, 191; memorandum on Russia and Turkey, 191-194; thinks Lord Aberdeen's peace policy calculated to ensure war, and that he should resign, 195; his scheme of Parliamentary Reform, 195; letter to Lord Palmerston defending his action in pushing Reform, 196; agreement with Lord Aberdeen on Reform and the Eastern question, 198; asked to take the Home Office on Lord Palmerston's resignation, 199; letter to and from Lord Lansdowne on the Cabinet meeting, 199, 200; annoyance at the dissensions in the Cabinet on the Eastern question, 200, 201; letter of reproach to Sir James Graham, 200; receives the assurance from Sir James that a despatch (that the allied fleet should enter the Black Sea) had been forwarded to the French Government in his views, 201; compromise with Lord Lansdowne on Reform, 201; defends Prince Albert's action in affairs, 203; admits the imminence of war, 203; postpones his Reform Bill, 204; replies to Sir John Shelley's and Mr. Disraeli's remarks on that postponement, 205; speculates on its further postponement and the Bill's chances of success, 206, 207; resigns, but is persuaded to withdraw his resignation, 207; letter from Palmerston, 208; also from Sidney Herbert, 209; gives the House his reasons for the postponement, 209; encomiums on his speech, 210; private troubles, 211; 'Punch's' cartoon of him and Lord Aberdeen, 211 *n*; divergence between his policy and that of Lord Aberdeen in the preliminaries to the Crimean War, 212; his treatment of the offer of an Austrian Alliance, 213; draft addresses to the Crown assuring it of support in the war against Russia, 214; former proposal to constitute a Board responsible for all the military departments, 215; reverts to this scheme, 215; further military arrangements, 216; would subsidise Sweden, 216; thinks the time has arrived when he should take office or cease to be a member of the Government, 217; letters to Lord Clarendon, 218; proposes to the Cabinet the separation of the War Department from the Colonial Office and the subsidising of Sweden,

RUS

218; letter to Lord Lansdowne, 218; suggests to Lord Aberdeen three ways of carrying on the Government, 219; letters to and from Lord Aberdeen on ministerial changes, 219-222; Sir George Grey suggests the Colonial Secretaryship or the Presidency of the Council to him, 220; Lord Aberdeen's letter to him concurring in same, 221; declines the Colonial Office on grounds of ill-health, 221; appointed President of the Council, 222; his account of the sleeping Cabinet, 223; his reply to Mr. Disraeli on the Aberdeen Ministry, 223, 224; letter to and from the Queen on his proposed resignation, 225; resting in Yorkshire, 226; address from the Corporation of Scarborough and his reply, 226; civic banquet to him and his address to the members of the Athenæum at Bristol, 226; consoled by favourable news from the Crimea, 227; announces his intended resignation to Lord Clarendon, 227; memorandum on the state of public affairs, 227; on the personal arrangements of the War Department, 229; urges on Lord Aberdeen the appointment of Palmerston as War Minister, 230; communications between him and Lord Lansdowne on the remodelling of the War Department, 232, 233; expresses a belief that he does not possess the confidence of Lord Aberdeen, 232, 233; memorandum on the defects in the military arrangements of the Government, 233; proposes to Lord Aberdeen concert with the French Government on a fresh plan of campaign, 236; his visit to Paris and conferences with the Emperor and his ministers, 237; declines to defend the Ministry on Mr. Roebuck's motion on the conduct of the Crimean War, and resigns, 237; his retrospective memorandum, 238; his equivocal position in the Aberdeen Ministry, 239; his retirement virtually terminates the Aberdeen Administration, 241; supports Mr. Roebuck's motion, 241; sent for by the Queen, but unable to form a Government, 241; Lord Palmerston asks his assistance in forming a Government, 241; declines, but agrees to represent Great Britain at the Vienna Conference, 241; his letter to Lord Clarendon

explaining views on the same, 242; letters of congratulation to him on his acceptance of the mission, 243; has interviews in Paris with the Emperor and others respecting the situation, 245; Palmerston's letter respecting his acceptance of office on reconstruction of the Cabinet, 245; accepts the Colonial Office, 246; interview with the King of the Belgians in Brussels, 247; interviews in Berlin with Baron Manteuffel, the King and the Prince of Prussia, 247; fails to withdraw Prussia from her isolated position, 248; goes on to Vienna, 248; interviews with Count Buol on the four points of the protocol of the Western powers defining object of the Crimean War, 249; his difficulties, 250; opening of the Conference, 250; perverse action of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 251; recommends the acceptance of Prince Gortchakoff's compromise regarding Russian force in the Black Sea, 253; his embarrassment at receiving no reply from the Government, 254; is informed that his colleagues cannot agree to his settlement of the first point, 254; his letters to Lord Panmure and Lady John Russell on the subject, 255; and to Lord Clarendon and Lord Lansdowne, 256; his account of the new proposal concerning the Black Sea, 258, 260; returns to London, 260; his letter to Lord Clarendon on the effect of the resignation of Drouyn de Lhuys, 262; withdraws his resignation on the entreaty of Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon, 263; his note on the surrender of his own opinions and the motives which may have swayed the French Emperor, 263; defends his own conduct and the policy of the Government in the House of Commons, but omits all reference to the Austrian proposal, 264, 265; effect produced consequently by Count Buol's version of the affair, 265; attacked by Milner Gibson in the House of Commons, 266; lame nature of his defence, 266; painful incidents connected with Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's notice of motion respecting his conduct at Vienna, 266; sends his resignation to Lord Palmerston, 267; explains the circumstances of his resignation, 268; deep impression made by his

language, 268; receives letters of thanks from Lord Granville and Solomon Hailes (a working man), 269; his feelings towards the members of the Cabinet, 270; and also towards the subordinate members of the Government, 271; record of his political career to this date, 271; resumes literary labours, 272; his biography of Fox, 272; character of his writing, 273; on moral and political progress, 273; as a lecturer, 274; lets his London house, 276; lengthened visit to Switzerland and Italy, 277; dines with Sir James Hudson, 277; at Florence, 278; interview with Cavour, 278; returns to England, 278; pleased with prospects of eldest son's future, 279; writes an epilogue for a play composed by his children, 280; his social qualities, 281; his straitened pecuniary means, 281; assisted by his brother the Duke of Bedford, 282; gives the Palmerston Administration an independent support, 283; his opinion of Lord Clarendon's mission for the conclusion of peace, 283; advocates the cause of education, 283; resolutions on education defeated, 284; speech in the debate on the Address at the opening of the session of 1857, 284; supports Mr. Locke King's motion for reduction of county franchise, 285; and Sir G. Lewis's Budget, 285; in favour of Mr. Cobden's resolution on the 'Arrow' affair, 286; doubts his chances of return for the City, 289; is returned, 291; effect on the country of his success, 291; attends meetings at Sheffield and Birmingham, 291; continues an independent supporter of Lord Palmerston, 292; news of outbreak of Indian Mutiny arrives, 292; answers Mr. Disraeli's attack on Indian administration, 292; moves an address assuring Crown of the support of the House in the Indian Mutiny crisis, 293; considers the machinery of government for India obsolete, 294; his scheme of reform therein, 294; his letter to Sir G. Grey on the French threats against England, 295; opposed to the alteration of the conspiracy laws, 295; answers Mr. Disraeli's speech attacking the great Reform Act, 296; his action on the Conservative Bill for the better government of India,

297 ; his motives misunderstood, 298 ; efforts to enable Jews to sit in Parliament, 299 ; Baron Rothschild's acknowledgment of his aid, 299 ; rises in popular estimation, 300 ; visits Lord Derby at Knowsley, 300 ; disinclined to disturb the Conservative Administration, 301 ; on signs of a crisis in Italy desires a congress to settle the matter, 301 ; his remedy for the bad form of government imposed on Italy, 302 ; his distrust of the Conservatives in this matter, and on Parliamentary Reform, 302 ; his objections to the Conservatives' proposed measure of Reform, 303 ; moves a resolution in conformity with his views, and defeats the Government, 303 ; issues his address to the electors of the City, 303 ; brings the Franco-Austrian question prominently forward, 304 ; is blamed for the dissensions in the Liberal camp, 304 ; his letters to Sir James Graham on the matter, 305 ; and to Lord Granville, 306 ; assents to the Queen's suggestion to serve under Lord Granville, but stipulates to lead the Commons, 306, 307 ; Granville's letter on the question, 307 ; Lord John's reply, 308 ; takes office as Foreign Minister under Palmerston, 309 ; has the Italian question to deal with on taking office, 310 ; defends the conduct of Victor Emanuel, 311 ; 'Italy for the Italians' the watch-word of his policy, 312 ; events move in favour of his policy, 313 ; his advice to Victor Emanuel, 314 ; advises the Queen to accept invitation to the proposed congress, 315 ; his proposals on the failure of the congress, 315 ; effects Cavour's return to office, 316 ; his policy the first step towards a United Italy, 318 ; letter to and from Sir James Hudson on the question of Savoy, 319 ; protests against the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, 320 ; effect in the House of Commons of his speech on the conduct of France, 321 ; supported by Lord Palmerston, 321 ; assures Count Apponyi as to the policy of Great Britain in Italy, 322 ; is not surprised at the insurrection in Sicily, 322 ; letters to the British Minister at Naples on the same, 322 ; urges on Cavour a policy of patience, 323 ; writes to Lord Cowley on affairs in Italy, 323, 324 ; declines the French suggestion to stop the passage of Garibaldi to Naples, 324 ; places pressure on Cavour to abstain from attacking Venice, 325 ; sides with Sardinia in her hour of difficulty, 325 ; his famous despatch of October 27, 1860, 325 ; Palmerston credited with its composition, 327 ; on the use of the words 'revolution' and 'revolutionary,' 327 ; letter from his nephew, Mr. Odo Russell, on the effect of the despatch in Italy, 328 ; uses his influence to complete the union of Italy, 329 ; visited by General Garibaldi, 329 ; visits Scotland with his family, 330 ; projects a new Reform Bill, 330 ; nature of the measure, 330 ; the Bill received with indifference, 330 ; withdraws it, 331 ; writes to Palmerston on the prospects of Reform in the then-existing House of Commons, 331 ; his feelings on withdrawing the Bill, 332 ; derived his chief support in the Cabinet from Mr. Gladstone, 333 ; is a loyal supporter of Mr. Gladstone's financial measures, 333 ; his letter to Palmerston on the Paper Duty Repeal Bill, and the expenditure on fortifications, 333 *n* ; accompanies the Queen to Germany, 334 ; kills his boar, 334 ; at a Palace concert, 335 *n* ; marriage of his second daughter, Victoria, to Mr. Villiers, 335 ; summoned to Woburn on the Duke of Bedford's serious illness, 336 ; death of the Duke, 336 ; Lord John's affection for him, 336 ; increase of his income, 336 ; goes to the House of Lords, 336 ; 'Punch' on the transition, 336, and *n* ; Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone on the change, 337 ; his language on the eve of the great American civil war, 338 ; directs the British Consul at Charleston to continue his functions, 341 ; his reply to Mr. Seward's despatch respecting agents of Southern Confederacy, 341 ; a deputation sent him from the Southern States, 341 ; recognises their belligerent rights, 341 ; advises neutrality, 342 ; his despatch on the powers of blockade entrusted to the President by Congress, 343 ; writes to Lord Palmerston on the question of raising the blockade, 344 ; his despatch on the case of the 'Trent,' 346 ; private instructions to Lord Lyons, 346 ; greatly affected by the death of the

Prince Consort, 347; letter to his daughter Victoria, 347; attends the Queen at Gotha, 349; letters from and to Lord Palmerston on the war in America, 350; his view of the military, political, and social aspects of affairs in America, 351; his despatch to Mr. Adams, 352; correspondence regarding the 'Alabama,' 353; is prepared to detain that vessel, but his proposal not approved by Cabinet, 355; Mr. Adams' demands of redress for injuries inflicted by the 'Alabama,' 356; his answer thereto, 357; views as to arbitration, 357; letters to Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, 358, 359; view of the convention signed by Lord Stanley consenting to arbitration, 360; his opinion three years afterwards, 361 *n*; displeased with the action of the 'Alabama' commission, 362; thinks the questions arising out of the escape of the 'Alabama' should not be tried by *ex post facto* law, 362; gives notice to move address on the indirect claims in the 'Alabama' arbitration, 364; makes a great impression by his speech on this occasion, 365; Mr. John Forster's opinion of the speech, 365; hurt by the conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Government respecting the 'Alabama,' 366; his account of the early history of the Polish insurrection, 368; his sympathies with the Poles, 369; nature of his despatch to Russia on the subject, 369; controverts the Russian arguments as to the right of Europe to interfere in Poland, 370, 371; thinks both Danes and Germans to blame in the Schleswig-Holstein question, 375; efforts at conciliation, 376, 377; his despatch accepted by Austria and Prussia as the basis of negotiation, 378; his advice not accepted by Denmark, 378; counsels moderation, 379; effect on the German Diet of his despatch to Sir A. Malet, 379; urges Germany and Denmark to accept mediation, 383; Germany accepts his offer, 384; but, influenced by English Press, Denmark refuses, 385; his opinion of the damage done by the English Press, 384, 385; procures the repeal of the objectionable ordinance of Denmark, 385; sends Lord Wodehouse to Copenhagen on a mission of peace, 386; failure of the mission, 387; letter to Sir A. Paget on the obstinacy of Denmark, 387; attempts to separate the questions of Schleswig and Holstein, 388; letter from Palmerston on this subject, 388; fails in his proposal to prevent the war, 388; his proposals for united action on the part of France and Great Britain, 389; Lord Palmerston's answer to the memorandum, 390; he and Lord Palmerston in favour of stronger measures than their colleagues, 391; his letter to Lord Granville on putting the fleet in motion, 393; considers it impolitic for this country to take an active part in the war, 395; his speech announcing the failure of the conference, 395; is defeated in the Lords, 396; but is victorious in the Commons, 396; letter to Lord Cowley on the result of the division, 396; summary of his policy throughout the Danish question, 396; his reputation not maintained thereby, 397; difficulties of his situation, 397; presented with addresses by Sunderland and Newcastle, 399; his language on the occasion, 399; receives the Order of the Garter, 400; visits Ireland, 401; on the legislative successes of the previous thirty years, 402; marriage of his eldest son, 403; his speech on the occasion, 404; visits Bowood to say farewell to the widow of the poet Moore, 404; his letter to Lord Palmerston on the income tax, 405; birth of a grandson, 406; on Lord Palmerston's death asked by the Queen to carry on the Government, 407; letter from Mr. Gladstone on the subject, 407; invites Lord Clarendon to take the Foreign Office, 407; his difficulties in forming a Government, 409; introduces changes in Administration, 409; is of opinion that a stable Ministry must be either frankly Liberal or frankly Conservative, 409; frames another measure of Reform, 409; its nature, 410; the Bill introduced by Mr. Gladstone, 410; dissatisfaction among Liberals at the incompleteness of the measure, 410; accepts Mr. Kinglake's compromise, 411; his Bill passes the second reading by a very small majority, 411; decides to persevere with Reform Bill, and introduce additional mea-

sures, 411; appeals to Lord Grosvenor to reconsider his position, 412; his Government defeated on Lord Dunkellin's amendment, 413; the Cabinet decide to tender resignation, 413; letters to the Queen on the crisis, 413-416; his action quickly vindicated, 417; completes his 'Life of Fox,' 418; his letters to Mr. Chichester Fortescue on 'The State of Ireland,' 418; his imaginary colloquies between Bishop Burnet and Archbishop Tillotson on the Athanasian Creed, 419; further literary work, 420; his 'Recollections and Suggestions,' 420; joy of his wife at the termination of his official career, 421; reads an address at the town hall of Tavistock, 421; again visits Italy, 421; witnesses the entry of Victor Emanuel into Venice, 422; visits his brother-in-law, Sir H. Elliot, at Florence, 423; charged by the 'Times' with jobbery regarding the supposed promotion of Mr. (afterwards Sir H.) Elliot in the diplomatic service, 423 *n*; correspondence with Sir James Hudson and Sir A. H. Layard on the same, 423-428 *n*; decides on moving for a commission to inquire into the revenues of the Irish Church, 429; his eldest son begins his parliamentary career, 430; marriage of his eldest daughter, 430; visits Ireland with his wife and youngest daughter, 430; received with gratitude by the Irish people, 430; proposes a series of resolutions affirming the necessity of improving the national education, 431; decides to abstain from taking office, 431, 432; on the disestablishment of the Irish Church, 433; presides at a meeting in St. James's Hall in support of Mr. Gladstone's policy regarding the Irish Church, 433; visits Scotland, &c., 434; invited by Mr. Gladstone to become a member of the Cabinet without other responsibility, 434; refuses the offer, 435; advocates the reform of the Irish Land Laws, 435; warmly supports Mr. Gladstone's Bill for the disestablishment of the Irish Church, 436; votes with the Conservatives on some points of the Bill, 436; congratulates Mr. Gladstone on the passing of the Irish Church Act, 437; his proposal regarding life peers, 437; invested with the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, 438; visit to the continent, 438; dines with the Emperor and Empress of France, 439; lines on a visit to Adisham, 439; his speech on the Irish question, 440 *n*; takes an active part in the passage of the Irish Land and Education Acts, 440; on the neutrality of Belgium, 441; letter from the King of the Belgians, 441; his sympathies with the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war, 442; on the Treaty of 1856, 442; does not approve of the policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government, 443; opposed to the abolition of purchase in the army, 443; again visits the continent, 444; his failing health, 445; introduces a measure for the better government of Ireland, 446; takes an active interest in the struggle for religious liberty between the Pope and the Emperor of Germany, 446; letters of thanks from the Emperor, 448, and Prince Bismarck, 449; domestic afflictions, 450; defends the cause of liberty in Eastern Europe, 450; letter from Garibaldi, 450; visited by Mr. and Mrs Gladstone, 452; his death, 452; tributes to his memory, 452, 453; reflections on his character and political career, 455; his readiness in debate, 460; Sydney Smith's witty observation on his physique, 461; the character of his oratory, 461; his amiable domestic nature, 465

Russell, Lord (Lord Tavistock's son), afterwards eighth Duke of Bedford, i. 155

Russell, Lord William (grandson of the fourth Duke of Bedford; murdered by Courvoisier), i. 2; loses his seat for Surrey, in 1807, i. 29; residing at Geneva, 114

Russell, Lord William (George William), son of the sixth Duke of Bedford, i. 2; interested in 'Mrs. Witty's' welfare, 21; aide-de-camp to Sir George Ludlow, 34; gets a troop in the 23rd, 35; wounded at Talavera, 51; aide-de-camp to General Graham, 51; characteristic postscript to a letter to his father, 52 *n*; unexpected meeting with Lord John at Portsmouth, 58; meets him again, at Vera, 72; on Lord Wellington's staff, 66; member for Bedford, 70; marries Miss Rawdon, 92; aide-de-

RUS

camp to the Duke, 93; returned again for Bedford, 108; his letter to Lord John on the latter's political obligations, 131; on marriage, 150; Lord John offers his official residence to him, 164; at Whitehall, 176 *n*; his sympathy with Lord John's ill health, 194 *n*; approves of the speech of Lord John's which 'upset the coach,' 200 *n*; letter to Lord John from Stuttgart, 233; and from Berlin, 371; death of, at Genoa, 432

Russell, Lord Odo (the late Lord Ampthill), his letter to Lord John, on the effect in Italy of the latter's famous despatch, ii. 328; 329 *n*; correspondence with Lord John on the struggle for religious liberty, 448, 449

Russell, William (Lord John's cousin), ii. 114

Russell, Lord Wriothesley, offered and declines the bishopric of Lichfield, i. 323 *n*; at Chenies, 434; on Lord John's resignation, ii. 238

Russia, war of, with Turkey, i. 151; aids in suppressing the Hungarian rebellion, ii. 54; action in the matter of the Polish refugees, 134; destroys the Turkish fleet at Sinope, 199

Rutherford, Mr., i. 403; ii. 145

STE.-AULAIRE, M. (French minister in London), ii. 9

St.-Germans, Lord, ii. 165

Salamanca, battle of, i. 59, 62

Saldanha, Duc de, *coup d'état* of, ii. 8; untrustworthiness of, 9; conditions imposed by him on the Queen of Portugal, 10; despotism of, 11

Salisbury, Lord, his proposal to give the clergymen of the Irish Establishment their glebes supported by Lord John, ii. 436

Sandown, Lord, his amendment to Molesworth's vote of want of confidence in Lord Glenelg, i. 296

Sanfedisti, the, ii. 39

'San Jacinto,' the, ii. 345

Santa Cruz, Marchioness of, i. 64

Scarborough, address of its citizens to Lord John, ii. 226

Scheldt, blockade of the, ii. 189

Schleswig-Holstein question, the, ii. 41, 48, 132, 368

Schwarzenberg, F., ii. 49

Scott, Sir Walter, in Selkirkshire, i.

SMI

31; at Edinburgh, 44; offer of pecuniary assistance from Lord John, 180

Scrope, Poulett, i. 282

Seaford, Lord, i. 164 *n*

Sebastopol, ii. 181, 228

Seville, English society at, in 1809, i. 40, 41

Seward, Mr. (Secretary of U. S.), urges British Government not to recognise agents of Southern Confederacy, ii. 341; Lord John Russell's reply, 341; his threatening language to Lord Lyons, 342

Seymour, Lord, in the Cabinet, ii. 134 *n*, 150 *n*

Seymour, Mr., i. 4 *n*

Seymour, Mrs., i. 24

Seymour, Sir G. Hamilton, his despatch on Portuguese affairs, ii. 10; refuses to claim an indemnity for Mr. Croft, 11 *n*; conversation with the Czar, ii. 180

Shaftesbury, Lord, his opinion of Lord John, ii. 275

Sharp, Mr. (Conversation Sharp), i. 229

Sheil, Mr., i. 236 *n*

Shelley, Sir John, declares Lord John's proposed Reform Bill to be a sham, ii. 204

Sheridan, Rt. Hon. E., fails at Westminster, i. 30; quoted on the fall of the Whigs in 1807, 222

Shirley, Dr., i. 475 *n*; ii. 116

Short, Dr., i. 475 *n*; ii. 116, 131

Sicily, ii. 48; revolt from Naples, 50; the agents of its Provisional Government visit England for arms, 50; furnished with them by an English contractor, 51

Siddons, Mrs., i. 7, 8, 25, 26

Sidmouth, Lord, i. 88, 117

Sinclair, Lady Madalina (daughter of the fourth Duke of Gordon), her marriage to Mr. Palmer of Luckley, i. 15

Sinclair, Sir Robert, of Stevenson, i. 15 *n*

Singleton, Archdeacon, i. 287 *n*

Sinope, destruction of the Turkish fleet at, ii. 199

Six Acts, the, i. 117, 118, 136

Slavery, abolition of, i. 193

Slidell and Mason, Messrs., the case of, ii. 344

Smedley, 'young' and 'old' (masters at Westminster School), i. 6

Smith, John Abel, his letter to Lord John on the latter's acceptance of office, ii. 247

SMI

Smith, Eliza, i. 25
Smith, Mr. (master at Westminster), i. 6
Smith, Mr. (of Woodnesboro'), tutor to Lord John, i. 13, 24
Smith, Mr. (member for Norwich), speech on the Indemnity Bill, i. 140
Smith, Sir Charles, i. 362
Smith, Sydney, 'very amusing,' i. 26; on Mr. Perceval, 35 *n*; his anecdote of Rogers, 137 *n*; on Lord John, 173; his story of Jeffrey and Leslie, 177 *n*; satire on Lord John's moral courage, 287; note on the race of the Russells, 288 *n*; poor opinion of the Melbourne Ministry, 303; high opinion of Lord John, 303, 304; anecdote of, 403 *n*; death of, 403; witty saying quoted, ii. 461
Smith, Vernon, quoted, i. 385; ii. 196, 293, 294
Solferino, battle of, ii. 310
Somers, Lord, i. 452; quoted, ii. 87 *n*
Somerset, Duke of, offers to retire from office to assist Lord John in forming an administration, ii. 408
Somerset, Lord Fitzroy (see Raglan, Lord), i. 35, 67
Somerville, Lord, i. 31
Somerville, Mrs., increase of her pension, ii. 145
Southwell, Lord, i. 268
Spain, Infanta of, the question of her marriage, ii. 1–3
Spain, Christina, Queen of, favours Prince Leopold's suit for her daughter, ii. 1, 2; alters her policy after the receipt of the Palmerston despatch, 3
Spain, Queen of, the question of her marriage, ii. 1–3
Spain, treaty of, with France for partition of Portugal, i. 37; Joseph Bonaparte made king, 37; rise of the people against French oppression, 37; the French in Madrid, 37, 63; affairs in, ii. 42
Speculative Society, the Edinburgh, i. 46, 47
Spencer, Captain Sir Robert, i. 71
Spencer, Lady (Lord Althorp's mother), letters to Lord John, i. 105, 126 *n*, 143; Lord John's 'Bee and the Fly' addressed to her, 149 *n*
Spencer, Lord, death of, i. 207
Spencer, Lord (see Althorp, Lord), on the Peel Ministry, i. 217; supports Lord John's views on finality in Reform, 290; on the ballot, 296; sympathy with Lord John on the death

STE

of his wife, 312 *n*; on the prospects of war with France in 1840, 347; 353; forecast on the ministerial outlook, 372; declares protection unnecessary and reciprocity a fallacy, 394; death of, 403; Lord John's article on him in the 'Edinburgh,' 404
Spencer, William, his poem on the 'Year 1806,' i. 123
Spring Rice, Mr. (afterwards Lord Monteagle), suggested for the Speakership, i. 215; on the motion for limiting supplies, 225; introduces the Church Rate Bill, 278, 281; Sydney Smith's satire on him, 304; desires the Speakership, 322; made Controller of the Exchequer, 335; weakness in dealing with revenue deficits, 365
Stanhope (at Dr. Moore's school), i. 4 *n*
Stanhope, Captain James H., i. 53 *n*
Stanhope, Lady Anna Maria (afterwards Lady Tavistock and Duchess of Bedford), i. 26; letter from Lord John on rook-shooting, 35; marriage, 36; death of, ii. 278
Stanhope, Lord, ii. 281, 436
Stanhope, Major, i. 240, 241 *n*
Stanley, Dean, ii. 117; quoted, 465
Stanley, Rt. Hon. E. (afterwards Lord Derby), in favour of a Central Association for procuring religious liberty, i. 147; member for Lancashire and Chief Secretary for Ireland, 168, 183; measure for Church Reform in Ireland, 187–193; Irish legislation, 198; of opinion that 'Johnny had upset the coach,' 199; resignation of, 200, 204; O'Connell's attack on him, 243 *n*; Lord John's defence, 244 *n*; on the Orange question, 265; warm friendship with Lord John, 244 *n*, 305 *n*; opposes the latter's educational schemes, 330; action on Irish registration, 365 *n*; his measure, in the Lords, for compensating Irish tenants, 400; motion censuring Lord John's Government for its interference in the Portuguese revolt, ii. 12; his motion in the Greek dispute, 61, 62; declines to form a ministry, 124, 128
Stanley of Alderley, Lord, Secretary of the Treasury, i. 282
Stanley, Lord (afterwards Earl of Derby), Foreign Minister, ii. 360
Stephen, Sir James (Under-Secretary of the Colonies), i. 337

Stephenson, Mr., his tubular bridge across the Conway, 74
Stewart, Admiral Houston, ii. 152
Stewart, Dugald, i. 44, 45, 57; ii. 20 *n*
Stirling, freedom of, conferred on Lord John, ii. 158 *n*
Stockmar, Baron, quoted, ii. 42 *n*; on Lord Palmerston's dismissal from the Foreign Office, 142
Stowe, Mrs. Beecher, and 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' ii. 339
Strafford, Lord (created Earl), i. 457; ii. 203
Strutt, Mr., ii. 221, 222
Stuart Wortley, Mr., his proposal to limit the franchise, i. 125
Suffrage, Bill for the extension of the, ii. 124–127
Sugar duties, i. 368, 370–372, 398, 430
Sumner, Dr. (Bishop of Chester), i. 478 *n*; made Archbishop of Canterbury, 480; ii. 116
Sumner, Mr. (American senator), ii. 360
Sumner, Mr., i. 29
Sunbury, Dr. Moore's school at, i. 4
Sussex, Duke of, i. 387 *n*
Sutton, Sir C. Manners (Speaker), i. 214, 216
Sweden, proposal to subsidise, for the Russian war, ii. 216, 218
Sydenham, Lord, quoted, i. 370; death of, 382
Syria, the revolt in, i. 350

Tadcaster, Lord, i. 458
Tahiti, the affair of, ii. 13
Tait, Dr., made Dean of Carlisle, ii. 117
Talavera, battle of, i. 51; field of, 68
Talents Administration, formation of the, i. 17; cause of its fall, 28
Talfourd, Justice, ii. 147
Talleyrand, quoted, i. 9
Tamworth manifesto, the, i. 211
Tankerville, Lady, i. 156
Tankerville, Lord, i. 156
Tavistock, borough of, in 1716, i. 70; 108
Tavistock, Lord (eldest son of the fourth Duke of Bedford), death of, i. 2
Taylor, Sir Herbert, private secretary to William IV., letters, &c. quoted, i. 209, 240, 241, 247 *n*, 251, 274, 281, 337
Tavistock, Lord (Francis, seventh Duke of Bedford), at school, i. 2, 5, 7; letter on fagging, 9; opinion of Pitt's policy, 12 *n*; at school at Woodnesboro', 13; betting with Lord John, 14; 18; coaches Lord John in riding, 19; in the chair at the Woburn sheep-shearing festival, 22; in Ireland, 23, 24; at Cambridge University, 26; marriage to Lady A. M. Stanhope, 36; member for Bedfordshire, 70; 108; offers Moore pecuniary help, 112; supports the Canning Ministry of 1827, 134; suggests Lord Althorp as leader of the House, 153 *n*; letters on Lord John's acceptance of office, 159, 160; approves of his brother's declaration on the Irish Church, 200 *n*; on Lord John's proposed nomination as leader of the House, 208; congratulates Lord John on his marriage, 230 *n*; approves of his attitude on the Reform question, 290; letter to Lord John on the Irish crisis, 315; and on his popularity as a leader, 318; President of the British and Foreign School Society, 329 *n*; letter from Lord Spencer on the Egyptian difficulty, 347; letters of congratulation to Lord John, 364, 371; gives Lord Melbourne's views on dissolution, 373; is angry with Peel, 375 *n*; assured by Lord John that he will adhere to a moderate course, 377; places Endsleigh at Lord John's disposal, 378 *n*; congratulates his brother on his speech on religious equality, 397; complaint made to him of Lord John's support of the Ten Hours clause, 399; against Lord John's formation of a Ministry, 411; death of his brother William, 432 tells Mr. Greville that 'the Queen and Prince Albert have got on vastly good terms with Lord John,' 434; on Lord John's speech on the income-tax, ii. 27; congratulates him on the safe issue of the Chartist procession, 69; reference to his escapes from assassination, 74 *n*; on Lord John's acceptance of a peerage, 100; medium of interchange of views between Lord John and Sir Robert Peel on Horace's Odes, 108; conversation with Palmerston on the position of the Whigs, 157; questions Lord John, by the Queen's desire, as to the course to be taken on the resignation of the Ministry, 160; letters to and from Lord Aberdeen

TEM

on the understanding on which Lord John accepted office in the Aberdeen Ministry, 164 *n*; communication from Lord Strafford, 203; settles an annuity on Lord John, 282; persuades him to answer an attack made by Mr. Disraeli on the framers of the great Reform Act, 296; death of, 336
Temple, Sir W. (Lord Palmerston's brother), ii. 52
Ten Hours Bill, the, i. 455
Tennyson, Mr., member for Blechingley, i. 144; his Bill to shorten the duration of Parliaments, 193, 194
Tennyson, Mr., created poet-laureate, ii. 145; 450
Test Act, the, i. 140
Thiers, M., i. 358; threatens Austria with war if she is not moderate in her demands on Italy, ii. 50 *n*; quoted, 319
Thomson, Colonel, i. 305 *n*
Thomson, Poulett, i. 215 *n*, 335, 358, 367
Thornton, Mr., i. 1
Thornton, Sir Edward, ii. 361
Thouvenel, M. (French Foreign Minister), ii. 315-318, 324
Tierney, Mr., i. 26, 108, 110, 111, 128, 134, 154
Tilsit, Treaty of, i. 36
Timber, duties on, i. 368; ii. 79
'Times,' the, attack of, on the Russell administration for permitting the Sicilian insurgents to be supplied with arms, ii. 51; accuses Lord John of jobbery, 423 *n*
Tithes Bill, i. 184, 201, 227, 257, 260, 266, 272, 300
Tithe war in Ireland, i. 184
Todd, Captain, i. 52 *n*
Torrens, Mr., i. 284 *n*
Torres Vedras, lines of, i. 53
Towns, Bill for promoting the health of, ii. 93
Tractarianism, ii. 116
Trant, General, i. 61
Treaty of Vienna, ii. 8
'Trent,' the, ii. 345
Trevelyan, Sir George, his Life of Lord Macaulay, ii. 91; 273
Tufnell, Mr., i. 400 *n*
Turgot, M., ii. 140
Turkey, its struggle with Greece, i. 151; with Russia, 151; war of, with Egypt, 346; refuses to give up fugitive Hungarians, ii. 54; 134, 135; maladministration of government in, 178

VIC

UNITED STATES, warlike feeling in the, towards England, i. 421; ii. 14

VAILLANT, MARSHAL, ii. 236; his answer to the French Emperor regarding the probable evacuation of the Crimea, 264
Van Diemen's Land, ii. 104
Vansittart, Mr., i. 109
Vattel, quoted, ii. 329
Vaughan, Dr. (head-master of Harrow School), ii. 279
Vernon, Dr. (Archbishop of York), death of, i. 475
Vernon, Mr., quoted, ii. 210
Victor Emanuel, King of Sardinia, projected marriage of his daughter with Prince Napoleon, ii. 301; seeks Lord John's advice, 313; is saluted as King of Italy by Garibaldi, 325; enters Venice, 422
Victoria, Queen, accession of, i. 281; cordial in her support of Lord Melbourne's ministry, 301; grief at its resignation, 320; opposes Sir Robert Peel's demand for the removal of the ladies of her household, 320; desire for the religious education of youth, 329; marriage with Prince Albert, 341; anxiety on the subject of war with France, 353; letter to Lord John on the resignation of the Melbourne Ministry, 381; summons Lord John to undertake the formation of a government on the resignation of Sir Robert Peel, 411; letter from Lord John announcing his failure to form an administration, 417; recalls Sir Robert Peel, 420; presents Lord John with Pembroke Lodge, Richmond, 449; wishes to intervene in the revolt in Portugal, ii. 9; her anxiety as to Palmerston's foreign policy, 43; her attitude in the Austro-Italian conflict, 46; on the selection of an envoy at the Conference on Italian affairs, 47; long consultation on foreign affairs with Lord John, 49; increased alarm and dissatisfaction with Palmerston's Austro-Italian policy, 52; directs that all despatches submitted for her approval should pass through the hands of Lord John, 53; her similar request on a previous occasion, 54 *n*; her displeasure with Lord Palmerston for his unaltered despatch to Mr. Wyse, 57; thinks Palmerston both

VIC

wrong in matter and manner in his conduct of the Greek dispute, 60; carries her complaints to the Irish Viceroy, 62; her memorandum on the relations between a Foreign Minister and his sovereign, 63; her visit to Ireland, 85; prorogues Parliament in person, 101; requests the aid of Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham in helping Lord John to reconstruct his ministry, 124; on their failure requests Lord John to form a ministry, 128; disapproves of the policy of Lord Palmerston in the Schleswig-Holstein question, 132; annoyance on the demi-official announcement that Palmerston intended to receive Kossuth, 133; and further at his reception of addresses disrespectful to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, 136; desires that the correspondence on this subject be brought before the Cabinet, 137; their decision, 137; advice to her ministers on the Coup d'état, 138; demands Lord Palmerston's dismissal from the Foreign Office, 142; sends for Lords Lansdowne and Aberdeen to form a ministry, 160; letter to Lord John on her selection of Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister, 161; annoyance at the accusations made of Prince Albert's unconstitutional interference in foreign and domestic affairs, 203; gratitude to Lord John for his able defence of the Prince, 203; is 'particularly pleased' with Lord John's speech in defence of his postponement of a Reform Bill, 205; and warmly approves of his conduct, 208; communicates to both Houses the declaration of war with Russia, 214; letter from and to Lord John on Mr. Disraeli's attack on the Aberdeen ministry, 225; receives with concern Lord John's resignation, 237; sends for Lord Derby to form a government, 241; applies to Lord Lansdowne for the same purpose, 241; interview with Lord John, 241; places herself in Lord Palmerston's hands, 241; is said to be opposed to dissolution, 287; her language regarding the Italian question at the beginning of 1859, 301; decides the question of supremacy between Lord Palmerston and Lord John by asking both to serve under Lord Granville, 306; sends for Palmerston, 308; expresses her dislike of the language

WAL

used by Ministers regarding the Italian question, 312; appeals to the whole Cabinet, 312; her alarm at the action of her Ministers, 315; issues proclamation enjoining neutrality in the coming strife between the Northern and Southern States of America, 342; death of the Prince Consort, 347; receives invitation from the Emperor Napoleon to attend a Congress of the sovereigns of Europe, 382; her answer, 382; disapproves of the action of Palmerston and Russell in their proposed despatch to Austria, regarding action of the fleet, 392; letter to Lord Russell on the death of Lord Palmerston, 407; receives with regret the decision of Lord John's Cabinet to resign, 413; correspondence with Lord Russell on the crisis, 414, 415; reluctantly consents to receive the resignation of the Cabinet, 417; sends for Mr. Gladstone to form an administration, 434

Vienna, revolution in, 38; bombarded by Jellachich, 49

Vienna Conference, ii. 241; the four points of the protocol of the Western powers, 248

Vienna Note, the, ii. 183-185, 188, 194

Villafranca, meeting of French and Austrian Emperors at, ii. 310; proposed Treaty of, 310

Villiers, Lady Emily, ii. 433

Villiers, Lady Victoria, Landseer's sketch of, ii. 113, 280, 347 *n*, 424; see also Russell, Victoria

Villiers, Rt. Hon. Charles, i. 370, 426 *n*, 440; resolutions on the Act of 1846, ii. 159, 399

Vitzthum, Count, his description of Lord John Russell's despatch on Italian affairs, ii. 327; quoted, 374 *n*

Vivian, Sir Hussey, i. 331 *n*

Vyvyan, Sir Richard, i. 173

WAKEFIELD theory of colonisation, i. 368

Walcheren expedition, the, i. 48

Waldegrave, Lord, i. 72

Waldemar, institution of, ii. 372

Wales, Prince of, ii. 350 *n*

Walewski, M., i. 351; personally assured by Palmerston of his approval of the Coup d'état, ii. 138; 140, 142, 261; desires the English Government to strengthen the conspiracy laws, 295; 313, 315

Walker, Admiral, i. 362 *n*
Walpole, Captain John (fourth son of second Earl of Orford), i. 53
Walpole, Sir Robert, i. 127 *n*, 160
Warburton, Mr., i. 219, 223; letter from O'Connell, 273
Warburton, Mrs., i. 402; delicate health of, ii. 131
Warburton, Rev. Mr., marriage with Isabel Lester, ii. 174
Ward, Mr. (master at Westminster School), i. 6
Ward, Mr., motion for reducing the temporal possessions of the Irish Church, i. 200; author of 'Appropriation,' 203; resolution on the Church in Ireland, 226; letter to Lord John, 367
Watson, Dr. (Bishop of Llandaff), i. 30, 79
Watts, Alaric, i. 149
Watts, Mr. (editor of the 'Souvenir'), i. 392
Wellesley, H. (afterwards Lord Cowley), i. 52; see Cowley, Lord
Wellesley, J., memorandum of, ii. 31, 32; his inclosures to the Duke of Wellington on the Lamartine correspondence, 33, 35
Wellesley, Lord, i. 197, 229
Wellesley, Sir Arthur (Duke of Wellington), in the Peninsula, i. 37, 38; in the lines of Torres Vedras, 53; enters Madrid, 59; retreat from before Burgos, 63; at Cadiz, 64; in command of the army of occupation in France, 93; retires from the Cabinet in 1827, 133; forms a Ministry, 138; 139, 145, 146; anger of the Tories with, 148; forwards Catholic emancipation, 148, 153; ideas on Reform, 157; resignation of, 158; windows of his house broken by the mob, 172; pledged to Reform in the representation of the people, 177; fails to form a ministry on Lord Grey's resignation, 177; recommends Sir Robert Peel as Prime Minister, 211; dramatic satire on him by Lord John, 212; dealing with the Corporation Bill, 245; advises postponement of the Irish Municipal Bill, 279; advice on the crisis with France in 1840, 346; influence in the Lords, 427; ii. 12; demands fresh defences for England, 13; refers to the critical nature of England's relations with the United States, 14; points out the vulnerability of the English coast, 14; his letter to Sir John Burgoyne on invasion, 18; letters from and to Lord John on retrenchment in army expenditure, 29, 30; correspondence with Lamartine, 31, 32, 34; letter to Lord John on the Chartist procession, 68; refuses to believe in the misconduct of the troops in the Irish rebellion, 73; 128, 158 *n*; his moral qualities cited for imitation, 161, 162
Wensleydale, Lord, ii. 437
Wessenberg, ii. 49
West, Master (boy actor), i. 8
Western, Lord, letter to Lord John, i. 261; quoted, 367
Westminster, Duke of, on Lord John's creation of peers, i. 457
Westminster School, management of, in 1803, i. 6; fagging at, 9
Westmoreland, Lord, i. 133; endeavours to secure a pacific solution of the Montenegrin difficulty, ii. 177; 185, 189; British ambassador at Vienna, 213; his letter to Lord John on the new proposals regarding the Black Sea, 260
Weymouth, Lady, i. 2, 27
Wheat, price of, at the end of 1816, i. 87
Whitbread, Mr., i. 5, 17, 108, 155 *n*
Whitbread, Mrs., i. 5
White, Mr. (Consul-General at Warsaw), ii. 368
Whitmore, Mr. (Lady Lucy Bridgeman's husband), i. 74
Wiffen, Mr. (librarian), i. 149
Wilberforce, Mr., i. 121
William IV. disapproves of Lord John's letter to the Birmingham meeting, i. 173 *n*; his private influence exercised to pass third Reform Bill, 178; opposes the appointment of Lord John as the leader of the House, 208; sends for the Duke of Wellington, 208; advised to select Sir Robert Peel, 211; his action in dismissing the Whig ministry canvassed, 217; wishes to have Lord Grey as Prime Minister, 232; antagonism to the members of the Melbourne administration, 239; delighted with Lord John's defeat in Devonshire, 239; language to ministers in the Council chamber, 240; personal dislike to Lord John overcome, 241; disapproves of the Corporation Bill, 243; deprecates collision with the House of Lords, 245; attitude on the Church Temporalities Bill, 246; opposes the Irish Municipal Bill,

WIL

247; alarm at O'Connell's invitation to dinner by the Viceroy, 248; approves of Lord John's Bristol address, 251; objects to Lord Brougham's appointment to any office, 252; reluctantly consents to abolish Orange lodges in the army, 264; highly approves of Lord John's amendment to Mr. Hume's motion on Orangeism, 265; dislike of Lord Glenelg, 240 *n*; 268; uneasiness at the proceedings of the General Association, 274; on Irish legislation, 274; excuse for not opening Parliament in person, 275; death of, 281

William, Prince of Orange, ii. 326

Wilmot, Sir E., motion on juvenile criminals, i. 342

Wilson, Professor, pension to, ii. 146

Wilson, Sir Robert, i. 121 *n*; 135

Wiseman, Dr., made Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, ii. 119; pastoral letter of, 125

Wodehouse, Lord (afterwards Lord Kimberley), ii. 184, 386

Wood, Lady M., ii. 69

Wood, Sir Charles, resignation of, i. 336, 337; letters to Lord John, 419, 427; on the potato famine, 435; quoted, on the Spanish marriages, ii. 4; 16, 17 *n*; abandons the income-tax, 25; his views on Irish legislation, 65; opposed to expenditure on Ireland, 78; agrees to the Canadian loan, 79; his small influence in debate, 90; attitude on Reform,

ZET

102; defeated on the Budget, 105; Budget of 1851, 122; financial measures of, 125; on the disfranchising clause of Lord John's Reform Bill, 130; 150 *n*; 201; letter to Lord John, 208; endeavours to dissuade the latter from breaking up the Government of Lord Aberdeen, 231 *n*; quoted, 243; 408

Wood, Mr. Page (afterwards Lord Hatherley), ii. 196

Woodnesboro' School, discipline at, i. 13

Wordsworth, William, and the Lord Rectorship of Glasgow, ii. 145

Wrangel, Marshal, enters Schleswig, ii. 389

Wynn, Rt. Hon. Charles, i. 119

Wyse, Mr. (British Minister at Athens), his negotiations in the Greek imbroglio with England, ii. 56–59; deprecates the idea of asking Austria to put down the Greek insurrection, 218

YEATES, Dr., i. 25

York, Duke of, i. 49; his speech against Catholic emancipation, 140; ii. 108 *n*

Young, Mrs. (actress), i. 8

ZETLAND, Lord, and his pocket borough of Richmond, ii. 91

THE END

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